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Abstract (How	to	develop	suppliers	within	an	Extended	Enterprise	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise)	
Complex	supply	chains	span	the	world	connecting	a	heterogeneous	network	of	 firms.	Digitisation	
offers	 them	 the	 opportunity	 to	 improve	 by	 leveraging,	 for	 example:	 leaner	 interfirm	workflows,	
swifter	 data	 sharing,	 smarter	 analytics	 and	 knowledge	 management,	 greater	 automation,	 and	
empowered	 decision-making.	 However,	 an	 onerous	 organisational	 development	 and	 change	
programme	is	required	to	adopt	such	innovations	and	move	towards	a	digital	enterprise.	
	
Research	into	organisational	change	tends	to	be	set	within	the	confines	of	a	single	firm.	Occasionally,	
it	includes	clusters	of	collaborating	firms,	but	rarely	does	it	cover	the	whole	of	an	extended	enterprise	
supply	 network.	 An	 exception	 is	 the	 supplier	 development	 process;	 yet,	 studies	 into	 its	 use	 for	
digitisation	are	very	shallow.	Moreover,	research	into	the	adoption	and	diffusion	of	enterprise-wide	
digital	technologies	has,	to	date,	mostly	had	to	consider	them	as	piecemeal	appendages.	Suppliers	
will	have	choice	and	may	be	supportive,	ambivalent,	or	outright	hostile	to	the	extent	or	pace	of	digital	
transformation.	 They	 may	 adopt	 different	 strategies	 in	 response	 to	 the	 investment,	 capability	
development,	open	access,	and	other	such	demands	placed	upon	them	by	the	focal	firm.	This	3-year	
longitudinal	research	programme	studies	Rolls-Royce	and	a	tiered	cross-section	of	24	of	its	suppliers,	
in	the	aerospace	sector,	as	they	confront	and	embark	upon	the	journey	towards	a	digital	enterprise.		
	
Literature	is	synthesised	to	create	a	9	step	process,	with	28	implementation	guidelines,	which	is	given	
the	descriptive	title	of	supplier	development	for	digital	transformation	(SD/DT).	The	SD/DT	process	
begins	with	a	strategic	review	and	ends	by	embedding	practices	into	routine	business.	The	guidelines	
are	 used	 to	 initiate	 action	 research	 cycles	 which	 coalesce	 around	 21	workshops	 held	 at	 various	
international	locations.	A	theoretical	framework	is	established	using	a	combination	of	institutional	
and	 organisational	 learning	 theories.	 Close	 to	 100	 interviews	 are	 conducted	 with	 buyers	 and	
suppliers.	Furthermore,	supplier	scorecards	capture	quantitative	data	on	a	quarterly	basis	across	the	
supply	base.	Data	is	triangulated	between	supplier	outcomes	and	their	relative	absorptive	capacity.	
	
Digital	minimum	 standards	 are	 created	which	 provide	 a	 shared	 vision,	 common	 vocabulary,	 and	
framework	for	heterogeneous	change	management.	Two	interim	waypoints	are	set	on	the	journey	
towards	a	digital	enterprise	and	progress	is	measured	for	the	24	suppliers	in	the	cohort.	Overall,	an	
encouraging	 success	 rate	 is	 achieved.	 Also,	 the	 use	 of	 supplier	 scorecards	 to	 operationalise	 and	
measure	relative	absorptive	capacity	shows	promise.	There	are	only	3	suppliers	for	whom	the	results	
do	not	triangulate.	Transferability	is	explored	together	with	recommendations	for	further	work.	
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	“Strive	for	perfection	in	everything.	Take	the	best	that	exists	and	make	it	better.	If	it	doesn't	exist,	
create	it.	Accept	nothing	nearly	right	or	good	enough.”	
Henry Royce 
	
	
“He	who	loves	practice	without	theory	is	like	the	sailor	who	boards	ship	without	a	rudder	and	compass	
and	never	knows	where	he	may	cast.”	
Leonardo da Vinci 
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“The	first	rule	of	any	technology	used	in	business	is	that	automation	applied	to	an	efficient	operation	
will	magnify	the	efficiency.	The	second	rule	is	that	automation	applied	to	an	inefficient	operation	will	
magnify	the	inefficiency.”	
Bill Gates 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Setting the scene 
 
 
 
 
	 	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 2 - 
1.1 A fascinating subject to research with aspects of wickedness 
My	research	explores	organisational	change	where	the	desired	future	state	is	a	Digital	Enterprise	and	
the	framework	for	change	is	supplier	development.	Henning	(1998)	introduces	the	concept	of	“The	
Digital	Enterprise”	in	her	book,	so	titled,	where	she	reflects	upon	the	combined	forces	of	digitisation,	
globalisation,	and	de-regulation.	She	argues:		
	
“Communication	 and	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 business	 process	
whether	we	are	designing	products,	negotiating	deals,	trading	goods,	promoting	services	or	
processing	purchases:	they	constitute	its	very	building	blocks.	Consequentially	digitisation	will	
affect	all	businesses	and	all	sectors	of	the	economy.	Automating	each	and	every	one	of	these	
dialogues	and	business	transactions	instantly	shrinks	distance	and	accelerates	the	pace	of	the	
business	world.	But	it	also	does	more	than	this.	It	introduces	different	economies	and	opens	
up	new	innovative	space.	Furthermore,	it	creates	new	possibilities	for	alliances,	opens	up	new	
markets,	forces	a	re-assessment	of	organisational	structure	and,	indeed,	invites	a	re-appraisal	
of	what	constitutes	a	company’s	core	competencies.	Thus,	technological	change	will	alter	not	
only	the	way	we	do	business,	but	also	the	way	we	think	about	it.”	
	
A	popular	business	process	change	model	from	the	same	era,	shown	in	Figure	1.1,	captures	many	of	
the	important	factors	and	considerations	involved.	
	
	
 
Figure 1.1: Business process change model 
(Kettinger	et	al,	1997)	
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There	have	been	many	advances	over	the	two	decades	since	these	articles	were	published;	however,	
the	Digital	Enterprise	is	yet	to	become	a	practical	reality.	For	the	aerospace	industry	alone,	a	$190bn	
cumulative	 impact	 is	 estimated	 (World	 Economic	 Forum,	 2017).	 To	 date,	 interfirm	 adoption	 and	
diffusion	of	enterprise-wide	systems	and	tools	has	typically	only	been	possible	as	a	piecemeal	digital	
appendage.	 I	shall	review	a	sample	of	them	in	chapter	2:	Electronic	Data	 Interchange	(Pawar	and	
Driva,	 2000);	 Product	 Data	Management	 (Waterson	 et	 al,	 2001);	 Digital	Mock-Up	 (McBeth	 et	 al,	
2006);	and	Product	Lifecycle	Management	(Bokinge	and	Malmqvist,	2012).	Now,	with	an	expansion	
in	the	capability	of	the	tools	and	the	digital	appetite	of	their	user	base,	scholars	have	identified	a	
need	for	co-evolution	and	stronger	alignment	across	the	entire	enterprise	suite	(Laframboise	and	
Reyes,	 2007;	 Oman	 et	 al,	 2017).	 With	 this,	 it	 becomes	 necessary	 to	 adapt	 the	 approach	 to	
organisational	change	(Kohnke,	2017).	
	
Research	into	organisational	change	tends	to	be	set	within	the	confines	of	a	single	firm.	Occasionally,	
it	includes	clusters	of	collaborating	firms,	but	rarely	does	it	cover	the	whole	of	an	extended	enterprise	
supply	network.	Here,	in	one	of	the	seminal	articles,	Chisholm	(1998)	lists	a	series	of	complexities	
which	 include	 “organisational	 boundaries,	 budget	 and	 control	 systems,	 and	 pre-conceived	
perceptions	 and	 attitudes	 about	 other	 organisations”.	 Complex	 supply	 chains	 span	 the	 world	
connecting	 a	 heterogeneous	 network	 of	 firms.	 Digitisation	 offers	 them	 the	 potential	 to	 improve	
efficiency	 and	 effectiveness;	 however,	 at	 present,	 adoption	 and	 diffusion	 of	 the	 constituent	
technologies	is	low	(Andrews	et	al,	2018;	Ezell	et	al,	2018;	Harris,	2018	and	2019;	Guyon	et	al,2019).	
Digital	maturity	varies	significantly,	for	example:	hardware	and	legacy	(brownfield)	issues,	software	
and	interoperability,	staff	and	training.	Moving	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise	could	be	very	onerous.		
	
Rittel	 and	Webber	 (1973)	 introduce	 the	 term	"wicked	problem"	and	Camillus	 (2008)	applies	 it	 to	
business	 enterprises.	 Leaders	 can	 be	 confronted	 with	 strategic	 issues	 which	 cannot	 be	 resolved	
merely	 by,	 say,	 gathering	more	 data	 or	 breaking	 the	 problem	down	 into	 smaller	 pieces.	 In	 their	
research	into	large	complex	systems	and	organisational	change,	Waddock	et	al	(2015)	bring	together	
wicked	problem	and	complexity	theories	to	identify	key	characteristics	and	intersections.	Figure	1.2	
uses	 these	 to	 position	 my	 own	 research.	 Those	 which	 most	 contribute	 to	 its	 wickedness	 and	
complexity	 are:	 interrelated	 problems,	 systems,	 and	 institutions;	 and	 multiple	 stakeholder	
interactions.	Furthermore,	the	problem	boundary	is	permeable	and	the	outcome	is	enigmatic.	
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Key 
characteristic 
(Waddock	et	al,	2015)	
Is	my	
circumstance	
wicked	and	
complex?	
Description of my research 
Problem 
definition and 
boundaries 
Partial	
The	extended	enterprise	comprises	of	multiple	firms,	and	the	
supply	chain	is	fractal,	so	the	organisational	boundaries	cannot	
be	 readily	 determined.	 Also,	most	 suppliers	 have	more	 than	
one	 customer	 and,	 therefore,	 reside	 in	 multiple	 (often	
competing)	 enterprises.	 Furthermore,	 new	 product	
introduction	and	changing	buyer/supplier	relationships	create	
permeability	 in	 the	 boundary	 of	 the	 extended	 enterprise.	
Digital	technology	can	be	emergent	and	disruptive.		
Interrelated 
problems, 
systems, and 
institutions 
YES	
An	 integrated,	 multi-disciplinary,	 and	 holistic	 roadmap	 is	
desired	 across	 the	 extended	 enterprise.	 Digital	 technologies	
are	at	various	levels	of	readiness	for	deployment	and	change	is	
often	needed	in	unison.	However,	the	required	investment	and	
business	 case	 varies	 across	 the	 constituent	 firms.	 Also,	 new	
operating	practices	and	business	models	are	emerging	from	the	
digital	 technologies.	 These	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 impact	 the	
power	regimes	and	working	relationships	between	the	people	
and	the	firms	in	the	extended	enterprise.		
Dynamics NO	
The	barriers	 to	entry	 remain	 relatively	high	 in	 the	aerospace	
industry	 and	 the	 pace	 of	 change	 is	 relatively	 slow.	 Although	
digital	technologies	have	the	potential	to	be	disruptive,	cause-
effect	relationships	can	be	determined	and	examined.	
Resolution and 
outcomes 
Partial	
The	different	firms	in	the	extended	enterprise	bring	their	own	
different	 perspectives	 to	 what	 constitutes	 a	 successful	
outcome.	Furthermore,	the	digital	technologies	are	themselves	
somewhat	 enigmatic.	 However,	 whilst	 there	 is	 no	 “stopping	
rule”	to	determine	when	the	problem	has	been	fully	resolved,	
there	are	established	metrics	for	the	operational	performance	
and	business	growth	of	the	firms	and	the	extended	enterprise.		
Predictability 
and patterning 
NO	
The	impact	of	digital	technologies	on	the	extended	enterprise	
does	 not	 create	 a	 chaotic	 system.	 New	 patterns	 need	 to	 be	
established,	but	more	through	coaching	and	peer	pressure	than	
through	such	mechanisms	as	“strange	attractors”.	
Multiple 
stakeholder 
interactions 
YES	
The	different	stakeholders	 in	the	extended	enterprise	do	not	
always	(fully)	agree	on	what	 is	proposed	or	acted	upon,	how	
change	should	be	approached,	or	even	what	the	appropriate	
goals	for	change	might	be.	However,	at	the	same	time,	bringing	
them	 together	 is	 crucial	 to	 reaching	 a	 successful	 enterprise-
wide	solution.	Therefore,	there	is	a	dichotomy.	
Path 
dependency NO	
Interventions	 typically	 have	 reversible	 consequences	 and	 it	
should	be	possible	to	take	a	trial-and-error	approach.	
	
Figure 1.2: Key characteristics of my research problem 
(list	of	key	characteristics	and	their	criteria	obtained	from:	Waddock	et	al,	2015)	
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1.2 Definition of key terms 
Definitions	of	the	key	terms	used	in	the	three	clauses	which	construct	my	research	title	are	as	follows:	
	
1.2.1 How to develop suppliers 
Supplier	 development	 (SD)	 is	 a	well-established	 field	 of	 research.	Many	 scholars	 trace	 it	 back	 to	
Leenders	(1966)	who	conducted	a	case	study	on	a	Canadian	manufacturer.	Subsequently,	according	
to	Wagner	(2006),	the	“first	wave”	of	research	began	in	the	late	1980’s	with	a	focus	upon	quality	
management.	This	was	followed	by	a	“second	wave”	in	the	mid-1990’s	as	researchers	looked	closer	
at	business	relationship	issues.	More	recently,	literature	reviews	point	to	purposes	ranging	from	the	
service	economy	to	environmental	sustainability	(Ahmed	and	Hendry,	2012;	Glock	et	al,	2017).	There	
is	also	a	strong	heritage	in	new	product	development	and	enhancing	technological	capabilities	(e.g.	
Lawson	et	al,	2014;	Krause	et	al,	2007;	Modi	and	Mabert,	2006;	Reed	and	Walsh,	2002).		
	
Scholars	 broadly	 agree	 upon	 the	 underlying	 definition	 and	 key	 principles	 of	 SD.	 The	 definition	
provided	below	was	synthesised	by	Ahmed	and	Hendry	(2012):	
	
“Any	effort	of	a	buying	firm	working	with	its	supplier(s)	to	increase	the	performance	and/or	
capabilities	of	the	supplier	and	meet	the	buying	firm's	short-	and/or	long-term	supply	needs.	
Moreover,	 promotes	 on-going	 improvements	 that	 are	 intended	 to	 benefit	 both	 buyer	 and	
supplier(s).”	
	
Thus,	 SD	 can	 be	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 context,	 processes,	 and	 desired	 outcomes.	 Using	 the	
framework	of	business	relationships	from	Child	(2001),	SD	is	typically	performed	in	circumstances	
where	 cooperation	 between	 firms	 is	 managed	 through	 formalised	 contractual	 provisions	 and	
improved	 transactional	 reach	 is	 required.	 As	 is	 the	 case	 for	 my	 research,	 SD	 may	 sit	 within	 an	
overarching	framework	of	supplier	performance	and	relationship	management	(e.g.	Gordon,	2008).	
However,	many	scholars	have	tended	to	treat	it	as	a	process	in	its	own	right	and	there	has	been	a	
propensity	for	weak	theoretical	substantiation	(Sucky	and	Durst,	2013).		Nevertheless,	outcomes	are	
consistent	with	supply	chain	learning	(Bessant,	2004)	and	may	be	categorised	as	either	operational	
(i.e.	intended	to	lead	to	“incremental	improvements	to	existing	ways	of	working”)	or	strategic	(i.e.	
intended	to	lead	to	“fundamentally	different	ways	of	doing	things”).	My	research	is	concerned	with	
the	latter.	
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1.2.2 Within an Extended Enterprise 
Boyce	(2001)	reveals	in	his	book	on	communicating,	transferring	knowledge,	and	learning	across	the	
corporate	frontier	that	many	such	supply	chain	practices	can	be	traced	back	to	at	least	a	century	ago.	
However,	compared	to	a	traditional	supply	chain,	the	notion	of	an	Extended	Enterprise	conveys	even	
greater	 levels	 of	 collaboration	 and	 integration	 between	 firms.	 They	 are	 defined	 as	 follows	 in	
ISO44001	(2017):		
	
“Associated	entities	(customers,	employees,	suppliers,	distributors)	that	directly	and	formally	
or	informally,	collaborate	in	the	design,	development,	production	and	delivery	of	a	product	or	
service	to	the	end	user.	In	relation	to	the	network-orientated	relationships,	management	of	
Extended	Enterprises	is	based	on	a	focal	company	view.”	
	
The	focus	of	my	research	is	upon	a	focal	firm	(Rolls-Royce)	and	its	suppliers	in	the	aerospace	industry.	
These	firms	are	familiar	with	the	organisational	structure	and	operating	principles	of	an	Extended	
Enterprise.	Boardman	and	Clegg	(2001)	cite	a	call	from	the	Engineering	Director	of	the	focal	firm	in	
1996	to	strengthen	communication	and	cohesion,	both	vertically	and	horizontally.	At	the	time,	the	
researchers	 used	 the	 term	 “embryonic”	 to	 describe	 the	 firm’s	 status	 as	 an	 Extended	 Enterprise.	
Others,	from	research	performed	predominately	in	the	automotive	industry,	have	coined	the	term	
Extended	Enterprise	Supplier	Network	(Dyer,	2000)	and	define	it	as:		
	
“A	value	chain	in	which	the	key	players	have	created	a	set	of	collaborative	processes	that	allow	
them	to	achieve	virtual	integration	and	work	together	as	an	integrated	team.”	
	
As	a	measure	of	scale,	Rolls-Royce’s	enterprise	resource	planning	(ERP)	system	holds	over	50,000	live	
part	numbers	and	executes	in	the	order	of	10	billion	purchase	order	transactions	per	year.	There	are	
approaching	 1000	 direct	 suppliers.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 highly	 fractal.	 Taking	 a	 turbine	 blade,	 for	
example,	there	could	be	up	to	60	chemicals	required	during	the	manufacturing	process	–	each	with	
their	own,	supplementary,	supply	chains.	However,	across	the	aerospace	industry,	there	is	evidence	
to	suggest	that	the	level	of	integration	between	firms	reduces	with	hierarchical	depth	(Alfalla-Luque	
et	 al,	 2013).	 The	 structure	 of	 the	 industry	 is	 often	 described	 as	 being	 an	 “extended	 hierarchy”	
(Thompson	and	McHugh,	2009)	or	“tier	hierarchy”	(Gadde	et	al,	2010).	Customers	are	served	by	a	
relatively	 small	 number	 of	 focal	 firms.	 Contracted	 through	 them	 are	 the	 next	 tier	 of	 firms,	 and	
through	them	the	next	tier,	and	so	forth.	A	highly	simplified	schematic	of	this	is	shown	in	Figure	1.3.	
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Figure 1.3: Simplified schematic of the hierarchy across the aerospace industry 
	
	
Hierarchy	is	important	to	my	research.		Scholars,	such	as	Otto	and	Obermaier	(2009),	reveal	a	strong	
link	between	hierarchy	and	causal	power	in	supply	networks.	Also,	the	hierarchy	is	not	uniform.	There	
are	 other	 contextual	 factors.	 Gasson	 (2013)	 describes	 the	 need	 for	 “many	 different	 disciplinary,	
organisational,	and	political	interests	to	be	negotiated	and	multiple,	diverse,	ways	of	working	to	be	
reconciled”	in	the	design	of	boundary-spanning	systems.	For	illustrative	purposes,	using	Figure	1.3,	
consider	how	some	of	the	following	contextual	factors	could	impact	power	in	the	tier	hierarchy:		
	
a) Firms	are	geographically	and	culturally	dispersed	in	the	tier	hierarchy.	A	could	be	a	small	firm	
headquartered	in	Asia;	B	could	be	a	large	firm	headquartered	in	the	USA.	
	
b) Firms	have	different	skills,	 competences,	and	business	strategies	 in	 the	 tier	hierarchy.	E	 is	
shown	serving	a	broad	customer	base	with	their	technology;	F	has	a	much	narrower	focus.	
	
c) Firms	respond	differently	to	circumstances	which	change	over	time.	D’s	technology	maybe	a	
basic	commodity	giving	them	little	power;	C’s	could	be	a	novel	innovation	giving	them	more	
power;	but	the	tier-2	is	intervening	to	consolidate	orders	and	attempting	to	leverage	volume.	
  
Tier	1:	Customers
(Airlines,	Airframers,	and
Financial	Establishments)
Tier	2:	Engines
(Rolls-Royce,	etc)
Tier	3:	Design/Make
(Integrators	and/or
major	assemblies)
Tier	4:	Make-to-Print
(Machine	shops	and
fabricators)
Tier	5:	Distributors
(Standard	parts,
Fasteners,	etc)
Tier	6:	Condition	 of	Supply
(Castings,	forgings,	etc)
Tier	7:	Elementals
(Raw	materials,
chemicals,	etc)
Tier	8:	Special	Processes
(Heat	treatment,
coatings,	etc)
Rolls-Royce Competitors
Aerospace Other	Sectors
A
B
C
D
E
F
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1.2.3 Towards a Digital Enterprise 
The	term	“towards”	is	used	in	my	research	title	to	denote	that	the	target	destination	is	emergent	and	
progressive.	A	heterogeneous	network	of	firms	is	involved	and,	therefore,	careful	orchestration	will	
be	required	for	any	aspects	of	change	which	need	to	be	performed	in	unison.	Generically,	the	process	
of	change	is	often	referred	to	as	digital	transformation	(DT).	This	term	is	defined	by	a	professional	
body	representing	the	UK	aerospace	industry	(ATI,	2017)	as:	“The	accelerated	evolution	of	business	
activity	enabled	by	digital	capability	and	technology.”	
	
Digital	Enterprise	is	a	more	enigmatic	and	loosely	defined	term.	A	particularly	vivid	and	expansive	
definition	comes	from	the	World	Economic	Forum	(2016):	
	
“A	truly	Digital	Enterprise	stands	for	more	than	just	using	new	technologies	for	the	sake	of	it.	
Rather,	what	truly	distinguishes	and	gives	a	Digital	Enterprise	its	competitive	advantage	is	its	
culture,	strategy	and	way	of	operating.	Digital	Enterprises	strive	continuously	to	enable	new	
and	leaner	operating	models	underpinned	by	agile	business	processes,	connected	platforms,	
analytics	and	collaboration	capabilities	that	enhance	the	productivity	of	the	firm.”		
	
Although	rare,	a	few	scholars	have	used	the	term	“Digital	Extended	Enterprise”	to	bridge	between	an	
Extended	 Enterprise	 and	 a	 Digital	 Enterprise.	 Laframboise	 and	 Reyes	 (2007)	 examine	 the	 supply	
network	 of	 an	 aerospace	manufacturing	 firm	 and	 identify	 co-evolution	 of	 the	 suppliers	 and	 the	
enterprise	systems.	Various	features	of	supply	chain	management	became	more	integrated,	such	as:	
product	design,	manufacturing	resource	planning,	and	quality	management.	Pulkkinen	et	al	(2018,	
2019)	 develop	 a	 conceptual	 model	 for	 Digital	 Extended	 Enterprises	 which	 covers:	 strategy,	
organisation,	 processes,	 supply	 network	 structure,	 business	 indicators,	 change	 management,	
products	and	services,	information	technology,	data	flows	and	networks.	
	
Other	scholars	have	used	the	term	“Digital	Supply	Chain”	to	convey	the	purpose,	the	technology,	and	
the	relationships.	Buyukozkan	and	Gocer	(2018)	review	109	articles	on	the	subject	and	I	use	their	
analysis,	together	with	the	other	literature	above,	to	capture	the	essence	of	a	Digital	Enterprise	in	
Figure	1.4.	This	is	based	upon	a	framework	of	business	factors	(Davis	and	Spekman,	2004).	It	is	an	
emergent	 continuum.	 Spekman	 and	 Davis	 (2016),	 for	 example,	 	 review	 progress	 for	 Extended	
Enterprises	and	highlight	a	paucity	of	research	into	their	use	of	big	data	and	predictive	analytics.	 	
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Figure 1.4: Essence of a Digital Enterprise 
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1.3 Illustrative example of a Digital Enterprise 
Rolls-Royce	constructed	a	Digital	Enterprise	demonstrator	during	my	research.	The	initial	purpose	
was	to	show	how	securing	investment	could	unlock	the	digital	future.	However,	I	subsequently	used	
and	expanded	upon	it	to	share	the	vision	of	a	Digital	Enterprise	more	widely	and	to	bring	it	more	to	
life.	The	demonstrator	has	eleven	stations	and	a	photograph	of	some	of	them	is	shown	in	Figure	1.5.	
A	full	tour	typically	lasts	a	few	hours	and	can	be	performed	physically	or	virtually.	
	
	
Figure 1.5: Digital Enterprise demonstrator 
	
There	are	two	stations	which	are	overarching	enablers	for	the	Digital	Enterprise:	cyber-security	and	
data	analytics.	There	is	another	station	which	draws	out	and	specifically	focuses	upon	the	people	and	
cultural	aspects	of	the	Digital	Enterprise:	digital	you.	The	remaining	eight	stations	use	an	illustrative	
example	to	trace	the	business	thread	through	the	product	lifecycle:	starting	and	finishing	with	the	
customer.	 The	 demonstrator	 seeks	 to	 explore	 the	 value	 proposition	 with	 the	 audience	 and,	
therefore,	 has	 the	 customer	 at	 its	 core.	 Key	 to	 business	 growth	 and	 retention	 is	 high	 customer	
satisfaction	which	comes	from	delivering	superior	customer	value	(Weinstein,	2012).	This	is	what	is	
meant	by	the	term	“value-driven”	in	the	final	row	of	Figure	1.4.	The	illustrative	(fictitious)	example	
used	to	demonstrate	the	Digital	Enterprise	is	summarised	below:	
	
a) Excellent	customer	service:	The	 theme	of	 this	 station	 is	 “Imagine	 if	we	knew	more	about	our	
customers	 than	 they	 know	 about	 themselves”.	 The	 scenario	 starts	 with	 fleet	monitoring	 and	
identifying	a	potential	new	opportunity	to	delight	the	customer.	An	improvement	in	fuel	burn	is	
traced	to	a	batch	of	components	machined	to	one-side	of	the	tolerance	band.	This	is	identified	
through	‘big	data’	analytics	which	combines	service	and	production	data.	The	potential	viability	
is	confirmed	with	the	customer.	
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b) Automated	conceptual	design:	The	theme	of	this	station	is	“Imagine	if	we	could	rapidly	design	
and	 prove	 new	 products	 based	 on	 systems	 modelling	 before	 committing	 to	 customer	
requirements.”	The	key	takeaway	for	suppliers	is	that	they	can	have	confidence	that	downstream	
risks	are	analysed	and	reduced	by	Rolls-Royce	before	any	modification	programmes	get	launched.	
	
c) Accelerated	closed	loop	detailed	design:	The	theme	of	this	station	is	“Imagine	if	product	design	
encompassed	 everything	 we’ve	 learnt	 from	 all	 products	 across	 the	 design,	 manufacturing,	
assembly,	test,	and	service	value-streams,	and	from	external	best	practice”.	All	of	the	knowledge	
and	 information	comes	together	 in	one	place	for	the	design	engineer.	Workflows	are	digitally	
automated.	The	output	is	a	model-based	definition	(MBD)	in	a	paperless	3D	digital	format.		
	
d) Digital	manufacturing:	 The	 theme	of	 this	 station	 is	 “Imagine	 if	 integrated	systems,	 combined	
with	 IoT,	 led	 to	 digital	manufacturing	 insights	 and	where	our	 competitive	 advantage	 through	
right-first-time	manufacturing	delivered	on	time,	to	cost,	every	time”.	The	demonstrator	shows	
the	application	of	a	range	of	digital	capabilities.	The	consumption	of	the	MBD	is	fully	automated.	
The	scenario	passes	through	the	industrialisation	review	gates	and	enters	into	full	production.	
	
e) Supply	chain	excellence:	The	theme	of	this	station	is	“Imagine	if	our	supply	chain	were	confident	
in	our	demand	signal	and	we	were	confident	that	they	could	fulfil	it	on	time,	every	time,	to	the	
right	 standard”.	 The	 demonstrator	 shows	 the	 integration	 of	 eSourcing,	 enterprise	 resource	
planning,	and	contract	management	through	a	Supplier	Portal.	The	scenario	explores	the	bull-
whip	effect	and	how	inventory	levels	(i.e.	financial	cash	flow)	could	be	better	optimised.		
	
f) Flawless	 assembly:	 The	 theme	 of	 this	 station	 is	 “Imagine	 if	 we	 provided	 part	 and	 build	
information	 to	 the	 point	 of	 use	 to	 improve	 right-first-time	 assembly,	 automated	 or	 manual,	
removing	work	content,	lead-time,	and	cost”.		
	
g) Automated	test:	The	theme	of	this	station	is	“Imagine	if	we	could	certify	a	product	purely	based	
on	our	models	and	where	every	physical	test	was	passed	based	on	the	cumulative	digital	model	
of	actual	part	data”.		
	
h) Power	as	a	service:	The	theme	of	this	station	 is	“Imagine	 if	we	are	seen	as	service	pioneers	–	
differentiated	by	our	reputation	for	enabling	customers	to	always	meet	their	operational	goals,	
continuously	enhancing	customer	experience	through	our	service	quality	and	value	for	money”.		
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1.4 Introduction to the researcher 
I	may	not	be	the	most	typical	of	doctorial	researchers;	therefore,	a	brief	introduction	is	in	order.	My	
research	methodology	can	be	described	as	being:	“work	based”	(Costley	et	al,	2010),	conducted	“in	
my	own	organisation”	(Coghlan	and	Brannick,	2014),	and	“real	world”	(Robson	and	McCartan,	2016).		
	
Starting	first	with	my	key	advantages:	I	have	extensive	prior	knowledge	and	ready	access	to	data.	I	
have	witnessed	first-hand	the	adoption	of	new	digital	technology	and	its	impact	upon	organisations.	
In	the	1980’s,	I	was	re-trained	and	transitioned	from	drawing	board	to	computer-aided	design	(CAD).	
I	 then	began	 to	explore	 the	opportunities	of	CAD/CAM	and	working	digitally	with	manufacturing	
colleagues	 from	other	 firms.	 I	now	work	 for	Rolls-Royce.	 I	have	held	 senior	 roles,	 including	Chief	
Design	Engineer,	and	worked	across	all	phases	of	the	product	lifecycle.	My	current	role	is	to	provide	
leadership	in	the	interface	between	Engineering	and	Procurement.	I	regularly	visit	suppliers	and	the	
outcomes	of	my	research	could	have	a	swift	and	significant	business	impact.	
	
My	key	disadvantage	is	that	I	have	to	take	special	measures	to	mitigate	the	potential	for	bias	and	any	
distortion	 of	my	 research.	My	 own	 actions	may	 have	 direct	 impact	 upon	my	 field	 of	 study	 and,	
therefore,	need	to	be	particularly	well	controlled	and	documented.	I	am	highly	aware	that	I	may	hear	
what	I	want	to	hear	and	that	others	may	tell	me	what	they	think	I	want	to	be	told.	Also,	there	are	
time	management	and	workload	challenges,	because	I	am	conducting	research	on	a	part-time	basis.		
	
Hailikari	et	al	(2007)	develop	a	model	of	prior	knowledge	which	I	use	in	Figure	1.6	to	complete	my	
introduction.	I	possess	prior	knowledge	which	is	both	declarative	and	procedural	across	the	complex	
and	 interwoven	 domains	 of	my	 research.	 I	 have,	 therefore,	 been	 able	 to	 recognise	 facts,	 define	
meaning,	understand	concepts	and	their	inter-relations,	solve	problems,	and	apply	my	knowledge.		
	
	 Declarative knowledge Procedural knowledge 
Component 
of prior 
knowledge 
Knowledge	of	
facts	
Knowledge	of	
meaning	
Integration	of	
knowledge	
Application	of	
knowledge	
Indicator 
of prior 
knowledge 
Recognising,	
enumerating,	
recalling,	
remembering	
Defining,	
reproducing,	
understanding		
Understanding	
concepts	and	their	
inter-relations,	
classifying,	
comparing	
Problem	solving,	
application	of	
knowledge,	
producing,	
implementing	
	
Figure 1.6: Model of prior knowledge (Hailikari	et	al	2007)	
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1.5 Aim and objectives for my research 
The	industrial	challenge	set	for	my	research	was	centred	around	digital	capability	acquisition,	new	
product/process	 development,	 and	 organisational	 change	 for	 the	 UltraFan®	 engine	 (Rolls-Royce,	
2017).	The	entry	into	service	for	this	engine	was	targeted	within	a	decade	from	starting	my	research	
in	2016.	By	then,	Digital	Enterprise	concepts	(e.g.	seamless	 interfirm	workflows	in	Figure	1.4)	and	
their	 supporting	 technologies	 (e.g.	 MBD	 in	 section	 1.3c/d)	 were	 forecast	 to	 have	 reached	 full	
maturity.	This	would	require	high-levels	of	knowledge	transfer	and	diffusion	across	the	global	supply	
base.	Hence,	my	research	was	launched	by	Rolls-Royce	in	order	to	respond	to	a	gap	in	knowledge	
about	Digital	Enterprise	organisational	structures	and	their	associated	capability	development.		
	
The	aim	of	my	research	is	to:	Define	the	supplier	development	(SD)	process	for	its	use	in	an	Extended	
Enterprise	to	facilitate	and	support	organisational	change	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	In	order	to	
fulfil	this	aim,	the	following	four	specific	research	objectives	are	addressed:	
	
1) Baselining:	Establish	the	generic	steps	in	the	SD	process	by	synthesising	literature	from	multiple	
sources.	Derive	and	baseline	an	approach	which	bridges	functional	or	domain	gaps.		
	
2) Evolving	through	application:	Advance	the	SD	process	to	promote	and	facilitate	the	adoption	
and	diffusion	of	Digital	Enterprise	technologies	across	a	complex	global	supply	base.	
	
3) Embedding	and	sustaining:	 Integrate	(2)	within	the	supplier	performance	management	(SPM)	
process.	Thus,	establish	a	means	to	embed	and	sustain	the	journey	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	
	
4) Route	proving:	Contribute	to	the	practice	of	work-based	research	which	is	a	relatively	new	field	
of	study	that	is	still	creating	and	understanding	methodologies	(Costley	et	al,	2010).	Thereby,	also	
perform	a	route	prover	for	Rolls-Royce	who	are	funding	the	research.		
	
Professor	Ann	Langley	helps	 to	put	my	research	objectives	 into	context	with	her	 response	 to	 the	
question	“Why	 is	 studying	processes	over	 time	 important?”	She	 lists	 four	 reasons	 (Gehman	et	al,	
2018).	Firstly,	the	centrality	of	time	in	our	world	and	how	much	research	still	does	not	suitably	take	
it	into	account.	Secondly,	the	importance	of	process	to	practitioners.	It	is	often	the	process	of	how	
to	 move	 from	 A	 to	 B	 which	 organisations	 seek	 to	 understand.	 Thirdly,	 sustainment,	 and	 the	
importance	of	process	thinking	to	the	activities	and	effort	involved.	Finally,	the	multiple	and	flowing	
nature	of	outcomes	which	can	often	otherwise	be	overlooked.		
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1.6 Overview and guide to my thesis 
There	are	eight	chapters	in	my	thesis	as	summarised	below:	
	
Chapter	1:	has	set	the	scene	and	laid	the	foundations	for	my	thesis.	It	describes	the	motivation	for	
my	 research	 and	 the	 industrial	 setting.	 The	 theme	 is	 organisational	 change	 under	 conditions	 of	
complex	heterogeneity,	embedded	hierarchy,	and	the	adoption	of	new	technology.	My	research	aim	
together	with	four	objectives	are	listed.	
	
Chapter	 2:	 provides	 a	 review	of	 background	 literature	 to	 establish	what	 is	 already	 known	 about	
supplier	development	(SD)	for	digital	transformation	(DT).	Literature	is	synthesised	to	create	a	nine	
step	process	with	supporting	guidelines.	This	initial	version	created	in	chapter	2	is	subsequently	used	
to	 launch	 my	 fieldwork.	 An	 additional,	 generic,	 facet	 to	 the	 research	 gap	 is	 identified	 which	
supplements	the	need	for	my	process	to	tackle	the	specific	topic	of	DT.	The	literature	review	reveals	
that,	regardless	of	the	topic	undergoing	change,	interfirm	rivalry	in	the	supplier	network	has	been	
previously	 found	 to	 impede	 organisational	 learning.	 Therefore,	 my	 process	 must	 account	 for	
potential	variability	in	the	strategic	response	of	firms.	
	
Chapter	 3:	 explains	 the	 key	 theories	 and	 concepts	 used	 by	 antecedent	 scholars.	 A	 theoretical	
framework	 is	 built	 for	 my	 research.	 Two	 waypoints	 are	 set	 on	 the	 journey	 towards	 a	 Digital	
Enterprise.	At	the	first,	supplier	choice	is	modelled	using	institutional	theory.	At	the	second,	diffusion	
and	 organisational	 adoption	 is	 modelled	 using	 institutional	 and	 organisational	 learning	 theories.	
Contextual	 factors	 are	 identified	 to	 characterise	 firms.	One	 contextual	 factor,	 relative	 absorptive	
capacity,	has	a	novel	approach	developed	to	operationalise	and	measure	it	using	supplier	scorecards.	
	
Chapter	4:	describes	 the	methodological	design	and	execution	of	my	research.	Action	research	 is	
confirmed	as	my	method	and	special	measures	are	incorporated	to	address	my	complex	positionality.	
Most	notably,	a	steering	group	and	expert	panel	are	established.	My	action	research	cycles	coalesce	
around	a	drumbeat	of	21	group-based	international	workshops	held	over	3-years	from	2017Q1	to	
2020Q1.	A	diverse	study	group	of	24	 firms	 is	established	and	 their	 relative	absorptive	capacity	 is	
tracked	independently.	Also,	buyer	and	supplier	 interviews	are	conducted	to	assess	both	purpose	
and	outcomes.	Success	criteria	for	the	cohort	of	suppliers	on	the	SD/DT	programme	is	developed	and	
agreed	with	their	buyers.	
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Chapter	5:	gives	the	first	part	of	my	empirical	results	in	the	form	of	a	comprehensive	description	of	
the	 SD/DT	process.	 This	 consists	 of	 nine	 steps	 for	 the	process,	 twenty-eight	 guidelines,	 and	 four	
categories	 of	 special	 intervention.	 Each	 guideline	 is	 assessed	 for	 its	 criticality	 and	 the	 level	 of	
adherence	that	was	achieved.	Also,	each	category	of	special	intervention	is	explained.	This	includes	
the	 digital	 minimum	 standards	 which	 emerged	 as	 the	 instrument	 for	 sharing	 best-practice	 in	
accordance	with	my	theoretical	framework.	Encouraging	signs	of	diffusion	are	provided.	
	
Chapter	6:	gives	the	second	part	of	my	empirical	results	in	the	form	of	the	outcomes	from	the	SD/DT	
process	 for	 the	 cohort	 of	 24	 suppliers.	 Data	 is	 compared	 and	 triangulated	 between	 the	 actual	
outcomes	revealed	by	interviews	versus	those	forecast	by	the	supplier	scorecards	and,	therein,	by	
my	proxy	for	relative	absorptive	capacity.	 It	 is	shown	that	18	suppliers	have	successful	outcomes.	
Furthermore,	it	is	shown	that	outcomes	are	forecast	correctly	by	supplier	scorecards	for	21	suppliers.	
Hence,	 the	 empirical	 results	 show	 that	 my	 organisational	 change	 process	 answers	 the	 research	
question.	It	is	shown	to	have	a	high	success	rate	(18:24	suppliers)	together	with	high	potential	(21:24	
suppliers)	to	be	operationalised	and	embedded	through	the	supplier	scorecards.	
	
Chapter	7:	discusses	and	explores	the	implications	of	my	empirical	results.	Three	aspects	are	covered.	
Firstly,	the	likely	sources	of	measurement	bias	in	the	supplier	scorecards	are	identified	as	negativity,	
ambiguity,	and	common	measure.	Training	and	the	systemisation/removal	of	mundane	transactional	
tasks	 are	 discussed	 as	 means	 of	 attenuating	 the	 bias.	 Secondly	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 perceived	
attributes	of	the	digital	minimum	standards	are	reviewed	and	it	is	argued	that	they	will	continue	to	
be	perceived	positively.	It	is	explained	that	their	baseline	acceptance	threshold	remains	unchanged	
for	 the	 time-being	whilst	diffusion	grows	and	any	 issues	with	awareness	bias	are	confronted	and	
addressed.	Thirdly	in	this	chapter,	my	experience	of	work-based,	part-time,	research	is	discussed.	
	
Chapter	8:	concludes	with	an	overall	summary	followed	by	a	description	of	my	research	contribution	
and	recommendations	for	further	work.	It	is	explained	how	I	contribute	to	knowledge	through	my	
process	for	heterogeneous	organisational	change	and	my	methodology	for	work-based	research.	
	
Figure	 1.7:	 provides	 a	 schematic	 overview	 of	 my	 research.	 The	 full	 journey	 and	 my	 research	
waypoints	are	shown	at	the	top	together	with	the	cohort	of	24	suppliers.	My	organisational	change	
process	is	shown	centrally	and,	beneath	it,	the	action	research	cycles	used	to	create	it.	 	
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Figure 1.7: Schematic overview of my research	  
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Chapter 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Establishing what is already known about 
supplier development (SD) 
for digital transformation (DT) 
	
	
	
	
Chapter	 1	 set	 the	 scene	 and	 introduced	 my	 research	 aim	 as	 being	 to:	 “Define	 the	 supplier	
development	(SD)	process	for	its	use	in	an	Extended	Enterprise	to	facilitate	and	support	organisational	
change	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise”.	It	explained	that	the	interfirm	industrial	setting	for	the	diffusion	
and	organisational	adoption	of	the	constituent	digital	technologies	has	complex	heterogeneity	and	
embedded	hierarchy.	These	are	potentially	significant	barriers	to	organisational	learning	and	change.	
	
Now,	chapter	2	reviews	extant	literature	to	scope	the	research	space	and	understand	the	research	
gap.	 This	 chapter	 is	 divided	 into	 six	 sections	 from	2.1	 to	 2.6.	 They	 begin	 by	 reviewing	 classic	 SD	
research	and	then,	in	section	2.3,	move	onto	other	similar	and	related	processes.	The	topic	to	which	
the	SD	process	 is	being	considered	to	be	applied,	digital	 transformation	 (DT),	 is	 then	reviewed	 in	
section	2.4.	It	is	found	that	SD	has	only	been	used	marginally	for	DT	(or	its	antecedents)	to	date,	but	
it	 could	 potentially	 play	 a	 much	 stronger	 and	 more	 influential	 role.	 Section	 2.5	 combines	 and	
consolidates	 the	process	 steps	and	guidelines	 from	all	 sections	 in	 this	 chapter	 to	produce	a	 final	
‘background’	version	for	use	in	my	fieldwork.	Finally,	section	2.6	summarises	and	draws	out	the	key	
implications.	A	bullet-point	executive	summary	is	given	overleaf	for	those	who	prefer	this	format.	
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Section	2.1:	 Supplier	development	(SD)	may	be	operated	on	a	dyadic	or	network	basis	
• SD	 may	 be	 conducted	 by	 firms	 using	 dyadic	 modes	 of	 application	 (direct	 or	
indirect)	or	through	a	network	known	as	a	Supplier	Association	(SA).		
	
• Factors	which	may	be	used	to	select	between	these	different	modes	of	application	
include	the	desired	outcomes	and	learning	mechanisms.	
	
Section	2.2:	 SD	has	nine	generic	steps	in	the	process	
• SD	has	nine	generic	steps	in	the	process	which	are	determined	from	a	review	and	
synthesis	of	extant	literature.	
	
Section	2.3:	 There	are	other	related	processes	which	have	similarities	to	SD	
• SD	has	similarities	to	4	areas	of	organisational	learning:	(a)	supply	chain	learning,	
(b)	business	network	learning,	(c)	collective	learning,	and	(d)	action	learning.	
	
• There	 is	 a	 gap	 in	 organisational	 learning	 research	 for	 supplier	 networks	 (Lane,	
2001).	This	 is	associated	with	 impediments	to	 learning	which	arise	from	factors	
such	as	interfirm	competition	and	conflicts	of	interest	e.g.	in	the	aerospace	sector.	
	
• Collaborative	improvement	(CoI)	has	been	studied	as	an	alternative	process	to	SD	
for	 interfirm	 learning	 in	 extended	 manufacturing	 enterprises.	 However,	 the	
outcomes	were	disappointing	from	three	cases	(aero,	auto,	and	agricultural	m/c).	
	
Section	2.4:	 SD	could	potentially	play	a	strong	and	influential	role	in	digital	transformation	(DT)	
• To	date,	SD	has	only	been	used	marginally	to	influence	DT	(or	antecedents).	
	
• But,	there	are	many	consistent	and	reinforcing	themes	found	in	the	SD	process	
steps	and	the	implementation	frameworks	for	enterprise-wide	digital	systems.	
	
• Also,	 it	 is	 not	 until	 recently	 that	 the	 functionality	 and	 readiness	 of	 digital	
technology	has	placed	the	concept	of	 the	Digital	Enterprise	within	 the	grasp	of	
industry.	Therefore,	this	suggests	that	my	research	timing	is	favourable.	
	
• Items	for	consideration	from	literature	include:	co-evolution	of	digital	processes	
and	 the	 supply	 network,	 systems	 and	 data	 road-maps,	 organisational	maturity	
models,	and	using	a	strategic	framework	to	develop	the	digital	supply	chain.	
	
Section	2.5:	 Background	 SD/DT	 (supplier	 development	 for	 digital	 transformation)	 process	 is	
established	to	initiate	my	fieldwork	
	
• SD/DT	process	steps	and	guidelines	are	combined	and	consolidated	from	all	of	the	
previous	sections	in	this	chapter	to	produce	a	final	‘background’	version.	
	
• This	version	is	used	later	in	my	research	to	initiate	my	fieldwork.	
	
Section	2.6:	 Summary	of	research	gap	and	key	implications	from	this	chapter	
• The	research	gaps	which	I	identify	and	target	through	chapter	2	are:	(i)	the	use	of	
SD	to	facilitate	DT,	and	(ii)	organisational	learning	in	complex	supplier	networks.  	
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2.1  SD may be operated on a dyadic or network basis 
Two	dyadic	modes	 of	 application,	 direct	 or	 indirect,	may	be	 taken	by	 firms	when	 conducting	 SD	
programmes	(e.g.	Glock	et	al,	2017;	Sucky	and	Durst,	2013).		In	the	case	of	direct	SD,	the	buying	firm	
invests	 resources	 into	 the	 supplier	 (e.g.	 on-site	 consultation,	 training	 programmes,	 temporary	
personnel	transfer,	or	providing	equipment).	In	the	case	of	indirect	SD,	the	buying	firm	adopts	a	more	
passive	role	(e.g.	setting	performance	goals,	defining	improvement	targets,	or	by	offering	incentives	
to	the	supplier).		
	
Another	mode	 of	 application,	 using	 a	 network,	 is	 credited	 by	 scholars	 as	 having	 evolved	 in	 the	
automotive	industry	in	Japan	after	the	Second	World	War.	Research	began	to	appear	in	the	1990’s	
using	native,	anglicised,	or	literal	terms.	For	example;	Kyoryoku	Kai	(Sako,	1993),	Supplier	Association	
(Hines,	 1994),	 and	 Keiretsu	 (Dyer,	 1996).	 For	 simplicity,	 I	will	 group	 them	all	 together	 under	 the	
heading	of	Supplier	Association	(SA)	which	is	defined	as	follows	by	Hines	and	Rich	(1998):	
	
“A	mutually	benefiting	group	of	a	company’s	most	important	subcontractors	brought	together	
on	 a	 regular	 basis	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 strategic	 and	 operational	 alignment	 through	 the	
development	of	awareness,	education	and	implementation	programmes	designed	to	achieve	
both	radical	and	incremental	improvements.”	
	
Figure	2.1	combines	research	from	Hines	(1994)	and	Dyer	(2000)	to	show	the	key	characteristics	of	
SA’s	 in	 the	automotive	 industry	 in	 Japan	and	USA.	Knowledge	 sharing	was	generally	 found	 to	be	
effective	and	this	suggests	potential	for	my	research.	However,	Aitken	(1998)	saw	mixed	success	from	
a	series	of	case	studies	in	the	UK.	He	categorised	four	different	strategies	which	may	be	adopted	by	
the	suppliers	towards	the	SA,	namely:	passive,	destructive,	withdrawal,	or	constructive.		
	
The	school	of	SA	research	has	been	criticised	by	some	scholars	for	maintaining	a	very	simplistic	view	
of	the	potential	range	of	buyer/supplier	relationships	which	may	prevail	in	practice.	Cox	et	al	(2004)	
stereotype	them	as	the	“lean	approach	to	supply	chain	management”.	They	argue	that	buyers	must	
typically	operate	in	many	different	supply	and	demand	circumstances	compared	to,	for	example,	the	
long-term	 and	 non-adversarial	 relationships	which	may	 be	 possible	 for	 a	 few	 in	 the	 automotive	
industry.	
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Figure 2.1: Key characteristics of automotive Supplier Associations (SA) 
(See	Hines	and	Rich,	1998,	for	other	potential	organisational	structures)	
	
Aoki	 and	 Lennerfors	 (2013)	 reflect	 upon	 the	 history	 of	 the	 SA	 and	 its	 contribution	 to	 improved	
business	performance.	Their	assessment	of	Western	firms	concludes	that	the	care	and	support	of	
SA’s	has	often	not	been	sufficiently	prioritised.	They	predict	a	period	of	reinvention	and	revival	after	
cost-cutting	had	been	the	preeminent	concern.	They	advocate	the	use	of	the	SA	for	building	deeper	
collaborations	with	suppliers,	particularly	at	the	earlier	stages	of	product	development.		
	
Key	is	to	not	consider	SD	and	SA	in	isolation.	Many	scholars	agree	that	the	decision	if/how	to	create	
and	utilise	SA’s	must	be	made	integral,	and	early,	in	the	SD	process	(e.g.	Krause	and	Handfield,	1999).	
Scholars	also	consider	learning	mechanisms	and	desired	outcomes	when	selecting	between	dyadic	
and	network	modes	of	application	(Bessant,	2004).		Thus,	it	is	prudent	to	review	literature	from	both	
the	SD	and	the	SA	schools	of	research	in	order	to	gain	insight	and	guidance	on	the	generic	steps	in	
the	process.	This	is	performed	in	section	2.2.	
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2.2 SD has nine generic steps in the process 
Despite	many	literature	reviews	into	SD	(e.g.	Glock	et	al,	2017;	Sillanpää	et	al,	2015;	Sucky	and	Durst,	
2013;	Ahmed	and	Hendry,	2012;	and	Arumugam	et	al,	2011),	they	have	all	used	simple	conceptual	
models	to	characterise	it	and	not	explored	the	role	it	could	play	in	DT.	Therefore,	in	accordance	with	
Tranfield	et	al	(2003),	I	began	by	selecting	articles	from	which	to	synthesise	the	generic	steps	of	the	
process.	I	then	used	this	to	look	at	how	it	had,	or	could	be,	applied	to	DT.	I	sought	help	from	an	expert	
(Andy	Page,	CEO	of	Sharing	in	Growth)	in	order	to	inform	and	guide	my	selection	of	articles.	Broader	
aspects	of	his	role,	and	that	of	others,	in	my	research	is	explained	in	Chapter	4.	
	
A	total	of	thirteen	articles	were	selected	as	shown	in	Figure	2.2.	The	steps	in	the	SD	process	which	
were	synthesised	from	them	are	to	be	taken	as	being	organised	around	an	improvement	loop.	There	
is	certainly	overlap	between	steps	and	there	may	be	iteration	or	repetition.		
	
The	ten	articles	selected	for	synthesis	from	an	academic	source	were	identified	using	the	SCOPUS	
database.	Searches	started	with	the	keywords	“supplier	development”	or	“supplier	association”,	but	
soon	expanded	as	the	resulting	articles	and	their	references	were	reviewed.	In	accordance	with	my	
research	title,	shortlisting	required	the	article	to	describe	the	“how	to”	aspects	of	the	SD	process	and	
to	be	an	originating	source.	No	additional	articles	were	identified	following	a	final	cross-check	against	
previous	SD	literature	reviews	conducted	over	the	last	decade.		
	
The	selection	of	articles	for	synthesis	from	industry	sources	proved	to	be	more	subjective	and	this	
was	where	 input	 from	my	 independent	expert	was	most	 required.	Three	articles	were	eventually	
selected	to	address	the	following	themes.	Firstly,	SC21	(2006)	was	selected,	because	it	describes	one	
of	the	longest	running	SD	programmes	in	the	aerospace	industry.	It	is	important	to	recognise	the	role	
which	may	be	played	in	SD	by	regional	clusters	and	governments	(Gardes	et	al,	2015).	Secondly,	SEDB	
(2017)	was	selected,	because	their	digital	maturity	tool	has	been	successfully	piloted	in	Singapore	
with	both	small/medium	enterprises	and	multinational	corporations.	It	is	important	to	recognise	the	
impact	of	globalisation	and	the	role	that	multinationals	play	in	developing	and	sustaining	indigenous	
firms	(Liu,	2009).	Finally,	BCG	(2017)	was	selected	as	one	of	the	leading	offerings	from	a	consultant	
firm.	It	is	important	to	recognise	the	role	which	they	may	play	as	either	a	solution	shop,	value-added	
process,	or	facilitated	network	(Christensen	et	al,	2013).	
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Figure 2.2: Synthesis of literature to identify nine generic process steps for SD 
 
I	broadly	compared	my	synthesis	in	Figure	2.2	against	the	well-renowned	process	for	leading	change	
devised	by	Kotter	(1995).	Mine	has	nine	steps	whereas	Kotter	has	eight;	however,	the	sequence	flows	
similarly	and	my	application	is	more	context-specific.	I	found	no	evidence	of	Kotter	having	been	used	
where	buyer/supplier	relationships	were	a	dominant	factor	(e.g.	Auguste,	2013).	Our	early	sequence	
of	steps	shows	reasonable	overlap:	my	steps	1	to	5,	and	Kotter’s	steps	1	to	4	(i.e.	establish	a	sense	of	
urgency,	form	a	powerful	guiding	coalition,	create	a	vision,	and	communicate	the	vision).	Our	latter	
sequence	of	steps	is	almost	identical:	my	steps	6	to	9,	and	Kotter’s	steps	5	to	8	(i.e.	empower	others	
to	act	on	the	vision,	plan	for	and	create	short-term	wins,	consolidate	improvements	and	produce	still	
more	change,	and	institutionalise	new	approaches).		
	
Sections	2.2.1	to	2.2.9	give	the	results	from	my	synthesis.	Herein,	for	each	generic	step,	I	capture	my	
key	findings	as	either	a	guideline	or	a	consideration.	The	latter	are,	at	this	initial	stage	of	my	literature	
review,	 prompts	 and	 placeholders	 for	 when	 I	 move	 onto	 consider	 any	 other	 articles	 on	 digital	
transformation	from	this	or	other	research	fields.		
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2.2.1 Generic process step 1: Strategic review 
Most	articles	describe	preparatory	activity	by	the	buying	firm	leading	up	to	the	launch	of	an	SD/SA	
programme	and,	where	they	do,	they	refer	to	it	as	having	a	strongly	strategic	dimension.	As	the	first	
generic	 step	 in	 the	 SD	 process,	 it	 is	 also	 essential	 to	 allow	 different	 buying	 firms	 from	 different	
starting	 points	 to	 anchor	 themselves.	 Krause	 and	 Handfield	 (1999),	 in	 particular,	 show	multiple	
phases	operating	in	series	which	build	up	through	reactive,	proactive,	and	integrated	SD	activities.		
	
Guideline	 1.1	 –	 Deploy	 other	 supply	 base	 management	 practices	 ahead	 of	 SD/SA:	 Krause	 and	
Handfield	(1999)	describe	the	goal	of	rationalising	the	supply	base	to	a	pool	of	potentially	capable	
suppliers	aligned	to	the	buyer’s	strategic	objectives,	before	deploying	SD/SA.	Their	research	at	the	
time	showed	 the	buyer’s	 strategic	goals	 to	be	dominated	by	a	desire	 to	 improve	 the	operational	
performance	(i.e.	quality,	cost,	and	delivery)	of	a	global	supply	base.	
	
Guideline	1.2	–	Launching	and	running	a	SD	programme	is	not	easy:	Various	statistics	abound,	but	
all	articles	give	an	impression	that	SD	can	be	difficult	and	complex.	Handfield	et	al	(2000)	describe	SD	
as	 challenging	 for	 all	 parties	 involved,	 buyer	 and	 supplier,	 and	 that	 success	 is	 not	 a	 foregone	
conclusion.	 They	 list	 examples	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 this:	 the	 commitment	 of	 financial,	 capital,	 and	
personnel	 resources;	 the	 sharing	 of	 timely	 and	 sensitive	 information;	 and	 the	measurement	 and	
reporting	of	performance	and	progress.	Furthermore,	Gordon	(2008)	describe	how	the	SD	process	
can	be	slow,	and	sometimes	frustrating,	requiring	determination,	patience,	and	perseverance.	
	
Guideline	1.3	–	Map	and	include	in	scope	the	total	global	Extended	Enterprise:	In	one	of	the	later	
steps	of	their	SD	process,	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	include	an	on-going	dialogue	about	sub-tier	
suppliers.	They	describe	 the	establishment	of	an	 integrated	supplier	network	as	a	benchmark	 for	
organisations	to	strive	to	achieve.	However,	they	explain	that	even	the	most	advanced	organisations	
which	they	studied	had	not	achieved	it	in	full.	Furthermore,	Handfield	et	al	(2000)	describe	the	need	
to	 “adapt	 to	 local	 conditions”.	 There	 are	many	 facets	 to	 this	 in	 a	 global	 supply	 chain	 including;	
language	and	culture,	technical	maturity,	and	the	strength	of	the	business	relationship.	
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Consideration	1a	–	Operating	Systems	have	long	been	an	impetus	for	SD:	In	giving	context	to	their	
conceptual	model	of	the	SD	process,	Hahn	et	al	(1990)	explain	that	industry	in	the	United	States	had	
traditionally	been	stable	and	well	established.	However,	they	forecast	change.	When	describing	the	
key	 forces	 for	 change,	 they	 highlight	 the	 evolution	 and	 innovation	 of	 computer-based	 operating	
systems.	 They	 list	 the	 following	 examples	 in	 a	 matrix	 of	 SD	 activities	 where	 they	 map	 the	
development	 of	 the	 supplier’s	 technical	 capability	 against	 their	 operating	 system:	 CAD/CAM,	
CIM/FMS,	JIT/MRP.	Furthermore,	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	also	cite	rapid	technology	change	as	
one	of	the	drivers	for	SD.	They	list	“Global	Information	Systems”	as	one	of	their	five	critical	success	
factors	for	developing	a	world-class	supply	base.	Handfield	et	al	(2000)	call	for	the	start	of	the	SD	
process	to	be	an	extension	of	corporate-level	strategic	planning	and	they	include	the	participation	
from	Information	Technology	(IT)	in	their	requirements.	
	
Consideration	1b	–	Disruptive	technologies	change	the	paradigm:	Hartley	and	Choi	(1996)	consider	
the	 implications	of	major	 technological	shifts	on	the	 incumbent	supply	base.	Future	sourcing	and	
development	 is	not	guaranteed,	even	 if	performing	well	 today.	Handfield	et	al	 (2000)	explain	the	
need	for	the	buying	firm	to	first	establish	its	long-term	supply	chain	strategies.	Krause	and	Handfield	
(1999)	call	 for	cross-functional	executive	 input	at	 the	start	of	 the	SD	process	and,	amongst	other	
things,	they	make	specific	reference	to	technology	roadmaps.	Quayle	(2000)	refers	to	the	coming	of	
the	“information	age”	and	explains	how	paperless	transactions	offer	the	potential	of	better	inter-
organisational	workflows.	Also,	as	an	example	of	one	of	the	reasons	why	SD	might	be	initiated,	he	
lists	the	need	to	work	with	small	and	medium	enterprises	to	be	assured	of	“year	2000	compliance”.	
Gordon	(2008)	gives	four	examples	to	illustrate	the	impetus	for	SD.	She	includes	therein	the	buying	
firm	seeking	to	 implement	a	high-performance	business	system	such	as	“lean	enterprise”	(section	
2.2.10	 point	 #1).	 BCG	 (2017)	 identify	 that	 both	 lean	management	 and	 Industry	 4.0	 support	 the	
objectives	of	operational	excellence,	but	each	 typically	applies	different	 types	of	 tools	 to	achieve	
these	goals.	 In	response,	they	update	their	offering	to	develop	an	integrated	approach.	Note	that	
here	the	concept	of	Industry	4.0	refers	to	the	“fourth	industrial	revolution	triggered	by	the	internet	
which	allows	communication	between	humans	as	well	as	machines	in	Cyber-Physical-Systems	(CPS)	
throughout	large	networks”	(Brettel	et	al,	2014).	
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2.2.2 Generic process step 2: Selection of method and team 
Handfield	et	al	(2000)	is	the	only	article	to	explicitly	reverse	this	and	the	next	step	of	the	process.	
However,	they	combine	aspects	of	the	first	step	and,	therefore,	have	no	need	to	show	it	as	another	
discrete	step	at	this	stage	of	the	process.		
	
Guideline	2.1	–	An	informed	decision	is	required	on	if/when	to	form	an	SA:	Potential	problems	which	
the	articles	list	as	inputs	to	the	decision-making	process,	include:	setting	unrealistic	expectations	for	
the	suppliers,	maintenance	and	sustainment	of	 the	SA	over	 the	 longer-term,	 trust	and	openness,	
clarity	 of	 communication,	 cross-functional	 support,	 and	 establishing	mutual	 benefits	 and	 sharing	
success	 across	 all	 parties.	 According	 to	Hines	 (1994),	 a	 range	 of	 other	 supplier	 coordination	 and	
development	tools	are	available	and	he	explicitly	lists:	meetings,	conferences,	consultations,	audits,	
and	documented	instructions.	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	give	a	few	examples	of	SA’s;	but,	they	
recommend	them	towards	the	end	of	their	SD	process.	They	scope	them	as	one	of	the	most	advanced	
strategies	to	be	deployed	at	a	time	when	the	buying	firm	has	fully	prepared	the	ground,	and	is	ready	
to	establish	a	truly	globalised	supply	base.	
	
Guideline	2.2	–	Top	management	 support	and	a	cross-functional	 team	are	essential:	All	 articles	
emphasise	the	importance	of	this.	Handfield	et	al	(2000)	sum	it	up	well	and	describe	it	as	“putting	
your	own	house	in	order”	and	then	moving	on	to	provide	a	“unified	front”	to	the	supplier.	See,	also,	
Section	2.2.10	point	#2	for	further	input	on	the	required	roles	and	responsibilities	for	SD.	
	
Consideration	2a	–	Establish	a	toolset	and	train	the	team:	All	articles	comment	upon	the	need	for	a	
cross-functional	team.	Some	articles	explicitly	mention	training	for	the	team	in	both	technical	and	
interpersonal	skills	(e.g.	Hines,	1994;	Hartley	and	Jones,	1997).	Aoki	and	Lennerfors	(2013)	also	raise	
the	matter	 of	 tacit	 knowledge	 and	 give	 an	 example	 of	 how	 insufficiently	 deep	 understanding	 is	
provided	to	a	supplier	through	design	drawings	alone.	An	interesting	example	in	the	context	of	my	
research.	Some	researchers	mention	independent	experts	and	coaches:	SC21	(2006)	offers	these	for	
what	is	effectively	the	“lean”	toolset.	The	equivalent	toolset	for	a	Digital	Enterprise	is	much	less	well	
established.	However,	SEDB	(2017)	is	an	early	example	and	is	described	by	its	authors	as	a	response	
to	the	need	to	create	a	common	language	and	clear	understanding	of	the	key	concepts	in	the	field.	
It	is	targeted	at	individuals,	companies,	and	other	support	partners.	
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2.2.3 Generic process step 3: Evaluation of suppliers 
Articles	begin	to	differ	noticeably	at	this	and	the	next	step	of	the	process	for	the	sequential	order	in	
which	suppliers	are	evaluated/selected.	The	difference	arises	because	some	of	the	articles	have	a	
relatively	narrow	scope	(i.e.	existing	incumbent	suppliers	who	are	effectively	already	pre-selected)	
whereas	others	are	looking	more	widely.	This	points	strongly	back	to	the	anchoring	which	needs	to	
have	been	achieved	through	the	strategic	review	in	the	first	generic	step	of	the	process.		
	
Guideline	3.1	–	Evaluation	is	likely	to	need	to	cover	multiple	factors:	There	is	no	noticeable	change	
over	time	in	the	articles	in	their	categorisation	of	the	factors	used	for	evaluation.	Hahn	et	al	(1990)	
summarise	the	categories	as:	technical,	quality,	delivery,	cost,	and	managerial	capability.	Krause	and	
Handfield	(1999)	find	the	supplier	performance	measurement	systems	used	for	this	purpose	to	be	
well	established	across	a	number	of	the	buying	firms	which	they	study.	
	
Consideration	3a	–	Evaluating	suppliers	 for	digital	maturity/needs	will	not	be	 straight-forward:	
Handfield	 et	 al	 (2000)	 explain	 that	 continuous	 long-term	 improvement	 of	 supplier	 performance	
requires	identifying	where	the	value	is	created	in	the	supply	chain.	For	a	Digital	Enterprise,	the	value	
proposition	and	areas	of	priority	and	focus	will	need	to	be	identified.	SEDB	(2017)	is	an	example	of	
an	early	response	to	this	and	their	framework	includes:	3	building	blocks,	8	pillars,	and	16	dimensions.	
It	 is	 described	by	 the	 authors	 as	 being	 a	 deliberate	 attempt	 to	 address	 the	 challenges	 hindering	
Industry	4.0	adoption	which	arise	 from	companies	 lacking	a	clear	vision,	strategy,	and	systematic	
roadmap.	Gordon	(2008)	explains	that	change	management	skills	are	required	at	suppliers.	They	may	
benefit	from	using	a	framework	such	as	that	provided	by	SEDB	(2017),	but	more	data	and	financial	
insights	will	be	required	to	identify	and	grasp	the	full	value	proposition	for	a	Digital	Enterprise.		
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2.2.4 Generic process step 4: Selection of suppliers 
As	mentioned	previously	for	step	3,	there	are	some	differences	in	the	articles	regarding	the	point	at	
which	suppliers	are	selected.	However,	the	way	in	which	they	describe	the	selection	process	itself	is	
all	very	similar.	The	planned	scope	of	subsequent	activities,	after	selection,	is	all	that	really	differs.		
	
Guideline	4.1	–	Selection	criteria	must	be	robust:	The	articles	list	many	potential	factors	for	supplier	
selection.	They	often	show	that	a	scientific	analytical	method	is	used	to	perform	it.	Factors	in	the	
selection	 criteria,	 include:	 the	 value	 of	 spend	with	 the	 supplier;	 the	 strategic	 importance	 of	 the	
supplier;	 the	 alignment	 and	 closeness	 of	 the	 buyer/supplier	 relationship;	 the	 past	 and	 present	
operational	performance	of	the	supplier;	the	supplier’s	readiness	for	change;	the	suppliers	financial	
position	 and	 their	 approach	 to	 investment;	 the	 enthusiasm	of	 the	 supplier;	 the	 openness	 of	 the	
supplier	and	 their	management	progressiveness;	and	 the	geographic	 location	of	 the	supplier	and	
their	proximity	to	either	the	buying	firm	or	other	suppliers	being	considered	for	participation.	Gordon	
(2008)	emphasises	the	need	to	assess	whether	the	supplier	is	ready	to	undergo	“real	change”.	Krause	
and	Handfield	(1999)	list	three	items	in	the	criteria	for	selecting	suppliers	for	their	more	advanced,	
proactive,	 SD	 activities:	 critical	 commodity,	 systemic	 history	 of	 problems,	 and	willingness	 of	 the	
supplier	management.	They	recommend	maintaining	strict	confidentiality.	The	analysis	and	results	
from	supplier	selection	should	be	held	in	private	by	the	seniors	in	the	buying	firm.		
	
Guideline	4.2	–	Suppliers	of	different	capability	may	be	selected	for	different	purposes:	According	
to	Hahn	et	al	(1990),	buying	firms	make	a	distinction	in	their	selection	of	suppliers	depending	upon	
the	capabilities	of	the	supplier.	The	buying	firm	will	not	provide	active	support	to	them	all:	some	
suppliers	will	be	encouraged	to	upgrade	their	own	capabilities.	Hartley	and	Jones	(1997)	promote	
the	selection	of	suppliers	with	a	“good	fit”	for	implementing	and	sustaining	systems-wide	solutions.	
Krause	 and	 Handfield	 (1999)	 explain	 that	 SD	 can	 be	 resource	 intensive	 and	 should	 be	 focused	
accordingly.	Gordon	 (2008)	places	 the	SD	process	within	 the	 framework	of	Supplier	Performance	
Management	(SPM)	and,	within	this,	she	gives	examples	of	the	practices	followed	by	Boeing		(section	
2.2.10	point	#3).	
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Guideline	 4.3	 –	 If	 starting	 an	 SA,	 do	 so	 with	 a	 relatively	 small	 membership:	 Hines	 (1994)	
recommends	that	in	the	early	stages,	to	keep	activities	focused	and	manageable,	membership	of	a	
new	SA	should	be	limited	to	no	more	than	15	companies.	There	is	no	disagreement	to	this	in	any	of	
the	other	articles.	
	
Consideration	4a	–	NPD	may	be	used	as	an	alternative	to	SA:	Aoki	and	Lennerfors	(2013)	major	on	
the	involvement	and	incorporation	of	suppliers	into	new	product	development	(NPD)	in	their	article	
about	 Toyota	 and	 the	 “new,	 improved	 Keiretsu”.	 Krause	 and	 Handfield	 (1999)	 describe	 the	
aspirational	goal	for	SD	as	being	to	have	a	globally	aligned	supplier	network.	For	long	term	success,	
they	also	place	strong	emphasis	on	the	integration	of	suppliers	into	NPD.	However,	in	their	process	
steps,	they	differentiate	between	phases:	NPD,	and	then	SA.	Implying	that	the	latter	could	be	more	
powerful,	but	is	more	difficult	to	succeed.		
	
Consideration	4b	–	 If	using	an	SA,	constitute	 it	 to	facilitate	access	to	specialist	skills:	Hahn	et	al	
(1990)	and	Hines	(1994)	use	a	matrix	to	describe	a	broad	array	of	capabilities	and	activities	which	
may	be	pursued	in	a	SD	programme.	Hines	(1994)	majors	on	benchmarking	across	suppliers	and,	by	
inference,	ready	access	is	either	required	to	top	performing	suppliers	or	to	those	who	are	familiar	
with	their	practices.	
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2.2.5 Generic process step 5: Launch of programme 
This	process	step	is	of	a	relatively	short	duration,	but	very	important	because	it	marks	the	formal	
launch	event(s)	for	the	SD/SA	programme.	All	articles	pause	to	reflect	upon	it	to	some	degree.		
	
Guideline	5.1	–	Use	the	power	of	the	voice	of	the	customer:	Hartley	and	Choi	(1996)	discuss	how	the	
involvement	of	the	customer	can	be	a	catalyst	for	change.	It	can	legitimise	the	change	programme	
and	help	to	overcome	the	supplier’s	organisational	inertia.	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	identify	the	
significant	 amount	 of	 time	 that	 buyer	 firms	 spent	 upfront	 communicating	 their	 intent	 to	 top	
management	within	the	supplier’s	organisation.	Quayle	(2000)	recommends	the	use	of	a	“supplier	
conference”	to	strengthen	support	and	acceptance.	
	
Consideration	5a	–	Break	the	stereotypes:	Hartley	and	Choi	(1996)	cite	one	supplier	manager	who	
explains	to	them	that	to	agree	to	participate	in	SD	“you	have	to	eat	your	pride”.	This	confirms	the	
perception	that	SD	can	become	too	focused	upon	problem	areas	as	opposed	to	strategic	areas	of	the	
business.	Also,	Gordon	(2008)	gives	an	example	of	a	large	buying	firm	trying	to	spread	the	message	
to	its	suppliers	about	a	new	concept	which	it	was	seeking	to	engage	and	introduce	with	them,	called	
“Lean	Enterprise”.	The	concept	was	so	radical	and	new	to	some	of	the	suppliers	that	despite	being	
diligent,	they	still	only	paid	lip-service	to	it.	The	use	of	the	term	(i.e.	Lean	Enterprise)	and	the	potential	
issues	associated	with	it	may	have	some	relevance	to	my	own	research	(section	2.2.10	point	#1).	
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2.2.6 Generic process step 6: Operation and support of programme 
This	is	an	ongoing	process	step	to	cover	general	administration	and	management	issues	throughout	
the	 SD/SA	 programme,	 once	 it	 has	 been	 launched.	 With	 this	 regard,	 all	 applicable	 post-launch	
contributions	from	the	articles	are	collated	here.		
	
Guideline	6.1	–	There	can	be	flexibility	in	the	operating	model:	Articles	describe	multiple	modes	of	
delivery	 from	part-time	to	 full-time	dedicated	teams.	Gordon	 (2008)	explains	how	resources	may	
come	 from	 the	 supplier,	 the	 customer,	 or	 third-party	 consultants.	 Although	 she	 identifies	 some	
drawbacks,	she	explains	that	the	latter	may	be	preferred	should	a	neutral	party	be	needed.	
	
Guideline	6.2	–	Establish	change	agents:	Hartley	and	Jones	(1997)	note	that	participation	from	the	
supplier	 should	 not	 be	 limited	 to	 just	 a	 few	 individuals	 on	 their	 “change	 team”	 if	 results	 are	 to	
become	sustained	and	embedded.	However,	should	it	be	needed,	they	suggest	that	the	buyer	firm	
could	provide	support	by	“shadow	consulting”	rather	than	by	hands-on	assistance.	Gordon	(2008)	
argues	that	there	is	a	higher	risk	of	failure	for	SD	activities	if	the	supplier	has	little	or	no	experience	
of	their	own	in	change	management.	Handfield	et	al	(2000)	describe	the	presence	of	a	“champion”	
from	within	 the	 supplier	 organisation.	 Krause	 and	Handfield	 (1999)	 also	mention	 the	 creation	of	
“islands	of	 best	 practice”	within	 suppliers	 and	how	effort	 is	 required	 to	 ensure	 that	 benefits	 are	
shared	by	the	supplier	across	their	own	sites.	Beyond	a	single	supplier,	 in	the	context	of	the	total	
supply	base,	they	go	on	to	mention	“pockets	of	excellence”.	They	make	a	subtle	argument	for	the	
buying	firm	to	use	these	to	influence	others	within	their	peer	group	of	suppliers.	Also,	although	they	
do	 not	 refer	 to	 it	 as	 such,	 Hartley	 and	 Choi	 (1996)	 introduce	 the	 concept	 of	 “nudge	 theory”	 by	
explaining	how	showcasing	at	an	annual	supplier	conference	can	be	used	to	stimulate	 interest	 in	
participation	 from	 across	 competing	 suppliers.	 Overall,	 the	 theme	 of	 change	 management	 is	
consistent	and	strong	amongst	the	researchers.	See	section	2.2.10	point	#2.	
	
Guideline	6.3	–	Principles	and	project	charters	help	with	communication	and	engagement:	Hines	
(1994)	 lists	 a	whole	 series	 of	 potential	 activities	which	 include:	 conferences,	 seminars,	 specialist	
workshops,	 company	 visits,	 visits	 to	 exemplar	 companies,	 regular	 newsletters,	 and	 group	 social	
events.	He	suggests	that	progress	against	targets	must	be	measured	explicitly	and	regularly,	perhaps	
twice	yearly.	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	also	recommend	swift	feedback	on	performance.	Aitken	
(1998)	goes	on	to	explain	how	consistent	signals	are	required	from	the	buyer.	He	argues	that	the	
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expectations	and	required	deliverables	from	the	supplier	have	to	be	established	and	maintained	very	
clearly	 to	prevent	adversely	 impacting	performance.	Handfield	et	al	 (2000)	are	more	prescriptive	
than	most	and	describe	the	formal	agreement	of	roles	and	responsibilities,	milestones,	deliverables,	
and	performance	metrics.	They	give	an	example	of	a	company	which	had	seen	benefit:	“spell	it	out”	
rather	than	to	work	to	a	“gentlemen’s	agreement”.	However,	Aoki	and	Lennerfors	(2013)	highlight	
how	different	organisations,	individuals,	and	cultures	prefer	different	approaches.	They	show	that	
leaving	some	ambiguity	can	prevent	results	from	being	capped.	It	provides	the	incentive/vision	to	
exceed	and	for	the	supplier	to	go	the	extra	mile.	They	advocate	striking	a	balance	between	explicit	
and	 implicit	communication.	Agreeing	to	team	principles,	 in	addition	to	creating	project	charters,	
may	be	a	way	of	doing	this.	Upon	joining	SC21	(2006),	participating	companies	are	required	to	get	
their	senior	executive	to	sign	their	firm	up	to	seven	principles.	As	an	example,	one	of	the	principles	
is	 called	 “Delivering	 Innovation”	 and	 it	 reads	 as	 follows:	 “We	will	 build	 on	 success	 to	 enable	 our	
industry	 to	be	a	 leader	 in	 the	development	of	 competitive	 value	 chains.	We	will	 pursue	 the	most	
competitive	 solutions	 for	our	 customers,	by	accessing	 innovation	and	 specialist	 expertise.	We	will	
encourage	 innovation	and	 investment	of	all	 types	 throughout	 the	 supply	 chain,	 achieved	 through	
providing	a	more	trusting	and	open	environment.”	
	
Consideration	6a	–	Promote	the	culture	of	a	 learning	organisation:	Krause	and	Handfield	 (1999)	
make	reference	to	the	concept	of	 the	“learning	organisation”.	They	acknowledge	from	their	case	
studies	that	benefits	were	two-way	and	also	came	from	buying	firms	looking	inwards.	They	state	in	
their	article	that	“asking	suppliers	to	adopt	practices	and	techniques	that	the	buying	firm	itself	has	
not	 adopted	 will	 only	 result	 in	 a	 loss	 of	 credibility.”	 Hartley	 and	 Jones	 (1997)	 describe	 process-
orientated	 SD	 and	 highlight,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	 buyer’s	 forecasting,	 planning,	 and	 scheduling	
systems	can	cause	problems	for	the	supplier	and	should	be	included	in	scope	for	SD	activities.	Also,	
Gordon	(2008)	states	that	buying	firms	are	typically	responsible	for	their	fair	share	of	problems	at	
the	supplier.	She	recommends	examining	interfaces	between	the	firms	and	reviewing	the	extent	to	
which	the	associated	processes	and	systems	are	causing	problems.	
	
Consideration	6b	–	Confidential	or	open-access?	Handfield	et	al	(2000)	describe	a	high-technology	
buying	firm	who	had	made	the	subject	of	confidentiality	a	specific	part	of	their	SD	agenda.	They	used	
Non-Disclosure	and	Exclusivity	Agreements	to	respond	to	situations	where	confidentiality	issues	and	
concerns	had	been	identified.	
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2.2.7 Generic process step 7: Delivery of short term results 
I	delineate	the	final	generic	steps	in	the	process	into:	delivery	of	short	term	results	(step	7),	growth	
of	results	for	the	longer	term	(step	8),	and	embedding	into	routine	business	(step	9).	Most	articles	
cover	the	first	of	these;	however,	very	few	cover	the	last.		
	
Guideline	7.1	–	Diagnostics	pinpoint	specific	focus	areas	and	help	to	prioritise:	Typically,	the	articles	
suggest	 that	 the	evaluations	 conducted	previously	 at	 step	3	provide	valuable	 inputs,	but	 are	 too	
general	to	focus	attention.	Hartley	and	Choi	(1996)	encourage	the	use	of	data	to	pinpoint	problem	
areas.	 Hines	 (1994)	 describes	 the	 benchmarking	 of	 suppliers	 within	 an	 SA	 to	 identify	 individual	
priorities	 and	 also	 to	 identify	 common	 themes	with	other	members	of	 the	 group.	Quayle	 (2000)	
recommends	benchmarking	to	be	performed	against	best-in-class	suppliers	but,	if	not	practical,	to	
be	at	 least	against	best-in-country	 suppliers.	Krause	and	Handfield	 (1999)	call	 for	an	on-site	“risk	
assessment”	to	be	conducted	by	a	cross-functional	team.	A	consensus	approach	(i.e.	strong	buy-in	
from	both	parties;	 the	 supplier	 and	 the	buyer)	 is	 emphasised	 in	most	 articles,	 together	with	 the	
setting	and	agreement	of	realistic	levels	of	improvement.		
	
Guideline	7.2	–	Configure	the	approach	to	suit:	Hartley	and	Jones	 (1997)	warn	against	 too	much	
mindless	repetition	if	the	desired	output	is	to	build	self-learning	capability	in	the	supplier	for	their	
long	term	sustainment	of	results.	Gordon	(2008)	warn	against	falling	victim	to	a	“trap	of	tools”.	Aitken	
(1998)	also	found	different	approaches	being	followed	with	different	levels	of	success.	He	proposes	
a	more	overt	approach	of	 tracking	effectiveness	over	 time.	SEDB	 (2017)	provides	an	approach	 to	
accommodate	 firms	 who	 have	 different	 starting	 points	 on	 their	 journey	 to	 a	 Digital	 Enterprise.	
Furthermore,	BCG	(2017)	has	developed	their	offering	to	provide	an	integrated	combination	of	lean	
tools	and	digital	technologies.		
	
Guideline	7.3	–	Use	demonstrators	and	quick-wins:	Hartley	and	Choi	(1996)	use	the	term	“model	
line”	to	describe	how	automotive	manufacturers	use	a	portion	of	their	production	 line,	 judged	to	
offer	 the	most	 potential,	 as	 the	 initial	 area	 of	 focus	 from	which	 to	 demonstrate	 improvements.	
Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	use	the	idiom	“learn	to	crawl	before	you	learn	to	run”.	Handfield	et	al	
(2000)	provide	examples	of	an	evaluation	criteria	to	 identify	 launch	projects	which	 is	based	upon	
ease/benefit	 considerations	 (i.e.	 Boston	 Matrix).	 Furthermore,	 BCG	 (2017)	 propose	 the	 rapid	
development	of	a	“minimum	viable	solution”	which	can	be	subsequently	improved	through	iteration.	
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Consideration	7a	–	Encourage	organic	and	direct	involvement:	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	give	an	
example	 of	 a	 buying	 firm	 providing	 significant	 support	 to	 its	 suppliers	 to	 help	 them	 with	 their	
adoption	of	 Electronic	Data	 Interchange	 (EDI).	 The	buying	 firm	provides	on-site	 training	and	also	
makes	 recommendations	 on	 hardware	 and	 software.	 The	 employees	 in	 the	 buying	 firm	 are	
encouraged	to	reach	out	and	do	this	with	all	of	their	suppliers.	Quayle	(2000)	also	cites	the	provision	
of	free	computer	hardware	to	encourage	the	adoption	of	EDI	amongst	small	and	medium	enterprises.	
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2.2.8 Generic process step 8: Growth of results for the longer term 
I	delineate	the	final	generic	steps	in	the	process	into:	delivery	of	short	term	results	(step	7),	growth	
of	results	for	the	longer	term	(step	8),	and	embedding	into	routine	business	(step	9).	Most	articles	
cover	the	first	of	these;	however,	very	few	cover	the	last.		
	
Guideline	8.1	–	SD	activities	may	be	categorised	into	phases	and/or	using	a	matrix:	According	to	
Hahn	et	al	(1990),	it	helps	to	categorise	potential	activities	in	order	to	narrow	their	focus	and	direct	
their	resolution	into:	capability	(technical,	manufacturing,	quality,	delivery,	financial,	or	managerial)	
and	 source	 (product,	 process,	 or	 operating	 system).	 Furthermore,	 Krause	 and	 Handfield	 (1999)	
identify	three	phases	of	progression	for	the	SD	process;	from	reactive	(problem	solving),	to	proactive,	
and	finally	to	integrative.	None	of	the	other	articles	are	as	explicit	as	these	in	their	categorisation;	
however,	on	the	whole,	they	consistently	lack	detail	on	what	constitutes	the	end	of	the	SD	process	
and	how	to	spot/implement	it.	
	
Guideline	8.2	–	Take	a	system-wide	approach:	Hartley	and	Jones	(1997)	argue	that	a	system-wide	
approach	 is	 required	 in	order	 for	SD	to	succeed.	They	explain	how	this	 is	due	 to	 the	 interrelated	
nature	of	technical,	managerial,	and	social	systems.	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	identify	the	skills	
gaps	 which	 exist	 and	 the	 requirement	 for	 suppliers	 to	 be	 coached	 to	 take	 a	 broader	 systems	
perspective.	
	
Guideline	8.3	–	Keep	 fresh:	Hines	 (1994)	 suggests	an	 iterative	 review	cycle	of	every	6	months	 to	
reflect	and	refocus.	He	scopes	this	widely	to	cover	supplier	membership,	active	programmes	of	work,	
etc.	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	describe	a	journey	of	progression.	Aitken	(1998)	also	warns	against	
creating	a	“talking	shop”.	He	argues	that	continued	inactivity	can	prevail;	particularly	if	suppliers	are	
adopting	a	“passive”	strategy	to	their	engagement	and	support.		
	
Guideline	8.4	–	Each	supplier	should	own	its	roadmap:	According	to	Hahn	et	al	(1990),	each	supplier	
has	a	unique	set	of	problems	and	is	starting/progressing	SD	with	different	resources	and	capability	
levels.	Many	of	 the	articles	use	 the	 term	“roadmap”	 to	describe	 the	 sequenced	plan	which	each	
supplier	should	“own”	to	achieve	their	goals	and	objectives.	
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Consideration	 8a	 –	 Share	 long-term	 strategies:	 Hines	 (1994)	 recommends	 sharing	 of	 long-term	
strategies	to	coordinate	a	supplier	network	and	to	build	synergistic	relationships.	He	points	to	sharing	
multilaterally	by	describing	the	different	axes	of	communication:	customer	to	supplier;	visa-versa;	
and	between	suppliers	once	their	common	themes	and	synergies	have	become	apparent.	Krause	and	
Handfield	 (1999)	also	refer	 to	the	sharing	of	 technology	roadmaps	with	suppliers	who	have	been	
selected	for	new	product/process	development.	
	
Consideration	8b	–	Create	an	expectations	roadmap:	Handfield	et	al	(2000)	list	their	top	pitfalls	for	
SD.	They	explain	the	need	for	buying	firms	to	clearly	articulate	the	value	proposition	to	the	supplier’s	
top	management	 in	order	to	obtain	and	retain	their	commitment.	They	go	onto	describe	how	an	
“expectations	 roadmap”	 can	 help	 to	 build	 trust	 and	 improve	 alignment.	 A	 number	 of	 the	 other	
articles	also	touch	on	this	challenge	of	bridging	the	gap	between	different	corporate	cultures	and	
aspirations.	Collectively,	potential	outcomes	in	buyer/supplier	relationships	are	discussed	in	terms	
of:	win/win,	win/lose,	win/draw,	or	visa-versa.	 
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2.2.9 Generic process step 9: Embedding into routine business	
This	is	the	final	generic	step	of	the	process	and,	unlike	all	previous	steps,	it	is	not	well	covered	by	any	
of	the	articles.	There	is	an	important	gap	in	how	to	play	the	end-game.	From	spotting	and	preparing	
for	it	well	in	advance,	through	to	the	phasing	and	transition	of	matters	into	routine	business.		
	
Guideline	9.1	–	Use	of	the	carrot	and	stick:	This	aspect	is	covered	by	most	articles.	Hahn	et	al	(1990)	
describe	 how	 the	 SD	 programme,	 if	 run	 properly	 over	 the	 long	 run,	 will	 result	 in	 participating	
suppliers	qualifying	for	“certified”	or	“preferred	supplier”	status	or,	if	they	do	not	achieve	the	desired	
results,	being	removed	from	the	supplier	base.	Hartley	and	Jones	(1997)	and	Krause	and	Handfield	
(1999)	discuss	these	and	a	range	of	other	forms	of	incentives/rewards	or	warnings/penalties.		
	
Guideline	 9.2	 –	 Build	 a	 supplier’s	 capability	 to	 self-improve:	 For	 the	 long	 term	 sustainment	 of	
performance,	Hartley	and	Jones	(1997)	describe	process-orientated	as	opposed	to	results-orientated	
SD.	Hahn	et	al	(1990)	use	a	matrix	to	direct	SD	activities	towards	developing	future	capability	and	
flexibility.	Striving	to	embed	new	practices	and	behaviours	within	the	supplier	is	a	common	theme.	
Krause	and	Handfield	 (1999)	view	the	outcome	of	a	successful	SD	programme	to	be	a	self-reliant	
supplier	who	can	initiate	their	own	improvement	projects	and	maintain	momentum.	Some	of	the	
articles	touch	on	the	hierarchical	nature	of	the	supply	chain	and	the	requirement	for	larger,	top-level,	
suppliers	to	flow	down	the	SD	process	to	their	sub-tiers.	See	section	2.2.10	point	#3.	Furthermore,	
BCG	 (2017)	 describes	 the	 final	 phase	 of	 their	management	 consultancy	 process	 as	 “scale”	when	
improvements	are	shared	along	the	supply	chain	and	plant	network.		
	
Consideration	9a	–	Take	a	holistic	approach	to	SD	by	integrating	within	SPM:	This	is	the	missing	link	
in	most	of	the	articles.	The	SD	process	does	not	sit	in	isolation.	Some	researchers	make	this	point	at	
the	start	of	the	SD	process;	but,	none	embrace	it	at	the	end.	Gordon	(2008)	explains	the	role	of	the	
SD	process	within	the	broad	framework	of	Supplier	Performance	Management	(SPM).	Amongst	other	
things,	 she	describes	 supplier	 scorecards	and	 shows	how	key	business	drivers	are	used	 to	define	
requirements	 and	 set	 performance	 expectations	 for	 suppliers.	 She	 includes	 technology	 as	 an	
attribute	covered	by	supplier	scorecards	alongside	cost,	quality,	and	delivery	performance.	She	cites	
Boeing	 as	 having	 used	 it	 to	 measure	 the	 product	 development	 capabilities	 of	 their	 suppliers.	
However,	it	is	not	clear	what	role,	if	any,	this	played	in	their	SD	process.		
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2.2.10 Collation, including the addition of other referenced literature 
Figure	2.3	collates	the	guidelines	and	considerations	for	my	subsequent	research.	For	most	entries,	
there	is	a	clear	line	of	sight	to	the	source	through	sections	2.2.1	to	2.2.9.	However,	in	a	few	cases,	
the	literature	review	extended	beyond	the	thirteen	articles	through	their	referenced	articles	and/or	
background	reading.	Therefore,	to	capture	the	full	depth	of	my	literature	review,	five	supplementary	
points	are	included	in	Figure	2.3.		These	are	explained	below.		
	
Point	#1:	Gordon	(2008)	refers	to	the	concept	of	a	“Lean	Enterprise”.	In	their	publication	on	Lean	
Enterprise	 Value,	 Murman	 et	 al	 (2002)	 give	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 insights	 gained	 from	 the	 Lean	
Aerospace	Initiative.	From	the	same	research	school,	Nightingale	and	Srinivasan	(2011)	look	beyond	
this	 to	what	 they	 call	 “Enterprise	 Transformation”.	 Neither	make	 any	 specific	 cross-reference	 to	
SD/SA;	however,	their	work	contributed	to	the	synthesis	of	my	Guideline	1.3	and	Consideration	5a.	
	
Point	#2:	A	few	of	the	articles	(e.g.	Hartley	and	Jones,	1997;	Handfield	et	al,	2000)	make	reference	to	
roles	 in	 the	organisation	 to	 support	 and	drive	 the	 SD/SA	process.	My	background	 research	drew	
heavily	upon	Beckhard	and	Harris	 (1987)	who	propose	management	 structures	and	 commitment	
strategies	for	organisational	transitions.	Furthermore,	Kanter	(1999)	is	very	explicit	about	roles	and	
responsibilities	in	her	article	about	managing	the	extended	enterprise	in	a	globally	connected	world.	
Although	she	does	not	explicitly	cover	the	steps	in	the	SD/SA	process,	she	describes	in	some	detail	
the	 role	 of	 Network	 Champion	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Collaboration	 Resource	 Team.	 These	
supplementary	sources	contributed	to	the	synthesis	of	my	Guidelines	2.2	and	6.2.	
	
Point	#3:	Gordon	(2008)	gives	examples	of	practices	followed	by	Boeing.	My	background	research	
identified	an	article	by	Behrans	 (2008)	where	he	explains	 the	“Lean	Engagement”	model	used	by	
Boeing	to	configure	their	approach	for	different	suppliers.	If	a	supplier	ranks	high	on	their	strategic	
scale	 and	 can	 self-improve,	 Boeing	work	with	 the	 supplier	 to	 align	 strategies	 and	 they	 focus	 on	
improving	processes	between	their	companies.	By	doing	so,	higher	efficiencies	can	be	achieved	than	
by	either	company	working	by	itself.	If	a	supplier	is	strategic,	but	cannot	self-improve,	Boeing	work	
with	the	supplier	to	identify	and	address	the	gaps	that	are	preventing	this.	Finally,	if	a	supplier	is	not	
strategic	and	cannot	self-improve,	Boeing	use	the	services	of	external	consultants	to	help	the	supplier	
reach	their	own	self-improvement	plateau.	The	article	by	Behrans	(2008)	contributed	significantly	to	
the	synthesis	of	my	Guidelines	4.2	and	9.2.	
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Point	#4:	Hines	(1994)	describes	benchmarking	across	suppliers	and	how	this	can	be	used	to	identify	
gaps	 in	 performance	 and	 develop	 roadmaps	 to	 close	 the	 gaps.	My	 background	 research	 looked	
beyond	Supplier	Associations,	and	the	work	of	SD/SA	researchers,	to	those	in	the	field	of	Business	
Associations.	 In	 a	 recent	 study,	 there	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 broad	 alliance	 of	 companies	 and	 key	
stakeholders	 (FIDO:	Fast	 Identity	Online	Alliance)	who	formed	a	Business	Association	to	resolve	a	
digital	interoperability	issue	(Ronit,	2018).	This	article,	and	some	of	the	predecessors	in	this	field	of	
research,	contributed	significantly	to	the	synthesis	of	my	Consideration	4b.	
	
Point	#5:	Krause	and	Handfield	(1999)	refer	to	the	concept	of	the	“learning	organisation”	which	they	
attribute	to	the	work	of	Peter	Senge.	My	background	research	drew	from	his	publications	on	the	fifth	
discipline,	Senge	(1990	first	edition,	2006	second	edition),	and	sustaining	momentum,	Senge	et	al	
(1999).	Although	there	is	no	explicit	reference	to	SD/SA,	the	latter	publication	includes	a	full	section	
on	diffusion	and	a	sub-section	on	community	of	companies	which	have	particularly	strong	resonance	
with	SD/SA.	Furthermore,	Wenger	et	al	(2002)	build	upon	aspects	of	Senge’s	work	in	their	publication	
on	cultivating	communities	of	practice	and	managing	knowledge.	They	introduce	the	concept	of	the	
“extended	 knowledge	 system”	 which	 operates	 across	 the	 Extended	 Enterprise	 and	 includes:	
suppliers,	distributors,	customers,	and	a	variety	of	other	partners	and	communities	outside	of	the	
focal	 firm.	 Again,	 no	 explicit	 reference	 to	 SD/SA,	 but	 a	 strong	 resonance.	 These	 supplementary	
sources	contributed	to	the	synthesis	of	my	Consideration	6a.	
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Generic 
Process Step 
Guidelines 
Considerations 
for potential interventions when 
applying to Digital Enterprises 
1. Strategic	
review	
1.1	Deploy	other	supply	base	management	practices	
ahead	of	SD/SA.	
	
1.2	Launching	and	running	a	SD	programme	is	not	easy.	
	
1.3	Map	and	include	in	scope	the	total	global	Extended	
Enterprise	(see	also	supplementary	#1	in	Section	2.2.10).	
1a.	Operating	Systems	have	long	
been	an	impetus	for	SD.	
	
1b.	Disruptive	technologies	
change	the	paradigm.	
2. Selection	of	
method	&	
team	
2.1	An	informed	decision	is	required	on	if/when	to	form	
an	SA.	
	
2.2	Top	management	support	and	a	cross-functional	
team	are	essential	(see	also	supplementary	#2	in	Section	2.2.10).	
2a.	Establish	a	toolset	and	train	
the	team.	
3. Evaluation	of	
suppliers	
3.1	Evaluation	is	likely	to	need	to	cover	multiple	factors.	
3a.	Evaluating	suppliers	for	digital	
maturity/needs	will	not	be	
straight-forward.	
4. Selection	of	
suppliers	
4.1	Selection	criteria	must	be	robust.		
	
4.2	Suppliers	of	different	capability	may	be	selected	for	
different	purposes	(see	also	supplementary	#3	in	Section	2.2.10).	
	
4.3	If	starting	an	SA,	do	so	with	a	relatively	small	
membership.	
4a.	NPD	may	be	used	as	an	
alternative	to	SA.	
	
4b.	If	using	an	SA,	constitute	it	to	
facilitate	access	to	specialist	skills	
(see	also	supplementary	#4	in	Section	
2.2.10).	
5. Launch	of	
programme	
5.1	Use	the	power	of	the	voice	of	the	customer.	 5a.	Break	the	stereotypes	(see	also	
supplementary	#1	in	Section	2.3.10).	
6. Operation	&	
support	of	
programme	
6.1	There	can	be	flexibility	in	the	operating	model.	
	
6.2	Establish	change	agents	(see	also	supplementary	#2	in	
Section	2.2.10).	
	
6.3	Principles	and	project	charters	help	with	
communication	and	engagement.	
6a.	Promote	the	culture	of	a	
learning	organisation	(see	also	
supplementary	#5	in	Section	2.2.10).	
	
6b.	Confidentiality	or	open-
access?	
7. Delivery	of	
short	term	
results	
7.1	Diagnostics	pinpoint	specific	focus	areas	and	help	to	
prioritise.	
	
7.2	Configure	the	approach	to	suit.	
	
7.3	Use	demonstrators	and	quick-wins.	
7a.	Encourage	organic	and	direct	
involvement.	
8. Growth	of	
results	for	the	
longer	term	
8.1	SD	activities	may	be	categorised	into	phases	and/or	
using	a	matrix.	
	
8.2	Take	a	system-wide	approach.	
	
8.3	Keep	fresh.	
	
8.4	Each	supplier	should	own	its	roadmap	
8a.	Share	long-term	strategies.	
	
8b.	Create	an	expectations	
roadmap.	
9. Embedding	
into	routine	
business	
9.1	Use	of	the	carrot	and	the	stick.	
	
9.2	Build	a	supplier’s	capability	to	self-improve	(see	also	
supplementary	#3	in	Section	2.2.10).	
9a.	Take	a	holistic	approach	to	SD	
by	integrating	within	SPM.	
	
Figure 2.3: Summary of SD guidelines & initial considerations for Digital Enterprise 
(This	is	the	first	iteration	derived	only	from	literature	on	the	SD	process.	See	Figure	2.5	for	the	final	version	in	Chapter	2)	
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2.3 There are other related processes which have similarities to SD	
This	section	reviews	 literature	on	processes	which	are	similar	or	related	to	SD,	but	which	are	not	
commonly	referenced	or	included	within	that	body	of	research.	Scholars	of	SD	have	had	a	tendency	
to	be	somewhat	insular	and	to	be	more	applied	than	theoretically	grounded	(Sucky	and	Durst,	2013).	
	
	
2.3.1 Four areas of organisational learning research have resonance with SD 
Four	areas	of	organisational	 learning	 research	are	of	particular	 interest,	namely:	 (a)	 supply	 chain	
learning,	(b)	business	network	learning,	(c)	collective	learning,	and	(d)	action	learning.	Here,	I	have	
used	my	own	titles	where	there	is	no	commonly	agreed	taxonomy.	The	first	two	areas	cover	literature	
exclusive	 to	 a	 business	 environment	 and	 inter-organisational	 learning:	 (a)	 covers	 that	 which	 is	
hierarchically	 power-based	 and	 more	 contractual	 in	 nature,	 and	 (b)	 covers	 that	 which	 is	 more	
relationship-based	and	highly	collaborative	in	nature.	The	other	areas	cover	literature	which	is	less	
exclusive	 to	 a	 business	 environment,	 but	where	 nevertheless	 groups	 are	 central	 to	 the	 learning	
process:	(c)	covers	that	which	is	more	learning/development	orientated,	and	(d)	covers	that	which	is	
more	problem/solution	orientated.	
	
a) Supply	chain	learning	(SCL)	
The	key	tenants	of	SCL	can	be	found	in	a	report	to	the	UK	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry	on	
using	 supply	 chains	 to	 transfer	 learning	 about	 best	 practice	 (Bessant	 et	 al,	 1999).	 However,	
despite	selecting	six	case	studies	in	what	were	regarded	as	relatively	advanced	industrial	sectors,	
Bessant	(2004)	subsequently	found	mixed	results	when	studying	the	application	of	the	process.	
He	observed	that	a	focal	firm	generally	took	the	lead	and	followed	nine	sequential	steps:	(i)	wake-
up	call	at	focal	firm	with	the	drivers	varying	by	sector	and	location;	(ii)	initial	adoption,	internally,	
in	response	to	the	wake-up	call;	(iii)	realisation	that	the	internal	changes	are	futile	unless	their	
supply	 chain	 also	undergoes	 simultaneous	 complementary	 changes;	 (iv)	 rationalisation	of	 the	
supply	 chain	 so	 that	 complementary	 changes	 can	 be	 more	 readily	 implemented	 and	
synchronised;	(v)	communication	to	the	supply	chain	of	the	new	requirements;	(vi)	mandating	
change	in	the	supply	chain;	(vii)	assisting	first-tier	suppliers;	(viii)	assisting	first-tier’s	with	their	
sub-tier’s;	and	(ix)	developing	the	capability	to	learn	from	suppliers	and	not	just	to	teach	them.	
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Comparing	Figure	2.3	with	the	work	of	Bessant	reveals	many	similarities	between	the	nine-step	
processes	for	SD	and	SCL.	Furthermore,	there	are	no	noteworthy	gaps	in	that	which	has	already	
been	 captured.	 SCL	 has	 not	 received	 much	 attention	 from	 other	 scholars,	 perhaps	 as	 a	
consequence	of	the	mixed	results	reported	by	Bessant	or	its	closeness	to	SD.	Exceptions	which	
have	some	relevance	to	my	research	are	Loke	et	al	(2012)	and	Sweeney	et	al	(2005).	In	the	former,	
they	demonstrate	a	link	between	SCL	and	TQM	(Total	Quality	Management)	and	argue	that	the	
activities	 of	 learning,	 re-learning	 and/or	 un-learning	 across	 the	 supply	 chain	 are	 mutually	
beneficial.	 In	 the	 latter,	 an	 emphasis	 is	 placed	 upon	 integrating	 solutions	when	 sharing	 best	
practice	on	the	development	and	implementation	of	ICT	strategies	for	supply	chains.	
	
Branching	out	from	the	work	of	Bessant	and	SCL	per	se,	but	to	draw	in	research	which	specifically	
covers	 the	aerospace	 sector,	 then	Alfalla-Luque	et	 al	 (2013)	 studied	 supply	 chain	 integration.	
Although	they	identify	that	aerospace	suppliers	often	group	together	in	associations	or	clusters	
to	tackle	technical	and	management	difficulties,	they	found	no	evidence	of	any	specific	behaviour	
aimed	at	promoting	deeper	integration.	They	reflect	that	aerospace	suppliers	recognise	the	need	
for	 integration,	but	 see	 it	more	as	an	obligation	 rather	 than	 the	 result	of	any	“organisational	
conviction”.	 They	 predict	 that	 the	 growth	 of	 lean	 manufacturing	 will	 improve	 integrated	
behaviour.	However,	they	caution	that	the	spread	of	good	practice	has	met	with	some	resistance	
in	the	aerospace	sector,	because	of	fear	of	losing	competitive	advantage.		
	
Finally,	it	is	important	to	mention	the	work	of	Lane	(2001)	on	organisational	learning	in	supplier	
networks.	He	 identified	a	gap	 in	 literature	and	argued	that:	“Although	work	on	organisational	
learning	 in	 hierarchies	 can	 be	 adapted	 so	 that	 it	 also	 becomes	 useful	 for	 the	 simulation	 and	
management	 of	 learning	 in	 supplier	 networks,	 important	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 problems	
remain.”	He	pointed	to	the	magnification	of	impediments	in	supplier	networks	driven	by	conflicts	
of	interest	and	the	fact	that	competition	is	often	as	important	as	collaboration.	
	
Disappointingly	the	article	by	Lane	has	not	been	highly	cited	by	scholars	since.	An	exception	is	an	
article	 by	 Coghlan	 and	 Coughlan	 (2008)	 which	 sets	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 CoI	 as	 an	
alternative	to	SD.	This	is	covered	in	section	2.3.2.	
	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 42 - 
b) Business	network	learning	(BNL)	
BNL	is	a	broader	domain	of	organisational	learning	research	compared	to	SCL	which	places	more	
emphasis	upon	the	social	exchange	process.	It	is	not	as	context-specific	and,	therefore,	may	not	
tackle	the	research	gaps	highlighted	above	by	Lane	(2001).	Terminology	varies	amongst	scholars;	
however,	I	settled	upon	BNL	because	it	is	used	as	the	title	of	a	book	(Hakansson	and	Johanson,	
2001)	which	collates	research	performed	by	the	IMP	(International	Marketing	and	Purchasing)	
group.	At	the	time	of	publication,	the	series	editor	explains	that	the	IMP	group	had	been	studying	
inter-firm	relationships	for	the	preceding	three	decades.	They	describe	BNL	as	typically	occurring	
in	 three	 phases:	 (i)	 firms	 learn	 about	 one	 another’s	willingness	 and	 ability	 to	 continue	 doing	
business	together;	(ii)	firms	modify	the	routines	that	govern	their	production	activities	for	mutual	
and	synergistic	benefit;	and	(iii)	firms	embrace	longer-term	coordination,	for	instance,	through	
the	development	of	new	products	or	production	processes.	Other,	less	positive,	outcomes	are	
also	included	in	scope	for	BNL,	with	the	researchers	explaining	that	“learning	in	relationships	does	
not	always	lead	to	closer	relationships”.	
	
Knight	(2002)	uses	a	framework	to	position	extant	literature	on	inter-organisational	learning	and	
network	learning.	She	cross-tabulates:	(i)	the	context	of	learning,	with	(ii)	the	level	of	the	learner.	
From	her	 literature	review,	she	only	finds	one	 illustrative	example,	Dyer	and	Nobeoka	(2000),	
where	 learning	 by	 the	 group	 of	 organisations	 is	 performed	 as	 a	 group	 and,	 through	 their	
interaction,	the	groups	behaviour	or	cognitive	structures	are	changed.	Here,	she	argues	that	the	
network	can	be	said	to	have	learnt.	This	phenomenon	is	that	which	I	am	seeking	to	harness	in	
order	to	move	an	Extended	Enterprise	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	The	referenced	article	by	Dyer	
and	Nobeoka	(2000)	can	be	attributed	to	what	Cox	et	al	(2004)	stereotype	as	the	“lean	approach	
to	 supply	 chain	 management”.	 See	 section	 2.1.	 Hence,	 I	 have	 categorised	 this	 domain	 of	
organisational	learning	research	as	BNL	rather	than	SCL.		
	
Knight	and	Pye	 (2004)	go	onto	 further	explore	 the	 relationship	between	network	change	and	
network	learning	through	an	empirical	study	of	the	prosthetics	(artificial	limbs)	supply	network.	
This	provides	valuable	theoretical	insights	for	Chapter	3.	However,	the	supply	network	which	they	
study	is	simple	and	their	research	does	not	seek	to	address	the	more	complex	issues	highlighted	
by	Lane	(2001).	Overall,	I	found	no	additions	to	Figure	2.3	from	my	literature	review	of	BNL.	
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c) Collective	learning	(CL)	
Garavan	 and	 Carbery	 (2012)	 describe	 CL	 as	 a	 dynamic	 and	 cumulative	 process,	 involving	
interactive	mechanisms,	whereby	learning	emerges	through	individual	knowledge	being	shared,	
disseminated,	 diffused,	 and	 further	 developed.	 Thus,	 CL	 is	 similar	 to	 BNL;	 however,	 I	 have	
categorised	them	separately	because	scholars	in	each	domain	have	generally	worked	in	isolation	
from	each	other.	 The	 specific	 application	of	 CL	which	my	 literature	 review	 found	 to	be	most	
relevant	to	my	research	is	for	the	study	of	regional	development.	
	
Camagni	(1991)	was	one	of	the	first	scholars	to	recognise	the	importance	of	CL	for	studying	the	
growth	 of	 regional	 clusters	 of	 technology-intensive	 firms.	 Subsequently,	 Keeble	 (2000)	
synthesised	 a	 series	 of	 studies	 and	 concluded	 that:	 “Europe’s	 successful	 technology-based	
clusters	are	invariably	characterised	by	active	and	relatively	intense	local	networking,	involving	
the	exchange	and	development	of	new	knowledge	and	enhanced	collective	learning	between	local	
firms	 and	 organisations,	 notwithstanding	 these	 clusters’	 different	 origins	 and	 structural	
characteristics.”	He	 identified	 three	 additional	 conditions.	 Firstly,	 that	 long	 term	 support	 and	
persistence	 was	 needed,	 over	 several	 decades,	 even	 under	 favourable	 external	 and	
environmental	 circumstances.	 Secondly,	 that	 benefit	 came	 from	 the	 role	 which	 larger	 firms	
played	 in	 orchestrating	 CL	 and	 networking	 through	 their	 local	 subsidiaries	 and/or	 their	 local	
supply	base.	Thirdly,	the	need	for	access	to	national	and	global	innovation	networks	in	order	for	
local	CL	processes	to	be	sustained	and	remain	effective.	
	
Physical	and	virtual	modes	of	CL	can	be	seen	to	converge	through	communities	of	practice.	Cross	
and	Israelit	(2000),	for	example,	consider	this	in	the	context	of	different	levels	of	learner	in	the	
learning	process.	A	more	recent	example	comes	from	Gandhi	et	al	(2016)	who	study	the	use	of	
video-based	 technology	 to	 collect,	 share,	 and	 track	 the	 implementation	 of	 good	 agricultural	
practices	 across	 India,	 Afghanistan,	 Ethiopia,	 Ghana,	 Niger	 and	 Tanzania.	 They	 attribute	 the	
success	 of	 the	 non-profit	 organisation,	 called	 Digital	 Green,	 in	 driving	 improvements	 in	
productivity	and	well-being	across	the	rural	communities	to	their	use	of	the	CL	process.	 	They	
highlight	how	the	facilitation	of	CL	was	enabled	through	their	digital	system.		
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Looking	beyond	the	world	of	corporate	business,	some	researchers	have	 included	CL	within	a	
broader	framework	called	Collective	Impact	for	tackling	complex	and	large-scale	social	change	
(Kania	and	Kramer,	2011	and	2013).	Here,	they	list	five	success	factors:	
	
Firstly,	a	common	agenda.	All	participants	must	have	a	shared	vision	for	change.	One	that	includes	
a	common	understanding	of	the	problem	and	a	joint	approach	to	solving	it	with	agreed	actions.		
	
Secondly,	a	shared	measurement	system.	Efforts	remain	aligned	by	collecting	data	and	measuring	
results	 consistently	 using	 key	 indicators	 at	 the	 community	 level	 and	 across	 all	 participating	
organisations.	They	hold	each	other	to	account	and	learn	from	their	successes	and	failures.	
	
Thirdly,	mutually	reinforcing	activities.	Each	participant	undertakes	activities	in	which	they	excel	
in	a	way	that	supports	and	is	coordinated	with	the	action	of	others.	
	
Fourthly,	continuous	communication.	Participants	need	several	years	of	regular	meetings	to	build	
up	 enough	 experience	with	 each	 other	 to	 recognise	 and	 appreciate	 the	 common	motivation	
behind	their	different	efforts.	Even	the	process	of	creating	a	common	vocabulary	takes	time,	and	
it	is	an	essential	ingredient	to	developing	shared	measurement	systems.	
	
Fifthly,	a	backbone	support	organisation.	The	expectation	that	collaboration	can	occur	without	a	
supporting	infrastructure	is	one	of	the	most	frequent	reasons	why	it	fails.	Coordination	takes	time	
and	participating	organisations	rarely	have	any	to	spare,	therefore,	plan	for	it	explicitly.	
	
Insights	gained	from	my	literature	review	of	CL	are	incorporated	into	the	final	update	to	Figure	
2.3	which	appears	as	Figure	2.5	in	section	2.6.	The	contributions	are	labelled	as	CL	#1,	CL	#2	and	
CL	#3.	They	mostly	apply	to	generic	step	6	of	the	SD	process	(i.e.	operation	and	support	of	the	
programme).	However,	they	also	supplement	the	guidelines	and	considerations	for	SA’s.		
	
d) Action	learning	(AL)	
AL	 is	 the	 final	 area	within	organisational	 learning	 research	where	my	 literature	 review	 found	
some	relevance	between	it	and	my	research.	At	its	core,	AL	involves	taking	action	and	reflecting	
upon	the	results.	My	reason	for	including	it	here,	albeit	very	briefly,	is	because	it	is	explicitly	used	
by	Coghlan	and	Coughlan	(2008)	to	set	the	theoretical	framework	for	CoI	as	an	alternative	to	SD.	
See	section	2.3.2.	I	found	no	other	items	of	note	for	Figure	2.3	from	my	literature	review	of	AL.	
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2.3.2  CoI is a potential alternative to SD devised for purposes similar to my own 
Collaborative	 improvement	(CoI)	emerged	towards	the	start	of	the	twentieth	century	from	an	EU	
funded	project	called	CO-IMPROVE.	Kaltoff	et	al	 (2007)	explain	that	the	CO-IMPROVE	project	was	
launched	in	response	to	the	lack	of	clear	theories	and	tools	to	support	inter-organisational	learning	
in	Extended	Manufacturing	Enterprises	 (EMEs).	 They	noted	 that	 Information	and	Communication	
Technology	 (ICT)	 was	 still	 in	 its	 infancy;	 which	 was	 preventing	 it	 from	 bridging	 the	 functional,	
geographical	and	organisational	barriers	to	the	continuous	improvement	of	EMEs.	Furthermore,	they	
argued	that	even	with	suitable	ICT	systems,	learning	together	across	companies	in	order	to	improve	
collaboratively	is	a	non-trivial	protracted	process.	Cagliano	et	al	(2002)	define	CoI	as	follows:	
	
“A	 purposeful	 inter-company	 interactive	 process	 that	 focuses	 on	 continuous	 incremental	
innovation,	aimed	at	enhancing	the	EME	overall	operational	performance.	It	is	simultaneously	
concerned	 with	 bringing	 about	 change	 in	 the	 EMEs,	 developing	 EMEs	 capabilities,	 and	
generating	actionable	knowledge.	Finally,	it	is	an	evolving	systematic	change	process	that	is	
undertaken	in	a	spirit	of	collaboration	and	learning.”	
	
Cagliano	(2000)	argues	that	the	overall	performance	of	a	supply	network	is	partly	the	result	of	the	
interaction	 and	 integration	 between	 all	 the	 members;	 therefore,	 improvement	 should	 not	 only	
involve	actions	on	supplier	processes,	but	also	actions	on	inter-company	processes.	Cagliano	et	al	
(2005)	associated	SD	with	the	former	(i.e.	supplier	processes)	and	introduced	the	concept	of	CoI	to	
respond	to	the	latter	in	the	context	of	the	EME	(i.e.	inter-company	processes).	In	their	study	of	an	
Italian	aircraft	manufacturer	and	four	of	its	local	suppliers	over	the	period	of	May	2002	to	February	
2003,	they	conclude	that,	apart	from	complexity,	trust	is	the	main	limitation	of	CoI	at	the	EME	level.	
	
Kaltoff	et	al	(2007)	publish	one	of	the	main	concluding	articles	from	the	CO-IMPROVE	project	where	
they	compare	each	of	the	different	approaches	which	were	followed.	In	addition	to	the	case	of	the	
Italian	aircraft	manufacturer,	other	studies	were	performed	with	a	Danish	agriculture	hydraulics	firm	
and	a	Dutch	automotive	electronics	firm;	together	with	three	each	of	their	local	suppliers.	All	cases	
are	of	the	initiation	type	(Figure	2.1)	and	cover	up	to	19	months	of	attempting	to	get	CoI	launched	
and	operational.	
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The	different	 implementation	approaches	 to	CoI	are	characterised	by	the	researchers	as:	 (a)	 top-
down,	directive,	focusing	upon	goal	alignment	and	assessment	in	order	to	provide	a	foundation	for	
improvement	 before	 actually	 improving;	 (b)	 bottom-up,	 learning	 by	 doing,	 focusing	 initially	 at	 a	
practical	level	before	moving	up	to	strategy;	and	(c)	laissez-faire,	non-directed,	with	equal	focus	upon	
concept	 building	 and	 experience	 from	 practice.	 Kaltoff	 et	 al	 (2007)	 conclude	 their	 work	 by	
recommending	a	combination	of	all	three	approaches,	if	not	from	the	beginning,	then	soon	into	the	
CoI	process.	Their	critical	success	factors	for	implementation	are:	understanding	and	direction	(from	
a);	 activity	 and	 learning	 (from	b);	 and	a	 genuine	willingness	 to	 collaborate	based	upon	 trust	 and	
commitment	(from	c).	
	
The	outcomes	of	the	CO-IMPROVE	project	are	disappointing.	At	an	industrial	 level,	all	three	cases	
stagnated.		No	new	improvement	projects	were	started	by	any	of	the	firms	for	at	least	the	final	5	
months	of	 the	19	months	of	 study.	 Furthermore,	 each	had	previously	needed	 to	be	 rejuvenated	
relatively	shortly	after	launch.	At	an	academic	level,	the	published	articles	are	not	highly	cited.	The	
learning	from	each	of	the	three	cases	only	appears	to	have	been	synthesised	retrospectively	by	the	
researchers.	Also,	most	importantly	in	my	opinion,	the	difference	between	the	SD	and	CoI	processes	
was	 insufficient	 for	 such	 a	 strong	 conceptual	 distinction	 to	 have	 been	made.	 Had	 it	 been	more	
evolutionary,	 then	 lessons	 learnt	 from	 the	 SD	 process	 may	 have	 made	 the	 CoI	 process	 more	
successful.		
	
Nevertheless,	CoI	and	the	CO-IMPROVE	project	provide	a	few	valuable	insights	for	my	research	which	
are	incorporated	into	the	final	update	to	Figure	2.3	which	appears	as	Figure	2.5	in	section	2.6.	Their	
critical	success	factors	resonate	most	strongly	with	generic	step	6	of	the	SD	process	(i.e.	operation	
and	support	of	the	programme)	and	are	labelled	as	COI	#1	in	Figure	2.5.		
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2.4 SD could potentially play a strong and influential role in DT 
Having	reviewed	literature	on	the	SD	process	in	section	2.2,	and	on	similar	or	related	processes	in	
section	 2.3,	 this	 section	 now	moves	 onto	 aspects	 relating	 to	 digital	 transformation	 (DT)	 and	 the	
journey	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	It	is	not	until	recently	that	the	functionality	and	readiness	of	
digital	technology	has	made	the	concept	of	a	Digital	Enterprise,	as	described	in	section	1.2.3,	within	
the	grasp	of	industry.	Therefore,	this	section	distinguishes	between	enterprise-wide	digital	systems	
which	are	discrete	versus	those	which	are	seeking	to	be	further	integrated	as	per	a	Digital	Enterprise.		
	
	
2.4.1 SD for ‘discrete’ enterprise-wide digital systems or their antecedents 
As	 industrial	 computer	 technology	 developed	 in	 the	 late	 1980’s,	 early	 indicators	 emerged	which	
suggested	a	research	link	to	SD.	Bessant	(1988),	for	example,	highlighted	that	collaboration	between	
customers	 and	 suppliers	 was	 necessary	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 complexity	 and	 high	 levels	 of	 systems	
integration	 required	 for	 the	successful	exploitation	of	CIM	 (Computer	 Integrated	Manufacturing).	
Also,	 Mowery	 (1988)	 described	 how	 CAD/CAM	 (Computer	 Aided	 Design	 /	 Computer	 Aided	
Manufacturing)	had	made	easier	the	“spinning	off”	of	development	and	production	tasks	to	either	
domestic	or	foreign	firms.		Cooper	and	Zmud	(1990)	proposed	a	technological	diffusion	approach	for	
the	 implementation	 of	 information	 technology	 (IT).	 They	 developed	 a	 stage	 model	 for	
implementation	which	 concluded	with	 infusion	 (i.e.	 their	 vision	was	 for	 IT	 to	 be	 used	 in	 a	more	
comprehensive	and	integrated	manner).	They	argued	that	political	and	learning	models	may	be	more	
useful	when	examining	infusion,	rather	than	rational	decision	models.	
	
Few	scholars	of	SD	have	studied	the	impact	upon	supplier	technological	capability;	however,	Reed	
and	Walsh	(2002)	did	so	with	two	companies	in	the	UK	aerospace	industry.	They	found	little	direct	
evidence	 of	 any	 impact,	 but	 an	 important	 indirect	 effect	 primarily	 through	 the	 strengthening	 of	
communication	 channels.	 They	 cited	 an	 example	where	 both	 parties	 involved	 in	 the	 SD	 process	
(buyer	and	supplier)	had	been	influenced	in	their	adoption	of	CAD	software	by	the	partnership.	Also,	
Hahn	et	al	(1990)	mapped	supplier	technical	capability	to	their	computer	operating	systems.	They	
went	onto	conduct	a	survey	to	assess	their	relative	importance	to	SD.	However,	the	81	respondents	
(16%	response	rate)	ranked	the	domain	in	which	early	enterprise-wide	digital	systems	were	included	
as	being	of	the	lowest	importance	to	SD	(Watts	and	Hahn,	1993).	
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Recent	empirical	data	on	the	application	of	SD	is	very	patchy,	but	one	of	the	more	credible	sources	
of	research	is	from	the	Centre	for	Purchasing	Studies	(CAPS).	They	conducted	a	survey	of	SD	activities	
in	2014	which	received	43	responses	from	firms	of	varying	sizes	across	multiple	industrial	sectors.	
Unfortunately,	 there	 is	 no	 indication	 of	 the	 response	 rate,	 but	 they	 argue	 that	 Information	
Technology	 (IT)	 is	 the	 attribute	 which	 is	 ranked	 as	 having	 been	 the	 least	 influenced	 by	 SD	
programmes	(CAPS,	2014).	This	conclusion	is	consistent	with	extant	literature	from	SD	scholars	which	
shows	 limited	 application	 of	 the	 process	 for	 matters	 relating	 to	 information/computer/digital	
systems.	 Electronic	 Data	 Interchange	 (EDI)	 has	 received	 the	 most	 attention	 (e.g.	 Krause	 and	
Handfield,	1999;	Lauer,	2000);	however,	Laming	(1993)	helps	to	put	this	into	perspective	as	follows:		
	
“Developments	 in	electronic	data	exchange	have	changed	 the	nature	of	communication	 in	
industry	greatly	over	the	past	decade	and	look	set	to	do	so	further	for	some	time	to	come.	In	
the	automotive	 industry,	 suppliers	have	been	required	 to	have	on-line	connections	 to	 their	
customers	for	such	purposes	as	delivery	requirements	since	the	late	1980’s.	GM	Europe,	for	
example,	 intends	 to	 have	 100%	of	 its	 suppliers	 on	 EDI	 links	 for	 shipping	 schedules,	 actual	
delivery	data	and	stock	status	data	by	1994.	Development	of	more	technical	communications	
–	design	data,	etc.,	has	been	slower,	due	to	the	greater	complexity	of	such	transmission,	and	
the	problems	for	customer	and	supplier	of	protecting	intellectual	property	rights	(an	electronic	
‘drawing’	sent	down	a	computer	line	is	more	vulnerable	to	piracy	than	a	traditional	print).”	
	
Therefore,	given	the	limited	insight	which	can	be	gained	from	SD	scholars,	I	now	turn	my	attention	
to	those	from	other	fields.	The	quote	above	from	Laming	suggests	that	the	implementation	of	PLM	
(product	lifecycle	management)	related	technologies	is	more	complex	than	EDI.	Hence,	I	reviewed	
articles	covering	these	technologies	and	compared	them	against	the	SD	process	steps	and	guidelines	
from	Figure	2.3.	The	results	for	those	which	I	found	most	informative	are	plotted	in	Figure	2.4.		
	
My	reason	for	selecting	the	articles	used	in	Figure	2.4	is:	Pawar	and	Driva	(2000)	provide	the	seminal,	
step-wise,	 implementation	framework	for	EDI	within	a	supply	chain	environment;	Waterson	et	al	
(2001)	study	the	implementation	of	a	PLM	related	technology	at	Rolls-Royce;	McBeth	et	al	(2006)	
study	the	implementation	of	another	related	technology	which	builds	upon	the	previous	and	covers	
the	 first	use	of	virtual,	extended,	design	 teams	at	Airbus	UK;	and	Bokinge	and	Malmqvist	 (2012)	
synthesise	PLM	guidelines	and	use	them	to	inform	a	case	study	of	a	multinational	firm.		
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SD process 
step 
	
(from	Figure	2.3)	
EDI 
	
Pawar	&	
Driva	
(2000)	
PDM 
	
Waterson	
et	al	
(2001)	
DMU 
	
McBeth	
et	al	
(2006)	
PLM 
	
Bokinge	&	
Malmqvist	
(2012)	
Details of any additional 
points raised by the EDI, 
PDM, DMU, or PLM articles 
missing from Figure 2.3 
1. Strategic	
review	 	 	 	 	
	
EDI	#1:	Build	contingency	planning	and	
funding	for	technological	breakthroughs	
into	the	strategic	plan	for	change.	
	
2. Selection	of	
method	and	
team	
	 	 	 	
	
PDM	#1:	Set	a	clear	remit	for	JAD	(Joint	
Application	Development)	and	USER	
groups	throughout	the	implementation.	
	
PLM	#1:	If	digitisation	impacts	processes,	
then	change/improve	them	beforehand	
or	provision	to	do	it	simultaneously.	
	
3. Evaluation	of	
suppliers	 	 	 	 	
	
EDI	#2:	Spot-check	surveys	can	help	to	
highlight	broader	industry	trends	
including	digital	interoperability.	
	
4. Selection	of	
suppliers	 	 	 	 	 	
5. Launch	of	
programme	 	 	 	 	 	
6. Operation	&	
support	of	
programme	
	 	 	 	
	
DMU	#1:	Events	with	all	suppliers	
ensured	that	the	same	message	was	
given	to	them	all	at	the	same	time.	
	
PLM	#2:	Use	expertise	from	third	parties.	
	
7. Delivery	of	
short	term	
results	
	 	 X	 	
	
DMU	#2:	Events	with	suppliers	on	a	1:1	
basis	were	successful	at	resolving	issues	
they	encountered.	
	
PLM	#3:	Aim	to	satisfy	rather	than	
optimise	(which	I	interpret	to	refer	to	the	
concept	of	the	minimum	viable	product).	
	
8. Growth	of	
results	for	the	
longer	term	
	 	 	 	
	
EDI	#3:	Install	a	feedback	loop	which	
includes	monitoring	of	any	‘knock-on’	
cumulative	effects.	
	
9. Embedding	
into	routine	
business	
	 	 	 	
	
DMU	#3:	The	standard	required	is	
captured	in	a	matrix	for	aspiring	suppliers	
to	measure	themselves	&	close	any	gaps.	
	
	
Figure 2.4: Comparing SD process steps from Figure 2.3 with EDI and PLM research 
 
l	=	Agreement	for	the	purposes	of	synthesis	i.e.	consistent	and	reinforcing	recommendations	
X	=	Disagreement	or	aspect	requiring	further	investigation	
EDI	#1	through	to	PLM	#3	provide	a	cross-reference	to	Figure	2.5	DT	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 50 - 
It	can	be	seen	from	Figure	2.4	that	there	are	many	consistent	and	reinforcing	contributions	to	my	SD	
process	steps.	Unsurprisingly,	there	is	little	overlap	shown	against	steps	3,	4	or	9;	because	the	articles	
on	digitisation	relate	to	predominately	incumbent	suppliers	as	opposed	to	new	supplier	selection	or	
supplier	 performance	 management.	 However,	 one	 item	 against	 step	 7	 warranted	 further	
investigation.	McBeth	et	al	(2006)	reported	that	it	was	necessary	for	Airbus	UK	to	establish	a	DMU	
(digital	mock-up)	 support	 organisation	 due	 to	 “reluctance	 to	 change	 by	 some	 suppliers”.	 Here,	 I	
contacted	the	lead	author	of	the	article	and	was	able	to	confirm	that	her	findings	did	not	put	into	
question	my	own	approach.	 The	DMU	support	organisation	had	been	 temporary	 and	action	was	
taken	to	prevent	re-occurrence	through	that	which	I	have	captured	as	DMU	#3	in	Figure	2.4.	
	
I	found	nothing	further	to	add	to	Figure	2.4	from	literature	on	the	implementation	of	other	‘discrete’	
enterprise-wide	digital	systems.	For	example:	Mabert	et	al	(2003),	Laukkanen	et	al	(2007),	and	Snider	
et	al	(2009)	who	studied	Enterprise	Resource	Planning	(ERP)	 implementation;	or	Wiengarten	et	al	
(2013)	 who	 studied	 e-business	 and	 its	 influence	 upon	 collaboration	 across	 buyer/supplier	
boundaries.	Thus,	I	next	turn	to	literature	on	more	‘integrated’	enterprise-wide	digital	systems.	
	
2.4.2 SD for more ‘integrated’ digital systems (i.e. towards a Digital Enterprise) 
As	a	relatively	recent	field	of	research,	implementation	studies	do	not	yet	exist	to	the	same	level	of	
detail	 as	 those	 found	 in	 Figure	2.4.	 Therefore,	 here,	 I	 take	 a	 thematic	 approach	 to	my	 literature	
review.	The	findings	are	summarised	below	together	with	a	cross-reference	which	places	them	in	
Figure	2.5.	This	is	the	final	version	of	my	process	steps	and	guidelines	before	commencing	fieldwork.	
	
Co-evolution	(INT	#1	in	Figure	2.5):	This	is	an	update	to	the	entry	labelled	PLM	#1	in	Figure	2.4	which	
refers	to	the	relationship	between	digitisation	and	business	processes.	Laframboise	and	Reyes	(2007)	
examine	the	potential	for	more	extensive	digitisation	of	an	aerospace	supply	network.	They	identify	
a	need	to	integrate	several	business	processes	in	parallel	in	order	to	be	successful.	They	point	to	the	
co-evolution	of	the	digital	enterprise	systems	together	with	the	supply	network.		
	
Maturity	model	(INT	#2	in	Figure	2.5):	This	is	an	update	to	the	entry	labelled	DMU	#3	in	Figure	2.4	
which	 refers	 to	 establishing	 a	minimum	 standard.	 Pulkkinen	 et	 al	 (2018,	 2019)	 start	 to	 take	 this	
further	 by	developing	 a	maturity	model	 for	 a	Digital	 Extended	Enterprise	 during	 their	 study	of	 a	
company	and	a	few	of	its	suppliers	producing	machinery	to	handle	mineral	aggregates.	
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Systems	 and	 data	 roadmap	 (INT	 #3	 in	 Figure	 2.5):	 This	 is	 a	 supplementary	 note	 on	 technology	
roadmaps	to	the	entries	labelled	8a	and	8.4	in	Figure	2.3.	In	the	case	of	Rolls-Royce	and	its	supply	
chain,	 the	 scope	at	 launch	of	 this	 research	 (i.e.	 2016/17)	was	 limited	 to	product	 technology	 and	
manufacturing	 technology.	 Some	 of	 the	 implementation	 guidelines	 for	 ‘discrete’	 enterprise-wide	
digital	systems	pointed	to	expanding	the	scope.	I	captured	it	in	the	entry	labelled	EDI	#1	in	Figure	2.4.	
However,	it	is	more	strongly	emphasised	by	scholars	of	the	move	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	Oman	
et	al	(2017),	for	example,	study	the	integration	of	both	ERP	(Enterprise	Resource	Planning)	and	MES	
(Manufacturing	Execution	System)	 in	 the	automotive	supply	chain.	They	establish	a	bi-directional	
exchange	of	data	and	find	that	when	this	is	incorporated	it	offers	controlled	change	management	in	
the	supply	chain	and	real	time	decision-making.	Furthermore,	Guyon	et	al	(2019)	argue	that	there	is	
a	long	and	complex	journey	ahead	to	achieve	this	vision	in	the	aerospace	industry.	This	suggests	the	
need	for	a	more	comprehensive	systems/data	roadmap	between	Rolls-Royce	and	its	supply	chain.		
	
Strategic	plan	(INT	#4	in	Figure	2.5):	This	is	an	additional	guideline	for	step	1	in	Figure	2.3.	As	the	
complexity	of	enterprise	systems	has	increased,	and	the	desire	to	integrate	them	has	grown,	scholars	
have	started	to	turn	to	the	need	to	formulate	strategy	for	DT.	For	example,	Kane	et	al	(2015),	in	their	
article	about	becoming	a	digitally	mature	enterprise,	argue	that	strategy,	not	technology,	drives	DT.	
However,	Matt	et	al	(2015)	reflect	on	the	challenges	of	integrating	and	aligning	DT	strategies.	They	
argue	that	DT	strategy	cuts	across	various	other	strategies	at	the	same	time	and,	therefore,	warn	
that	complex	coordination	efforts	may	be	needed.	Hess	et	al	(2016)	propose	a	set	of	guidelines	which	
are	 based	 upon	 their	 research	with	 three	German	media	 companies.	 They	mention	 the	 need	 to	
acquire	or	develop	new	competencies.	Buyukozkan	and	Gocer	(2018)	point	explicitly	to	the	need	for	
a	strategic	framework	for	developing	the	digital	supply	chain.		
	
2.5 Background SD/DT process is established to initiate my fieldwork 
Whilst	no	scholars	in	sections	2.4.1	or	2.4.2	named	SD	outright	as	a	key	enabler,	I	contend	that	their	
work	suggests	that	it	could	play	a	strong	and	influential	role	in	developing	suppliers	from	within	an	
Extended	 Enterprise	 towards	 a	 Digital	 Enterprise.	 To	 this	 end,	 I	 shall	 refer	 to	 that	 which	 I	 am	
researching	as	the	supplier	development	for	digital	transformation	(SD/DT)	process.	For	clarity,	I	have	
combined	all	of	my	findings	from	chapter	2	and	then	renumbered	the	guidelines	and	considerations	
into	Figure	2.5.	The	origin	of	each	entry	is	provided	in	brackets	to	allow	it	to	be	traced	back	to	source.	
I	will	use	this	later	to	initiate	fieldwork.	 	
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SD/DT 
process step 
‘Background’ guidelines and considerations 
with which to initiate fieldwork 
1. Strategic	
review	
1.i.	Strategy	for	DT	cuts	across	various	other	strategies	at	the	same	time	and,	therefore,	complex	
coordination	efforts	may	be	needed	(from	INT	#4	in	section	2.4.2	and	1.2/1a	in	Figure	2.3).	
1.ii.	Build	contingency	planning	and	funding	for	technological	breakthroughs	into	the	strategic	
plan	for	change	(from	EDI	#1	in	Figure	2.4	and	1b	in	Figure	2.3).	
1.iii.	Map	and	include	in	scope	the	total,	global,	supply	base	(from	1.3	in	Figure	2.3).	
1.iv.	Deploy	other	supply	base	management	practices	ahead	of	SD/SA	(from	1.1	in	Figure	2.3).	
2. Selection	of	
method	and	
team	
2.i.	 Use	 methodology	 which	 integrates	 business	 processes	 and	 co-evolves	 digital	 enterprise	
systems	together	with	the	supply	base	(from	INT	#1	in	section	2.4.2	and	PLM	#1	in	Figure	2.4).	
2.ii.	Gain	the	support	of	top	management,	build	a	cross-functional	team,	and	train	the	team	in	
the	methodology	(from	2.2	and	2a	in	Figure	2.3).	
2.iii.	Make	an	informed	decision	on	if/when	to	launch	Supplier	Association(s)	and	set	a	clear	remit	
for	JAD	(Joint	Application	Dev)	and/or	USER	groups	(from	2.1	Figure	2.3	&	PDM	#1	in	Figure	2.4).	
3. Evaluation	of	
suppliers	
3.i.	Evaluation	is	likely	to	need	to	cover	multiple	factors	(from	3.1	in	Figure	2.3).	
3.ii.	Evaluating	suppliers	for	digital	maturity/needs	will	not	be	straight-forward,	but	spot-check	
surveys	can	help	 to	highlight	broader	 industry	 trends	 including	areas	of	common	 interest	and	
digital	non-interoperability	(from	3a	in	Figure	2.3	and	EDI	#2	in	Figure	2.4).	
4. Selection	of	
suppliers	
4.i.	The	selection	criteria	must	be	robust	(from	4.1	in	Figure	2.3).	
4.ii.	Plan	the	mix	including	different	capabilities	for	different	purposes	(from	4.2/4b	in	Figure	2.3).	
4.iii.	If	considering	the	launch	of	a	Supplier	Association,	do	so	with	a	relatively	small	membership	
or	perhaps	use	New	Product	Development	as	an	alternative	(from	4.3	and	4a	in	Figure	2.3).	
5. Launch	of	
programme	
5.i.	Use	the	power	of	the	voice	of	the	customer	(from	5.1	in	Figure	2.3).	
5.ii.	Break	the	stereotypes	to	inspire	and	avoid	apathy	(from	5a	in	Figure	2.3).	
6. Operation	&	
support	of	
programme	
6.i.	 Establish	 and	 maintain	 a	 backbone	 support	 organisation	 and,	 as	 appropriate,	 draw	 in	
expertise	from	third	parties	(from	CL	#1	in	section	2.3.1	and	PLM	#2	in	Figure	2.4).	
6.ii.	 The	 operating	 model	 can	 be	 flexible,	 but	 agreeing	 guiding	 principles	 and	 using	 project	
charters	may	help	with	communication	and	engagement.	Maintain	a	balance	between	top-down	
goal	setting	 in	combination	with	bottom-up	learning	by	doing.	Use	events	with	all	suppliers	 in	
attendance	to	ensure	that	the	same	message	is	being	given	to	all	at	once	(from	6.1/6.3	in	Figure	
2.3,	COI	#1	in	section	2.3.2,	and	DMU	#1	in	Figure	2.4).	
6.iii.	Promote	the	culture	of	a	 learning	organisation	and	establish	a	network	of	change	agents	
(from	6.2	and	6a	in	Figure	2.3).	
6.iv.	 Communities	 of	 practice	 may	 help	 to	 facilitate	 physical	 and	 virtual	 modes	 of	 collective	
learning	(from	CL	#2	in	section	2.3.1	and	supplementary	#5	in	Figure	2.3).	
6.v.	Set	policy,	and	keep	it	under	review,	for	sharing	through	either	open-access	or	non-disclosure	
(from	6b	in	Figure	2.3)		
7. Delivery	of	
short	term	
results	
7.i.	 Use	 demonstrators	 and	 quick-wins	 to	 promote	 the	 concept	 of	 agility	 (sprints)	 and	 the	
minimum	viable	product	(from	7.3	in	Figure	2.3	and	PLM	#3	in	Figure	2.4).	
7.ii.	Recognise	that	at	the	start	some	may	need	more	support	than	is	the	vision	for	the	longer	
term	and	that	it	takes	time	to	build	trusting	relationships.	Therefore,	be	prepared	to	configure	
the	 approach	 to	 suit.	 Events	 on	 a	 1:1	 basis	 may	 help	 with	 engagement,	 diagnostics	 and	
prioritisation	(from	7.1/7.2/7a	in	Figure	2.3	and	DMU	#2	in	Figure	2.4).	
8. Growth	of	
results	for	
the	longer	
term	
8.i.	Create	a	common	vision	and	vocabulary	(from	CL	#3	in	section	2.3.1).	
8.ii.	 Enhance	 long-term	 strategic	 road-mapping	 to	 include	 digital	 systems	 and	 data.	 Clearly	
articulate	both	the	expectations	and	the	value	proposition	(from	8.2/8a/8b	in	Figure	2.3	and	INT	
#3	in	section	2.4.2).	
8.iii.	 Each	 supplier	 must	 own	 their	 actions/roadmap.	 Install	 a	 feedback	 loop	 which	 includes	
monitoring	of	any	‘knock-on’	cumulative	effects	(from	8.4	in	Figure	2.3	and	EDI	#3	in	Figure	2.4).	
8.iv.	Keep	it	fresh	-	activities	may	be	performed	in	phases	(from	8.1/8.3	in	Figure	2.3).	
9. Embedding	
into	routine	
business	
9.i.	Integrate	into	the	process	for	supplier	performance	management	(from	9.1/9a	in	Figure	2.3).	
9.ii.	Develop	the	concept	of	a	minimum	standard	into	a	maturity	model	(from	INT	#2	in	section	
2.4.2	and	DMU	#3	in	Figure	2.4).	
9.iii.	Focus	on	inter-org	or	building	the	supplier’s	capability	to	self-improve	(from	9.2	Figure	2.3).	
	
Figure 2.5: Final version of the ‘background’ process steps & guidelines for SD/DT  
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2.6 Summary of research gap and key implications from this chapter 
Many	have	studied	fragments	of	my	research	space;	however,	none	have	looked	at	the	whole.	This	
is	perhaps	unsurprising	since	there	are	aspects	of	complexity	and	wickedness	(Figure	1.2).	A	Digital	
Enterprise	requires	a	suite	(plural)	of	integrated	enterprise-wide	digital	technologies.	Furthermore,	
these	must	be	adopted	and	diffused	 into	a	complex	 supply	base	 (i.e.	 firms	may	not	be	 receptive	
and/or	may	lack	the	capability).		
	
The	research	gaps	which	I	have	identified	and	targeted	through	chapter	2	are:	(i)	the	use	of	SD	to	
facilitate	 DT	 (Figure	 2.2;	 CAPS,	 2014;	Watts	 and	 Hahn,	 1993),	 and	 (ii)	 organisational	 learning	 in	
complex	 supplier	 networks	 (Lane,	 2001).	 Orlikowski	 and	 Barley	 (2001)	 argue	 that,	 because	 of	
important	epistemological	differences	between	the	research	fields	of	 information	technology	and	
organisational	studies,	much	can	be	gained	from	greater	interaction	between	them.	They	call	for	a	
fusion	of	perspectives	and	refer	to	such	“hybrid	studies”	as	being	different	from	the	mainstream	of	
both	fields.	
	
I	have	made	the	following	contributions	in	chapter	2:	
	
a) Introduced	the	nine-step	SD	process	through	synthesis.	
	
b) Identified	that	SD	is	a	viable	process	to	be	used	for	DT	and	shown	there	are	few	alternatives.	
	
c) Generated	a	‘background’	framework	of	SD/DT	process	steps,	guidelines	and	considerations	
with	which	to	initiation	fieldwork.			
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Chapter 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Explaining the theories and concepts 
used in my research 
	
	
	
	
	
	
Chapter	 1	 set	 the	 scene	 and	 introduced	 my	 research	 aim	 as	 being	 to:	 “Define	 the	 supplier	
development	(SD)	process	for	its	use	in	an	Extended	Enterprise	to	facilitate	and	support	organisational	
change	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise”.	Chapter	2	reviewed	literature	and	found	that	SD	had	only	been	
used	marginally	to	date	for	digital	transformation	(DT)	or	its	antecedents.	But,	 it	could	potentially	
play	a	much	stronger	and	more	 influential	 role.	An	 initial	version	of	 the	SD/DT	process	steps	and	
guidelines	were	synthesised	for	use	in	my	fieldwork.		
	
Now,	chapter	3	explains	the	key	theories	and	concepts	used	by	scholars	of	SD	and	DT	in	order	to	build	
a	theoretical	framework	for	my	research.	This	chapter	is	divided	into	seven	sections	from	3.1	to	3.7.	
It	begins	by	 introducing	 theory	 in	section	3.1	and	constructing	 the	 framework	 in	section	3.2.	The	
three	key	aspects	of	the	theoretical	framework	are	then	explained.	These	are:	contextual	factors	to	
characterise	firms	in	section	3.3,	Waypoint	A	to	study	supplier	choice	in	section	3.4,	and	Waypoint	B	
to	study	diffusion	and	organisational	adoption	 in	section	3.5.	Finally,	section	3.6	explains	that	my	
research	 paradigm	 is	 that	 of	 critical	 realist,	 and	 section	 3.7	 summarises	 and	 draws	 out	 the	 key	
implications.	A	bullet-point	executive	summary	is	given	overleaf	for	those	who	prefer	this	format.	
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Section	3.1:	 Overview	of	theories	and	the	key	concepts	associated	with	them	
• Six	 theories	 are	 introduced,	 including:	 institutional,	 organisational	 learning,	
knowledge	transfer,	and	diffusion	of	innovation.	
	
• Associated	concepts	are	introduced,	including:	learning	cycles,	dynamic	capability,	
absorptive	capacity,	downward	causation,	and	proximity.	
	
• A	 research	 gap	 is	 revealed	 in	 the	 operationalisation	 and	 measurement	 of	
absorptive	capacity	(Wijk	et	al,	2011;	Roberts	et	al,	2012;	&	Lewandowska,	2015).	
	
• My	level	of	analysis	shall	include	network,	dyad,	and	firm;	but,	exclude	people.	
	
Section	3.2:	 Theoretical	framework	created	for	my	research	
• Interfirm	knowledge	transfer	is	modelled	as	donor–recipient.	
	
• Waypoints	 A	 and	 B	 are	 placed	 on	 the	 journey	 towards	 a	 Digital	 Enterprise.	
Notionally,	 they	 are	 set	 at	 the	 transition	 from	 short	 term	 to	 growth	 in	 results	
(SD/DT	steps	7	to	8)	and	during	the	embedding	into	routine	business	(steps	8	&	9).	
	
Section	3.3:	 Contextual	factors	to	characterise	firms	
• Seven	contextual	factors	are	identified	and	a	proxy	is	readily	available	for	most.	
	
• A	 situational	 approach	 is	 developed	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 role	 of	 the	 firm	 in	 new	
product	development.	The	specificity	of	digital	systems	and	tools	is	not	included.	
	
• A	 new	 approach	 is	 developed	 for	 the	 operationalisation	 and	 measurement	 of	
relative	absorptive	capacity	using	supplier	scorecards.	
	
Section	3.4:	 Studying	progress	at	Waypoint	A	
• Supplier	choice	is	modelled	using	institutional	theory.	
	
• Responses	to	SD/DT	are	assumed	to	be	limited	to	5	options	(acquiescence,	etc.).	
	
Section	3.5:	 Studying	progress	at	Waypoint	B	
• Diffusion	and	organisational	adoption	 is	modelled	using	a	fusion	of	 institutional	
and	organisational	learning	theories.		
	
• Adoption	rates	are	predicted	to	rise	after	the	setting	and	sharing	of	best-practice.	
	
Section	3.6:	 Research	question,	scope,	and	paradigm	
• My	research	paradigm	is	that	of	critical	realist.	
	
Section	3.7:	 Summary	of	key	implications	from	this	chapter	
• Contributions	from	this	chapter	are	listed.	Also,	the	alternative	research	directions	
which	were	discounted	are	explained. 	
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3.1 Overview of theories and the key concepts associated with them 
Scholars	of	SD	have	had	a	tendency	to	be	somewhat	insular	and	to	be	more	applied	than	theoretically	
grounded	(Sucky	and	Durst,	2013).	Hence,	section	2.3	of	my	literature	review	expanded	the	scope	to	
include	organisational	learning	processes	with	applicability	to	SD.	This	exposed	the	importance	of	the	
relationship	between	learning,	knowledge,	change,	and	diffusion	which	is	central	to	my	research.		
	
Scholars	 of	 DT	 are	 far	more	 numerous;	 therefore,	 I	 will	 narrow	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 review	 to	 the	
theoretical	models	which	 they	have	used	 for	adoption	at	 firm	or	supply	chain	 level.	According	 to	
Oliveira	and	Martins	(2011),	the	most	commonly	used	are:	the	diffusion	of	innovation	(DOI)	theory;	
the	technology,	organisation	and	environment	(TOE)	framework;	and	combined	theories	which	often	
include	 institutional	 theory.	 As	 digital	 technology	 becomes	 ever	 more	 complex,	 the	 latter	 are	
recommended	in	order	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	adoption	phenomenon.	A	recent	study	
in	the	automotive	supply	chain,	for	example,	uses	a	combination	of	DOI,	TOE,	and	institutional	theory	
(Simoes	et	al,	2019).	
	
The	following	contents	of	section	3.1	give	an	overview	of	these	theories	and	concepts	which	have	
been	most	commonly	used	by	scholars	of	SD	and	DT.	This	can	become	a	complex	web.	Therefore,	to	
aid	 the	 reader,	 I	 have	 included	 a	 brief	 conclusion	 at	 the	 end	 of	 each	 sub-section	when	 there	 is	
something	of	particular	relevance	to	the	construction	of	the	theoretical	framework	for	my	research.	
	
However,	first,	it	is	apt	to	mention	the	theories	which	I	have	not	included.	Cropper	and	Palmer	(2008)	
provide	 a	 summary	 of	 theories	most	 commonly	 used	 by	 scholars	 to	 explain	 inter-organisational	
change.	 The	 field	 is	 fragmented	 and	 the	 theories	 vary	 strikingly	 in	many	 aspects	 including	 their	
treatment	 of	 the	 dynamic	 and	 temporal	 qualities	 of	 change.	 In	 addition	 to	 those	 which	 I	 have	
included,	 they	 list	 four	others	which	 I	 rejected	 for	 the	 following	 reasons.	 Firstly,	 transaction	 cost	
economics	which	I	rejected	because	the	link	between	SD/DT,	financial	efficiency,	and	organisational	
survival	 is	 as	 yet	 unproven.	 Considerable	 effort	 would	 need	 to	 be	 directed	 towards	 this	 in	 the	
research	and	it	is	not	an	area	of	personal	interest	for	me.	Secondly,	population	ecology	theory	which	
I	rejected	because	I	am	studying	incumbent	suppliers	in	an	environment	where	the	pace	of	change	is	
slow.	 Finally,	 strategic	 choice	 and	 resource	 dependency	 theories	 which	 I	 rejected	 because	 I	 am	
studying	a	mature	industrial	sector	where	the	creation	of	radically	new	partnerships	is	rare.		
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3.1.1 Organisational learning theory 
According	to	Argote	(1999),	the	study	of	organisational	learning	can	be	traced	back	to	the	1930’s.	It	
is	usually	conceptualised	as	a	process	(section	2.3),	but	literature	on	it	and	other	closely	related	fields	
has	 become	 characterised	 by	 diverse	 and	 overlapping	 terminology	 (Vera	 et	 al,	 2011).	 Before	
introducing	the	theory,	it	should	be	made	clear	that	organisational	learning	features	in	DT	as	well	as	
SD	research.	Very	highly	cited	articles,	for	example,	include:	technology	diffusion	and	organisational	
learning	 in	 business	 computing	 (Attewell,	 1992)	 and	 learning	 to	 implement	 enterprise	 systems	
(Robey	et	al,	2002).	
	
a) Learning	cycles	and	dynamic	capability	
Organisational	 learning	 theorists	 commonly	 use	 the	 concept	 of	 cycles	 to	 learn	 and	 to	 drive	
change.	It	 is	based	upon	first/second/third	order	learning	(Bateson,	1972)	which	later	became	
redefined	 to	 be	 single/double/deutero	 loop	 learning	 (Argyris	 and	 Schon,	 1978).	 Single-loop	
learning	refers	to	incremental	improvements	in	existing	ways	of	doing	things.	Vera	et	al	(2011)	
describe	it	as	occurring	when	“a	mismatch	between	intended	and	obtained	outcomes	is	detected	
and	corrected	without	changing	the	underlying	routines	that	govern	the	behaviours”.	Double-loop	
learning	involves	reflexivity	and	leads	to	the	learning	of	new	behaviours	rather	than	the	refining	
of	existing	skills.	Vera	et	al	 (2011)	describe	 is	as	occurring	when	“a	mismatch	 is	detected	and	
corrected	by	first	changing	the	routines	based	on	a	new	conception	of	the	universe”.	Deutero-
loop	learning	is	an	even	higher	level	of	reflectivity	that	is	said	to	occur	when	the	learning	process	
itself	is	examined	and	learned	anew.	Vera	et	al	(2011)	summarise	it	is	as	“learning	to	learn”.	
	
Helfat	 et	 al	 (2007)	 go	 onto	 define	 dynamic	 capability	 as	 “the	 capacity	 of	 an	 organisation	 to	
purposefully	 create,	 extend,	 or	 modify	 its	 resource	 base”.	 By	 contrast,	 operational	 capability	
refers	to	routines	which	empower	firms	to	deploy	their	resources	to	earn	a	living	in	the	present	
(Collis,	1994;	Winter,	2003;	Zahra	et	al,	2006).	Vera	et	al	(2011)	associate	double-loop	learning	
with	dynamic	capability	and	single-loop	learning	with	operational	capability.	In	an	article	cited	in	
section	2.3.1b	on	business	network	learning,	Dyer	and	Nobeoka	(2000),	suggest	that	the	notion	
of	dynamic	capability	needs	to	be	extended	beyond	the	boundaries	of	a	single	firm.	Building	upon	
their	previous	definition,	Helfat	et	al	 (2007)	define	relational	capability	as	“dynamic	capability	
with	the	capacity	to	purposefully	create,	extend,	or	modify	the	firm’s	resource	base,	augmented	
to	include	the	resources	of	its	alliance	partner”.		
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b) Absorptive	capacity	
One	type	of	dynamic	capability	is	absorptive	capacity	(Vera	et	al,	2011).	For	our	purposes,	it	can	
be	traced	back	to	the	seminal	work	by	Cohen	and	Levinthal	 (1990).	Hislop	et	al	 (2018)	define	
absorptive	 capacity	 succinctly	 as:	 “An	 organisation’s	 ability	 to	 understand,	 absorb,	 and	 use	
external	 knowledge”.	 Scholars	 often	 break	 it	 down	 into	 a	 number	 of	 discrete	 knowledge	
processes	 (e.g.	 acquisition,	 assimilation,	 transformation,	 and	 exploitation:	 in	 accordance	with	
Zahra	and	George,	2002).	
	
Many	scholars	point	to	absorptive	capacity	as	being	important	to	my	research,	for	example:	SD	
(e.g.	MacDuffie	and	Helper,	1997;	Dyer	and	Nobeoka,	2000;	and	Arroyo-Lopez	et	al,	2012),	DT	
(e.g.	 Malhotra	 et	 al,	 2005;	 and	 Roberts	 et	 al,	 2012),	 inter-organisational	 and	 buyer/supplier	
relationships	(e.g.	Lane	et	al,	2001;	Volberda	et	al,	2010;	Saenz	et	al,	2014),	open	innovation	(e.g.	
Lichtenthaler	and	Lichtenthaler,	2009;	Su	et	al,	2013;	Lakemond	et	al,	2016),	and	evolutionary	
economic	geography	(e.g.	Giuliani,	2010;	and	Malmberg	and	Maskell,	2010).	The	five	articles	cited	
against	SD	and	DT	are	explored	in	more	detail	in	the	paragraphs	below.		
	
Dyer	 and	 Nobeoka	 (2000)	 were	 introduced	 in	 section	 2.3.1b	 in	 relation	 to	 SD	 and	 business	
network	learning.	They	performed	a	case	study	into	how	Toyota	facilitated	inter-organisational	
knowledge	 transfers	 across	 a	 network	 of	 first-tier	 automotive	 suppliers	 in	 Japan	 and	 North	
America.	They	pointed	to	the	nesting	of	the	network	 into	smaller	 learning	teams	based	upon,	
amongst	other	factors,	the	suppliers	which	achieved	a	certain	level	of	absorptive	capacity	with	
regard	to	the	Toyota	Production	System.		
	
MacDuffie	 and	 Helper	 (1997)	 also	 conducted	 case	 studies	 of	 automotive	 suppliers	 in	 North	
America,	but	with	Honda.	The	aims	of	the	SD	programmes	were	the	same	(i.e.	promoting	lean	
production	 and	developing	 the	 associated	 capabilities),	 but	 the	delivery	was	of	 the	dyadic	 as	
opposed	to	network	type	(section	2.1).	The	authors	used	absorptive	capacity	to	characterise	what	
Honda	 experienced	 with	 their	 suppliers	 from	 a	 long-term	 dependency	 and	 sustainment	
perspective.	They	characterised	larger	suppliers	as	having	more	absorptive	capacity	than	smaller	
ones,	 primarily	 because	 of:	 related	 prior	 knowledge	 of	 the	 traditional	 skills	 upon	which	 lean	
production	 was	 based;	 and	 a	 stronger	 identity	 arising	 from	 technical	 expertise,	 history	 of	
successful	performance,	cohesive	corporate	structures,	and	high	employee	tenure.	
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MacDuffie	and	Helper	 (1997)	concluded	their	article	with	 the	 following	statement:	“However,	
even	the	best	transfer	mechanism,	applied	to	a	highly	absorptive	and	responsive	recipient,	is	not	
sufficient	 to	 guarantee	 successful	 knowledge	 transfer.	 The	 fundamental	 lesson	 of	Honda’s	 BP	
experience	is	that	a	supplier-customer	relationship	which	generates	high	motivation	for	learning	
and	 high	 trust	 between	 provider	 and	 recipient	 is	 a	 crucial	 condition	 for	 any	 transfer	 of	 a	
complicated,	largely	tacit	body	of	knowledge	like	lean	production.”	
	
Arroyo-Lopez	et	al	(2012)	conducted	a	more	recent	study	of	SD,	but	reached	similar	conclusions	
to	the	previous	two.	They	obtained	survey	results	from	3	buying-firms	(50%	response	rate),	47	of	
their	 suppliers	 (100%	 response	 rate),	 and	 a	 further	 7	 suppliers	 (17%	 response	 rate)	 in	 the	
automotive	industry	in	Mexico.	They	confirmed	their	hypothesis	that:	“The	relationship	between	
knowledge	transfer	activities	for	supplier	development	and	improvement	of	supplier’s	capabilities	
is	moderated	by	the	absorptive	capacity	of	the	supplier.”	They	recommended	more	screening	and	
nesting/phasing	of	suppliers	on	SD	programmes	on	the	basis	of	their	absorptive	capacity.	
	
Malhotra	et	al	(2005)	performed	an	exploratory	field	study	of	the	RosettaNet	consortium.	Their	
focus	 was	 the	 building	 of	 enterprise-level	 absorptive	 capacity	 in	 supply	 chains	 through	
information	 technology	 infrastructure.	 They	 concluded	 that:	 “…	 enterprises	 have	 to	 build	
requisite	absorptive	capacity	to	prepare	for	collaborative	knowledge	creation	with	their	supply	
chain	 partners.	 Absorptive	 capacity	 in	 this	 context	 is	 the	 ability	 of	 enterprises	 to	 acquire	 and	
assimilate	 information	 from	 their	 supply	 chain	 partners	 and	 to	 transform	 and	 exploit	 this	
information	to	achieve	superior	operational	and	strategic	outcomes.”	
	
Roberts	 et	 al	 (2012)	 identify	 a	 research	 gap	 for	 the	 operationalisation	 and	measurement	 of	
absorptive	 capacity.	 They	 searched	 for	 evidence	 of	 absorptive	 capacity	 in	 literature	 on	
information	 systems	 and	 identified	 98	 articles.	 They	 revealed	 shortcomings	 when	measuring	
absorptive	capacity	solely	as	an	asset	(i.e.	the	firm’s	prior	knowledge	base	using	proxies	such	as	
the	number	of	patents	 raised)	and	pointed	 to	 the	need	 to	measure	 it	more	 consistently	as	a	
capability	(i.e.	in	accordance	with	my	earlier	definition	for	both	absorptive	capacity	and	dynamic	
capability).	They	drew	from	other	scholars	when	they	argued	that:	“To	conduct	valid	empirical	
research,	the	conceptual	domain	of	absorptive	capacity	should	be	effectively	converted	into	the	
operational	domain”.		
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Roberts	 et	 al	 (2012)	 also	 emphasised	 that:	 “…	 as	 a	 knowledge-based	 construct,	 absorptive	
capacity	is	domain-specific.	For	example,	a	firm	may	have	high	absorption	capacity	in	new	product	
development	yet	have	low	absorption	capacity	in	supply	chain	operations.	Developing	measures	
that	capture	the	knowledge	specificity	of	absorption	capacity	will	strengthen	construct	validity	
and	provide	greater	implications	for	managers.	Hence,	researchers	should	identify	the	particular	
knowledge	domain	for	absorptive	capacity	relevant	to	a	specific	research	context.”		
	
The	research	gap	for	the	operationalisation	and	measurement	of	absorptive	capacity	has	also	be	
characterised	by	 its	 level	of	analysis.	Wijk	et	al	 (2011)	divide	extant	 literature	 into	that	which	
considers	absorptive	capacity	at	the	firm-level	versus	the	dyad-level.	The	latter	is	of	most	interest	
to	my	research,	but	only	four	articles	were	identified	here	with	four	means	of	operationalisation:	
patents,	publications,	related	technologies,	and	questionnaire	scales.	The	far	more	recent	article	
which	they	cite	is	by	Tallman	and	Phene	(2007)	who	operationalise	based	upon	patent	citations	
and,	therefore,	lack	the	depth	sought	by	Roberts	et	al	(2012).	Regarding	the	other	approaches	to	
operationalisation,	at	either	dyad-level	or	firm-level,	Wijk	et	al	(2011)	explain	that	scholars	have	
often	had	to	resort	to	using	questionnaire	scales	to	differentiate	between	capabilities.	Compared	
to	 other	 aspects	 of	 research	 into	 absorptive	 capacity,	 they	 conclude	 that	 progress	made	 on	
operationalisation	and	measurement	is	low.	
	
Furthermore,	 the	 research	 gap	 for	 the	 operationalisation	 and	 measurement	 of	 absorptive	
capacity	has	also	be	characterised	by	 its	mode	of	measurement.	Lewandowska	 (2015)	divides	
extant	literature	into	three	modes	that	are	used	in	studies	relating	to	open	innovation:	perceptive	
instruments	 (i.e.	 questionnaire	 scales),	 input-orientated	 indicators	 (e.g.	 research	 and	
development	spend,	human	capital,	and	professionalism),	and	output-orientated	indicators	(e.g.	
patents).	She	 lists	strengths	and	weaknesses	for	each	mode	of	measurement,	but	highlights	a	
common	problem	with	the	lack	of	access	to	suitable	data.		
	
Conclusion	drawn	for	the	construction	of	my	theoretical	framework:	Absorptive	capacity	is	a	vital	
concept	 to	 include.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 research	 gap	which	has	 been	 identified,	 I	will	 seek	 to	
operationalise	and	measure	it	through	supplier	scorecards.	These	are	briefly	introduced	next.		
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c) Organisational	alignment,	scorecards,	and	maturity	models	
Kaplan	and	Norton	(1996)	were	the	first	to	introduce	the	concept	of	the	balanced	scorecard	to	
measure	the	performance	of	firms	and	align	improvement	initiatives.	This	gained	much	interest,	
but	 initially	 had	 a	 predominately	 intra-organisational	 focus	 (Frimanson	 and	 Lind,	 2001).	
Subsequently,	a	later	publication	had	a	whole	chapter	on	aligning	external	parties	which	took	a	
more	strategic	view	of	supplier	scorecards	(Kaplan	and	Norton,	2006).		
	
Cited	at	the	time	(November	2003)	by	Kaplan	and	Norton,	Rolls-Royce	were	described	like	many	
as	 having	 a	 key	 performance	 indicator	 (KPI)	 supplier	 scorecard	 which	 only	 covered	 quality,	
delivery,	and	cost	metrics.	Kaplan	and	Norton	argued	that	such	a	narrow	operational	approach	
would	“miss	opportunities	to	align	suppliers’	processes	and	their	human	and	information	capital	
to	enhance	supply-chain	performance.”	They	recommended	the	addition	of	other	perspectives	
and	attributes	including,	as	an	illustrative	example,	the	establishment	of	a	shared	objective	for	
the	buyer	and	supplier	to	extend	their	use	of	e-Commerce	together.		
	
Supplier	scorecards	may	incorporate	organisational	maturity	assessments.	Anderssen	and	Jessen	
(2003)	define	organisational	maturity	as	the	“state	where	the	organisation	is	in	a	perfect	condition	
to	achieve	its	objectives”.	In	SD,	there	is	a	long	tradition	of	using	organisational	maturity	models	
as	 benchmarking	 and	 diagnostic	 tools	 (e.g.	 Hines,	 1994;	 Hartley	 and	 Choi,	 1996;	 Krause	 and	
Handfield,	1999;	SC21,	2006).	Similar	are	emerging	for	DT	(e.g.	Mahdikhah	et	al	2014	for	PLM;	
NIST	2016	for	MBD/E;	Schumacher	et	al	2016	&	SEDB	2017	for	Industry	4.0;	Klotzer	and	Pflaum	
2017	 for	 digitisation	 of	 manufacturing	 supply	 chains;	 BSI	 2019	 for	 digital	 manufacturing).	
Nevertheless,	in	terms	of	maturity	models	for	processes	in	the	field	of	supply	chain	collaboration,	
they	are	judged	to	still	be	in	their	infancy	with	more	yet	to	come	(Ho	et	al,	2019).		
	
A	few	scholars	have	investigated	the	operationalisation	and	measurement	of	absorptive	capacity	
using	 balanced	 scorecards,	 however,	 in	 most	 cases	 this	 has	 been	 for	 intra-organisational	
purposes	only.	An	exception	is	McAdam	et	al	(2010).	They	studied	the	development	of	absorptive	
capacity	based	innovation	in	a	knowledge	transfer	partnership	between	a	small	to	medium	sized	
enterprise	 (SME)	 in	Northern	 Ireland	and	a	 local	university.	They	did	 so	by	 following	a	2-year	
action	research	programme.	Their	balanced	scorecard	was	not	pre-existing,	and	went	through	
numerous	iterations,	but	the	researchers	concluded	that	the	approach	was	generally	helpful.	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 63 - 
3.1.2 Knowledge transfer theory 
For	my	research	subjects,	Hislop	et	al	(2018)	categorise	their	knowledge	management	situation	as	
heterogeneous.	Multiple	firms	are	involved	who	have	very	distinct	differences	(e.g.	knowledge	base,	
sense	 of	 identity,	 native	 language,	 etc.).	 	 Under	 such	 circumstances,	 Easterby-Smith	 et	 al	 (2008)	
provide	a	donor-recipient	model	of	the	factors	which	shape	inter-organisational	knowledge	transfer.	
This	is	shown	in	Figure	3.1	and	it	helps	to	place	absorptive	capacity	(section	3.1.1b).		
	
	
Figure 3.1: Model of factors shaping inter-organisational knowledge transfer 
(Easterby-Smith	et	al,	2008)	
	
Easterby-Smith	et	al	 (2008)	consider	both	dyad	and	network	 relationships,	but	are	noncommittal	
about	them	and	call	for	more	research	into	which	offers	the	most	effective	platform	for	knowledge	
transfer.	Categorised	similarly	to	Figure	3.1,	Winkelen	and	McKenzie	(2011)	provide	a	checklist	of	17	
practices	 for	 knowledge	 transfer	 and	 inter-organisational	 learning	 in	 collaborative	 networks.	 In	
comparison	 to	Figure	2.5,	 there	 is	only	one	notable	difference	 in	 that	 they	 insist	upon	 long-term	
continuity	in	role	from	individuals	appointed	to	represent	their	firms.	This	is	covered	in	section	3.1.6.	
	
Conclusion	 drawn	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 my	 theoretical	 framework:	 Figure	 3.1	 will	 be	 used	 to	
underpin	my	theoretical	framework.	Absorptive	capacity,	intra-organisational	transfer	capability,	and	
the	nature	of	knowledge	will	be	incorporated	through	my	use	of	supplier	scorecards.	However,	social	
ties	will	be	excluded	from	the	scope	of	my	research	and	this	is	explained	in	section	3.1.6.	
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3.1.3 Institutional theory 
Mintzberg	et	al	(2009)	categorise	institutional	theory	as	coming	from	the	school	of	research	where	
strategy	 formulation	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 a	 reactive	 process.	 They	 explain	 that	 institutional	 theory	 is	
concerned	with	the	pressures	that	firms	face	from	their	environment.	Strategy	becomes	a	case	of	
finding	ways	of	acquiring	economic	resources	(e.g.	money	and	machinery)	and	converting	them	into	
symbolic	ones	 (e.g.	prestige	and	 reputation),	and	visa-versa,	 in	order	 to	protect	 themselves	 from	
uncertainty.	A	complex	and	powerful	set	of	norms	emerge.	To	be	successful,	a	firm	must	meet	and	
master	these	norms	which	drives	them,	over	time,	to	adopt	similar	structures	and/or	practices.		
	
For	my	research,	the	outcome	is	not	intended	to	be	an	enterprise	which	is	fully	homogeneous;	yet,	
the	process	of	change	can	be	considered	to	be	similar	to	that	of	homogenisation.	Meyer	and	Rowan	
(1977)	and	DiMaggio	and	Powell	 (1983)	use	the	term	“institutional	 isomorphism”	to	describe	this	
phenomenon	 in	 structure,	 process,	 and/or	 behaviour.	 Three	modes	 are	 identified:	 coercive	 (e.g.	
publishing	vision	statements	and	setting	 requirements),	mimetic	 (e.g.	benchmarking	and	 learning	
together	to	share	and	deal	with	uncertainty),	and	normative	(e.g.	training	and	exchanging	experts	
and	professional	 staff).	 Scott	 (2014)	 describes	 different	 forms	of	 institutional	 activity	 from	 those	
which	may	be	used	to	maintain	and	reinforce	existing	norms	through	to	those	which	may	be	used	to	
create,	 innovate,	 or	 disrupt.	 He	 mentions	 business	 associations	 and	 communities	 of	 practice	 as	
examples	of	extending	institutional	activities	beyond	single	firms.		
	
Institutional	 theory	 has	 been	 used	 by	 SD	 scholars	 in	 as	 diverse	 settings	 as	 the	 buyer-side	
implementation	of	a	new	SD	programme	by	an	automotive	manufacturer	in	North	America	(Rogers	
et	al,	2007)	to	the	supplier-side	adoption	of	new	SD	practices	in	agricultural	diary	supply	chains	in	
India	 (Yawar	 and	Kauppi,	 2018).	More	 generically,	 it	 has	 also	been	 shown	 to	help	 to	 explain	 the	
adoption	 of	 new	 manufacturing	 practices	 across	 global	 industry	 (Ketokivi	 and	 Schroeder,	 2004;	
Turkulainen,	 2017).	 Furthermore,	 institutional	 theory	 has	 been	 used	 extensively	 in	 DT	 research.	
Robey	 and	 Boudreau	 (1999)	 use	 it	 to	 understand	 the	 processes	 which	 promote	 and	 impede	
information	 technology	 related	 change	 in	 organisations.	 Teo	 et	 al	 (2003)	 use	 it	 to	 predict	 the	
intention	 to	 adopt	 inter-organisational	 financial	 linkages.	 Currie	 (2011)	 develops	 an	 institutional	
theory	for	information	technology.	Pishdad	and	Hiader	(2013)	and	Bohorquez	Lopez	(2018)	develop	
institutional	models	for	enterprise	resource	planning	(ERP)	systems.		
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a) Downward	causation	and	causal	loops	
Writing	about	causal	power,	Elder-Vass	(2010)	explains	that	business	structures	and	associations	
exert	 a	 “downward	 causation”	 influence	 over	 their	 constituent	 members.	 My	 research	
circumstance	 fits	 with	 that	 classified	 as	 weak	 intensity	 (Emmeche	 et	 al,	 2000),	 because	 the	
suppliers	are	free	agents	and	are	not	constrained	by	regulatory	or	legal	requirements	to	act	of	
their	 own	 accord.	 Also,	 an	 interweaving	 of	 downward	 and	 upward	 looped	 processes	 is	 an	
important	feature.	Jong	and	Nooteboom	(2000)	describe	them	as	iterative	processes	of	mutual	
adjustments	between	the	buyer	and	supplier	 in	order	 to	sustain	strong	and	effective	working	
relationships.	In	their	study,	they	also	reveal	that	physical	location	can	influence	the	causal	loops.	
	
Conclusion	drawn	for	the	construction	of	my	theoretical	framework:	Weak	intensity	of	downward	
causation	and	a	process	of	mutual	adjustment	point	to	suppliers	having	choice.	They	may	not	
respond	 positively	 to	 the	 SD/DT	 process.	 The	 use	 of	 institutional	 theory	 to	 study	 this	
phenomenon	within	my	theoretical	framework	is	explained	in	more	detail	in	section	3.4.	
	
b) Institutional	thickness	
The	concept	of	institutional	thickness	is	often	attributed	to	the	seminal	work	by	Amin	and	Thrift	
(1994)	 on	 regional	 development.	 They	 specify	 four	 factors	within	 a	 given	 locality.	 Firstly,	 the	
strong	 presence	 of	 a	 plethora	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 organisation.	 Secondly,	 high	 levels	 of	
interaction	 amongst	 these	 organisations.	 Thirdly,	 the	 development,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 these	
interactions,	of	patterns	of	coalition	and	collective	action.	Finally,	a	sense	of	 identity	amongst	
participants	that	they	are	involved	in	a	common	enterprise.	In	the	most	favourable	cases,	they	
forecast	 outcomes	 which	 include:	 formal	 and	 tacit	 knowledge	 capture,	 sharing,	 and	 reuse;	
flexibility	to	learn	and	change;	and	high	innovative	capacity.	
	
Thick	is	not	necessarily	better	than	thin	e.g.	the	risk	of	lock-in	(Asheim,	2000)	and	the	need	to	
contextualise	 (Rodriguez-Pose,	 2013).	 The	extant	 literature	was	 revisited	by	 Zukauskaite	et	 al	
(2017)	who	stated	that	“indicators	of	institutional	thickness	are	rather	hard	to	estimate”	and	“it	
is	 important	to	deal	with	the	question	of	thickness	for	what	…	thickness	has	to	be	related	to	a	
concrete	phenomenon	on	which	it	might	have	either	a	positive	or	a	negative	impact”.		
	
Conclusion	drawn	for	the	construction	of	my	theoretical	framework:	Institutional	thickness	helps	
to	build	up	to	the	concept	of	proximity	which	is	covered	in	section	3.1.3d.	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 66 - 
c) Institutional	distance	
The	concept	of	institutional	distance	is	often	attributed	to	the	seminal	work	by	Kostova	(1999)	
on	 multinational	 enterprises	 and	 the	 transfer	 of	 practices	 from	 a	 parent	 firm	 to	 its	 foreign	
subsidiary(s).	 She	defines	 it	 as	 the	difference	between	 the	organisational	profiles	 (regulatory,	
cognitive,	and	normative)	at	the	different	sites.	For	practices	to	be	successfully	transferred	there	
must	be:	an	organisational	culture	at	the	recipient	which	is	supportive	of	learning,	change,	and	
innovation;	compatibility	between	the	values	implied	by	the	practice	and	the	underlying	values	
in	the	recipient’s	organisational	culture;	and	commitment	and	trust	in	the	transfer	coalition.	
	
Numerous	scholars	have	used	the	concept	of	institutional	distance	in	their	research;	however,	
relatively	few	have	directed	its	use	towards	supply	chains.	Exceptions	include:	Bhakoo	and	Choi	
(2013)	who	explored	heterogeneity	in	a	healthcare	supply	chain;	Busse	et	al	(2016)	who	assessed	
ethics	and	risk	in	global	supply	chains;	Dong	et	al	(2017)	who	studied	e-collaboration;	and	Ho	et	
al	 (2017)	who	studied	knowledge	 transfer	and	 trust.	There	has	been	 little	attention	 to	power	
regimes;	although,	Pallot	et	al	(2010)	applied	the	concept	to	distributed	working	environments.	
	
Conclusion	drawn	for	the	construction	of	my	theoretical	framework:	Institutional	distance	helps	
to	build	up	to	the	concept	of	proximity	which	is	covered	in	section	3.1.3d.	
	
d) Proximity	
As	 the	 name	 suggests,	 the	 concept	 of	 proximity	 has	many	 similarities	 to	 that	 of	 institutional	
distance;	 but,	 it	 has	 become	more	 favoured	 in	 economic	 geography	 literature	 (e.g.	 Regional	
Studies,	2015).	Knoben	and	Oerlemans	(2006)	review	extant	literature	and	list	seven	dimensions:	
institutional,	 cultural,	 social,	 technological,	 cognitive,	 organisational,	 and	 geographical.	 They	
identify	 three	 (geographical,	 organisational,	 and	 technological	 proximity)	 as	 being	 of	 most	
importance	to	inter-organisational	collaboration.		
	
Schmitt	and	Biesebroeck	(2013)	use	the	concept	of	proximity	to	reveal	heterogeneous	effects	in	
automotive	 supply	 chains.	Hansen	and	Mattes	 (2018)	explore	 the	 role	played	by	proximity	 in	
power	regimes.	Research	into	DT	and	proximity	is	still	very	sparse	(Pallot	et	al,	2010);	however,	
Dallasega	et	al	(2018)	find	evidence	of	digital	technologies	in	construction	supply	chains	mainly	
influencing	geographical,	organisational,	technological,	and	cognitive	proximity.		
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Increasingly,	theorists	are	shifting	from	a	static	to	a	dynamic	perspective	of	proximity.	Balland	et	
al	(2015)	lay	the	foundations	for	this.	The	dominant	processes	which	they	identify	are:	learning,	
institutionalisation,	 agglomeration,	 integration,	 and	 decoupling.	 The	 first	 two	 of	 these	 are	
covered	in	sections	3.1.1	and	3.1.3,	the	third	is	defined	in	a	manner	which	shows	itself	to	be	very	
similar	to	that	described	in	section	3.1.3b,	the	fourth	was	included	in	section	2.3.1a	through	the	
work	 of	 Alfalla-Luque	 et	 al	 (2013),	 and	 the	 fifth	 will	 be	 tackled	 later	 in	 section	 3.1.6.	 It	 is	
comforting	to	be	able	to	draw	this	comparison	from	an	 independent	source	having	arrived	at	
these	processes	through	other	routes	myself.	
	
Finally,	to	build	upon	section	3.1.1a,	a	brief	 introduction	to	the	concept	of	relative	absorptive	
capacity.	Scholars	using	cognitive	proximity	(section	3.1.3d)	or	cognitive	distance	(section	3.1.3c)	
often	trace	their	definitions	and	measurements	back	to	relative	absorptive	capacity	(Lane	and	
Lubatkin,	1998).	The	concept	allows	for	the	fact	that	a	firm	may	not	have	an	equal	capacity	to	
learn	 from	 all	 others.	 There	 is	 a	 learning	 construct,	 for	 example,	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 3.1.	
Furthermore,	there	may	be	an	optimum	(e.g.	Nooteboom,	1999	and	2006).	That	which	is	large	
enough	for	firms	to	offer	each	other	something	new,	but	not	so	large	that	they	cannot	understand	
each	other	or	reach	agreement.	
	
Conclusion	drawn	for	the	construction	of	my	theoretical	framework:	Proximity	provides	a	broad	
holistic	 view,	 therefore,	 I	 will	 use	 it	 to	 prioritise	 the	 contextual	 factors	 for	 my	 theoretical	
framework.	See	section	3.3.	
	
3.1.4 Diffusion of innovation (DOI) theory 
DOI	theory	is	usually	attributed	to	Rogers	(1995,	2003),	although	his	work	includes	and	is	built	upon	
the	work	of	many	others.	He	identifies	five	types	of	variables	that	determine	an	innovation’s	rate	of	
adoption:	perceived	attributes	of	the	innovation	(i.e.	relative	advantage,	compatibility,	complexity,	
trialability,	 and	 observability);	 type	 of	 innovation-decision	 (i.e.	 optional,	 collective,	 or	 authority);	
communication	 channels	 (e.g.	mass	media	 or	 interpersonal);	 nature	 of	 the	 social	 system	 (e.g.	 in	
norms,	degree	of	network	interconnectedness,	etc.);	and	extent	of	change	agents’	promotion	efforts.	
Adopters	are	categorised	as	innovators,	early	adopters,	early	majority,	late	majority,	or	laggards.		
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For	 studies	 into	 the	 adoption	 of	 digital	 technology	 at	 firm-level,	 a	 common	use	 of	DOI	 theory	 is	
through	an	assessment	of	the	digital	technology’s	innovation	attributes	i.e.	 its	relative	advantage,	
compatibility,	complexity,	trialability,	and	observability	(e.g.	Kapoor	et	al,	2014;	Oturakci	and	Yuregir,	
2018).	This	may	then	be	used	in	combination	with	other	theories	such	as	institutional	theory	or	the	
TOE	framework	(e.g.	Oliveira	and	Martins,	2011;	Simoes	et	al,	2019).	
	
Conclusion	drawn	for	the	construction	of	my	theoretical	framework:	Aspects	of	DOI	theory	are	similar	
to	others	in	section	3.1	and	their	mapping	is	shown	in	Figure	3.3.	I	will	use	the	‘perceived	attributes	
of	the	innovation’	later	in	Chapter	7	to	review	an	aspect	of	the	supplier	scorecards.	
	
3.1.5 Technology, organisation, and environment (TOE) framework 
The	TOE	framework	was	devised	by	Tornatzky	and	Fleisher	(1990).	In	their	book	they	give	an	example	
of	 the	 boundaries	 between	 firms	 using	 the	 case	 of	 buyers	 in	 the	 automotive	 sector	 who	 were	
unsuccessful	when	they	simply	tried	to	give	their	suppliers	deadlines	for	the	installation	of	computer-
aided-design	(CAD).	Tornatzky	and	Fleisher	(1990)	propose	that	there	are	three	contextual	factors	
that	 influence	 the	 process	 by	 which	 firms	 adopt	 and	 implement	 technological	 innovations:	
technology	(e.g.	its	characteristics	and	availability),	organisation	(e.g.	its	size,	structures,	and	slack),	
and	environment	(e.g.	the	market	structure	and	regulation).	The	TOE	framework	is	occasionally	used	
alone	to	model	information	technology	at	firm-level,	but	it	is	more	common	for	it	to	be	combined	
with	other	theories	(Oliveira	and	Martins,	2011).	
	
Conclusion	drawn	for	the	construction	of	my	theoretical	framework:	Aspects	of	TOE	are	very	similar	
to	others	in	section	3.1	and	their	mapping	is	shown	in	Figure	3.3.	Technology	is	covered	in	both	the	
entry	for	technological	proximity	and	absorptive	capacity.	
	
3.1.6 People and relationship theory 
The	level(s)	of	analysis	in	my	theoretical	framework	could	potentially	span	that	of	the	network,	dyad,	
firm,	and	individual.	Historically,	the	latter	has	been	the	least	researched;	however,	interest	is	now	
growing	(e.g.	Wang	et	al,	2018).	Also,	Figure	3.1	pointed	to	social	ties	as	being	one	of	the	many	factors	
to	consider	for	inter-organisational	knowledge	transfer.	Nevertheless,	 I	have	chosen	to	exclude	it.	
My	reason	for	doing	this	is	driven	by	research	priorities	and	the	impracticality	of	gathering	suitable	
data	during	three	years	of	fieldwork.	Below	is	my	justification	from	the	perspective	of	theory.	
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I	turn	first	to	Thompson	(1967)	as	one	of	the	formative	and	influential	researchers	of	organisations	
to	start	to	argue	my	case	for	not	including	the	individual	in	my	theoretical	framework.	In	his	work,	he	
frequently	refers	to	circumstances	when	people	in	organisations	are	omnipotent.	However,	he	also	
states	that	this	is	not	the	case	under	any	of	the	following	three	conditions:	(i)	when	the	complexity	
of	 the	 technology	exceeds	 the	comprehension	of	 the	 individual,	 (ii)	when	 the	 resources	 required	
exceed	the	capacity	of	the	individual	to	acquire,	and	(iii)	when	the	organisation	faces	contingencies	
on	more	fronts	than	the	individual	is	able	to	keep	under	surveillance.	All	of	these	conditions	apply	to	
my	research	(see,	for	example,	Figure	1.2).	
	
This,	 of	 course,	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 people	 in	 the	 firms	which	 I	 am	 studying	 are	 powerless	
puppets.	It	is	simply	a	measure	of	degree	and	influence.	The	following	quotes	help	to	explain	this:	
	
“The	higher	 level	 entity	…	acts	 through	 the	 individual:	 those	properties	 that	 the	 individual	
acquires	by	occupying	the	role	are	essentially	properties	of	the	organisation	localised	in	the	
individual.”	Elder-Vass	(2010)	
	
“Here,	it	is	the	specific	combination	of	effort,	rather	than	the	powers	of	atomised	individuals,	
that	is	the	[dominant]	causal	property	of	the	group	or	institution.”	Vincent	&	Wapshott	(2014)	
 
“The	organisation	is	an	appropriate	level	of	analysis	because	it	is	in	organisations	that	learning	
occurs	…	Ultimately,	diffusion	is	a	field-level	process	in	which	higher-level	institutional	effects	
unfold	through	lower-level	organisational	decisions	…	Further	shaping	the	decision	context	for	
organisations	at	the	field-level	is	the	presence	of	proselytizers	who	actively	persuade	members	
of	a	social	domain	to	adopt	a	diffusing	innovation.”	Chandler	and	Hwang	(2015) 
 
The	dominant	proselytizers	in	the	last	quote	manifest	themselves	in	my	research	as	the	people	whom	
I	refer	to	as	change	agents	(see	6.iii.	in	Figure	2.5).	Their	organisational	power	base	will	come	from	
them	being	expert,	referent,	rewarding,	coercive,	and/or	legitimate	(Hinkin	and	Schriesheim,	1989).	
Furthermore,	they	must	also	network	and	communicate	in	order	to	influence	effectively.	Some	of	
the	 change	 agents	 in	my	 research	 will	 inevitably	 be	more	 skilled	 at	 doing	 this	 than	 others,	 but	
regardless	they	are	acting	as	agents	of	the	firm	that	appoints	them.	I	will	treat	it	as	a	property	of	the	
firm	as	to	whether	they	appoint	a	suitable	candidate	to	be	their	change	agent,	track	their	progress	
and,	as	required,	intervene	with	support	and	encouragement.	 	
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3.2. Theoretical framework created for my research	
Figure	 3.2	 shows	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 which	 I	 created	 for	my	 research.	 I	 take	 the	 donor-
recipient	model	for	knowledge	transfer	from	Figure	3.1	and	use	contextual	factors	to	position	each	
firm	in	my	study	group	within	it.	The	contextual	factors	are	based	upon	previous	research	into	supply	
chains	(section	3.1.3d)	and	I	identify	a	suitable	proxy	to	measure	each	(section	3.3).	I	then	set	two	
waypoints	in	order	to	study	each	firm’s	response,	progress,	and	outcome	from	the	SD/DT	process:	
	
• Waypoint	 A	 assesses	 the	 initial	 period	 of	 launch,	 uptake,	 and	 engagement	 through	 the	
delivery	of	short	term	results	(i.e.	up	to	step	7	in	the	SD/DT	process).	Suppliers	have	choice	
and	 may	 not	 respond	 positively	 (section	 3.1.3a).	 Therefore,	 I	 study	 their	 approach	 and	
behaviour	using	institutional	theory	(section	3.4)	e.g.	is	there	evidence	of	acquiescence?	This	
first	waypoint	is	also	a	decision-point	for	continued	membership	of	the	SD/DT	programme	
and	it	is	possible	that	some	of	the	firms	in	my	study	group	may	not	progress	beyond	it.	
	
• Waypoint	B	 studies	 the	 longer	 term	 results	and	 the	embedding	 into	 routine	business	 (i.e.	
steps	8	and	9	in	the	SD/DT	process).	Here,	the	individual	and	collective	learning	outcomes	of	
firms	 can	 be	 more	 meaningfully	 assessed,	 because	 their	 level	 of	 engagement	 has	 been	
previously	 confirmed	 at	 Waypoint	 A.	 Therefore,	 I	 look	 to	 a	 fusion	 of	 institutional	 and	
organisational	learning	theory	to	study	them	(section	3.5)	e.g.	is	there	evidence	of	adoption	
and	diffusion?	
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Figure 3.2: Theoretical framework created for my research 
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3.3 Contextual factors to characterise firms 
Salimian	et	al	(2017)	provide	a	fitting	introduction	to	this	section:	“Effective	implementation	of	SD	
activities	 is	 contingent	 upon	 a	 thorough	 understanding	 of	 situational/contextual	 factors	 that	
moderate	the	performance	impact	of	SD	schemes	…	[it]	is	not	a	universal	concept	which	could	always	
bring	many	benefits	to	organisations”.	Figure	3.3	lists	the	contextual	factors	which	I	shall	use.	
	
Concept Proxy 
Level of 
analysis 
Measurement and source 
Geographical	
Proximity	
	
(from	sections	3.1.2,	
3.1.3b,	3.1.3c,	
and	3.1.3d)	
Location	
of	firm	 Network	
Established	approach	taken	
(e.g.	Knoben	and	Oerlemans,	2006)	
	
To	protect	the	identity	of	firms,	they	shall	be	
grouped	into	region	(Asia,	Europe,	and	North	
America).	Although,	further	granularity	on	
regional	clustering	is	retained	for	analysis	if	
required.	The	most	dominant	(HQ)	location	
shall	be	used	for	multi-national	firms.		
Organisational	
Proximity	
	
(from	sections	3.1.2,	
3.1.3c,	3.1.3d,	3.1.4,	
and	3.1.5)	
Size	
of	firm	 Firm	
Established	approach	taken	
(e.g.	Salimian	et	al,	2017;	Qamar	&	Hall,	2018)	
	
The	number	of	employees	in	the	firm	shall	be	
used	and,	to	suit	the	range	in	my	study,	
grouped	as:	small	firms	(<500),	medium	firms	
(500	to	5000),	and	large	firms	(>5000).	
Strategic	
alignment	 Dyad	
Established	approach	taken	(i.e.	Cox,	2014)	
	
The	position	of	the	firm	in	the	procurement	
portfolio	analysis	as	ascribed	by	the	buyer	at	
Rolls-Royce.	The	categories	application	to	my	
study	group	of	firms	are:	aligned,	sub-optimal	
misalignment,	or	dysfunctional	conflict.	
Tier	in	the	
Extended	Enterprise	 Network	
Established	approach	taken	
	
See	section	1.2.2	and	Figure	1.3	
Technological	
Proximity	
	
(from	sections	3.1.2,	
3.1.3d,	3.1.4,	and	3.1.5)	
Role	of	firm	in	
New	Product	
Development	
Dyad	
Situational approach required 
	
See	section	3.3.1	
Power	Relations	
	
(from	sections	3.1.2,	
3.1.3c,	3.1.3d,	3.1.4,	
and	3.1.5)	
Power	Regime	 Dyad	
Established	approach	taken	(i.e.	Cox,	2014)	
	
The	position	of	the	firm	in	the	procurement	
portfolio	analysis	as	ascribed	by	the	buyer	at	
Rolls-Royce.	The	categories	application	to	my	
study	group	of	firms	are:	buyer	dominance,	
supplier	dominance,	or	interdependence.	
Relative	
Absorptive	Capacity	
	
(from	sections	3.1.1b,	
3.1.2,	3.1.3b,	3.1.3c,	
and	3.1.3d)	
Supplier	Scorecard	
	
(from	sections	3.1.1c,	
3.1.4,	and	3.1.5)	
Dyad	
New approach required 
	
See	section	3.3.2	
	
Figure 3.3: Contextual factors to characterise firms 
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3.3.1 Measurement of technological proximity using the role of the firm in NPD 
Some	 of	 the	 articles	 reviewed	 in	 section	 3.1.3	 refer	 to	 the	 need	 for	 contextual	 factors,	 when	
appropriate,	to	be	situational	and	considered	in	relation	to	the	specific	phenomenon	being	studied	
(e.g.	Zukauskaite	et	al,	2017).	Therefore,	for	my	study	of	SD/DT,	I	judged	that	such	an	approach	was	
appropriate	 for	 technological	 proximity.	 Figure	 3.4	 shows	 the	 measurement	 criteria	 which	 I	
developed	from	concepts	on	supplier	integration	during	new	product	development	(NPD)	defined	in	
Monczka	et	al	(2000).	In	my	case,	categorisation	is	not	in	any	hierarchical	order	nor	on	a	maturity	
scale.	 But,	 labels	 from	 NPD1	 to	 NPD9	 are	 provided	 for	 ease	 of	 reference.	 My	 categories	 for	
technological	proximity	measure	the	fundamental	basis	of	the	supplier	firm’s	dyadic	relationship	with	
the	 focal	 (buyer	 firm)	 in	 the	 Extended	 Enterprise.	 For	 each	 technological	 proximity	 category,	 a	
different	value	proposition	is	likely	for	the	adoption	of	digital	technologies	and	the	move	towards	a	
Digital	Enterprise.	
	
	 	  DESIGN lens 
MAKE 
lens 
BUY 
lens 
Design/Make	
	
Design	
responsibility	held	
by	the	supplier	
High	
Level	of	physical	
integration	to	the	buyer	
NPD	
1 
Simultaneous	
engineering	is	likely	
to	be	required	
Driven	entirely	
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Figure 3.4: Measurement of technological proximity using the role of the firm in NPD 
(adapted	and	developed	from	Monczka	et	al,	2000) 
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I	 considered,	 but	 discounted,	 two	 alternative	 approaches	 to	 that	 shown	 in	 Figure	 3.4	 for	 the	
measurement	of	technological	proximity.	Firstly,	I	considered	measuring	the	strength	of	alignment	
between	the	supply	chain	strategy	and	the	functional	or	 innovative	characteristics	of	the	product	
(Fisher,	1997;	Harris	et	al,	2010).	But,	I	found	this	approach	to	offer	little	value;	because,	I	was	dealing	
with	incumbent	suppliers	and	there	was	already	good	alignment	for	all	of	those	in	my	research	study	
group.	Secondly,	I	considered	measuring	each	type	of	digital	technology	within	the	Extended	(Digital)	
Enterprise	and	the	match	between	it	and	the	supplier.	Pawar	and	Driva	(2000),	for	example,	list	three	
main	components	for	electronic	trading	to	take	place:	standards	to	structure	data,	communication	
infrastructure	to	enable	the	flow,	and	software	to	transmit	and	translate.	I	wrestled	most	with	how	
to	deal	with	 the	specificity	 required	here.	After	careful	consideration,	 I	decided	that	my	research	
would	assume	that	technological	proximity,	and	therefore	inter-firm	relationships,	are	agnostic	to	
the	different	brands	of	digital	software	and	infrastructure	used	by	firms.		
	
There	is	a	case	for	taking	the	opposite	position.	For	example,	the	focal	firm	in	an	Extended	(Digital)	
Enterprise	may	be	seeking	to	mandate	specific	brands	in	order	to	be	assured	of	digital	interoperability	
and	 cyber-security.	 Adoption	may	 be	 easier	 for	 suppliers	where	 the	 same,	 or	 highly	 compatible,	
brands	are	already	being	used.	Furthermore,	there	is	another	subtlety	which	may	contribute	to	some	
suppliers	 taking	 a	more	 cautionary	 approach	 than	 others.	 At	 present,	many	 of	 the	 international	
standards	required	for	exchanging	and	collaborating	with	digital	data	are	immature	or	incomplete.	
Consider	 this	 potential	 scenario:	 (a)	 supplier	 working	 with	 different	 focal	 firms	 finds	 that	 they	
mandate	 different	 digital	 brands;	 (b)	 supplier	 is	 forced	 to	 choose	 sides	 because	 the	 cost	 and	
complexity	of	dealing	with	incompatible	digital	brands	is	prohibitive;	(c)	supplier	becomes	locked-in	
to	 one	 focal	 firm;	 (d)	 supplier	 loses	 power;	 (e)	 focal	 firm	 leverages	 power	 to	 extract	 data	 and	
knowledge;		(f)	focal	firm	stands	up	another,	cheaper,	supplier	and	passes	data	and	knowledge	to	
them	via	the	SD/DT	process;	and	(g)	original	supplier	ceases	to	trade	unless	they	foresee	events	and	
pursue	other	business	opportunities	e.g.	not	being	so	eager	to	adopt	and	acquiesce	at	point	(b).		
	
However,	Figure	3.5	provides	a	glimpse	of	the	complexity	which	is	involved	in	gathering	data,	and	
keeping	it	up-to-date,	regarding	the	specificity	of	digital	systems	and	tools.	The	results	support	the	
findings	from	others	on	the	low	state	of	industrial	readiness	for	digital	manufacturing	(e.g.	Harris,	
2018	&	2019).	Knowledge	and	expertise	is	needed	to	determine	which	of	these	brands	will	operate	
seamlessly	together.	Furthermore,	it	is	a	snapshot	in	time	and	the	pace	of	change	is	increasing.	
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Figure 3.5: Survey showing the complex specificity of digital systems and tools 
(responses	received	from	63	suppliers	to	Roll-Royce;	55%	response	rate	to	a	survey	in	2019Q4)	
	
Hence,	in	addition	to	the	impracticalities	of	gathering	and	using	such	data,	I	decided	that	my	research	
would	ignore	the	specificity	of	digital	systems	and	tools	for	the	following	reasons:	
	
a) Functionality	drives	the	value	proposition:	Figure	3.4	gives	insight	into	the	desired	functionality	
of	the	digital	systems	and	tools	from	which	an	estimate	can	be	made	of	the	value	proposition.	
Like	any	asset,	firms	will	budget	and	invest	to	upgrade,	or	replace,	their	digital	systems	and	tools.		
	
b) My	theoretical	 framework	supports	convergence	over	 time:	Adoption	and	diffusion	occurred	
with	Total	Quality	Management	(Furusten,	2013;	Scott,	2014).	 It	 is	reasonable	to	assume	that	
similar	 will	 occur	 here	 and	 that	 it	 can	 be	 modelled	 using	 institutional	 theory.	 The	 value	
proposition	grows	as	functionality	grows.	Under	rising	pressure,	unresolved	issues	are	resolved.		
	
c) Casting	the	right	shadow:	The	vision	for	a	Digital	Enterprise	 infers	that	 it’s	digital	system	and	
tools	are	interoperable	(Figure	1.4).	Thus,	it	could	send	mixed	messages,	and	distract	from	the	
intended	direction	of	travel,	if	they	were	used	as	a	prime	attribute	to	contextualise	firms.		
	
d) Alternative	forums	for	resolution:	Two	forums	were	identified	by	Rolls-Royce	representatives	on	
international	 standard	committees,	namely:	A&DPLMAG	 (2014)	and	AESQ	 (2015).	 It	has	been	
shown	 to	 be	 mutually	 advantageous	 in	 SD	 programmes	 if	 multiple	 buying	 firms	 can	 take	 a	
collegiate	approach	with	their	common	supplier	firms	(Aune	et	al,	2013).		
	
NOTE:	 Although	 I	 did	 not	 explicitly	 ask	 at	 interview,	my	 perception	 is	 that	 firms	 would	 see	 the	
specificity	of	digital	systems	and	tools	to	be	more	an	SD/DT	process	issue	than	a	contextual	factor.	I	
cover	it	later	in	section	5.2.1	when	I	explain	how	the	collective	power	of	the	supply	base	was	sought	
to	be	leveraged	through	the	SD/DT	process.	There	is	a	long	way	yet	to	go	to	resolve	this	matter. 	
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3.3.2 Measurement of relative absorptive capacity using supplier scorecards  
A	research	gap	in	the	operationalisation	and	measurement	of	absorptive	capacity	was	introduced	in	
section	3.1.2b	(Wijk	et	al,	2011;	Roberts	et	al,	2012;	and	Lewandowska,	2015).	Therefore,	I	had	to	
develop	a	new	method	to	study	it	which	is	summarised	in	Figure	3.6.		
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Figure 3.6: Measurement of relative absorptive capacity using supplier scorecards 
	
Supplier	scorecards	are	introduced	in	section	3.1.2c.	They	have	evolved	at	Rolls-Royce	since	the	firm	
were	referenced	by	Kaplan	and	Norton	(2006)	and,	for	the	last	decade,	have	included	technology	as	
an	attribute.	Because	the	scorecard	combines	multiple	attributes,	Rolls-Royce	call	them	an	Integrated	
Supplier	 Scorecard	 (ISS)	 and	use	 them	with	a	 Supplier	 Engagement	Plan	 (SEP).	 Suppliers	have	an	
ISS/SEP	 if	 the	 buyer	 at	 Rolls-Royce	 assesses	 them	 as	 being	 strategically	 important	 and/or	
operationally	 significant.	 The	 list	 of	 ISS/SEP	 suppliers	 is	 subject	 to	 continual	 review.	 The	number	
peaked	at	122,	and	changed	by	no	more	than	5%	per	year,	over	the	duration	of	my	research.	
	
Supplier	scorecards	are	used	to	structure	the	monthly	business	reviews	held	between	Rolls-Royce	
and	its	suppliers.	They	are	seen	as	a	joint	output.	As	a	minimum,	they	must	be	completed	quarterly	
and	uploaded	into	a	central	repository.	For	the	first	3	years	of	my	research	(2016	to	2018),	the	format	
remained	unchanged.	However,	as	explained	 in	chapter	5,	this	was	changed	for	the	start	of	2019	
onwards.	In	all	cases,	supplier	scorecards	are	completed	independently	of	the	prime	researcher.	
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Figure	3.7	explains	how	my	new	method	of	measuring	relative	absorptive	capacity	using	supplier	
scorecards	 meets	 the	 dimensions	 and	 components	 specified	 by	 Zahra	 and	 George	 (2002).	 The	
supplier	scorecards	are	constructed	using	a	series	of	questions	against	which	an	assessment	is	made	
that	scores	the	supplier	from	three	(fully	achieved)	to	zero	(not	achieved).	Scores	are	summated	to	
give	an	overall	score	with	the	threshold	between	satisfactory/unsatisfactory	performance	set	at	70%.	
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The	 supplier	 scorecard	 (technology)	 benchmarks	 the	
supplier	and	ranks	their	technology	(product,	process,	and	
system)	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 ‘best	 in	 class’.	 The	 capability,	
availability,	and	track	record	of	their	own	internal	staff	are	
considered	plus	 the	 strength	of	 their	 external	 networks	
(universities,	research	centres,	and	professional	bodies).	
Also,	 the	 level	 of	 investment	 in	 the	 acquisition	 and	
development	of	technology	directed	towards	Rolls-Royce	
must	satisfy	a	threshold	which	is	defined	as	a	percentage	
of	the	suppliers’	annual	turnover	with	Rolls-Royce.	
Assimilation 
• Understanding	
• Interpretation	
• Comprehension	
• Learning	
At	 least	 annually,	 a	 technology	 road-mapping	 and	
matching	event	must	be	performed	between	Rolls-Royce	
and	the	supplier.	To	gain	a	score	of	three	(full	marks)	on	
the	 supplier	 scorecard,	 there	 must	 be	 full	 alignment	
between	the	strategies	of	Rolls-Royce	and	the	supplier.	
Transformation 
• Internalisation	
• Conversion	
• Recodification	
• Bisociation	
The	 expectation	 which	 is	 set	 by	 Rolls-Royce	 in	 their	
supplier	scorecard	(technology)	is	that	the	best	available	
technology	 is	 currently	 being	 deployed	 onto	 their	
products	and	programmes.	Should	 this	not	be	 the	case,	
then	 a	 score	 of	 less	 than	 three	 (i.e.	 not	 full	 marks)	 is	
awarded	 and	 the	 transformation	 effort	 is	 then	 tracked	
through	the	supplier	engagement	plan.	
Exploitation 
• Use	
• Implementation	
• Core	competencies	
• Harvesting	resources	
	
The	 supplier	 scorecard	 (technology)	 uses	 the	 TRL/MCRL	
approach	 plus	 project	 management	 tools	 to	 govern	
programmes	 and	 track	 their	 maturity	 through	 to	 full	
implementation	 and	 deployment.	 For	 my	 method	 of	
measuring	 absorptive	 capacity,	 I	 have	 also	 used	 the	
supplier	scorecard	(operational)	in	Figure	3.6.	It	can	be	a	
leading	indicator	for	distractions	and/or	opportunities	on	
technology	 programmes.	 If	 operational	 performance	 is	
unsatisfactory,	 then	 the	 challenges	 could	 become	 a	
distraction	 which	 divert	 the	 suppliers’	 resources.	
Alternatively,	it	may	help	to	give	them	a	focus	or	impetus	
for	speeding	up	their	implementation	and	deployment.	
	
	
Figure 3.7: Supplier scorecards meet the dimensions of absorptive capacity 
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3.4 Studying progress at Waypoint A 
Waypoint	A	is	shown	in	Figure	3.2	and	is	set	notionally	at	the	transition	from	the	delivery	of	short	
term	results	(i.e.	step	7	in	the	SD/DT	process)	to	the	growth	of	results	for	the	longer	term	(i.e.	step	8	
in	the	SD/DT	process).	I	look	to	institutional	theory	to	help	to	understand	this	initial	period	of	launch,	
uptake,	and	engagement.	
	
Although	not	directly	referencing	it,	Aitken	(1998)	from	section	2.2	reveals	glimpses	of	institutional	
theory	 in	 his	 study	 of	 supplier	 associations	 and	 lean	 initiatives.	 He	 codifies	 supplier	 response	
strategies	as	either:	constructive,	passive,	withdrawal,	or	destructive.	He	argues	that	the	role	of	the	
supplier	should	not	be	considered	as	a	passive	recipient	of	the	focal	firm’s	actions	to	spread	good	
practice.	However,	this	important	aspect	has	not	been	well	studied	since.	In	section	2.3.1b,	I	cite	Lane	
(2001)	as	highlighting	how	it	contributes	to	the	research	gap	in	supply	chain	learning.	Furthermore,	
Rogers	et	al	(2007)	criticise	the	whole	body	of	SD	research	as	generally	not	considering	the	symbolic	
role	in	maintaining	institutional	legitimacy.	I	wish	for	my	research	to	help	to	close	these	gaps.	
	
However,	Mintzberg	et	al	(2009)	raise	some	concerns	over	the	use	of	institutional	theory	and	warn	
of	 the	dangers	of	expecting	a	 firm	 to	 respond	 too	 rationally	 to	a	complex	environment	 it	 cannot	
control.	Nevertheless,	they	point	to	its	successful	use	at	the	“mature	stage”	of	a	firm’s	lifecycle.	Here,	
they	describe	circumstances	very	similar	to	my	own.	Stable	and	well	established	firms	being	subject	
to	renewal	as	their	environment	is	changed	through	the	diffusion	of	new	technology.	Furthermore,	
Gadde	et	al	(2010)	recommend	the	use	of	institutional	theory	to	inform	supply	network	strategies	in	
situations	where	problems	are	difficult	to	assess	and	solve	through	formal	approaches	(i.e.	when	it	
is	more	than	just	a	matter	of	writing	new	contracts	or	relying	upon	legislation).		
	
In	one	of	the	seminal	works	on	institutional	theory,	Oliver	(1991)	suggests	that	the	options	open	to	
firms	 to	 respond	 to	 institutional	 processes	 are	 limited	 to:	 acquiescence,	 compromise,	 avoidance,	
defiance,	or	manipulation.	A	recent	example	is	provided	in	a	case	study	by	Acosta	et	al	(2014).	They	
consider	three	tiers	of	a	supply	chain	in	the	Colombian	(Latin	America)	food	industry	together	with	
their	local	industry	association.	They	investigate	how	the	focal	firm	integrates	the	requirements	of	a	
SD	 programme	 and	 diffuses	 it	 to	 its	 sub-tier	 suppliers.	 Their	 research	 is	 focused	 upon	 how	 this	
impacts	social	welfare	and	environmental	(green)	sustainability.		
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Acosta	et	 al	 (2014)	 find	evidence	of	 the	 three	 lowest	 confrontation	 strategies	 (i.e.	 acquiescence,	
compromise,	and	avoidance),	but	no	evidence	of	those	which	are	more	confrontational	(i.e.	defiance	
or	manipulation).	They	hypothesise	that	this	is	because	of	the	dominant	power	of	the	focal	firm	and	
the	corresponding	strength	of	the	coercive	institutional	pressure.	They	also	highlight	the	mediating	
role	of	network	ties	through	the	local	industry	association.	They	argue	that	this	helps	to	adapt	the	
poorly	understood,	internationally-orientated,	demands	to	the	local	conditions.	
	
Figure	 3.8	 combines	 the	 assessment	 guidelines	 used	 by	 Acosta	 et	 al	 (2014)	 with	 the	 original	
explanatory	examples	provided	by	Oliver	(1991).		
	
Overall,	empirical	evidence	of	Oliver’s	more	confrontation	strategies	is	rare.	In	a	review	of	53	articles	
where	an	institutional	perspective	was	taken	to	study	information	technology	related	phenomena,	
other	 than	acquiescence,	Mignerat	 and	Rivard	 (2015)	only	 found	one	example	where	a	different	
strategy	was	 being	 followed	or	 considered.	 This	was	 another	 low	 confrontation	 strategy,	 that	 of	
avoidance,	which	they	found	to	be	present	 in	eMarkets.	However,	 they	called	for	more	research.	
They	 argued	 that	 greater	 diversity,	 beyond	 low	 confrontation	 strategies,	 is	 likely	 to	 exist	 for	 the	
implementation	and	adoption	of	information	technology.	My	research	will	use	Figure	3.8	to	explore	
this	matter	at	Waypoint	A.	
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Strategic 
Response to 
Institutional 
Processes 
Oliver (1991) Acosta et al (2014) 
Acquiescence 
Habit:	Following	visible,	taken-for-
granted	norms.	
	
Imitate:	Mimicking	institutional	
models.	
	
Comply:	Obeying	rules	and	accepting	
norms.	
The	practice	is	fully	
implemented.	It	has	become	
part	of	the	company’s	
operating	processes.	
Compromise 
Balance:	Balancing	the	expectations	of	
multiple	constituents.	
	
Pacify:	Placating	and	accommodating	
institutional	elements.	
	
Bargain:	Negotiating	with	institutional	
stakeholders.	
The	company	feels	the	need	to	
balance	conflicting	demands	
from	multiple	sources	or	
between	external	pressures	
and	internal	objectives.	
The	implementation	is	partial,	
but	the	company	does	not	try	
to	conceal	it.	
Avoidance 
Conceal:	Disguising	non-conformity.	
	
Buffer:	Loosening	institutional	
attachments.	
	
Escape:	Changing	goals,	activities,	or	
domains.	
Little,	or	no,	
implementation	occurs.	
The	company	conceals	the	
non-conformity.		
Defiance 
Dismiss:	Ignoring	explicit	norms	and	
values.	
	
Challenge:	Contesting	rules	and	
requirements.	
	
Attack:	Assaulting	the	sources	of	
institutional	pressure.	
The	company	publically	
dismisses	the	practice	or	
attacks	the	source.	
No	implementation	occurs.	
Manipulation 
Co-opt:	Importing	influential	
constituents.	
	
Influence:	Shaping	values	and	criteria.	
	
Control:	Dominating	institutional	
constituents	and	processes.	
The	company	actively	tries	to	
change	the	content	of	the	
practice.	The	intended	practice	
is	not	implemented.	
 
 
Figure 3.8: Strategic responses to institutional processes 
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3.5 Studying progress at Waypoint B 
Waypoint	B	is	shown	in	Figure	3.2	and	is	set	during	the	growth	of	results	for	the	longer	term	(i.e.	step	
8	in	the	SD/DT	process)	and	the	embedding	into	routine	business	(i.e.	step	9	in	the	SD/DT	process).	
Here,	I	look	to	a	fusion	of	institutional	and	organisational	learning	theory	to	study	the	SD/DT	process	
for	the	following	two	reasons.	Firstly,	I	wish	to	maintain	continuity	with	institutional	theory	having	
used	it	at	Waypoint	A	to	account	for	supplier	choice.	Institutional	theory	has	a	strong	track	record	of	
having	been	used	 for	 both	 SD	 and	DT	 research	 (section	3.1).	 Secondly,	 I	wish	 to	build	 upon	 and	
respond	to	the	organisational	learning	research	which	I	covered	in	section	2.3,	most	notably:	Lane	
(2001)	and	Knight	(2002).	Since	their	research,	Haunschild	and	Chandler	(2008)	have	coined	the	term	
“institutional-level	learning”	to	describe	the	process	which	occurs	when	institutions	change	due	to	
some	learning	experience.	Few	scholars	have	integrated	these	theories	and	advanced	this	particular	
research	agenda.	However,	Chandler	and	Hwang	(2015)	developed	a	simplified	model	which	I	have	
synthesised	in	Figure	3.9.	They	call	for	empirical	research	to	explore	it.		
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	 	 Note	that	the	authors,	Chandler	and	Hwang	(2015),	give	a	clear	warning	that	their	mapping	is	highly	simplified	and	influenced	by	several	contextual	factors.	
	
Figure 3.9: Simplified model of diffusion and organisational adoption strategies 
(synthesised	from	Chandler	and	Hwang,	2015)	
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The	technology	diffusion	models	from	Geroski	(2000)	provide	a	further	perspective	to	Figure	3.9	and	
suggest	similar	characteristics.	The	“prohibit”	model	has	resonance	with	institutional	theory	and	the	
drivers	which	I	described	in	section	3.4	for	Waypoint	A.	He	explains	that	this	model	follows	from	the	
premise	that	“different	firms,	with	different	goals	and	abilities,	are	likely	to	want	to	adopt	the	new	
technology	 at	 different	 times”.	 Pointing,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 to	 consideration	 of	 the	 fact	 that	
suppliers	have	choice.	Also,	the	“epidemic”	model	has	resonance	with	organisational	learning	theory	
and	that	which	I	am	seeking	to	find	evidence	of	at	Waypoint	B.	He	explains	that	this	model	follows	
from	the	premise	that	“what	limits	the	speed	of	usage	is	the	lack	of	information	available	about	the	
new	technology,	how	to	use	it,	and	what	it	does.”	
	
The	 importance	of	the	sharing	of	best	practice	 is	shown	clearly	by	Chandler	and	Hwang	(2015)	 in	
Figure	3.9.	It	is	positioned	as	the	key	enabler	to	transition	from	an	emergent	to	an	intermediate	stage	
of	 diffusion.	 The	 authors	 suggest	 that	 “before	 the	 point	 of	 best-practice	 consensus	 is	 reached,	
adoption	rates	are	 likely	to	be	 low	but	will	 rise	once	standards	are	set”.	This	maps	directly	to	the	
SD/DT	 process	 as	 it	moves	 from	 step	 7	 to	 steps	 8	 and	 9.	 Here,	 Figure	 2.5	 contains	 guideline	 8.i	
(common	vision	and	vocabulary)	and	guideline	9.ii	(minimum	standards	and	maturity	models).		
	
Hence,	at	Waypoint	B,	my	research	will	search	for	evidence	of	best-practice	sharing.	
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3.6 Research question, scope, and paradigm 
My	research	paradigm	is	that	of	critical	realist.	Blaikie	and	Priest	(2017)	review	a	range	of	potential	
paradigms	 for	 social	 research.	 They	 argue	 that	 “once	 preliminary	 work	 identifies	 the	 need	 to	
investigate	a	causal	mechanism	for	an	important	regularity	and,	perhaps,	suggests	how	a	situation	
or	practice	may	change	as	a	result	of	what	generates	the	regularity,	then	a	critical	realist	inquiry	is,	
prima	facie,	the	obvious	candidate”.		
	
The	ontological	domains	of	critical	realism	and	institutional	theory	are	interrelated	and	compatible	
(Wry,	 2009).	 The	 following	 description	 from	 Scott	 (2014)	 conveys	my	 approach.	 He	 explains	 the	
distinctive	features	of	using	institutional	theory	to	study	organisations	over	alternative	approaches.	
	
“Institutionalists	 eschew	 a	 totalistic	 or	 monolithic	 view	 of	 organisational	 and	 societal	
structures	and	processes	…	
	
Institutionalists	emphasise	 that	even	 innovative	actions	make	use	of	pre-existing	materials	
and	enter	into	existing	contexts	which	affect	them	and	to	which	they	must	adjust	…	
	
Institutionalists	 insist	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 non-local,	 as	 well	 as	 local,	 forces	 shaping	
organisations	…	
	
Institutionalists	 have	 re-discovered	 the	 important	 role	 played	 by	 ideas,	 specifically,	 and	
symbolic	elements,	generally,	in	the	functioning	of	organisations	…	
	
Institutionalists	accord	more	attention	to	types	of	effects	occurring	over	longer	time	periods…	
	
Closely	related	to	their	concern	with	time,	institutionalists	also	accord	more	attention	to	an	
examination	 of	 social	mechanisms	…	 interest	 in	mechanisms	 directs	 attention	 away	 from	
questions	regarding	what	happened	to	questions	of	how	things	happen	…	
	
Institutionalists	 embrace	 research	 designs	 that	 support	 attention	 to	 examining	 the	
interdependence	of	factors	operating	at	multiple	levels	to	affect	the	outcomes	of	interest.”
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The	causal	mechanism	which	my	research	is	exploring	can	be	summarised	using	the	following	format	
which	was	adapted	from	Easton	(2000)	and	his	critical	realist	case	study	into	industrial	networks:	
	
An	object	=		 	 	 	 Extended	Enterprise	for	which	Rolls-Royce	are	the	focal	firm.	
	
with	structure	=		 	 	 Hierarchy	of	firms	(Figure	1.3).		
	
possessing	powers	and	liabilities	=		 Derived	from	contextual	factors	(Figure	3.3).	
	
under	conditions	=		 	 	 SD/DT	process	(Figure	2.5)	used	to	initiate	fieldwork.	
	
will	produce	a	change	of	events	=		 Does	the	object	move	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise?		
	 	 	 	 	 Waypoints	A	and	B	are	set	to	assess	progress	(sections	3.4/3.5).	
	
	
Figure	 3.10	 consolidates	 the	 research	 question,	 scope,	 and	 gaps.	 Chapter	 3	 has	 identified	 and	
targeted	a	third	research	gap	and,	therefore,	this	is	the	final	entry.		
	
Research Question Research Scope Research Gaps 
How	to	develop	suppliers	…	
The	aerospace	sector	
which	has	collaborative,	
adversarial,	and	ambivalent	
buyer/supplier	
relationships.	
Using	SD	to	facilitate	DT	
(Figure	2.2;	CAPS,	2014;	
and	Watts	&	Hahn,	1993)	
	
Organisational	learning	
in	complex	supplier	networks	
(Lane,	2001)	
	
Operationalisation	&	measurement	
of	absorptive	capacity	
(Wijk	et	al,	2011;	Roberts	et	al,	2012;	
and	Lewandowska,	2015)	
within	an	Extended	Enterprise	…	
towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	
	
Figure 3.10: Summary of research question, scope, and gaps 
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3.7 Summary of key implications from this chapter 
I	have	made	the	following	contributions	in	chapter	3:	
	
a) Established	a	theoretical	framework	for	my	research.	
	
b) Identified	contextual	factors	with	the	level	of	analysis	spanning	the	network,	dyad,	and	firm.	
	
c) Developed	a	situational	approach	to	measure	the	role	of	firms	in	new	product	development.	
	
d) Developed	a	novel	approach	to	operationalise	and	measure	relative	absorptive	capacity	using	
supplier	scorecards.	
	
e) Set	 two	 waypoints	 on	 the	 journey	 towards	 a	 Digital	 Enterprise	 using	 institutional	 and	
organisational	learning	theories.	
	
f) Confirmed	my	research	paradigm	as	critical	realist.	
	
	
Briefly,	 it	 is	apt	to	mention	the	alternative	research	directions	which	I	discounted.	My	scope	(and	
funding)	is	concerned	with	supply	chain	management.	I	quickly	found	my	interest	drawn	to	the	causal	
powers	and	 institutional	mechanism	within	an	Extended	 (Digital)	Enterprise.	Therefore,	 I	avoided	
paths	which	risked	taking	my	research	into	the	specialist	domains	of	digital	technology	or	pedagogy.	
Nevertheless,	during	the	exploratory	phase	of	my	research,	I	contemplated	placing	more	emphasis	
upon	exploring	the	co-creation	and	diffusion	of	shared	technical	data	standards	and	digital	protocols.	
As	explained	in	section	3.3.1,	I	wrestled	with	aspects	of	the	specificity	of	digital	systems	and	tools.	
However,	 I	 settled	 upon	 adding	 to	 the	 stimulus	 to	 resolve	 these	 matters	 rather	 than	 making	 a	
concerted	attempt	to	advance	them	per	se.	
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Chapter 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Explaining the design and execution 
of my research 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Chapters	 1	 and	 2	 set	 the	 scene	 and	 synthesised	 process-steps	 for	 organisational	 change	 from	
literature.	Chapter	3	constructed	a	 theoretical	 framework	 for	my	research.	 It	 included	contextual	
factors	 with	 which	 to	 characterise	 firms	 and	waypoints	 at	 which	 to	 study	 choice,	 diffusion,	 and	
organisational	adoption.	
	
Now,	chapter	4	describes	the	research	methodology	and	how	it	is	designed	to	develop	and	test	the	
SD/DT	process.	This	chapter	is	divided	into	six	sections	from	4.1	to	4.6.	It	begins	by	selecting	action	
research,	 conducting	a	validity	 check,	and	 taking	 special	measures	 in	 response.	Then,	 section	4.3	
constructs	 the	 action	 research	 cycles,	 explains	 how	 they	 coalesce	 around	 a	 drumbeat	 of	 21	
workshops	held	over	3-years,	and	introduces	my	diverse	study	group	of	24	firms.	The	triangulation	
strategy	is	described	in	section	4.4	whilst	section	4.5	goes	onto	explain	that	transferability	is	a	better	
concept	 to	 adopt	 than	 generalisation.	 Finally,	 section	 4.6	 summarises	 and	 draws	 out	 the	 key	
implications.	A	bullet-point	executive	summary	is	given	overleaf	for	those	who	prefer	this	format. 	
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Section	4.1:	 Action	research	(AR)	is	confirmed	as	my	method	
	
• Case	study	research	is	a	potential	method	to	use	instead	of	AR,	but	it	is	rejected	
because	my	researcher-object	relation	is	interventionist	(not	observer).	
	
• AR	 features	 strongly	 in	 one	 of	 the	 seminal	 works	 on	 interfirm	 network	
development	(Chisholm,	1998).	Also,	more	recent	articles	point	to	it	being	likely	
to	lead	to	theoretical	innovations	and	sustainable	change	in	my	research	setting.	
	
• AR	has	past	precedence	of	being	used	for	similar	purposes	to	my	own.	There	are	
calls	for	it	to	be	used	more.	
	
• Validity	check	is	passed	for	my	application	of	AR,	but	ethical	and	researcher	power	
issues	are	highlighted.	
	
Section	4.2:	 Special	measures	are	taken	to	address	my	complex	positionality	
	
• Aspects	of	my	insider/outsider	positionality	vary	for	my	dealings	within	my	own	
firm	and	for	my	dealings	with	other	firms.	My	positionality	is	not	uniform.	
	
• Nevertheless,	I	am	well	supported	by	the	staff	and	global	structures	at	Rolls-Royce	
in	working	cross-culturally	(Hofstede	et	al,	2010).	
	
• Steering	group	is	established	to	guide	my	research.	
	
• Expert	panel	is	established	to	provide	independent	specialist	support.	
	
Section	4.3:	 AR	cycles	are	initiated	using	the	‘background’	SD/DT	process	
	
• AR	cycles	of	plan–act/observe–reflect	are	followed.	They	are	 initiated	using	the	
background	version	of	the	SD/DT	process	synthesised	from	literature	in	chapter	2.	
	
• AR	cycles	coalesce	around	a	drumbeat	of	21	group-based	workshops	facilitated	by	
the	prime	researcher	and	held	at	international	locations	from	2017Q1	to	2020Q1.	
	
• A	diverse	study	group	of	24	firms	is	established.	
	
Section	4.4:	 Triangulation	strategy	to	compare	absorptive	capacity	with	supplier	outcomes		
	
• Relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 is	 the	 only	 contextual	 factors	 to	 change	 over	 the	
duration	of	my	research.	It	 is	measured	quantitatively	using	supplier	scorecards	
and	the	data	is	gathered	independently	of	the	prime	researcher.	
	
• Supplier	outcomes	are	assessed	against	success	criteria	using	mainly	qualitative	
data	 which	 is	 gathered	 from	 various	 sources.	 The	 assessment	 is	 performed,	
somewhat	independently,	by	the	prime	researcher	and	another	member	of	staff.	
	
• A	 response	 framework	 is	 constructed	 for	 supplier-side	 interviews	 to	 aid	 the	
discussion	about	“What	is	your	firms	purpose	in	being	on	the	SD/DT	programme?”.		
	
Section	4.5:	 Transferability	is	a	better	concept	to	adopt	than	generalisation	of	my	results	
	
• Findings	may	be	 transferred	 from	a	sending	 to	a	 receiving	context	 (Lincoln	and	
Guba,	1985).	
	
Section	4.6:	 Summary	of	key	implications	from	this	chapter	
	
• Contributions	from	this	chapter	are	shown	listed.	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 89 - 
4.1 Action research is confirmed as my method 
Through	the	following	sub-sections,	I	conclude	that	action	research	has	the	potential	to	answer	my	
research	question.	It	is	well	suited	to	my	research	situation,	has	past	precedence	of	being	used	for	
similar	purposes,	and	passes	a	validity	check.	
	
4.1.1 Action research is well suited to my setting 
My	research	is	work-based	as	explained	in	section	1.4.	Costley	et	al	(2010)	list	nine	methodological	
frameworks	which	have	been	used	for	such	research:	phenomenological	approaches,	hermeneutics,	
grounded	 theory,	 action	 research,	 soft	 systems,	 survey-based	 research,	 ethnography,	 case	 study	
research,	and	bricolage.	They	explain	that	organisational	change	is	at	the	heart	of	action	research	
and,	therefore,	from	this	perspective	it	looks	to	be	an	obvious	candidate.	The	alternative	is	case	study	
research	 which	 is	 far	 more	 common	 in	 SD	 literature	 (Ahmed	 and	 Hendry,	 2012).	 A	 comparison	
between	 the	 two	methods	 is	 given	 by	 Karlsson	 (2016)	 which	 I	 have	 used	 to	 down-select	 action	
research	as	shown	in	Figure	4.1.		
	
Action	 research	 can	 be	 more	 socially	 demanding	 on	 the	 researcher	 than	 case	 study	 research;	
however,	I	selected	it	in	full	knowledge	of	this.	From	my	perspective,	the	pain	is	worth	the	gain.	Also,	
researchers	can	become	co-opted	over	time	and	lose	a	critical	reflexive	distance.	I	will	address	these	
points	later	in	this	chapter.	
	
Words	of	support	for	action	research	come	from	multiple	sources.	In	one	of	the	seminal	works	on	
inter-organisational	network	development,	Chisholm	(1998)	explains	that	“using	action	research	to	
create	and	maintain	networks	as	learning	systems	emphasises	a	process	of	proactive	engagement,	
not	simply	reactive	adjustment”.	Meehan	et	al	(2016)	argue	for	greater	use	to	study	purchasing	and	
supply	management,	concluding	that:	“…	the	depth	and	criticality	of	[action]	research	is	likely	to	lead	
to	theoretical	innovations	and	sustainable	change	in	organisational	practice”.	Coughlan	and	Coghlan	
(2016)	 give	 an	 example	 where	 they	 argue	 that	 the	 development	 of	 theory	 for	 a	 manufacturing	
strategy	process,	which	was	emergent	through	action	research,	would	have	been	difficult	to	generate	
by	other	 less	 intensive	case-orientated	methods.	Also,	according	to	Costley	et	al	 (2010),	 I	am	in	a	
unique	 and	 privileged	 position	 as	 a	 work-based	 researcher	 with	 the	 opportunity	 to	 perform	my	
research	longitudinally.	They	cite	such	advantages	as	“some	work	issues	are	beset	with	paradox	and	
ambiguity,	but	an	insider	is	often	able	to	unravel	and	comprehend	such	intricacies	and	complications.”		
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Perspective	
Characteristics	
of	case	study	
research	
	
Karlsson	(2016)	
Characteristics	
of	action	
research	
	
Karlsson	(2016)	
Reason	why	I	selected	action	research	(AR)	
Research	aim	
Finding	issues	
and	variables;	
additions	to	
theories	
Finding	out	
about	change	
mechanisms	and	
addressing	a	
practical	
problem	
Addressing	a	practical	problem	was	a	
prerequisite	set	by	my	employer	who	
funded	my	research.	Nevertheless,	a	
series	of	case	studies	could	have	been	
considered.	However,	through	the	
literature	review,	my	own	interests	in	
change	mechanisms	also	grew.	
Researcher-
object	
relation	
Observer	 Interventionist	
Overall,	this	aspect	had	the	greatest	
impact	upon	my	selection	of	AR.	My	
employer,	who	funded	my	research,	set	as	
a	prerequisite	that	there	should	be	a		
‘progressive	delivery	of	results’	which	
pointed	heavily	towards	a	method	with	
‘active’	intervention.	
Data	 May	be	confidential	
Probably	
confidential	
High	levels	of	commercial	confidentiality	
restricted	the	consideration	of	a	multiple	
case	study	approach,	especially	if	they	
were	beyond	my	own	firm.	
Analytical	
process	
Within-case	and	
across-case	
analysis	and	
pattern	finding	
Continuing	
co-enquiry	with	
the	actors	in	the	
system	
In	addition	to	the	above,	AR	was	an	
attractive	method	because	the	process	of	
co-enquiry	offers	the	potential	to	improve	
both	insights	and	buy-in.		
Conclusions	
Proposed	
variables	and	
hypotheses	
Impacts	of	
interventions	
Although	there	is	only	a	sample	of	one	for	
the	Extended	(Digital)	Enterprise,	this	is	far	
more	defensible	given	it	is	a	network	
compromising	of	a	large	number	of	actors	
with	different	contextual	factors.	
Generalisation	 Can	be	limited	 Hardly	identifiable	
Being	company-funded,	
first	and	foremost,	their	own	research	
needs	had	to	be	satisfied.	
See	section	4.5	for	how	generalisation	of	
the	results	is	covered	by	transferability.	
	
Figure 4.1: Key reasons why action research is selected over case study 
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4.1.2 Action research has past precedence of being used for similar purposes  
Action	 research	 is	 only	marginally	 represented	 in	 supplier	 development,	 but	 there	 is	 some	 past	
precedence	which	 I	 can	draw	upon.	Coghlan	and	Coughlan	 (2008)	describe	 the	approach	used	 in	
section	2.3.2	as	an	 integration	between	action	 learning	and	action	 research	 (ALAR).	 Industrialists	
engaged	in	action	learning	whilst	academics	performed	the	action	research.	This	resonates	with	some	
of	my	own	experience.	For	example,	Waterson	et	al	(2001)	describe	their	21-month	implementation	
study	of	PDM	at	Rolls-Royce	as	“the	research	broadly	falls	within	the	tradition	of	action	research,	that	
is,	our	remit	involved	providing	the	company	with	recommendations	for	improvement	and	change,	as	
well	as	satisfying	a	set	of	academic	research	questions.”	
	
Looking	more	broadly,	action	research	has	long	been	used	in	the	fields	of	digitisation,	computing,	
and	information	technology.	For	example,	Symon	and	Clegg	(1991)	based	their	study	of	CAD/CAM	
implementation	upon	it.	Baskerville	and	Wood-Harper	(1996)	review	the	role	of	action	research	for	
developing	and	implementing	information	systems	and,	subsequently,	Baskerville	and	Meyers	(2004)	
provide	six	illustrative	examples.	Estruch	et	al	(2008)	use	action	research	to	study	PLM	in	firms	within	
a	ceramic	tile	cluster	which	they	call	an	Extended	Enterprise.	Furthermore,	Pulkkinen	et	al	(2018	and	
2019)	use	action	research	over	a	2-year	period	to	develop	a	maturity	model	for	what	they	call	a	Digital	
Extended	Enterprise.		
	
From	a	purchasing	and	supply	chain	management	perspective,	Momme	and	Hvolby	(2002)	use	action	
research	to	study	the	global	outsourcing	of	production	for	fabricated	pressure	vessels	from	a	multi-
national	enterprise	to	external	suppliers.	They	describe	themselves	as	active	participants	as	well	as	
researchers.	 Their	 research	 delivers	 guidance	 on	 how	 to	 identify,	 evaluate,	 and	 select	 suppliers.	
Furthermore,	Maestrini	et	al	(2016)	use	action	research	to	study	the	design	and	implementation	of	a	
supplier	 performance	 measurement	 system	 in	 the	 banking	 industry.	 They	 describe	 how	
buyer/supplier	 relationships	 are	 often	 “messy”	 and	 change	 over	 time.	 They	 reflect	 how	 action	
research	helps	to	integrate	diverse	perspectives,	providing	mutually	beneficial	solutions.	
	
To	conclude,	Ahmed	and	Hendry	(2012)	recommend	that	future	research	should	“use	longitudinal	
case	studies	or	action	research	to	validate	and	determine	measures	of	SD	success	in	terms	of	short-
term	key	performance	 indicators	and	measures	of	 long-term	relationship-specific	and	competitive	
advantage	outcomes.”		
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4.1.3 Validity check is passed but highlights ethical and researcher power issues  
Herr	 and	 Anderson	 (2015)	 offer	 a	 range	 of	 criteria	 for	 assessing	 action	 research	 taken	 from	 the	
perspective	of	the	typical	approach	to	researcher	positionality	i.e.	from	insider	to	outsider.	However,	
mine	cannot	be	positioned	in	this	manner	and	I,	therefore,	found	the	work	of	Bartunek	et	al	(2000)	
to	 be	 more	 appropriate.	 Here,	 they	 are	 specifically	 concerned	 with	 distinguishing	 between	
consultancy	and	manager-led	action	research	in	situations	where	managers	or	project	leaders	are	
directly	involved	in	the	research	themselves.	They	identify	issues	and	themes	as	a	form	of	validity	
check	by	studying	the	characteristics	and	effectiveness	of	such	research	in	diverse	settings.	There	are	
eight	themes	and	my	test	responses	are	summarised	below:	
	
Theme	1	from	Bartunek	et	al	(2000):	The	initial	assignment	to	carry	out	work	that	leads	to	the	action	
research	project	is	likely	to	come	from	the	manager’s	superiors	and	to	be	part	of	the	manager’s	job	
description.	
Test	response	for	my	research	setting	against	theme	1:	TRUE.	
	
Theme	 2	 from	Bartunek	 et	 al	 (2000):	 The	 other	 participants	 in	 the	 intervention	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
subordinates	who	need	to	buy-in	to	the	change	project.	
Test	response	for	my	research	setting	against	theme	2:	FALSE.	But,	Bartunek	et	al	(2000)	also	make	
reference	to	having	decision-control	and	influence.	This	is	true	in	my	setting.	
	
Theme	3	from	Bartunek	et	al	(2000):	The	intervention	is	 likely	to	be	aimed	primarily	at	 increased	
productivity.	
Test	response	for	my	research	setting	against	theme	3:	FALSE.	But,	Bartunek	et	al	(2000)	also	make	
reference	to	interventions	which	are	aimed	at	improving	processes.	This	is	true	for	my	setting.	
	
Theme	4	from	Bartunek	et	al	(2000):	Managers	may	find	it	helpful	to	constitute	a	consulting	team	to	
assist	in	the	intervention.	
Test	response	for	my	research	setting	against	theme	4:	TRUE.	This	was	taken	 into	account	and	
incorporated	into	my	research	design.	See	section	4.2.	Bartunek	et	al	(2000)	suggest	that	the	team	
can	either	be	assigned	by	the	researcher	themselves	or	by	their	superior.	
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Theme	5	from	Bartunek	et	al	(2000):	Data	gathering	can	take	place	through	a	variety	of	formal	and	
informal	means.	
Test	response	for	my	research	setting	against	theme	5:	TRUE.	
	
Theme	6	 from	Bartunek	 et	 al	 (2000):	 Feedback	 sessions	 can	be	 integrated	 into	 the	work	day	or	
conducted	separately.	
Test	response	for	my	research	setting	against	theme	6:	TRUE.	
	
Theme	7	from	Bartunek	et	al	(2000):	The	manager	is	likely	to	have	a	personal	stake	in	the	outcome	
of	the	intervention.	
Test	response	for	my	research	setting	against	theme	7:	TRUE.	This	warrants	further	explanation.	
My	 research	 benefited	 greatly	 from	 the	 concept	 attributed	 to	 Senge	 (2006)	 of	 the	 “learning	
organisation”.	My	employer,	and	in	particular	the	series	of	 industrial	supervisors	for	my	research,	
created	an	environment	which	helped	to	promote	the	philosophy	that	the	outcome	of	my	research	
was	a	 learning	outcome.	The	problem	being	addressed	was	 challenging;	 therefore,	 there	was	no	
undercurrent	of	expectation	to	provide	a	quick	fix.	I	was	free	to	fail,	learn,	and	try	again.	
	
Theme	8	from	Bartunek	et	al	 (2000):	The	managers	were	all	 receiving	training	 in	action	research	
while	carrying	out	their	interventions.	
Test	response	for	my	research	setting	against	theme	8:	TRUE.	
	
	
	
Hence,	I	conclude	that	it	is	valid	for	me	to	use	action	research.	
	
However,	scholars	using	action	research	 in	an	 interfirm	setting	(e.g.	Coghlan	and	Coughlan,	2008;	
and	Goduscheit	et	al,	2008)	identify	the	need	to	address	an	array	of	ethical	and	researcher	power	
issues.	Costley	et	al	(2010)	give	some	mitigations	for	the	“response	effect”	which	may	arise,	but	admit	
that	these	matters	are	often	not	easily	dealt	with	by	standard	practice	and	protocols.	The	special	
measure	which	I	took	are	described	in	section	4.2.	
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4.2 Special measures are taken to address my complex positionality 
Robson	and	McCartan	(2016)	warn	that	“someone	attempting	to	carry	out	research	into	the	situation	
in	which	they	themselves	are	working	…	may	find	that	the	change	aspects	become	virtually	impossible	
to	 separate	out	 from	 the	 research	 itself.”	 But,	 they	 go	onto	explain	 that	 it	 is	 feasible	 to	 conduct	
credible	 research	when	 faced	with	 this	dilemma.	 Like	many	others,	 they	emphasise	 the	need	 for	
strong	academic	supervision	and	good	training.	Despite	conducting	my	research	on	a	part-time	basis,	
I	 was	 still	 very	 fortunate	 to	 have	 an	 empathetic	 and	 effective	 supervisory	 relationship	 with	 my	
academic	supervisor.	I	quickly	grew	to	realise	it’s	importance	and	I	am	very	indebted	to	him	for	it.		
	
My	biggest	methodological	concern	was	power	asymmetry.	As	a	well-known	member	of	the	buying	
firm,	I	foresaw	that	my	research	could	encroach	upon	commercially	sensitive	matters	with	supplier	
firms.	Also,	I	was	dealing	with	different	company	and	national	cultures.	Just	within	my	own	firm,	my	
position	in	global	headquarters	meant	that	 I	was	 inevitably	viewed	as	an	outsider	by	the	regional	
supplier	 and	 commodity	 management	 teams	 from	whom	 I	 wished	 to	 gather	 data.	Whilst	 many	
scholars	recognise	duality	of	role,	they	tend	to	base	their	research	guidelines	upon	a	rather	static	
view	 of	 insider/outsider	 being	maintained	 throughout	 the	 research	 process.	 Herr	 and	 Anderson	
(2015),	for	example,	describe	a	continuum	of	six	positionalities	for	action	research.	However,	they	
do	not	 include	a	non-uniform	situation	 such	as	my	own	where	 the	 researcher	must	be	aware	of	
different	aspects	of	their	positionality	within	their	own	firm	and	in	their	dealings	with	other	firms.		
	
Nevertheless,	 scholars	 advocate	 reflexivity	 as	 a	means	 by	 which	 power,	 position,	 and	 perceived	
status	 can	 be	 regularly	 questioned	 and,	 if	 appropriate,	 mitigated	 during	 a	 research	 programme	
(Kemmis	and	McTaggart,	2000;	Coghlan	and	Brannick,	2014).	As	a	part-time	researcher	operating	
from	within	my	own	firm,	I	sought	to	create	enough	space	and	distance	to	employ	this.	Costley	et	al	
(2010)	 recommend	 an	 ongoing	 process	 to	 help	 the	 researcher	 to	 clearly	 articulate	 their	 own	
perspective	and	to	draw	balance	from	others	who	provide	alternative	constructs	and	objectivity.	I	
established	 a	 steering	 group	 and	 an	 expert	 panel	 to	 support	 me	 in	 doing	 it.	 However,	 before	
introducing	them,	I	should	first	mention	that	I	was	also	well	supported	in	working	cross-culturally	
(Hofstede	et	 al,	 2010).	 It	was	 routine,	 for	example,	 for	me	 to	be	able	 to	make	arrangements	 for	
simultaneous	English/Mandarin	 translation	at	events	held	 in	China.	Furthermore,	 colleagues	with	
local	knowledge	could	help	me	to	prepare	interview	scripts	and	to	interpret	the	results	afterwards.		
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4.2.1 A steering group is established to guide my research  
The	 rationale	 for	establishing	my	 steering	group	 came	 from	a	number	of	 scholars.	Coughlan	and	
Coghlan	(2002)	call	 for	action	researchers	to	use	them	to	help	with	governance	and	reflection	on	
“emergent	learning”.	Lomax	et	al	(1996)	refer	to	them	as	“validation	meetings”	and	Bartunek	et	al	
(2000)	use	them	for	“consulting”.	Herr	and	Anderson	(2015)	go	further	and	suggest	they	may	serve	
the	researcher	as	a	kind	of	“devil’s	advocate”.	I	used	mine	for	a	mixture	of	these	purposes	depending	
upon	where	I	was	in	the	research	programme	and	what	issues	were	facing	me	at	the	time.	
	
My	steering	group	consisted	entirely	of	staff	from	Rolls-Royce,	although	occasionally	my	academic	
supervisor	made	a	guest	appearance	to	supplement	my	regular	one-to-one	supervisions	with	him.	
Usually	it	was	chaired	by	my	line	manager,	co-ordinated	with	my	industrial	supplier,	and	attended	by	
a	cross-section	of	my	peers	and	seniors	from	across	the	business.	There	were	a	number	of	major	
changes	 of	 personnel	 over	 the	 duration	 of	my	 research	which	 impacted	 the	 frequency	 that	 the	
steering	group	met	and	 some	of	 the	 consistency	of	 thought.	At	 its	peak,	particularly	when	 I	was	
wrestling	with	emergent	findings,	it	met	six-weekly.	During	less	intensive	periods,	it	was	held	on	an	
ad	hoc	basis	upon	my	request.	
	
	
4.2.2 An expert panel is established to provide independent specialist support  
I	was	aware	of	the	risk	of	“groupthink”	arising	from	all	of	the	members	of	my	steering	group,	and	
many	of	the	specialists	which	I	would	draw	upon	for	my	research,	coming	from	the	same	firm.	Robson	
and	McCartan	 (2016)	warn	of	bias	 and	gave	me	 the	 impetus	 to	establish	 an	 independent	expert	
panel.	I	began	by	approaching	academics	or	industrialists	who	had	a	background	working	knowledge	
of	my	firm.	This	broadened	slightly	to	authors	of	key	items	of	literature	as	I	happened	upon	them.	I	
never	held	group	sessions,	but	instead	sought	their	expert	advice	periodically	on	a	one-to-one	basis.	
	
All	of	the	five	members	of	my	expert	panel	have	kindly	agreed	to	be	named	in	my	thesis.	They	are:	
Professor	 James	 Aitken	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Surrey,	 Professor	 Du	 from	 Shanghai	 Jiao	 Tong	
University,	Dr	Greg	Harris	from	Auburn	University,	Andy	Page	who	is	the	CEO	of	Sharing	in	Growth,	
and	Brad	Farris	who	is	a	model-based	enterprise	(MBE)	consultant.	I	am	very	grateful	to	them.	They	
gave	their	time	and	expertise	on	a	voluntary	unpaid	basis. 	
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4.3 AR cycles are initiated using the ‘background’ SD/DT process 
Costley	et	al	(2010)	describe	the	PDSA	(plan-do-study-act)	cycle	as	a	form	of	action	research	(AR).	
This	improvement	cycle	is	familiar	to	me	and	the	industrial	setting	of	my	research	(Deming,	1986).	
Out	of	personal	preference,	 I	use	 the	version	 from	the	action	researcher	planner	by	Kemmis	and	
McTaggart	(1988).	This	describes	the	AR	iterative	cycle	as:	plan,	act	and	observe,	and	then	reflect.	Its	
origins	are	in	pedagogy	and	I	am	attracted	by	the	link	to	learning	cycles	(section	3.1.1a).		
	
Coghlan	and	Brannick	(2014)	give	options	for	conducting	AR	in	a	controlled	manner	for	organisational	
development.	 However,	 they	 warn	 to	 expect	 change	 to	 occur	 “messily	 and	 unpredictably”.	 The	
overarching	framework	which	 I	use	 is	attributed	to	Beckhard	(1997).	There	 is	a	present	state	(i.e.	
Extended	Enterprise),	desired	future	state	(i.e.	Digital	Enterprise),	and	a	series	of	AR	cycles.	The	latter	
are	summarised	 in	Figure	4.2.	The	final	 (thesis)	cycle	captures	and	synthesises	the	 learning	based	
upon	the	experience	gained	throughout	the	core	activity	(Zuber-Skerritt	and	Perry,	2002).		
	
AR cycle 
Number of 
full iterations 
Sequence and format 
Basic	 30+	
• A	 full	 iteration	 of	 the	 basic	 AR	 cycle	was	 performed	 for	
each	of	the	21	workshops	(see	Figure	4.3).	
• In	addition,	my	field	notes	record	others	which	blended	in	
more	 “messily”	 over	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 research	
programme	to	study	specific	interventions.		
• Overall,	in	excess	of	30	full	iterations	were	performed.	
Minor	
Core	 9	
• A	full	iteration	of	the	minor	core	AR	cycle	was	performed	
for	each	of	the	9	steps	in	the	SD/DT	process.	See	Figure	1.7	
and	Figure	2.5.	
Major	
Core	 4	
• A	full	iteration	of	the	major	core	AR	cycle	was	performed	
for	groups	of	steps	in	the	SD/DT	process	at	points	which	
coincided	 with	 workshop	 2	 (steps	 1	 to	 4),	 workshop	 7	
(steps	5	to	7),	workshop	14	(steps	3	to	9),	and	workshop	
21	(steps	8	to	9).	See	Figure	1.7	and	Figure	4.3.	
Thesis	 1	
• This	began	in	earnest	after	workshop	18	in	order	to	inform	
the	 writing	 of	 my	 thesis,	 synthesis,	 and	 combined	
reflection	on	all	of	the	above.	See	Figure	1.7	and	Figure	4.3.	
	
Figure 4.2: Summary of my action research (AR) cycles 
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The	‘background’	version	of	the	SD/DT	process	from	Figure	2.5	was	used	to	initiate	the	AR	cycles.	
These	coalesced	around	workshops	and,	in	total,	twenty-one	were	held	as	shown	in	Figure	4.3.	Each	
workshop	was	facilitated	by	the	prime	researcher,	group	based,	and	typically	of	two	or	three	day’s	
duration.		Initially	they	were	hosted	by	Rolls-Royce,	then	they	moved	to	research	centres	(i.e.	neutral	
venues),	and	by	the	fifth	workshop	they	were	being	hosted	by	the	suppliers	at	their	own	facilities.	
The	final	breakdown	saw	ten	(48%)	hosted	by	Rolls-Royce,	eight	(38%)	hosted	by	suppliers,	and	three	
(14%)	at	research	centres.	Although	most	workshops	were	held	in	UK/Europe,	there	were	three	(14%)	
held	in	Asia	Pacific	and	two	(10%)	held	in	the	USA.		
	
My	inspiration	for	establishing	and	maintaining	a	regular	drumbeat	of	workshops	came	from	the	CoI	
process	(section	2.3.2)	and	specifically	from	Kaltoff	et	al	(2007).	They	found	that	workshops	helped	
to	create	a	positive	learning	environment	in	which	participant	firms	were	open	to	sharing	knowledge.	
During	 workshops,	 facilitation	 helped	 to	 keep	 focus	 and	 translate	 dialogue	 into	 concrete	
improvement	projects.	Between	workshops,	facilitation	helped	to	deliver	milestones	and	maintain	
momentum.		
	
Chisholm	(1998,	2000)	also	informed	my	design	and	delivery	of	the	workshops.	He	used	AR	to	study	
the	development	and	maintenance	of	inter-organisational	networks	in	the	USA.	I	found	three	of	his	
recommendations	particularly	useful:	recognise	that	workshops	are	a	significant	part	of	the	AR	cycle	
requiring	conscious	design	work	beforehand;	directly	 involve	network	members	 in	the	design	and	
delivery	of	workshops;	and	hold	debriefing	sessions	swiftly	afterwards	to	reflect,	question,	and	learn	
from	happenings.	
	
Figure	4.3	shows	that	I	used	the	steering	group	(section	4.2.1)	and	expert	panel	(section	4.2.2)	to	
help	me	to	evaluate	and	reflect	upon	the	workshops	as	part	of	the	AR	cycles.	What	is	not	shown,	
however,	is	the	significant	contribution	made	by	many	other	members	of	staff	from	Rolls-Royce	in	
the	design	and	delivery	of	the	workshops.	 It	would	have	been	impossible	to	conduct	my	research	
without	 them.	 Some	 scholars	 have	 suffered	 from	 delayed	 access	 to	 technical	 expertise	 and	
supporting	documentation	when	studying	 the	use	and	deployment	of	digital	 tools.	Kennedy	et	al	
(2015),	for	example,	highlight	how	such	difficulties	impacted	their	prioritisation	of	intervention	over	
enquiry:	action	over	research.	I	was	very	fortunate	to	experience	no	such	problems.		
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Workshop 
Number 
Date Venue Host 
Number 
of firms 
present 
Who evaluated and reflected 
with the prime researcher as 
part of the AR iterative cycles? 
Start	of	the	AR	cycles	with	Step	1	in	the	SD/DT	process	(Strategic	Review)	
1	 2017	Q1	 Asia	Pacific	 Rolls-Royce	 93	in	total	20	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	the	academic	supervisor	
The	output	from	workshop	1	was	used	to	inform	the	next	steps	in	the	SD/DT	process	and	the	associated	
AR	cycles	which	eventually	led	to	Step	5	(Launch	of	Programme)	
2	 2017	Q3	 UK	 Rolls-Royce	 15	in	total	14	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Accenture	Consultants	
(who	had	presented	at	the	workshop)	
The	output	from	workshop	2	was	used	to	inform	the	next	steps	in	the	SD/DT	process	and	the	associated	
AR	cycles	which	eventually	led	to	Step	7	(Delivery	of	Short	Term	Results)	
3	 2017	Q4	 UK	 Research	Centre	
13	in	total	
13	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	a	member	of	the	research	faculty	
(who	had	presented	at	the	workshop)	
4	 2017	Q4	 USA	 Research	Centre	
9	in	total	
5	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	a	member	of	the	research	faculty	
(who	had	presented	at	the	workshop)	
5	 2018	Q1	 UK	 Supplier	 7	in	total	7	from	Study	Group	
Over	this	3-month	period,	evaluation	and	
reflection	was	performed	with	the	academic	
supervisor	and	the	Steering	Group	
6	 2018	Q1	 UK	 Rolls-Royce	 97	in	total	23	from	Study	Group	
7	 2018	Q1	 UK	 Rolls-Royce	 14	in	total	14	from	Study	Group	
The	output	from	the	preceding	workshops	was	used	to	inform	the	next	steps	in	the	SD/DT	process	and	the	associated	
AR	cycles	which	eventually	led	to	Step	8	(Growth	of	Results	for	the	Longer	Term)	
8	 2018	Q2	 Europe	 Supplier	 1	in	total	1	from	Study	Group	
Over	this	6-month	period,	evaluation	and	
reflection	was	performed	with	the	academic	
supervisor	and	the	Steering	Group	9	 2018	Q2	 Europe	 Supplier	
12	in	total	
12	from	Study	Group	
10	 2018	Q2	 UK	 Rolls-Royce	 36	in	total	0	from	Study	Group	
11	 2018	Q4	 Asia	Pacific	 Rolls-Royce	 13	in	total	3	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Professor	Du	(Shanghai	Jiao	Tong	
University)	who	had	presented	at	it		
12	 2018	Q4	 Europe	 Supplier	 17	in	total	17	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Dr	Greg	Harris	(Auburn	
University)	who	had	presented	at	it	
13	 2019	Q1	 UK	 Rolls-Royce	 18	in	total	4	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	a	representative	from	another	
OEM	in	the	aerospace	sector	(Thales	Group)	who	
attended	the	workshop	as	an	observer	
14	 2019	Q1	 USA	 Supplier	 18	in	total	14	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Brad	Farris	(MBE	consultant)	
who	had	presented	at	it	
The	output	from	the	preceding	workshops	was	used	to	inform	the	next	steps	in	the	SD/DT	process	and	the	associated	
AR	cycles	which	eventually	led	to	Step	9	(Embedding	into	Routine	Business)	
15	 2019	Q2	 UK	 Rolls-Royce	 94	in	total	23	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Professor	James	Aitken	
(University	of	Surrey)	
16	 2019	Q2	 UK	 Rolls-Royce	 13	in	total	11	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Professor	James	Aitken	
(University	of	Surrey)	
17	 2019	Q2	 Asia	Pacific	 Supplier	 38	in	total	3	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Professor	Du	(Shanghai	Jiao	Tong	
University)	who	had	observed	it	
18	 2019	Q4	 Europe	 Supplier	 21	in	total	17	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	the	academic	supervisor	
(who	had	attended	the	workshop	as	an	observer)	
19	 2019	Q4	 UK	 Research	Centre	
16	in	total	
0	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	the	academic	supervisor	
20	 2020	Q1	 Europe	 Rolls-Royce	 81	in	total	19	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Professor	James	Aitken	
(University	of	Surrey)	
21	 2020	Q1	 Europe	 Supplier	 24	in	total	18	from	Study	Group	
This	was	performed	before	and	after	the	
workshop	with	Professor	James	Aitken	
(University	of	Surrey)	
	
Figure 4.3: Drumbeat of workshops held throughout my research programme  
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The	firms	who	attended	the	workshops	came	from	the	following	groups:	(a)	the	total	population	of	
ISS/SEP	suppliers	to	whom	steps	1	to	4	of	the	SD/DT	process	was	applied	on	typically	an	annual	basis;	
(b)	 the	 cohort	 of	 suppliers	 from	 [a]	who	 joined	 the	 SD/DT	 programme;	 (c)	 other	 suppliers	 from	
beyond	[a]	who	were	co-opted	onto	the	SD/DT	programme	(e.g.	software	vendors);	and	(d)	other	
suppliers	from	beyond	[a]	who	did	not	join	the	SD/DT	programme	but	occasionally	participated	in	
activities	(e.g.	sub-tier	suppliers).	The	suppliers	referred	to	as	(b)	form	the	main	study	group	for	my	
research.	 There	 are	 twenty-four	 of	 them	 and,	 to	 protect	 their	 confidentiality,	 they	 have	 been	
renamed	using	the	phonetic	alphabet.	To	avoid	confusion,	the	term	Indigo	is	used	(instead	of	India)	
and	two	terms	(Mike	and	November)	are	omitted.	Figure	4.4	shows	their	pattern	of	attendance.	
	
	 Workshop Number 
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	 15	 16	 17	 18	 19	 20	 21	
Alpha	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Bravo	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	 l	 l	 l	 X	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Charlie	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 l	 l	 	 X	 	 	 l	 	 X	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 X	
Delta	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Echo	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Foxtrot	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 	 X	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Golf	 l	 X	 X	 	 l	 l	 X	 	 X	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 X	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Hotel	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 l	
Indigo	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 X	 	 l	 l	
Juliet	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Kilo	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Lima	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 l	 l	 	 X	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Oskar	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Papa	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 l	 	 l	 	 	 	 	
Quebec	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Romeo	 l	 l	 X	 	 	 l	 l	 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sierra	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 l	
Tango	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 X	 l	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	
Uniform	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 l	 	 X	 l	 	 l	 l	 	 	 	
Victor	 	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 X	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Whiskey	 l	 X	 X	 	 	 l	 l	 	 X	 	 l	 	 	 	 l	 	 l	 	 	 	 	
X-ray	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 X	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Yankee	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 l	 X	 	 l	 	 	 l	 	 l	 l	 X	 	 l	 	 l	 l	
Zulu	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 l	 l	 l	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 l	
Additional	attendees	at	the	workshops	came	from	groups	(a),	(c)	and	(d)	who	are	described	in	the	main	text	above	
(a)	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 l	 	
(c)	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 	 l	 	 l	 	 	 l	
(d)	 	 	 	 l	 	 	 	 	 	 l	 l	 	 l	 	 	 	 l	 	 l	 	 	
	
Figure 4.4: Attendance at the workshops (l	=	attended;		X	=	invited,	but	declined)  
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Figure	 4.4	 shows	 the	 pattern	 of	 attendance	 at	 the	workshops	 to	 have	 been	 stable	 and	 quorate.	
Occasionally,	firms	were	unable	to	attend.	However,	even	at	workshop	9	(which	was	transitionary	
with	some	firms	departing	and	others	joining	after	the	first	year)	attendance	never	dropped	below	
two-thirds	of	those	invited.	
	
The	 twenty-four	 firms	 in	 my	 main	 study	 group	 are	 very	 diverse.	 A	 summary	 of	 a	 few	 of	 their	
contextual	factors	from	Figure	3.3	is	given	in	Figure	4.5.	My	steering	group	judged	them	to	be	suitably	
representative	of	the	firms	within	the	Extended	Enterprise.	The	only	contextual	factor	which	changed	
over	 the	 duration	 of	 my	 research	 was	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity.	 The	 measurement	 and	
triangulation	of	this	is	explained	next	in	section	4.4.	
	
 
	
 
Figure 4.5: Summary of the twenty-four suppliers in my main study group 
(The	numbers	within	the	pie-charts	provide	the	geographical/size	distribution	of	the	24	firms)	
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4.4 Triangulation to compare absorptive capacity to supplier outcomes 
Key	to	my	research	is	the	operationalisation	and	measurement	of	relative	absorptive	capacity	using	
supplier	scorecards	(section	3.3.2).	This	proved	to	be	the	only	contextual	factor	which	changed	over	
my	research	timescales	and,	fortunately,	quantitative	data	could	be	gathered	using	an	existing	well	
established	process.	However,	an	approach	was	required	to	triangulate	in	order	to	study	if/how	it	
pointed	to	the	actual	outcomes	which	were	being	observed	in	practice	from	the	SD/DT	process.	
	
Constructing	a	triangulation	strategy	is	subjective	and	“the	triangulatory	investigator	is	left	to	search	
for	a	logical	pattern”	(Jick,	1979).	Two	factors	helped	me.	First,	I	had	“cases	within	a	case”	(Gehman	
et	al,	2018).	My	study	group	of	suppliers	are	diverse	as	shown	by	Figure	4.5.	Second,	I	had	privileged	
access	 to	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 dyad	 (buyer	 and	 supplier)	 throughout	 three	 years	 of	 field	work.	My	
challenge	was	to	mitigate	the	potential	for	bias	arising	from	my	positionality	and	prior	knowledge.	In	
total,	I	conducted	nearly	one	hundred	interviews	(24	suppliers;	2	dyadic	perspectives;	and	2	phases	
i.e.	towards	the	start	and	finish	of	my	research).	All	interviews	were	semi-structured	with	questions	
sent	to	the	interviewees	in	advance	together	with	a	research	overview	and	an	ethics	statement.	All	
interviews	were	recorded	and	transcribed	afterwards.		
	
Buyer-side	interviews	were	conducted	with	the	procurement	and	technical	staff	at	Rolls-Royce	who	
managed	the	operational	and	strategic	relationship	with	the	supplier.	These	interviews	were	typically	
held	 to	 coincide	 with	 the	 annual	 buyer/supplier	 business	 reviews	 for	 2018	 and	 2019,	 namely:	
between	workshops	9	and	12;	and	between	workshops	17	and	18.	In	most	cases,	interviews	were	
conducted	face-to-face	on	company	premises.	When	not,	by	phone.	The	interviews	sought	to	track	
the	buyer’s	perception	of	their	suppliers’	progress	and	outcomes	through	the	SD/DT	process.	The	
buyers	 had	 previously	 baselined	 their	 desired	 outcomes	 when	 they	 selected	 their	 suppliers	 to	
participate	in	the	SD/DT	programme	(step	4	in	Figures	2.5	and	5.1).	
	
Supplier-side	interviews	were	conducted	with	the	staff	who	managed	their	relationship	with	Rolls-
Royce	and/or	who	were	nominated	to	attend	the	workshops	in	Figure	4.4.	These	interviews	were	
conducted	in	conjunction	with	their	first	workshop	attendance	and,	if	they	were	invited	to	workshop	
18,	in	the	period	after	it	and	up	to	workshop	20.	The	first	interview	was	typically	conducted	face-to-
face	at	 the	 suppliers’	premises	and	 the	 second	by	phone.	 The	 interviews	 sought	 to	establish	 the	
suppliers’	perspective	of	the	value	of	the	SD/DT	process	and	their	reasons	for	participation.		
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 102 - 
4.4.1 Interview design to explore Waypoints A and B 
Waypoints	A	and	B	are	shown	in	Figure	3.2.	My	contextual	factors	and	theoretical	framework	are	
explained	 in	 sections	3.3,	 3.4,	 and	3.5.	My	 interviews	needed	 to	be	designed	 to	 triangulate	with	
relative	absorptive	capacity	(as	operationalised	and	measured	through	the	supplier	scorecards)	and	
explore	Waypoints	A	and	B.	 In	so	doing,	 I	was	mindful	of	scholars,	such	as	Robson	and	McCartan	
(2016),	 who	 argue	 that	 “a	 focus	 solely	 on	 outcomes	 …	 does	 little	 to	 develop	 a	 cumulative	
understanding	of	complex	social	interventions.”		
	
My	first	phase	of	interviews	studied	supplier	selection	and	on-boarding	(i.e.	up	to	step	7	of	the	SD/DT	
process);	therefore,	my	second	phase	of	interviews	were	those	used	to	explore	Waypoints	A	and	B.	
They	began	with	buyer-side	interviews	after	workshop	17	(2019Q2)	and	finished	with	supplier-side	
interviews	up	to	workshop	20	(2020Q1).	By	this	time,	many	of	those	interviewed	had	a	few	years’	
familiarity	with	the	SD/DT	programme	since	 it	had	been	 launched	at	workshop	2	(2017Q3).	A	full	
interview	sequence	(buyer,	then	supplier)	was	possible	for	20	out	of	the	24	suppliers	 in	the	main	
study	group.	The	suppliers	who	were	not	covered	 in	 full	and	are,	 therefore,	not	 included	 for	 this	
aspect	of	the	interview	results	in	Chapter	6	are:	Papa,	Romeo,	Tango,	and	Whiskey.	
	
The	 buyer-side	 interviews	 were	 semi-structured	 and	 based	 upon	 the	 five	 strategic	 responses	 to	
institutional	processes	shown	in	Figure	3.8.	The	results	were	used	to	study	Waypoint	A.	From	the	list	
of	five	strategic	responses,	most	buyers	selected	“acquiescence”	to	describe	how	their	supplier	was	
responding.	However,	the	buyers	overwhelmingly	stated	that	the	codification	and	terminology	from	
Figure	3.8	lacked	sufficient	granularity	and	carried	too	many	negative	connotations.	They	fed	back	
that	my	questions	were	too	“negatively	loaded”	(Robinson	and	Leonard,	2019).	
	
Therefore,	to	prepare	for	the	supplier-side	interviews	and	the	study	of	Waypoint	B,	I	used	MAXQDA	
qualitative	analysis	software	to	cluster	and	synthesise	the	terms	which	the	buyers	had	used	during	
their	interviews	(i.e.	when	they	were	elaborating	upon	those	from	Figure	3.8).	The	new	terms	which	
emerged	are	shown	in	Figure	4.6.	The	originating	terms	from	Figure	3.8	are	highlighted	in	bold	and	
those	 which	 were	 synthesised	 from	 the	 buyers	 are	 listed	 alphabetically	 next	 to	 them.	 They	 are	
grouped	on	the	basis	of	word	association	using	the	context	in	which	they	were	raised	by	the	buyers	
when	discussing	Figure	3.8.	 Some	 terms	were	 raised	by	 the	buyers	which	went	beyond	 this	and,	
therefore,	two	new	groups	(D	and	F)	are	created	for	them	in	Figure	4.6.		
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	 What	is	your	firms	purpose	in	being	on	the	SD/DT	programme?	
Group	A	 Acquiescing	 Aligning	 Complying	 Integrating	 Sponsoring	
Group	B	 Avoiding	 Buffering	 Deferring	 Observing	 Waiting	
Group	C	 Balancing	 Compromising	 Customising	 Internalising	 Translating	
Group	D	 Benchmarking	 Developing	 Discovering	 Learning	 Understanding	
Group	E	 Challenging	 Defying	 Deviating	 Resisting	 Testing	
Group	F	 Contributing	 Explaining	 Sharing	 Reciprocating	 Teaching	
Group	G	 Controlling	 Influencing	 Innovating	 Manipulating	 Steering	
 
Figure 4.6: Response framework used for supplier-side interviews (Waypoint B) 
(terms	from	Figure	3.8	are	highlighted	here	in	bold,	but	were	not	in	bold	when	used	for	interview)	
	
I	based	the	construction	of	Figure	4.6	upon	Foddy	(1993)	who	categorises	it	as	“goal	antecedents”	
(i.e.	I	am	trying	to	establish	the	respondents	purpose	in	being	on	the	SD/DT	programme).	His	process	
of	construction	begins	with	mainly	open	questions	(i.e.	my	buyer-side	interviews)	and	then	uses	the	
resulting	responses	as	a	basis	for	more	closed	questions	(i.e.	my	supplier-side	interviews).	I	also	used	
one	of	the	means	of	measurement	which	he	suggests	(i.e.	ranking	scale:	choose	the	first,	then	second,	
then	 third	 …	 most	 applicable	 response)	 and	 followed	 many	 of	 his	 probing	 and	 threat	 reducing	
strategies.	 I	 also	 used	 interview	 strategies	 from	 Kvale	 (2006)	 and	 Tayeb	 (2001)	 to	 deal	 with	
differences	in	values	and	practices	across	firms	and	to	minimise	my	monopoly	of	interpretation.		
	
Scholars	use	various	terms	to	describe	my	response	framework	in	Figure	4.6.	For	example:	retrieval	
clues	 in	 Robinson	 and	 Leonard	 (2019),	 clarification	 features	 in	 Metzler	 et	 al	 (2015),	 example	
responses	 in	 Tourangeau	 et	 al	 (2014),	 word	 preferences	 in	 McPherson	 et	 al	 (2014),	 and	 word	
associations	in	Hovardas	and	Korfiatis	(2006).	They	report	advantages	and	disadvantages.	Therefore,	
I	pretested	in	accordance	with	Robinson	and	Leonard	(2019).	I	used	expert	review	and	pilot	testing	
in	order	to	confirm	that	my	construction	had	validity	(i.e.	“one	that	measures	what	it	is	intended	to	
measure”)	 and	 reliability	 (i.e.	 “questions	 are	 answered	 consistently”).	 I	 used	 Rolls-Royce	 staff	 in	
supplier-facing	 roles	 from	 around	 the	 world	 given	 the	 international	 nature	 of	 my	 research.	 No	
problems	were	identified	and,	hence,	no	adjustments	were	made	to	Figure	4.6	prior	to	its	use.	
	
The	supplier-side	 interviews	used	to	study	Waypoint	B	were	semi-structured	and	based	upon	the	
response	framework	in	Figure	4.6.	English	was	not	the	first	language	for	some	of	those	interviewed	
and	they	stated	that	they	found	the	format	helpful.	Also,	compared	to	the	buyer-side	interviews,	it	
reduced	the	need	for	unstructured	discussion	to	clarify	and	prevent	misinterpretation.	Furthermore,	
in	Chapter	6,	consistent	themes	will	be	shown	to	have	carried	through	buyer/supplier	interviews.	
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4.4.2 Success criteria for Waypoints A and B 
Figure	3.2	 shows	how	Waypoints	A	and	B	are	milestones	 that	 I	 set	 to	 track	 the	 journey	 from	an	
Extended	Enterprise	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	My	theoretical	 framework	for	exploring	them	is	
described	 in	 sections	 3.4	 and	 3.5	 respectively.	 This	 section	 now	 explains	 how	 progress	 will	 be	
assessed	in	Chapter	6	in	order	for	the	results	to	be	triangulated	with	relative	absorptive	capacity.	
	
Waypoint	A	 considers	 supplier	 choice	using	 the	 five	 potential	 strategic	 responses	 to	 institutional	
processes	defined	by	Oliver	(1991).	Therefore,	as	such,	there	is	no	success	criteria	used	here.	It	 is	
instead	a	means	of	categorisation	for	enquiry.	The	buyer	reflects	upon	the	level	of	engagement	and	
progress	being	made	by	their	supplier.	Occasionally,	this	prompted	a	change	(e.g.	early	exit	for	the	
supplier	 from	the	SD/DT	programme	or	move	to	a	 local	 regional	cluster)	 in	which	case	the	buyer	
discussed	 and	 agreed	 this	with	 their	 supplier.	 Chapter	 6	 includes	 a	 summary	of	 the	 results	 from	
Waypoint	A	and	Chapter	5	describes	how	the	SD/DT	process	was	followed.	
	
Waypoint	B	 is	 that	which	 is	used	 in	Chapter	6	to	 judge	whether	the	SD/DT	process	has	delivered	
successful,	 or	 unsuccessful,	 outcomes	 and	 to	 triangulate	 this	 with	 the	 measurement	 of	 relative	
absorptive	 capacity	 from	 the	 supplier	 scorecards.	 The	 success	 criteria	 for	Waypoint	 B	 considers	
adoption	and	diffusion	in	accordance	with	section	3.5.	Also,	closer	digital	alignment	emerged	as	an	
important	consideration	through	the	buyer-side	interviews.	The	term	that	they	prioritised	alongside	
“acquiescing”	in	Figure	4.6	was	“aligning”.	Previously	during	my	research,	 it	had	been	established	
that:	(a)	suppliers	were	typically	well	below	the	level	of	digital	maturity	perceived	to	be	industry	best	
practice,	 and	 (b)	 action	 and	 investment	 was	 being	 taken	 to	 improve	 but	 it	 was	 piecemeal	 and	
uncoordinated	as	a	supply/value	chain.	See	Figure	5.1,	step	5,	guideline	5.ii.	
	
Figure	4.7	shows	the	six	questions	used	to	form	the	success	criteria	for	Waypoint	B.	Each	question	
must	be	answered	in	the	positive	in	order	for	the	outcome	to	be	categorised	in	Chapter	6	as	having	
been	successful.	Two	persons	performed	the	assessment	independently	as	explained	in	the	following	
paragraph.	Nevertheless,	it	is	predominately	a	buyer-side	view	of	what	constitutes	success	from	the	
SD/DT	 process	 at	Waypoint	 B	 on	 the	 journey	 towards	 a	 Digital	 Enterprise.	 From	 Figure	 3.9,	 the	
instrument	used	for	the	sharing	of	best	practice	 is	 the	digital	minimum	standards	and,	therefore,	
they	play	an	important	role	in	the	success	criteria.	Many	of	the	questions	in	Figure	4.7	evolved	during	
the	buyer-side	interviews	and	they	were	all	eventually	ratified	by	my	steering	group	(section	4.2.1).	
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Buyer-side	
Interview	
(section	4.4.1)	
Supplier-side	
Interview	
(section	4.4.1)	
Digital	Minimum	
Standards	
(section	5.2.3)	
SD/DT	
Programme	
(chapter	5)	
Q1:	Is	there	evidence	of	
closer	digital	alignment	
and	an	overall	net	
benefit	from	having	this	
supplier	on	the	SD/DT	
programme?	
	
	
	
This	aspect	of	the	success	
criteria	predominately	
took	a	dyad-level	view	
from	the	buyer’s	
perspective.	If	the	supplier	
had	been	sourced	on	the	
new	UltraFan®	engine	
project,	then	consideration	
was	also	given	to	their	
level	of	engagement	and	
readiness	for	model-based	
definition.	
	
Occasionally,	during	their	
interviews,	buyer’s	also	
offered	positive	
observations	(no	negatives	
were	forthcoming)	for	the	
network-level.	
Q2:	Is	there	evidence	of	
closer	digital	alignment	
and	an	overall	net	
benefit	from	having	this	
supplier	on	the	SD/DT	
programme?	
	
	
	
This	aspect	of	the	success	
criteria	took	solely	a	
firm-level	view	from	the	
suppliers’	perspective.	
Q3:	By	the	end	of	2019,	
is	the	level	of	access	to	
the	training	and	
awareness	APP	for	the	
digital	min	standards	
commensurate	with	the	
firm’s	size	and	global	
footprint?	
	
This	aspect	of	the	success	
criteria	used	access	
request	data	for	the	APP	
and	compared	it	with	the	
data	used	to	assess	the	
firm’s	contextual	factors	in	
section	3.3.	
Q6:	Has	the	firm	made	
a	tangible	contribution	
to	the	SD/DT	program?	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Examples	may	include:	
leading	a	working	
group;	hosting	a	
workshop;	presenting	
at,	or	providing	
presentation	material	
for,	a	cascade	briefing	to	
suppliers	beyond	the	
cohort;	or	volunteering	
for	roles	in	the	2020	
communities	of	practice.	
	
	
This	aspect	of	the	success	
criteria	used	the	prime	
researchers	field	notes	and	
took	a	cohort-level	and	a	
network-level	perspective.	
Q4:	Were	the	digital	
minimum	standards	
either	achieved	by	the	
end	of	2019	or	a	
gap	closure	plan	
agreed	for	2020?	
	
This	aspect	of	the	success	
criteria	used	supporting	
data	which	was	submitted	
in	conjunction	with	the	
2019Q4	supplier	scorecard	
(technology).	It	was	only	
applied	to	those	suppliers	
who	had	one.	
Q5:	Are	key	actions	
related	to	Q4	
captured	in	the	Tech	
Engagement	Plan?	
	
This	aspect	of	the	success	
criteria	used	the	2019Q4	
supplier	scorecard	
(technology).	It	was	only	
applied	to	those	suppliers	
who	had	one.	But,	if	so,	it	
gave	an	indication	of	
prioritisation	&	escalation.	
	
Figure 4.7: Success criteria used for Waypoint B comprises of six questions 
	
NOTE:		One	 of	 my	 prime	 references	 in	 section	 2.2,	 Krause	 and	 Handfield	 (1999),	 remark	 about	
supplier	development	(SD)	that	“the	final	objective	is	to	achieve	a	globally	aligned	supplier	network”.	
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The	assessment	of	supplier	outcomes	at	Waypoint	B	was	performed	in	2020Q1	using	Figure	4.7	once	
all	interviews	were	completed	and	transcribed.	Two	persons	performed	the	assessment	in	order	to	
balance	the	need	for	background	knowledge	with	a	level	of	independence.	These	persons	were	the	
prime	researcher	(Paul	Hacker)	and	a	graduate	engineer	(Liwei	Lu)	who	was	on	a	6-month	placement	
in	the	Supply	Chain	Collaboration	department	at	Rolls-Royce	up	until	the	end	of	2020Q1.	My	thanks	
to	Liwei	for	his	help,	support,	and	meticulous	approach.	
	
The	assessment	was	performed	in	the	following	manner:	
• Liwei	Lu	collated	all	of	the	data	from	interview	transcriptions	and	other	sources. 
• Paul	Hacker	used	the	data	to	assess	outcomes	for	all	suppliers	using	the	success	criteria	given	in	
Figure	4.7. 
• Liwei	Lu	reviewed	the	data	together	with	Paul	Hacker’s	written-up	rationale	for	the	assessment	
of	a	sample	of	three	suppliers	(Alpha,	Bravo,	and	Charlie). 
• Liwei	Lu	clarified	any	points	with	Paul	Hacker	in	order	to	familiarise	himself	with	the	application	
of	the	success	criteria. 
• Liwei	Lu	conducted	the	assessment	by	himself	for	the	remaining	twenty-one	suppliers. 
• Paul	 Hacker	 and	 Liwei	 Lu	 compared	 their	 full	 set	 of	 individual	 results,	 found	 very	 strong	
agreement,	 and	 after	 discussion	 around	 a	 few	 points	 (i.e.	 explaining	 acronyms,	 specialist	
technical	 terms,	 or	 historical	 references)	 reached	 consensus	 for	 all	 suppliers.	 The	 results	 are	
provided	in	Chapter	6.  
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4.5  Transferability is a better concept to adopt than generalisation	
In	 reviewing	 the	 role	 of	 action	 research	 in	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	 information	
systems,	Baskerville	and	Wood-Harper	(1996)	describe	it	as	being	“context-bound”.	It	is	difficult	to	
determine	 the	 cause	 of	 any	 given	 effect	 when	 it	 could	 be	 due	 to	 either:	 the	 environment,	 the	
researcher,	and/or	the	methodology.	Therefore,	they	argue	that	action	research	produces	narrow	
learning,	because	each	situation	is	unique	and	cannot	be	repeated.	However,	Greenwood	and	Levin	
(2006)	refer	 to	“trans-contextual	credibility”.	They	argue	that	action	research	does	not	generalise	
through	abstraction	and	 the	 loss	of	history	and	context.	A	 conscious	 reflection	must	be	made	of	
similarities	and	differences.		
	
Costley	et	al	(2010)	go	onto	explain	the	importance	of	“situated-ness”	for	work-based	research.	They	
advise	researchers	to	be	aware	of,	and	to	 fully	describe	 in	their	output,	 the	organisation	and	the	
environment	in	which	it	operates.	They	warn	against	the	assumption	that	any	of	the	findings	from	
one	organisation	can	be	applied	to	others.	Nevertheless,	by	extension,	the	opposite	is	also	true.	We	
should	not	default	to	the	position	that	it	does	not	apply.	Rather	that	we	do	not	know,	one	way	or	the	
other.	
	
Herr	and	Anderson	(2015)	review	how	to,	carefully,	tackle	the	application	and	read-across	of	results	
from	action	research.	Amongst	other	approaches,	they	explain	how	to	move	away	from	the	notion	
of	the	generalisation	of	findings	to	one	of	transferability.	Findings	can	be	transferred	from	a	sending	
to	a	receiving	context,	in	accordance	with	Lincoln	and	Guba	(1985):	
	
“If	there	is	to	be	transferability,	the	burden	of	proof	lies	less	with	the	original	investigator	than	
with	the	person	seeking	to	make	an	application	elsewhere.	The	original	inquirer	cannot	know	
the	sites	to	which	transferability	might	be	sought,	but	the	appliers	can	and	do.	The	best	advice	
to	give	to	anyone	seeking	to	make	a	transfer	is	to	accommodate	empirical	evidence	about	the	
contextual	similarity;	the	responsibility	of	the	original	investigator	ends	in	providing	sufficient	
descriptive	data	to	make	such	similarity	judgements	possible.”	
	
In	conclusion,	generalisation	of	my	results	must	be	handled	with	caution.	Transferability	is	a	better	
concept	to	adopt	than	generalisation. 	
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4.6 Summary of key implications from this chapter 
I	was	presented	with	the	following	warning	when	I	placed	my	action	research	into	the	classification	
system	devised	by	Coghlan	and	Brannick	(2014):	“Clearly	the	most	difficult	and	demanding	in	terms	
of	scale,	complexity,	conceptual,	analytical	and	practical	knowledge	and	skill.”		
	
However,	I	consider	myself	to	be	extremely	fortunate.	Tayeb	(2001)	reflects	upon	the	ideal	design	of	
research	programmes	and	describes	circumstances	such	as	my	own	as	“feasible	only	for	a	select	and	
fortunate	few”.		
	
I	have	made	the	following	contributions	in	chapter	4:		
	
a) Selected	action	research	as	my	method	and	passed	a	validity	check.	
	
b) Reflected	upon	my	complex	positionality	and	taken	special	measures	to	address	 it	using	a	
steering	group	and	expert	panel.	
	
c) Coalesced	action	research	cycles	around	a	drumbeat	of	21	workshops.	
	
d) Introduced	a	diverse	study	group	of	24	firms.	
	
e) Constructed	a	response	framework	for	supplier-side	interviews	to	aid	the	discussion	on	their	
goal	antecedents.	
	
f) Established	 a	 triangulation	 strategy	 to	 compare	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	with	 supplier	
outcomes.	
	
g) Identified	that	transferability	is	a	better	concept	to	adopt	for	my	results	than	generalisation.	
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Chapter 5 
 
RESULTS (part 1 of 2) 
 
Description of the SD/DT process 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Chapters	 1	 and	 2	 set	 the	 scene	 and	 synthesised	 process-steps	 for	 organisational	 change	 from	
literature.	Chapter	3	constructed	a	theoretical	framework.	Chapter	4	described	my	action	research	
methodology	and	how	it	develops	and	tests	the	SD/DT	process	through	fieldwork.		
	
Now,	 chapter	 5	 provides	 the	 first	 part	 of	 my	 empirical	 results	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 comprehensive	
description	of	the	SD/DT	process	as	output	from	my	final	(thesis)	action	research	cycle.	This	chapter	
is	divided	into	three	sections	from	5.1	to	5.3.	It	begins	by	introducing	the	process	documentation.	
Then,	section	5.2	explains	the	special	interventions	which	are	taken	to	facilitate	the	SD/DT	process.	
Finally,	section	5.3	summarises	and	draws	out	the	key	implications.	A	bullet-point	executive	summary	
is	given	overleaf	for	those	who	prefer	this	format.	
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Section	5.1:	 Nine	steps	in	the	SD/DT	process	are	output	from	thesis	AR	(action	research)	cycle	
	
• My	research	ended	partway	through	step	9	of	the	SD/DT	process	at	workshop	21.	
At	 this	point,	 the	 cohort	had	11	distinct	projects	of	which:	6	were	 live,	3	were	
complete,	1	was	cancelled,	and	1	was	in	the	hopper	to	be	launched.	
	
• 9	steps,	28	guidelines,	and	4	categories	of	special	intervention	are	output	from	my	
final,	thesis,	AR	cycle	for	the	SD/DT	process.	
	
• Each	guideline	 is	assessed	for	 its	criticality	and	the	 level	of	adherence	that	was	
achieved.	Also	captured	are	the	key	enablers	and	blockers.	
	
• The	documentation	was	first	drafted	by	the	prime	researcher	from	field	notes.	It	
was	then	reviewed,	individually,	by	4	other	team	members.	Changes	were	agreed	
to	c.10%	of	the	assessments	and	a	few	additional	points	were	incorporated.	
	
Section	5.2:	 Four	categories	of	special	intervention	are	taken	to	facilitate	the	SD/DT	process	
	
• Special	 interventions	 are	 taken	 to	 increase	 programme	 thickness.	 Software	
vendors	are	co-opted	onto	the	programme.	Also,	a	prize	is	awarded	which	gives	
access	to	specialist	facilities/resources	away	from	busy	production	environments.	
	
• Special	interventions	are	taken	to	organise	the	eclectic	mix	of	firms	and	maintain	
programme	cohesion.	A	regional	cluster	group	is	established	in	China,	workshops	
are	delivered	for	the	UltraFan®	project	and	commodity	groups,	and	large	firms	are	
encouraged	to	host	group	workshops	and/or	have	1:1	events	with	the	focal	firm.	
	
• Special	 interventions	 are	 taken	 to	 diffuse	 across	 the	 broader	 supply	 base.	 An	
engagement	model	is	developed	by	the	focal	firm	which	comprises	of	4	levels.	The	
positioning	 of	 firms	 depends	 upon	 their	 strategic	 segmentation	 and	 their	
capability	for	self-improvement.	Digital	minimum	standards	are	co-created	and	an	
APP	is	released	for	training	and	awareness	purposes.	
	
• Special	 interventions	 are	 taken	 to	 establish	 a	 dynamic	 model	 of	 membership.	
Communities	of	practice	are	introduced	for	2020.	
	
Section	5.3:	 Summary	of	key	implications	from	this	chapter	
	
• Digital	minimum	 standards	 are	 shown	 to	 have	 emerged	 as	 the	 instrument	 for	
sharing	best	practice	in	accordance	with	my	theoretical	framework	in	chapter	3.	
There	is	some	indication	of	diffusion;	however,	it	is	still	very	early	days.	Therefore,	
this	is	identified	as	a	topic	for	discussion	in	chapter	7.	
	
• Overall,	my	 research	 has	made	 a	 positive	 business	 contribution.	 However,	 the	
SD/DT	 programme	 has	 undergone	 a	 long	 gestation	 (in	 business	 terms)	 and	 it	
remains	uncertain	how	business	value	will	continue	to	be	extracted	and	to	grow.		
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5.1 Nine steps in the SD/DT process are output from thesis AR cycle 
Figure	5.1	gives	the	output	from	my	final,	thesis,	action	research	cycle	in	the	format	of	nine	steps,	
twenty-eight	 guidelines,	 and	 four	 categories	 of	 special	 intervention	 for	 the	 SD/DT	 process.	 The	
guidelines	are	presented	in	accordance	with	two	sources	which	I	found	to	be	particularly	clear	and	
informative	when	I	came	across	them	during	my	literature	review.	Firstly,	Bokinge	and	Malmqvist	
(2012)	who	used	a	high,	medium,	and	low	scale	of	criticality/adherence	to	assess	how	well	their	PLM	
implementation	 guidelines	 had	 been	 followed.	 Secondly,	 Bessant	 (2004)	 who	 captured	 the	 key	
enablers	and	blockers	from	his	case	studies	into	supply	chain	learning.	Furthermore,	the	guidelines	
in	Figure	5.1	give	a	cross-reference	to	the	special	interventions	which	are	described	in	section	5.2.	
	
Figure	5.1	was	first	drafted	by	the	prime	researcher	(Paul	Hacker)	from	field	notes	which	were	taken	
and	grouped	against	the	initial	baseline	steps	and	guidelines	(Figure	2.5).	It	was	then	passed	to	four	
members	of	the	team	from	Rolls-Royce	who	had	participated	with	the	prime	researcher	in	most,	if	
not	 all,	 of	 the	 steps	 in	 the	 SD/DT	 process.	 These	 persons	 were:	 Ian	 Molyneux	 (Procurement	
Executive),	 Ben	 Buckton	 (Procurement	 Development	 Manager),	 James	 Buck	 (Chief	 of	 Digital	
Manufacturing),	 and	 Alistair	 Mateer	 (Digital	 Manufacturing	 Manager).	 Individually,	 they	 each	
reviewed	and	commented	upon	the	first	draft.	There	were	no	major	disagreements	and,	therefore,	
it	was	possible	to	consolidate	all	 inputs	without	the	need	for	any	further	group	reviews.	Changes	
were	agreed	 to	approximately	10%	 (6	out	of	56)	of	 the	high,	medium,	and	 low	ratings	 for	either	
adherence	or	 criticality.	Also,	 a	 few	additional	points	or	 clarifications	were	 incorporated	 into	 the	
narrative.	My	thanks	to	Ian,	Ben,	James,	and	Alistair	for	their	tireless	help	and	support	throughout.	
	
My	research	ended	partway	through	step	9	of	the	SD/DT	process	at	workshop	21.	Therefore,	for	this	
final	step	in	the	process,	the	assessment	of	adherence	to	the	guidelines	is	only	based	upon	progress	
to	date.	When	my	research	finished,	there	were	11	distinct	projects	and	their	status	was	as	follows:	
• 3	completed	(digital	minimum	standard	format	2019/2020,	MBD	go-live,	and	eFAIR	diffusion).	
• 1	cancelled	before	go-live	(eDAR),	but	the	learning	had	been	passed	onto	a	follow-on	project.	
• 4	at	the	capability	development	phase	(DPEX,	MBE	supplier	portal	and	digital	interoperability,	
eFPA,	and	digital	minimum	standard	format	2021).	
• 2	at	the	discovery	phase	(commodity	twin	and	production	twin).	
• 1	awaiting	launch	in	the	project	hopper	(value	proposition	for	the	Digital	Enterprise).		
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SD/DT step 1: Strategic review 
SD/DT step 1 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
1.i.	Strategy	for	DT	cuts	
across	various	other	
strategies	at	the	same	time	
and,	therefore,	complex	
coordination	efforts	may	be	
needed.	
How:	Step	1	of	the	SD/DT	process	was	initially	performed	in	the	period	up	to,	including,	
and	shortly	after	workshop	1.	However,	the	PhD	research	programme	helped	to	keep	
it	live	thereafter.	The	learning	school	approach	to	strategy	formulation	was	followed	
(Mintzberg	et	al,	 2009).	 The	 scope	was	aimed	at	 the	 fourth	 level,	business	network	
redesign,	in	the	series	of	IT-related	transformations	defined	by	Morton	(1991).	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	 Someone	 to	 spend	 the	 time	 coordinating	 efforts	who	 has	 a	 high	 level	 of	
declarative	and	procedural	prior	knowledge	(see	Figure	1.6).	
Blockers:	Strategy	formation	was	emergent	in	line	with	the	learning	school	approach	
(Mintzberg	et	al,	2009)	and	required	prior	knowledge	(see	above)	and	a	good	network.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
1.ii.	Build	contingency	
planning	and	funding	for	
technological	
breakthroughs	into	the	
strategic	plan	for	change.	
How:	During	the	exploratory	phase	up	to	workshop	1,	vision	documents	were	traced	
back	to	1994	and	2005	for	Electronic	Product	Definition	and	PLM	supplier	collaboration	
respectively.	Interviews	with	those	involved	established	that	shortfalls	in	functionality	
and	funding	plagued	these	programmes.	Aspects	of	which	continue.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	LOW	degree.	
Enablers:	A	core	team	with	perseverance	and	resilience	(see	2.ii).	
Blockers:	An	unprecedented	set	of	circumstances	placed	severe	financial	pressure	on	
the	 focal	 firm	 during	 the	 period	 of	 research.	 Funding	 levels	 were	 reduced	 and	 all	
expenditure	was	subject	to	strict	review.	Nevertheless,	the	criticality	of	this	guideline	
has	been	set	at	medium	to	reflect	that	prioritisation	is	possible	(i.e.	the	80/20	rule).	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	MEDIUM	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
1.iii.	Map	and	include	in	
scope	the	total,	global,	
supply	base.	
How:	 The	 application	 of	 the	 SD/DT	 process	 was	 built	 upon	 nearly	 twenty	 years	 of	
successful	operation	as	an	Extended	Enterprise	 (see	Section	1.2.2).	 The	 supply	base	
was,	therefore,	fully	mapped	and	segmented	prior	to	the	launch	of	the	programme.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	A	mature	and	well	known,	albeit	complex,	supply	base	(see	Figure	1.3).		
Blockers:	With	 the	 benefit	 of	 hindsight,	 it	 would	 have	 helped	 to	 have	mapped	 the	
supply	base	earlier	using	the	lean	engagement	approach	(see	Figure	5.2).	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
1.iv.	Deploy	other	supply	
base	management	practices	
ahead	of	SD/SA.	
How:	In	addition	to	the	baseline	provided	through	1.iii.	the	SD	process	had	been	used	
previously	for	lean,	although	it’s	use	had	been	somewhat	dormant	over	recent	years.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	An	established	infrastructure	of	supplier	scorecards	and	engagement	plans	
containing	strategic,	as	well	as	operational,	attributes	(see	Section	3.3.2).	
Blockers:	 A	 relatively	 poor	 perception	 of	 supplier	 development	 (i.e.	 cost-cutting);	
therefore,	this	term	was	avoided	and	others	were	used	such	as	Focus	Group.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	 None	emerged.	
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SD/DT step 2: Selection of method and team 
SD/DT step 2 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
2.i.	Use	methodology	which	
integrates	business	
processes	and	co-evolves	
digital	enterprise	systems	
together	with	the	supply	
base.	
How:	The	methodology	followed	the	SD/DT	process	which	is	contained	herein.	It	had	to	be	
created	 and	 was,	 therefore,	 not	 available	 at	 the	 time	 of	 workshop	 1.	 However,	 during	
workshop	1,	c.100	of	the	focal	firm’s	top	suppliers	were	asked	the	question	“How	do	we	
become	more	digital?”	 in	small	groups	 in	open	brainstorm	sessions.	They	confirmed	the	
importance	 of	 this	 subject	 and	 pointed	 to	 some	 potential	 solutions.	 This	 subsequently	
helped	with	buy-in	and	provided	a	solid	platform	upon	which	to	take	the	next	step	in	the	
SD/DT	process.		
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	 Approximately	 6	 months	 prior	 to	 workshop	 1,	 in	 response	 to	 another	 ‘wicked	
problem’	to	drive	to	Zero	Defects,	a	forum	similar	to	a	Supplier	Association	was	established.	This	
started	as	a	potentially	one-off	Focus	Group,	but	exceeded	expectations	and	morphed	 into	a	
collection	of	ongoing	Working	Groups.	As	a	collaborative	structure,	this	laid	the	foundations	for	
that	which	was	then	used	and	built	upon	by	the	SD/DT	process.	
Blockers:	Without	 knowing	 the	 SD/DT	 process	 upfront,	 the	 planning	 horizon	 for	 the	 action	
research	 was	 somewhat	 limited	 and	 its	 use	 started	 where	 there	 was	most	 interest	 and	 not	
necessarily	where	there	was	most	need.	The	digital	enterprise	systems	in	Engineering	(e.g.	MBE)	
tended	to	dominate	over	those	in	Procurement	(e.g.	e-Sourcing)	and	Planning	(e.g.	ERP).	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
2.ii.	Gain	the	support	of	top	
management,	build	a	cross-
functional	team,	and	train	
the	team	in	the	
methodology.	
How:	The	support	of	top	management	was	gained	at	an	early	stage	through	their	sponsorship	
of	the	PhD	research	programme.	Furthermore,	it	was	reinforced	by	the	output	from	workshop	1	
which	 confirmed	 there	 was	 a	 gap	 to	 be	 filled	 and	 that	 the	 supply	 base	 wished	 to	 actively	
participate.	 In	 accordance	 with	 Kanter	 (1999),	 a	 Network	 Champion	 and	 a	 Collaboration	
Resource	 Team	 were	 established.	 Existing	 forums	 were	 used	 for	 governance.	 However,	 the	
methodology	 (i.e.	 SD/DT	process)	was	emergent,	 because	 it	was	being	 created	as	 a	 result	 of	
‘action	research’.	The	team	were,	therefore,	untrained	 in	SD/DT;	although,	as	an	experienced	
group	of	industrialists,	they	were	very	familiar	with	the	approach	of	‘learning	by	doing’.		
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	The	timing	of	the	first	iteration	of	step	2	coincided	with	a	push	from	the	Procurement	
and	Engineering	Directors	at	the	focal	firm	to	bring	their	functions	closer	together.	Also,	as	well	
as	this	being	done	at	the	sector-level,	they	were	also	asked	to	sponsor	for	the	whole	corporation.	
Blockers:	 The	prime	researcher	 took	 the	 role	of	Network	Champion	 (Kanter,	1999),	but	was	
unable	to	establish	a	successor	despite	a	few	attempts	which	were	made	over	the	coming	years.	
Anticipating	and	planning	for	this	could	have	been	performed	better	here.	It	becomes	more	of	a	
blocker	later	in	the	SD/DT	process	(see	6.i).	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
2.iii.	Make	an	informed	
decision	on	if/when	to	
launch	Supplier	
Association(s)	and	set	a	
clear	remit	for	JAD	(Joint	
Application	Dev)	and/or	
USER	groups.	
How:	 See	 2.i.	 in	 that	 a	 recent	 precedent	 had	 been	 set	 for	 a	 forum	 similar	 to	 a	 Supplier	
Association	and,	therefore,	a	well	informed	decision	was	able	to	be	made	on	whether	to	commit	
the	 time/effort/expectation	necessary	 to	 run	another	one.	However,	 the	added	dimension	of	
defining	the	role	which	members	might	play	in	the	requirements	capture,	development,	and	user	
acceptance	testing	of	digital	enterprise	systems	was	unanticipated	and	emerged	over	time.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.	
Enablers:	There	was	a	pull	for	this	from	workshop	1.	
Blockers:	Still	now,	after	3	years’	experience,	it	is	not	straight-forward	facilitating	how	suppliers	
will	play	a	strong	and	active	role	in	the	requirements	capture,	development,	and	user	acceptance	
testing	 of	 digital	 enterprise	 systems.	 The	 challenges	 range	 from	 logistical	 to	 cultural	 to	
motivational.	Matters	are	not	helped	by	many	Execs	lacking	a	sufficient	knowledge	of	digital.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	MEDIUM	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	 None	emerged.	
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SD/DT step 3: Evaluation of suppliers 
SD/DT step 3 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
3.i.	Evaluation	is	likely	to	
need	to	cover	multiple	
factors.	
How:	Evaluation	was	aided	by	the	supply	base	already	being	mapped	and	segmented	(see	
1.iii)	and	data	being	readily	available	from	supplier	scorecards	and	engagement	plans	which	
contained	 strategic,	 as	well	 as	operational,	 attributes	 (see	1.iv).	 Therefore,	 the	 scope	of	
potential	suppliers	to	consider	was	well	controlled	and	evaluation	was	initially	performed	
by	survey	(see	3.ii).	Shortlisting	was	then	followed	by	internal	discussion	at	the	focal	firm	
with	the	operational	and	strategic	management	teams	who	interfaced	with	the	suppliers.	
For	shortlisting,	the	dominant	factor	in	the	evaluation	was	whether	the	supplier	was	likely	
to	demonstrate	a	supportive	and	collaborative	spirit	 to	 the	 launch	of	 this	new	 initiative.	
Secondary	factors	were	their	current	 level	of	digital	maturity	and	the	perceived	need	for	
this	 to	 be	 improved,	 or	 shared	 to	 help	 others,	 for	 operational	 performance	 or	 strategic	
capability	development	purposes.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	An	established	infrastructure	of	supplier	scorecards	and	engagement	plans	containing	
strategic,	as	well	as	operational,	attributes	(see	Section	3.2.2).	
Blockers:	 At	 this	 point	 in	 time,	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 value	 proposition	 was	 still	 very	
immature	which	made	the	evaluation	less	sophisticated	than	it	otherwise	may	have	been.	Also,	
it	contributed	to	the	evaluation	only	being	performed	with	incumbent	suppliers.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
3.ii.	Evaluating	suppliers	for	
digital	maturity/needs	will	
not	be	straight-forward,	but	
spot-check	surveys	can	help	
to	highlight	broader	
industry	trends	including	
areas	of	common	interest	
and	digital	non-
interoperability.	
How:	 To	 create	 a	 survey,	 the	 team	 (see	 2.ii)	 drew	 in	 additional	 subject	 matter	 experts	 in	
enterprise	 processes	 and	 their	 associated	 digital	 systems/tools.	 The	 survey	 had	 six	 sections	
covering:	company	details;	design	systems;	manufacturing	systems;	purchasing	systems;	supply	
chain	 planning	 systems;	 and	 organisational	 infrastructure.	 Up	 to	 twelve	 open	 and	 closed	
questions,	per	section,	were	posed	in	the	survey	with	the	aim	of	evaluating	the	suppliers’	current	
status,	aspirational	position,	and	suggested	areas	for	collaboration.	A	maturity-based	scale	was	
used	in	accordance	with	Moultrie	et	al	(2007)	which,	recognising	the	rapidly	changing	nature	of	
digital	technologies,	set	the	second	highest	level	of	maturity	as	being	that	which	the	focal	firm	
believed	to	be	‘industry	best	practice’	at	that	point	in	time.	The	survey	was	in	electronic	format	
and	 was	 distributed	 to	 all	 of	 those	 who	 attended	 workshop	 1.	 There	 was	 a	 period	 of	
approximately	two	months	to	complete,	return,	evaluate	and	down-select	before	workshop	2.	
The	 response	 rate	 to	 the	 survey	 was	 49%.	 This	 was	 judged	 to	 be	 satisfactory	 against	 the	
benchmark	 of	 35-40%	 set	 by	 Baruch	 and	Holtom	 (2008)	 for	 organisational-level	 surveys	 of	 a	
cross-functional	nature	which	require	a	single	consolidated	response.	
Special	Interventions:	Exploratory	studies	leading	up	to	workshop	1	were	centred	around	new	
product	development	(NPD).	Customer	policy	such	as	that	from	the	DoD	(2018)	was	yet	to	be	
published,	 but	 the	writing	was	 on	 the	wall.	 Although	 not	 performed	 here,	 supplier	 selection	
and/or	capability	development	for	NPD	could	have	been	part	of	the	evaluation,	and	a	special	
intervention	which	is	more	centred	around	it	is	described	later	in	section	5.2.2.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	New	product	development	 at	 the	 time	was	beginning	 to	use	 the	digital	 capability	
assessment	 tool	 (NIST,	 2016).	 This	 helped	 to	 inform	 the	 survey.	 Also,	 the	 group	 of	 twelve	
suppliers	which	had	been	brought	together	to	work	on	Zero	Defects	(see	2.i)	were	asked	to	help	
by	trialling	the	survey	in	advance.	Their	feedback	was	very	valuable	and	was	incorporated	before	
the	survey	was	distributed	more	widely.	
Blockers:	Digital	transformation	is	a	complex	and	diverse	subject.	Getting	to	the	right	person(s)	
from	which	to	gather	accurate	data	is	not	easy,	especially	given	other	factors	such	as:	different	
company	sizes,	organisational	structures,	and	language	barriers.	Allow	plenty	of	time	to	do	so.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	MEDIUM	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	
A	point	of	timing	and	emphasis,	as	opposed	to	a	new	guideline,	is	the	importance	of	creating	a	
common	vision	and	vocabulary	at	the	earliest	opportunity.	This	is	covered	later	as	guideline	8.i.	
It	takes	time.	However,	without	it,	those	who	do	not	have	a	full	grasp	of	the	subject	are	prone	to	
misuse/misunderstand	the	many	specialist	terms	and	buzzwords	involved.	
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SD/DT step 4: Selection of suppliers 
SD/DT step 4 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
4.i.	The	selection	criteria	
must	be	robust.	
How:	The	survey	(see	3.ii)	asked	whether	the	supplier	wished	to	participate	 in	what	became	
workshop	 2	 in	 order	 to	 follow-up	 on	 the	 topics	 which	 they	 had	 raised	 in	 the	 survey	 and	 in	
workshop	1	 (see	2.i).	The	only	condition	was	 for	 them	to	have	completed	and	returned	their	
survey.	However,	it	was	explained	that	the	number	of	participants	was	restricted;	therefore,	a	
dynamic	model	of	membership	was	envisaged	which	would	allow	those	who	were	unsuccessful	
to	participate	at	future	events	(see	Section	5.2.4).	From	the	suppliers,	there	were	no	requests	
for	further	clarification	nor	complaints	about	not	being	selected	at	launch.	From	the	focal	firm,	
there	were	a	few	cases	where	there	were	either	too	many,	or	too	few,	suppliers	nominated	from	
a	given	region	or	commodity	group	to	achieve	the	desired	mix	 (see	4.ii).	These	matters	were	
readily	resolved	through	discussion.	
Special	Interventions:	Dynamic	membership	(de-selection	&	exit)	is	described	in	Section	5.2.4.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	A	mature	and	well	known,	albeit	complex,	supply	base	(see	Figure	1.3).	
Blockers:	None	identified.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	MEDIUM	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
4.ii.	Plan	the	mix	including	
different	capabilities	for	
different	purposes.	
How:	A	mix	was	sought	which	gave	a	representative	cross-section	of	the	supply	base.	Some	of	
the	 contextual	 factors	 from	 Figure	 3.3	 were	 used	 and	 mapping,	 such	 as	 that	 in	 Figure	 4.5,	
confirmed	that	a	suitably	representative	cross-section	had	been	achieved.	Careful	consideration	
was	given	to	whether	to	include	direct	competitors,	but	this	was	not	off	limits.	See	6.v.	
Special	Interventions:	Interfirm	relations	were	assumed	to	be	agnostic	of	digital	systems/tools	
(see	 Section	3.3.1);	 therefore,	 this	was	not	used	as	 such	 in	 the	 selection.	However,	 a	 special	
intervention	emerged	over	time	which	sought	to	leverage	the	collective	power	of	the	supply	base	
(see	Section	5.2.1).	By	chance,	 larger	suppliers	who	were	selected	used	a	myriad	of	products	
from	the	dominant	software	vendors	which	helped	to	give	us	more	leverage	with	them.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.	
Enablers:	 There	was	 no	 shortage	 of	 interested	 suppliers	 to	 select	 from	 and	we	were	 over-
subscribed.	This	is	a	testament	to	the	previous	steps	of	the	SD/DT	process.		
Blockers:	Top-down,	gentle,	encouragement	was	required	in	a	few	cases	for	the	non-Western	
suppliers.	Global	events	run	by	the	focal	firm	had	a	history	of	being	dominated	towards	Western	
preferences,	such	as:	the	time	zones	for	WebEx,	the	locations	for	face-to-face	meetings,	English	
as	the	main	language	for	discussion,	and	the	attitudes/approaches	to	sharing	best	practice.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
4.iii.	If	considering	the	
launch	of	a	Supplier	
Association,	do	so	with	a	
relatively	small	membership	
or	perhaps	use	New	
Product	Development	as	an	
alternative.	
How:	Workshop	2	was	in	effect	the	launch	of	a	themed,	global,	Supplier	Association.	Although,	
it	was	called	a	Focus	Group	in	order	to	avoid	any	negative	connotations	and	to	use	a	title	which	
remained	consistent	with	other	forums	being	used	by	the	focal	firm	at	the	time.	The	target	set	
for	 the	 number	 of	 members	 was	 twelve;	 however,	 this	 was	 permitted	 to	 grow	 somewhat	
surreptitiously	to	sixteen.	With	relatively	short	notice	for	international	travel,	fourteen	suppliers	
from	the	main	study	group	were	available	to	attend	workshop	2.	
Special	 Interventions:	 Other	 options	 for	 how	 to	 group	 and	 distribute	 an	 eclectic	 mix	 of	
suppliers,	and	the	respective	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	each	option,	became	clearer	over	
time.	This	is	explained	in	Section	5.2.2.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.	
Enablers:	A	member	of	the	focal	firm	had	first-hand	experience	of	Supplier	Associations	from	
having	 previously	 worked	 for	 Toyota	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Morgan	 and	 Liker,	 2006).	 He	 was	
interviewed	by	the	prime	researcher	 in	order	to	gather	his	 insights	and	 lessons	 learnt.	His	 in-
depth	knowledge	of	the	similarities	and	differences	in	buyer/supplier	relationships	between	both	
sectors	(automotive	versus	aerospace)	was	helpful	in	defining	the	scope	and	vision.	
Blockers:	This	was	a	period	of	discovery	and,	with	the	knowledge	now	gained,	it	would	have	
been	even	better	if	a	range	of	other	interplaying	options	were	considered.	See	Section	5.2.2.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	MEDIUM	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	 None	emerged.	
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SD/DT step 5: Launch of programme 
SD/DT step 5 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
5.i.	Use	the	power	of	the	
voice	of	the	customer.	
How:	The	previous	steps	in	the	SD/DT	process	had	led	up	to,	and	signposted,	the	launch	
event	(workshop	2).	Therefore,	it	carried	more	gravitas	with	the	suppliers,	because	it	
was	 clearly	 important	 to	 the	 seniors	 of	 the	 focal	 firm.	 Both	 the	 Procurement	 and	
Engineering	 Directors	 were	 seen	 to	 be	 taking	 a	 strong	 personal	 interest.	 An	 end	
customer	(Airline)	had	also	attended	workshop	1	and	had	been	very	pointed	about	the	
need	to	become	more	efficient	and	reduce	costs.	At	the	time,	exploring	opportunities	
through	digital	transformation	seemed	to	be	high	on	everyone’s	agenda.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 life	 cycle	 of	 digital	 transformation	 as	 an	 aid	 to	 business	
improvement,	the	timing	was	good	for	the	launch	of	this	particular	programme.	The	
period	 of	 hype	 was	 diminishing,	 but	 glimpses	 of	 the	 potential	 value	 proposition	
remained.	 Funds	 were	 available	 for	 investment	 and	 the	 launch	 of	 this	 programme	
offered	the	potential	to	do	so	more	wisely	whilst	posing	no	tangible	risk.		
Blockers:	None	identified.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
5.ii.	Break	the	stereotypes	
to	inspire	and	avoid	apathy.	
How:	Four	aspects	were	considered	with	a	view	to	inspiring	and	engaging	the	launch	
participants:	venue;	content	and	format;	guest	speakers;	and	key	messages.	Firstly,	the	
venue	was	unconventional	compared	to	the	normal	standards	used	by	the	focal	firm	
with	its	suppliers.	The	workshop	was	held	in	the	recently	 installed	Innovation	Lab	at	
one	of	the	focal	firm’s	main	sites.	The	facilities	included	very	large	touchscreens	with	
soft	seating,	breakout	areas,	and	digital	demonstrators.	Secondly,	the	agenda	for	the	
day’s	workshop	covered	both	the	 ‘hard’	 technology	and	the	 ‘soft’	people	aspects	of	
digital	transformation.	A	mixture	of	presentation	and	discussion	formats	were	used	and	
suppliers	brought	some	of	their	own	case	studies	to	share	with	the	group.		Thirdly,	the	
guest	speaker	was	from	Accenture	Consultants	who	had	been	working	with	the	World	
Economic	 Forum	on	 the	Digital	 Transformation	 Initiative	 since	 2015.	 This	 helped	 to	
broaden	 the	 perspective	 and	 to	 put	 the	 programme	 into	 context.	 Finally,	 the	 key	
messages	 at	 the	 launch	 event	 were	 informed	 by	 the	 previous	 steps	 in	 the	 SD/DT	
process	and,	therefore,	this	started	to	create	a	sense	of	momentum	(i.e.	taking	action	
as	opposed	to	being	seen	as	a	talking	shop).	An	expectation	was	set	for	capturing	the	
actions	into	themed	groups	and	arranging	a	follow-up.	The	key	messages	at	the	launch	
event	were	extracted	from	the	results	to	the	survey	(see	3.ii)	and	these	revealed	that:	
suppliers	were	typically	well	below	the	level	of	digital	maturity	perceived	to	be	industry	
best	practice;	action	and	investment	was	being	taken	to	improve	but	it	was	piecemeal	
and	uncoordinated	as	a	supply/value	chain;	and	this	programme	could	help	to	improve	
our	collective	position.	Also,	the	‘focal	firm	knows	best’	stereotype	was	erased,	or	at	
least	 diminished,	 through	 the	 launch	event.	 The	 team	mantra	 started	 to	 emerge	of	
“learning	together”	and	feeling	our	way	together	through	the	“digital	fog”.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	None	of	the	suppliers’	other	customers	were	launching	a	programme	such	as	
this	at	the	time,	nor	since,	to	the	knowledge	of	the	prime	researcher	(as	informed	by	
supplier	 interviews).	Therefore,	this	benefited	the	programme	in	that	 it	was	seen	as	
being	new	and	pioneering.	
Blockers:	None	identified.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	 None	emerged.	
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SD/DT step 6: Operation and support of programme 
SD/DT step 6 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
6.i.	Establish	and	maintain	a	
backbone	support	
organisation	and,	as	
appropriate,	draw	in	
expertise	from	third	parties.	
How:	The	Core	Resource	Team	ebbed	and	flowed,	but	the	prime	researcher	remained	
as	 the	 Network	 Champion	 throughout	 (i.e.	 approx.	 3	 years).	 Continuity	 helps,	 but	
succession	planning	has	been	 inadequate.	See	2.ii.	There	 is	a	risk	of	the	programme	
being	overly	associated	with	a	single	individual	which	may	hinder	its	future	operation	
if/when	 personnel	 are	 changed.	 The	 use	 of	 third	 parties	 has	 been	 gradual	 and	
controlled.	Such	an	approach	is	recommended.	However,	overall	(as	first	noted	in	2.i),	
it	has	continued	to	prove	harder	to	engage	with	other	functions	beyond	Engineering.	
Special	 Interventions:	Careful	consideration	was	given	to	 the	 timing	and	the	role	of	
third	parties.	This	is	explained	in	Section	5.2.1.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	LOW	degree.	But	 this	varied	across	 the	
functions	and	the	low	assessment	is	because	not	all	became	as	fully	engaged	as	desired.	
Enablers:	A	strong	network	existed	within	 the	 focal	 firm	(called	the	Chiefs	of	Digital	
Manufacturing)	which	quickly	embraced	the	programme	and	helped	to	support	it.	Also,	
a	rolling	sequence	of	placements	on	the	internship	and	graduate	training	scheme	was	
established	 at	 the	 focal	 firm.	 Under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 Network	 Champion,	 this	
resource	proved	to	be	very	valuable	in	maintaining	the	momentum	of	the	programme.	
Blockers:	Budgetary	planning	was	limited	for	the	backbone	support	organisation	and	a	
strong	reliance	was	placed	upon	discretionary	effort.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
6.ii.	The	operating	model	
can	be	flexible,	but	agreeing	
guiding	principles	and	using	
project	charters	may	help	
with	communication	and	
engagement.	Maintain	a	
balance	between	top-down	
goal	setting	in	combination	
with	bottom-up	learning	by	
doing.	Use	events	with	all	
suppliers	in	attendance	to	
ensure	that	the	same	
message	is	being	given	to	
all	at	once.	
How:	The	participating	suppliers	were	doing	so	on	a	voluntary	basis	at	their	own	cost	and,	
therefore,	a	balance	had	to	be	maintained	with	other	business	priorities	if/when	they	arose.	
Different	contextual	factors	played	a	role	here.	For	example,	smaller	firms	were	less	able	to	
ring-fence	resources	or	to	allow	them	to	travel	internationally	at	short	notice.	The	drumbeat	
of	workshops	provided	the	overall	 framework	for	the	programme;	however,	most	action	
only	tended	to	coalesce	around	them.	Attempts	were	made	annually	to	revisit	and	refresh	
the	 equivalent	 of	 the	 project	 portfolio	 and	 work	 breakdown	 structure.	 At	 workshop	 3,	
looking	towards	2018,	a	series	of	Working	Groups	were	formed.	After	workshop	12,	looking	
towards	2019,	a	series	of	Project	Charters	were	drafted.	After	workshop	18,	looking	towards	
2020,	a	 series	of	Communities	of	Practice	were	proposed.	The	 latter	 is	 covered	 in	more	
detail	 in	 6.iv.	Workshops	 6,	 15	 and	 20	were	 used	 to	 diffuse	 the	 key	messages	 into	 the	
broader	supply	base	on	an	annual	basis	in	2018,	2019	and	2020	respectively.	
Special	 Interventions:	 By	 workshop	 9,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 a	 special	 intervention	 was	
necessary	for	those	who	struggled	to	communicate	in	English.	Also,	around	this	time,	
other	permutations	to	the	operating	model	(e.g.	1:1’s	with	the	larger	suppliers	on	the	
programme)	started	to	be	explored.	These	are	explained	in	Section	5.2.2.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	 The	 rigour	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 PhD	 research	 programme	 resulted	 in	more	
frequent	and	open	discussion	about	the	operation	of	the	programme	than	would	have	
otherwise	been	the	norm.	Feedback	was	seen	to	be	welcome	and	to	be	acted	upon.	
Blockers:	Relying	heavily	upon	goodwill,	without	a	unifying	funding	stream	(e.g.	neither	
new	product	development	nor	government	funded	research	programme),	meant	that	
expectations	were	not	always	aligned.	This	was	exasperated	by	the	different	contextual	
factors	including	the	global	dispersion	and	the	varying	levels	of	digital	maturity.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
6.iii.	Promote	the	culture	of	
a	learning	organisation	and	
establish	a	network	of	
change	agents.	
How:	 The	 “learning	 together”	 mantra	 took	 hold	 strongly	 from	 the	 start	 (see	 5.ii).	
However,	how	specifically	this	related	to	the	role	of	the	participants	who	were	sent	by	
their	firms	to	the	workshops	was	left	undefined	and	open	to	interpretation.	The	term	
“change	 agents”	 was	 first	 used	 explicitly	 at	 workshop	 14	 where	 an	 exercise	 was	
performed	to	explore	what	this	meant	and	how	the	role	should	be	discharged	…		
CONTINUED	ON	THE	NEXT	PAGE	
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…	 This	 exposed	 a	 number	 of	 gaps	 where	 participants	 were	 struggling	 to	 share	 the	 key	
messages	from	the	workshops	back	into	their	own	organisations.	In	addition	to	following-
up	thereafter	on	a	1:1	basis,	a	role	model	for	a	“change	agent”	was	invited	to	share	their	
experiences	at	a	subsequent	workshop	(number	18).	
Special	 Interventions:	 On	 occasion,	 encouraging	 suppliers	 (and	 particularly	 the	 larger	
firms)	to	host	a	workshop	gave	their	“change	agent”	a	boost.	See	Section	5.2.2.	Also,	the	
operating	model	of	the	2020	CoP	helped	to	further	clarify	roles.	See	Section	5.2.4.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.	
Enablers:	The	sponsorship	and	use	of	a	PhD	research	programme	helped	to	send	a	strongly	
positive	message	about	being	open	to	learning.	No	hostilities	were	ever	encountered;	but,	
perhaps	 it	neutralised	any	potential	 concerns	and	provided	a	 safer	 route	 into	what	may	
have	otherwise	been	more	sensitive	matters.		
Blockers:	Challenges	were	under-estimated	on	how	the	participants	at	the	workshops	were	
to	disseminate	and	act	as	a	conduit	back	 into	their	own	organisations.	Also,	participants	
came	 from	 a	 mixture	 of	 technical	 and	 non-technical	 roles.	 Digital	 transformation	 is	 a	
complex	subject	which	requires	significant	coordination.	With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	this	
should	have	been	a	stronger	theme	from	launch.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
6.iv.	Communities	of	
practice	may	help	to	
facilitate	physical	and	
virtual	modes	of	collective	
learning.	
How:	 The	 first	 attempt	 at	 using	 an	 electronic	 tool	 to	 support	 networking,	 sharing	 best	
practice,	 and	 problem	 solving	 was	 made	 at	 workshop	 6.	 One	 of	 the	 suppliers	 on	 the	
programme	 volunteered	 to	 source,	 host,	 and	 administer	 an	 electronic	 tool.	 However,	
despite	it	being	user-friendly,	it	was	rarely	used.	Feedback	suggested	that	this	was	because	
of	two	reasons.	Firstly,	suitably	close	working	relationships	were	too	early	to	have	formed	
and	did	not	extend	to	all	of	the	digital	subject	matter	experts	within	each	firm.	Secondly,	
the	format	used	for	electronic	communication	and	collaboration,	which	was	similar	to	social	
media,	 seemed	 to	 be	 more	 suited	 for	 intra-	 rather	 than	 inter-organisational	 purposes.	
About	a	year	later,	following	workshop	18,	a	more	structured	approach	to	communities	of	
practice	was	suggested	for	2020.	This	received	strong	support	and	a	survey	was	distributed	
by	the	focal	firm	to	match	topics	to	interested	parties.	The	topics/parties,	and	the	overall	
approach	for	2020,	received	ratification	at	workshop	21	which	is	where	the	period	of	study	
has	ended.	
Special	Interventions:	The	operating	model	for	the	2020	CoP	is	shown	in	Section	5.2.4.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.	
Enablers:	None	identified.	
Blockers:	 Language	 and	 accessibility,	 when	 working	 globally,	 together	 with	 the	
protection	of	intellectual	property	when	working	inter-organisationally.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	MEDIUM	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
6.v.	Set	policy,	and	keep	it	
under	review,	for	sharing	
through	either	open-access	
or	non-disclosure.	
How:	 During	 the	 initial	 workshops,	 policy	 was	 established	 by	 mutual	 agreement	 that	
whatever	 was	 shared	 was	 done	 so	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 it	 being	 open-access.	 On	 very	 few	
occasions,	when	it	proved	necessary	because	competing	suppliers	or	foreign	nationals	were	
present,	access	became	more	 limited.	A	non-disclosure	agreement	with	the	suppliers	on	
the	 programme	was	 never	 used	 individually	 nor	 as	 a	 group;	 however,	 it	was	 used	with	
guests	e.g.	Consultancy	Firms.	Existing	members	were	given	a	courtesy	briefing	when	new	
suppliers	 joined	 the	 programme	who	were	 their	 direct	 competitors;	 however,	 decision-
rights	on	membership	were	always	retained	by	the	focal	firm.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.	
Enablers:	The	Network	Champion	became	suitably	trusted	by	all	parties	to	be	able	to	
facilitate	a	hub-and-spoke	model	for	matters	where	more	intimacy	was	desired.	
Blockers:	 The	 global	 diversity	 and	 competitive	 mix	 of	 the	 group	 most	 probably	
exaggerated	the	already	different	attitudes	to	sharing	and	protecting	data.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	
None	 emerged.	 Although,	 to	 draw	 step	 6	 together,	 it	 should	 be	 emphasised	 that	
running	the	programme	required	constant	“marketing”	to	sustain	discretionary	effort.	
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SD/DT step 7: Delivery of short term results 
SD/DT step 7 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
7.i.	Use	demonstrators	and	
quick-wins	to	promote	the	
concept	of	agility	(sprints)	
and	the	minimum	viable	
product.	
How:	 This	 step	 in	 the	 SD/DT	 process	 ran	 up	 to	 workshop	 7.	 The	 focal	 firm	 had	
established	 a	 Digital	 Academy	 for	 its	 own	 staff	 and,	 from	workshop	 2	 onwards,	 its	
services	were	extended	for	use	by	the	suppliers	on	the	programme.	This	helped	the	
group	 to	 begin	 to	 explore,	 together,	 some	 of	 the	 cultural	 aspects	 of	 8.i.	 To	many,	
concepts	 such	 as	 “failing	 fast”	 were	 very	 unfamiliar	 and,	 in	 the	 safety	 conscious	
aerospace	 sector,	 it	was	essential	 to	 set	 them	 into	 the	 right	 context.	This	particular	
concept	was	 to	prove	highly	 relevant	when	 the	group’s	 showcase	quick-win	project	
(called	eDAR)	failed	to	go-live	as	planned	shortly	after	workshop	7.	The	reason	was	a	
shortfall	against	cyber-security	requirements	and,	whilst	some	were	left	deflated,	most	
focused	 on	 the	 positives	 and	 the	 learning	 which	 had	 been	 acquired.	 Nevertheless,	
overall,	the	experienced	gained	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight	is	to	launch	more	projects,	
run	them	faster,	and	thereby	deliver	more	quick-wins.	
Special	Interventions:	None	taken.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.	
Enablers:	 During	workshop	4,	 a	 visit	was	made	 to	what	 at	 the	 time	was	 the	Digital	
Manufacturing	and	Design	Innovation	Institute	(DMDII).	One	of	their	funded	research	
projects	 (14-06-01,	 MBE	 supply	 chain	 technical	 data	 package)	 had	 been	 recently	
completed.	They	gave	permission	for	it	to	be	used	by	the	suppliers	on	the	programme	
as	the	initial	‘discovery’	test	case	which	all	performed	for	benchmarking	purposes.	
Blockers:	Company	funding	was	constrained	and	one	of	the	most	obvious	projects	to	
start	could	not	be	launched	(i.e.	the	Global	Supplier	Portal).	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
7.ii.	Recognise	that	at	the	
start	some	may	need	more	
support	than	is	the	vision	
for	the	longer	term	and	that	
it	takes	time	to	build	
trusting	relationships.	
Therefore,	be	prepared	to	
configure	the	approach	to	
suit.	Events	on	a	1:1	basis	
may	help	with	engagement,	
diagnostics	and	
prioritisation.	
How:	During	this	period,	all	suppliers	on	the	programme	were	visited	on	a	1:1	basis	at	
their	home	facility	by	the	Network	Champion	(who	was	also	the	prime	researcher).	This	
established	 key	 contacts	 and	 provided	 a	 deeper	 appreciation	 of	 needs	 and	
expectations.	It	also	helped	to	set	the	Network	Champion	as	the	common	node	and,	
over	time,	as	a	trusted	confidant.	Towards	the	end	of	this	period,	it	was	important	to	
update	and	share	progress	with	the	broader	supply	base	who	had	attended	workshop	
1	and	been	the	original	catalysts.	This	was	done	at	workshop	6	in	an	unconventional,	
but	 inspiring,	 manner	 for	 which	 there	 was	 positive	 feedback.	 Suppliers	 on	 the	
programme	 shared	 their	 work	 under	 spotlights	 in	 an	 otherwise	 dark,	 smoke-filled,	
room.	 The	mantra	 from	 the	workshop	 2	 launch	 event	was	maintained	 of	 “working	
together	to	find	our	way	through	the	digital	fog”.	
Special	 Interventions:	 Configuration	 of	 the	 approach	 to	 suit	 different	 contextual	
factors	was	developed	further	and	used	later	in	the	programme.	See	Section	5.2.2.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	The	global	 infrastructure	of	 the	 focal	 firm.	This	made	 it	 relatively	straight-
forward	 for	 the	Network	 Champion	 to	 visit	 the	 home	 facility	 of	 all	 suppliers	with	 a	
translator,	 if	 required,	 together	 with	 local	 contacts	 who	 had	 a	 good	 grasp	 of	 the	
suppliers’	business	and	priorities.	
Blockers:	Diagnostics	were	initially	attempted	using	the	digital	capability	assessment	
tool	 (NIST,	 2016).	 This	 was	 convenient,	 but	 proved	 relatively	 ineffective.	 With	 the	
benefit	 of	 hindsight,	 it	may	 have	 delayed	 progress	 on	what	 proved	 to	 be	 far	more	
essential.	Namely	8.i.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	
None	 emerged.	 Although,	 as	 was	 also	 raised	 in	 step	 3	 of	 the	 SD/DT	 process,	 the	
importance	of	creating	a	common	vision	and	vocabulary	at	the	earliest	opportunity	is	
further	emphasised	here.	This	is	captured	by	guideline	8.i.		
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SD/DT step 8: Growth of results for the longer term 
SD/DT step 8 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
8.i.	Create	a	common	vision	
and	vocabulary.	
How:	This	step	in	the	SD/DT	process	ran	up	to	approx.	workshop	14;	although	steps	7	to	8	to	9	
must	be	seen	as	being	overlapping	with	their	transition	blurred	and,	if	necessary,	iterative.	Key	
to	step	8	is	that	those	on	the	programme	must	have	successfully	developed	and	embedded	a	
common	vision	and	vocabulary.	Two	means	of	doing	this	were	used.	Firstly,	the	Digital	Enterprise	
demonstrator	 to	 explore	 concepts,	 together,	 and	 to	 play	 out	 scenarios	 (see	 Section	 1.3).	
Secondly,	the	creation	of	Digital	Minimum	Standards	which	are	described	in	Section	5.2.3.	Their	
initial	construction	emerged	as	an	outcome	of	workshop	7.	By	workshop	14,	they	had	moved	
from	spreadsheet	format,	which	was	trialled	by	the	suppliers	on	the	programme,	to	storyboards	
for	a	digital	APP	which	would	be	used	later	to	diffuse	into	the	broader	supply	base.		
Special	Interventions:	The	digital	APP	which	is	described	in	Section	5.2.3.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.		
Enablers:	 The	 Digital	 Enterprise	 demonstrator	 was	 initially	 created	 for	 other	 purposes,	
therefore,	it	was	available	for	use	by	this	programme	on	a	free-of-charge	basis	(see	Section	1.3).	
Blockers:	Supplier	feedback	on	the	digital	APP	has	been	extremely	positive.	However,	they	have	
also	indicated	that	it	may	have	suffered	from	not	following	the	approach	of	a	minimum	viable	
product.	This	may	have	allowed	the	key	principles	to	have	been	cascaded	and	adopted	sooner.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
8.ii.	Enhance	long-term	
strategic	road-mapping	to	
include	digital	systems	and	
data.	Clearly	articulate	both	
the	expectations	and	the	
value	proposition.	
How:	The	supplier	scorecard	 is	described	 in	Section	3.3.2.	A	series	of	changes	were	made	to	
each	of	the	attributes	(quality,	cost,	deliver,	management,	and	technology)	for	2019	which	were	
communicated	extensively,	buyer-side	and	supplier-side,	via	multiple	channels.	Through	this	step	
in	the	SD/DT	process,	the	criteria	for	the	management	and	technology	attributes	were	enhanced	
to	include	aspects	relating	to	digital	systems.	However,	attempts	to	reach	out	to	the	suppliers	on	
the	programme	to	link	this	into	the	cost	attribute	(i.e.	the	value	proposition)	did	not	get	traction.	
Special	Interventions:	The	ISS/SEP	which	is	described	in	section	5.2.3.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	MEDIUM	degree.	
Enablers:	The	construction	of	the	scorecards	was	due	an	update,	anyway,	for	2019.		
Blockers:	The	value	proposition	for	DT	is	complex	and	crosses	a	minefield	of	commercial	issues.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
8.iii.	Each	supplier	must	
own	their	actions/roadmap.	
Install	a	feedback	loop	
which	includes	monitoring	
of	any	‘knock-on’	
cumulative	effects.	
How:	To	maintain	top-down	senior	programme	sponsorship,	buyer-side	and	supplier-side,	
it	was	essential	for	a	feedback	loop	to	be	established	through	the	executive	system	i.e.	the	
supplier	scorecard.	This	contributed	to	the	changes	 in	8.ii.	This	was	also	used	in	the	PhD	
research	programme	for	triangulation	purposes	and	the	results	are	contained	in	Chapter	6.	
Special	Interventions:	The	ISS/SEP	which	is	described	in	section	5.2.3.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	LOW	degree.	
Enablers:	No	negative	‘knock-on’	cumulative	effects	were	found	to	have	emerged.	
Blockers:	Inherent	communication	problems	across	multiple	parties	within	large	firms.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
8.iv.	Keep	it	fresh	-	activities	
may	be	performed	in	
phases.	
How:	By	workshop	14,	 there	were	a	 total	of	eight	projects	 in	 the	programme	which	were	at	
different	phases	 in	their	 life	cycle.	One	project	had	been	successfully	completed	(eFAIR).	One	
project	had	been	stopped	just	before	go-live	(eDAR	–	see	7.i).	Two	projects	were	approaching	
their	deployment	phase	into	the	broader	supply	base	(MBD;	and	Digital	Minimum	Standards	–	
see	8.i).	Four	projects	were	 in	 their	 initial	discovery	or	capability	development	phases	 (DPEX;	
eFPA;	MBE	supplier	portal;	and	the	Digital	Enterprise	demonstrator).	
Special	Interventions:	Dynamic	membership	(de-selection	&	exit)	is	described	in	Section	5.2.4.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	None	identified.	
Blockers:	The	generation	of	ideas	for	new	projects	was	constrained	at	times	by	uncertainty	over	
the	scope	of	the	programme.	It	was	intended	to	be	able	to	embrace	new	ways	of	working	(i.e.	
digital/data	rich),	but	tended	to	find	most	traction	when	focusing	upon	the	transactional	tools.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	 None	emerged.	
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SD/DT step 9: Embedding into routine business	
SD/DT step 9 
	
(from	Figure	2.5)	
Results from the AR cycles 
	
(see	Section	4.3	for	an	explanation	of	how	the	AR	cycles	were	initiated	and	run)	
9.i.	Integrate	into	the	
process	for	supplier	
performance	management.	
How:	This	 final	step	 in	 the	SD/DT	process	started	after	approximately	workshop	14;	
however,	it	has	not	been	concluded	to	date.	Key	to	step	9	is	that	the	SD/DT	process	
must	have	been	successfully	integrated	and	embedded.	This	is	yet	to	be	fully	achieved	
and	to	do	so	requires	both	incorporation	and	systemisation	into:	Quality	System	(i.e.	
sourcing	 and	 supplier	 selection,	 ESCA,	 and	 supplier	 performance	 management,	
ISS/SEP);	 Production	 System	 (i.e.	 “How	 To”	 and	 “Best	 Practice”	 Guides),	 and	 the	
Commercial	Negotiation	Framework	(e.g.	Cost	Levers).	Nevertheless,	progress	to	date	
is	 encouraging.	 An	 initial	 route-prover	 by	 the	 focal	 firm	 (Project	 Athena)	 has	
successfully	used	that	described	in	9.ii.	for	sourcing	and	supplier	selection	purposes.	
Special	Interventions:	The	engagement	and	diffusion	model	which	is	described	in	Figure	5.2.	
Adherence:	Progress	to	date	is	that	this	guideline	has	been	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	Success	here	is	built	upon	the	previous	steps	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Blockers:	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	world	is	grappling	with	the	COVID-19	pandemic.	It	
is	currently	uncertain	how	this	will	impact	the	continuation	of	the	programme.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
9.ii.	Develop	the	concept	of	
a	minimum	standard	into	a	
maturity	model.	
How:	This	covers	the	extension	of	8.i.	from	that	which	is	shared	and	used	by	only	the	
suppliers	on	the	programme	to	that	which	is	diffused	and	adopted	across	the	broader	
supply	base.	Also,	the	concept	of	the	minimum	standard	needs	to	have	moved	up	a	
level	to	one	where	it	is	recognised	that	the	minimum	standard	increases	over	time	and	
there	are	consequences	if	it	is	not	achieved.	Progress	has	been	made	on	establishing	
such	a	maturity	model,	however,	it	has	not	been	fully	embedded	to	date.	The	digital	
APP	is	still	being	used	for	training	and	awareness	purposes	on	both	the	buyer-side	and	
the	 supplier-side.	 User	 registration	 provides	 an	 indication	 of	 diffusion.	 More	 work	
remains	in	2020	to	upskill	the	global	workforce	and	to	embed	the	key	principles.	
Special	Interventions:	The	digital	APP	which	are	described	in	Section	5.2.3.	
Adherence:	Progress	to	date	is	that	this	guideline	has	been	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	The	production	system	used	by	the	focal	firm	is	constructed	using	a	minimum	
standard	framework;	therefore,	this	was	familiar	to	many	on	the	buyer-side.	
Blockers:	English	is	not	the	first	language	for	some	users	of	the	digital	APP.	A	mandarin	
version	 is	 being	 created,	 but	 it	 would	 have	 been	 even	 better	 if	 there	 had	 been	 a	
stronger	focus	(and	funding)	for	a	global	communication	strategy.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
9.iii.	Focus	on	inter-org	or	
building	the	supplier’s	
capability	to	self-improve.	
How:	Permutations	 to	 the	operating	model	are	described	 in	6.ii.	By	workshop	21,	a	
network	 of	 complementary	 programmes	 had	 been	 established.	 Firstly,	 the	 original	
global	 programme	 which	 has	 been	 the	 main	 focus	 of	 this	 research.	 Others	 have	
included:	regional	(China),	new	product	development	(UltraFan®),	and	commodity	sub-
tier	(Controls).	Others	in	planning	are:	regional	(India)	and	sector	(Defence).		
Special	Interventions:	The	engagement	and	diffusion	model	which	is	described	in	Figure	5.2.	
NPD,	Commodity,	and	Regional	programmes	described	in	Section	5.2.2.	
Adherence:	This	guideline	was	satisfied	to	a	HIGH	degree.	
Enablers:	Access	to	government	and	other	research	or	support	programmes.	
Blockers:	Local	resources	and	infrastructure	needs	to	be	secured	or	established	if	not	
already	present.	
Criticality:	This	guideline	is	of	HIGH	criticality	to	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
Any	new	guidelines	which	
emerged	from	the	AR	cycles.	
None	emerged.	Although,	it	is	worth	reflecting	here	on	the	overall	iterative	nature	of	
the	 SD/DT	 process.	 Returning	 back	 to	 2.ii,	 for	 example,	 where	 even	 now	 top	
management	support	(both	at	focal	firm	and	suppliers)	remains	key	for	sustainment.	
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5.2 Four categories of special intervention facilitate SD/DT process 
Special	interventions	to	facilitate	the	SD/DT	process	are	grouped	into	four	broad	categories.	
	
5.2.1 Special interventions taken to increase programme thickness 
The	concept	of	“programme	thickness”	 is	derived	 from	that	of	“institutional	 thickness”	 in	 section	
3.1.3c,	namely:	the	presence	of	a	plethora	of	different	kinds	of	organisation,	high	levels	of	interaction	
amongst	them,	the	development	of	patterns	of	coalition	and	collective	action,	and	a	sense	of	identity	
that	they	are	involved	in	a	common	enterprise.	Rather	than	the	concept	of	thickness	being	applied	
to	a	physical	locality,	it	is	instead	considered	to	apply	here	to	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	
Gaining	programme	thickness	began	with	supplier	selection	at	step	4	of	the	SD/DT	process.	A	sense	
of	that	which	was	achieved	is	shown	in	Figure	4.5	and	more	detail	is	provided	in	Chapter	6	across	all	
of	the	contextual	factors.	As	was	anticipated,	the	programme	needed	time	to	embed	and	mature	in	
order	to	establish	and	develop	the	principles	described	above.	However,	over	time,	it	was	possible	
to	gradually	increase	programme	thickness	through	two	special	interventions	of	note.	
	
Firstly,	after	supporting	the	launch	of	the	programme	at	workshop	2,	firms	such	as	software	vendors	
were	re-introduced	from	workshop	14	onwards	as	shown	in	Figure	4.4	(c).	The	vision	for	this	special	
intervention	was	as	 follows:	 the	collective	power	of	 the	enterprise	was	 ready	 to	be	harnessed	 in	
order	to	help	to	resolve	complex	matters	such	as	digital	non-interoperability;	and	giving	access	to	
the	software	vendors	to	hear	the	voice	of	their	customer	base	could	serve	to	strengthen	their	support	
and	grow	the	coalition.	The	status	at	workshop	21	was	that	requirements	had	become	much	better	
understood,	by	all	parties,	but	there	were	no	easy	solutions	identified.	Nevertheless,	actions	were	
agreed	and	incorporated	into	one	of	the	communities	of	practice	which	was	launched	for	2020.	
	
Secondly,	 another	 special	 intervention	which	was	 taken	 to	 increase	programme	 thickness	was	 to	
provide	firms	with	free	access	to	specialist	facilities	and	resources.	This	took	the	form	of	a	prize	for	
2020.	A	sandpit	environment,	remote	from	their	home	production	facilities,	was	offered	together	
with	 supporting	 digital	 equipment	 and	 specialist	 staff.	 Firms	 applied	 for	 the	 prize	 with	 the	 only	
condition	being	that	they	had	to	be	prepared	to	openly	share	their	findings	and	outcomes.	Selection	
was	on	the	basis	of	the	potential	of	their	project	to	deliver	multi-level	benefits	 (firm,	cohort,	and	
network).	At	workshop	21,	the	winner	presented	their	entry	and	the	plan	for	2020.		
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5.2.2 Special interventions taken to organise the eclectic mix 
Gardes	et	al	(2015)	identify	differences	between	“organic”	and	“synthetic”	groupings	of	firms	and	
warn	that	the	latter	are	at	risk	of	being	self-serving.	I	found	that	a	balance	was	required	between	
programme	 thickness	 and	programme	 cohesion.	 These	properties	were	 emergent.	 At	 the	 launch	
workshop,	the	programme	was	envisaged	as	a	single,	stand-alone,	global	mix	of	suppliers	operating	
to	principles	similar	to	those	of	a	focus	group	and	meeting	only,	say,	a	maximum	of	twice	per	year	
(see,	for	example,	Krueger	and	Casey,	2015).	In	general,	the	appetite	proved	to	be	for	more	than	this;	
however,	different	groups	and	interests	were	present.	As	such,	the	programme	was	not	uniform	and	
special	 interventions	 were	 required	 to	 organise	 the	 eclectic	 mix.	 The	 final	 composition	 which	
emerged	is	described	below:	
	
a) Regional:	The	priority	for	this	special	intervention	was	given	to	China	for	a	number	of	reasons	
(beyond	my	research	objectives).	The	key	issues	which	needed	to	be	addressed	were	differences	
in	 digital	 maturity	 and	 preferred	 language	 of	 communication.	 Compared	 to	 most	 on	 the	
programme,	the	Chinese	firms	were	at	a	lower	level	of	digital	maturity	and	were	struggling	to	
communicate	effectively	in	English	with	the	other	firms.	Workshops	11	and	17	were	therefore	
designed	to	better	satisfy	their	needs	and	to	establish	a	regional	cluster	group.	A	hub-and-spoke	
operating	model	was	adopted	with	the	main	(global)	programme.	It	can	be	seen	from	Figure	4.4	
that	the	firms	in	the	study	group	who	attended	workshops	11	and	17	were	Papa,	Uniform,	and	
Whiskey.	Their	triangulated	outcomes	at	Waypoint	A/B	are	provided	in	Chapter	6.	It	can	be	seen	
that	two	were	unsuccessful	and	they	remain	at	step	7	of	the	programme.	Nevertheless,	another	
(more	positive)	interpretation	is	that	none	have	left	the	programme	which,	without	this	special	
intervention,	would	almost	certainly	have	been	the	case.	
	
b) New	Product	Development	(NPD):	An	industrial	prerequisite	set	for	my	research	was	to	support	
the	UltraFan®	engine	(section	1.5).	I	began	by	conducting	exploratory	interviews	with	staff	from	
a	 few	 firms	who	had	 significant	NPD	experience.	 I	 focused	upon	 the	 Joint	 Strike	 Fighter	 (JSF)	
Enterprise,	 because	 of	 its	 highly	 regarded	 collaborative	 digital	 environment	 (Sheridan	 and	
Burnes,	2018).	From	my	exploratory	interviews,	I	identified	that	a	special	intervention	might	help	
to	bridge	between	project	and	commodity	responsibilities	within	Rolls-Royce.	The	operational	
and	strategic	relationship	with	suppliers	is	commodity-owned,	but	the	overall	coordination	and	
industrialisation	during	NPD	is	project-owned.		
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Thus,	workshop	10	was	designed	exclusively	for	the	smaller	(fast-make)	suppliers	to	the	UltraFan®	
engine	 who	 had	 the	 weakest	 commodity-ownership.	 Also,	 workshop	 13	 was	 designed	 for	 a	
sample	of	other	suppliers	to	the	UltraFan®	engine	who	had	stronger	commodity-ownership.	It	
can	be	seen	from	Figure	4.4	that	no	firms	from	the	study	group	attended	workshop	10,	but	four	
attended	workshops	13.	These	were	Alpha,	Bravo,	Tango,	and	Zulu.	Their	triangulated	outcomes	
at	Waypoint	A/B	are	provided	in	Chapter	6.	It	can	be	seen	that	one	was	unsuccessful	and	has	left	
the	 programme,	 but	 three	 remain	 and	 have	 successfully	 progressed	 to	 step	 8/9.	 The	 most	
significant	 achievement,	 however,	 culminated	 at	workshop	 18.	 At	 the	 commencement	 of	my	
research,	a	significant	risk	on	the	UltraFan®	engine	was	supply	chain	readiness	for	digital	product	
definition	(MBD).	At	workshop	18,	a	full	state	of	readiness	was	confirmed	with	the	firms	present	
and	a	notice	to	suppliers	(NTS478)	was	duly	issued	to	the	whole	supply	base	in	November	2019.	
No	major	issues	with	adoption	have	been	reported	since.	
	
c) Commodity:	Interview	feedback	was	positive	about	the	NPD	special	interventions	made	through	
workshops	10	and	13.	One	person	reflected	after	a	workshop	that	“new	business	is	coming	and	
to	win	it	there	is	a	need	for	digital	transformation”.	Many	appreciated	the	alignment	of	capability	
development	 with	 delivery	 onto	 a	 current	 live	 project.	 However,	 sourcing	 for	 the	 UltraFan®	
engine	remains	at	a	very	preliminary	stage;	therefore,	a	further	special	intervention	was	taken	
with	workshop	19.	This	brought	together	sub-tier	suppliers	from	one	specific	commodity	group.	
No	firms	from	the	main	study	group	attended.	Workshop	19	was	found	to	be	of	mixed	success.	
On	the	negative	side,	there	has	been	a	low	level	of	follow-up	in	terms	of	the	access	requests	from	
these	 particular	 firms	 to	 the	 APP	 for	 the	 digital	 minimum	 standards	 (section	 5.2.3).	 On	 the	
positive	side,	one	person	commented	after	the	workshop	that	“my	competitors	and	peers	are	on-
board	with	digital	transformation,	so	I	must	not	get	left	behind”.		
	
d) Large	Firm:	Two	special	interventions	were	taken	with	large	firms.	Inviting	them	to	either	host	a	
group	 or	 a	 one-to-one	 workshop.	 These	 aimed	 to	 improve	 exposure	 to	 back-office	 digital	
specialists,	leverage	synergies,	and	help	change	agents	to	coordinate	and	disseminate.	Six	of	the	
ten	large	firms	in	the	study	group	had	these	special	measures	applied:	Delta,	Echo,	Foxtrot,	Golf,	
Kilo,	and	Papa.	Chapter	6	shows	that	only	one	of	the	firms	was	unsuccessful	at	Waypoint	A/B;	
however,	multiple	factors	are	at	play.	No	conclusions	can	really	be	drawn	from	this.	Anecdotally,	
deeper	interfirm	contacts	were	established	and	personal	relationships	have	blossomed.		
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5.2.3 Special interventions taken to diffuse across the broader supply base 
The	engagement	and	diffusion	model	evolved	 through	a	 series	of	 special	 interventions.	 The	 final	
version	is	shown	in	Figure	5.2.	It	was	adapted	and	developed	from	Behrans	(2008)	who	used	it	for	
lean	manufacturing	(section	2.2.10	point	#3).		
	
	
Currently,	
is	the	supplier	
segmented	by	
the	focal	firm	as	
strategic?	
Does	the	
supplier	possess	
capabilities	for	
their	own	self-
improvement?	
The	focus	of	the	
engagement	
approach	taken	
by	the	focal	firm	
Examples	of	the	key	enablers	
Engagement 
Level 1 YES	 YES	
Developing	and	
improving	
enterprise-wide	
systems	and	
processes,	
together	
This	increasingly	became	an	
important	consideration	for	the	
selection	of	suppliers	for	the	SD/DT	
programme	(i.e.	iterations	of	step	4).	
Diffusion	beyond	this	was	through	the	
ISS/SEP	and	digital	APP.	Also,	via	
workshops	6,	15,	and	20.	
Engagement 
Level 2 YES	 NO	
Identifying	and	
closing	the	gaps	
to	build	
capabilities,	
and/or	make	
investment	
decisions,	for	the	
suppliers	own	
self-improvement	
In	addition	to	the	framework	provided	
by	the	digital	APP	and	ISS/SEP	(see	
above),	this	is	where	the	special	
interventions	in	sections	5.2.1	and	
5.2.2	were	most	prevalent.	Of	
particular	note	are:	increasing	
programme	thickness,	facilitating	
regional	clusters,	and	championing	
the	change	agents	at	large	firms.	
Engagement 
Level 3 NO	 YES	
Evaluating	and	
selecting	
suppliers	for	
future	business	
and/or	new	
opportunities	
With	an	initial	route-prover	at	the	
focal	firm	(Project	Athena),	the	digital	
minimum	standards	were	successfully	
used	for	sourcing	and	supplier	
selection	purposes.	Also,	although	not	
the	prime	focus	of	the	workshops,	
potentially	new	or	emergent	suppliers	
were	present	at	approx.	a	third	of	
them	(i.e.	4,	10,	11,	13,	17,	19	&	21).		
Engagement 
Level 4 NO	 NO	
Promoting	a	
network	of	third	
parties	to	help	
suppliers	to	reach	
their	own	self-
improvement	
plateau	
Increasing	programme	thickness	(see	
section	5.2.1)	was	used	here	and,	in	
particular,	as	a	concept	for	building	
the	regional	cluster	in	China	(see	
section	5.2.2).	A	mandarin	version	of	
the	digital	APP	is	being	created	to	
provide	a	consistent	framework.	
	
Figure 5.2: Engagement and diffusion model used for the SD/DT process 
(adapted	and	developed	from	Behrans,	2008)	
	
The	engagement	and	diffusion	model	helped	to	direct	the	effort	and	resources	of	the	focal	firm.	For	
example,	 in	 relation	 to	 engagement	 level	 4	 in	 Figure	5.2	 and	 the	 regional	 special	 intervention	 in	
section	5.2.2.	The	latter	is	intended	to	deliver	the	former.	Otherwise,	there	is	no	exit	strategy	as	was	
found	by	Boeing	after	two	decades	with	some	of	their	Chinese	aerospace	suppliers	(Liu,	2009).	
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Figures	5.1	and	5.2	mention	the	supplier	scorecard,	or	 it’s	abbreviation	of	 ISS/SEP	(section	3.3.2),	
digital	minimum	standards,	and	the	APP	for	training	and	awareness.	In	Figure	5.1,	against	guideline	
8.ii,	it	explains	that	an	update	to	all	attributes	in	the	ISS/SEP	was	performed	for	2019.	My	research	
primarily	influenced	three	aspects	of	this.		
	
Firstly,	the	number	of	suppliers	for	whom	technology	was	an	attribute	in	their	ISS/SEP	was	reduced	
in	order	to	focus	effort	on	both	sides.	This	took	effect	from	the	start	of	2019	onwards.	The	impact	
upon	my	study	group	of	24	suppliers	can	be	seen	through	Appendix	A	and,	in	summary,	was	that:	14	
(58%)	continued	to	have	technology	as	an	attribute	in	their	ISS/SEP;	6	(25%)	ceased	to	have	it	but	
continue	to	be	classed	as	 ‘sustaining’	suppliers;	1	(4%)	was	added	and	is	classed	as	an	‘emerging’	
supplier;	and	3	(13%)	have	never	had	it	and	remain	classed	as	‘special	case’.	Overall,	my	study	group	
now	represents	about	a	third	of	the	supply	base	for	whom	technology	is	an	attribute	in	their	ISS/SEP.	
	
Secondly,	the	question-set	for	the	technology	attribute	in	the	ISS/SEP	was	updated.	The	scope	was	
previously	product	and	manufacturing	process	technology.	It	was	expanded	to	include	digital	systems	
capability.	 The	 net	 effect	 was	 a	 20%	 change	 in	 how	 suppliers	 were	 scored;	 however,	 this	 was	
introduced	very	gradually	during	2019.	A	framework	of	digital	minimum	standards	was	used.	This	
was	co-created	by	the	firms	on	the	SD/DT	programme	to	establish	a	common	vision	and	vocabulary	
for	a	Digital	Enterprise.		A	neutral,	functionality-based,	framework	is	provided	which	is	agnostic	to	
the	branding	and	specificity	of	software	or	tools.	An	indication	of	diffusion	is	provided	by	Figure	5.3.	
	
Thirdly,	an	APP	was	created	to	provide	training	on	the	above.	Figure	5.4	gives	sample	screenshots.		
	
Figure 5.3: Requests for access to the APP for the digital minimum standards 
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Figure 5.4: Screenshots from the APP for the digital minimum standards 
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5.2.4 Special interventions taken to establish a dynamic model of membership 
A	 few	matters	 instigated	 this	 special	 intervention.	 Firstly,	 as	described	 in	 Figure	5.1	 (step	4),	 the	
programme	was	 over-subscribed	 at	 launch	 and,	 throughout	 the	 period	 of	my	 research,	 demand	
exceeded	capacity.	Secondly,	by	also	removing	the	ISS/SEP	technology	attribute	from	some	suppliers	
for	2019	onwards,	there	was	a	risk	that	they	may	perceive	that	digital	transformation	was	not	seen	
as	relevant	to	them	and/or	they	may	become	disenfranchised	about	future	business.	
	
Therefore,	workshops	6,	15,	and	20	were	designed	to	respond	to	these	matters,	because	the	whole	
supply	base	were	 in	attendance	 (i.e.	approx.	100	suppliers	who	were	assessed	as	being	the	most	
strategically	 important	 or	 operationally	 significant	 to	 Rolls-Royce).	 Interactive,	 peer-to-peer,	
presentations	were	delivered	together	with	informal	question	and	answer	sessions.	The	workshops	
are	 included	 in	 Figure	 5.2	 and	 this	 overarching	 framework	 helped	 to	 target	 the	 approach	 and	
construct	the	key	messages.	All	suppliers	were	given	a	few	requirements	for	2019	onwards	as	‘digital	
basics’	in	the	management	attribute	of	the	ISS/SEP.	These	are	summarised	at	the	top	of	Figure	5.4.	
They	were	not	onerous,	but	promoted	dialogue	and	the	use	of	the	APP.		
	
Supplier	membership	 of	 the	 SD/DT	 programme	was	 typically	 reviewed	 annually	with	 their	 Rolls-
Royce	buyers.	Changes	in	the	membership	status	of	my	study	group	occurred	in	2018	(at	workshops	
9,	11,	and	12),	2019	(at	workshop	18),	and	2020	(at	workshop	21).	For	those	firms	who	were	members	
of	the	programme	for	2020,	the	style	of	participation	evolved	to	that	of	four	communities	of	practice:	
commodity	twin,	production	twin,	eProcurement,	and	digital	minimum	standards.	Memberships	and	
roles	were	agreed	at	the	end	of	2019,	each	community	of	practice	held	at	least	one	launch	meeting	
by	WebEx	at	 the	beginning	of	2020,	and	 then	 they	presented	 their	project	 charters	and	plans	at	
workshop	21.	The	operating	model	which	they	devised	is	shown	in	Figure	5.5.	
	
Purpose	of	CoP	
• Provide	a	forum	for	identified	members	to:	
o Share	knowledge	and	best	practice.	
o Seek	help	and	guidance.	
o Look	at	new	&	emerging	technology/capability.	
Role	of	members	
• Possess	&	develop	detailed	knowledge	of	subject.	
• Act	as	the	point	of	contact	for	their	business	users.	
• Be	an	effective	communicator	and	change	agent.	
Desired	outcomes	
• Network	of	like-minded	individuals.	
• More	informed	community.	
• Sharing	of	best	practices	and	lessons	learnt.	
• Capability	&	skills	requirements	better	understood.	
• Work	as	one	to	leverage	standards	and	solutions.	
Typical	tasks	within	role	
• Cascade	and	communication	in	own	business.	
• Sharing	and	escalation	of	common	issues.	
• Support	capability	development	&	implementation	
(People/Process/Tools).	
	
	
Figure 5.5: Operating model for 2020 communities of practice  
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5.3 Summary of key implications from this chapter 
This	section	begins	by	comparing	my	results	with	the	research	from	others.	Then,	I	summarise	the	
business	and	academic	contribution.	Finally,	I	identify	items	for	discussion	in	chapter	7.	
	
5.3.1  Comparing my results with the research from others 
All	of	the	evidence	gathered	points	to	mine	being	the	first	derivation	of	the	SD/DT,	or	equivalent,	
process.	This	has	been	the	consistent	message	from	the	firms	in	my	study	group	and	the	others	who	
were	 co-opted	onto	 the	programme.	Many	 are	 able	 to	provide	 a	broad	perspective	 from	having	
worked	closely	with	other	focal	firms	in	the	aerospace	industry	and	beyond.	
	
In	Figure	5.6,	I	return	to	the	work	of	Bokinge	and	Malmqvist	(2012)	on	PLM	implementation	for	a	
comparison	 of	 results.	We	 identify	 a	 similar	 number	 of	 guidelines	 and	 our	 assessments	 of	 their	
criticality	 are	 similarly	 distributed.	However,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 adherence	 to	 the	
guidelines.	This	is	not	entirely	unexpected,	because	our	research	methodologies	are	very	different.	
Bokinge	and	Malmqvist	first	generate	their	guidelines	and	then	perform	a	retrospective	case	study	
to	see	if	they	are	being	followed	in	practice.	I	generate	an	initial	version	in	a	similar	manner,	but	then	
go	through	44+	iterative	cycles	of	plan–act/observe–reflect	as	described	in	Figure	4.2.	Nevertheless,	
Bokinge	and	Malmqvist	argue	that	adherence	to	guidelines	remains	a	common	problem	even	if	they	
are	 readily	 available.	 My	 speculation	 is	 that	 the	 structure	 and	 scrutiny	 of	 my	 action	 research	
programme	may	have	mitigated	this.	Furthermore,	the	extension	of	my	guidelines	through	special	
interventions	may	have	made	them	more	transferable.	Overall,	in	addition	to	the	four	persons	who	
counter-checked	 and	 amended	 my	 guidelines	 during	 their	 generation,	 I	 am	 satisfied	 from	 this	
comparison	of	results	that	mine	have	been	categorised	appropriately	at	an	elemental	level.	
	
Criticality	or	relevance	
of	the	guideline	
SD/DT	
(Figure	5.1)	
PLM	
(Bokinge	and	Malmqvist,	2012)	
HIGH	 22	(79%)	 20	(84%)	
MEDIUM	 6	(21%)	 2	(8%)	
LOW	 0	 2	(8%)	
Adherence	to	
the	guideline	 	 	
HIGH	 16	(57%)	 1	(4%)	
MEDIUM	 9	(32%)	 6	(25%)	
LOW	 3	(11%)	 17	(71%)	
	
Figure 5.6: Comparison of guidelines (SD/DT and PLM) 
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5.3.2 Business contribution 
This	 section	 was	 prepared	 with	 one	 of	 my	 industrial	 supervisors	 (Ian	 Molyneux,	 Procurement	
Executive).	 There	 has	 undoubtedly	 been	 a	 positive	 business	 contribution	 from	my	 research.	 The	
Extended	Enterprise	has	been	inspired	about	the	Digital	Enterprise,	the	consistent	development	of	
the	vision	since	2017,	and	the	highly	collaborative	approach	used	to	move	towards	it.	At	the	time	of	
writing	in	March	2020,	there	are	10	suppliers	who	have	fully	achieved	the	digital	minimum	standards	
and	39	(including	the	10)	with	a	gap	closure	or	continuous	improvement	plan	for	2020.	Also,	over	
200	members	of	staff,	dispersed	globally	across	the	Extended	Enterprise	(focal	firm	and	its	supply	
base),	have	accessed	the	training	APP.	
	
Furthermore,	the	comprehensive	documentation	which	has	been	generated	for	the	SD/DT	process	
(Figure	5.1)	has	allowed	 it	 to	be	widely	shared	with	others.	As	a	result,	 two	representatives	from	
another	Rolls-Royce	business	sector	attended	workshop	21	as	observers	with	a	view	to	launch	their	
own	programme	later	in	2020.	Also,	subject	to	the	outcome	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic,	there	are	
plans	to	launch	another	regional	cluster	group	in	India	in	2020Q3	similar	to	that	launched	in	China.	
	
Another	significant	business	contribution	 from	my	research	was	 the	achievement	of	 supply	chain	
readiness	for	digital	product	definition	(MBD)	on	the	UltraFan®	and	other	engines	in	November	2019	
(NTS478).	The	firms	on	the	SD/DT	programme	performed	trials,	test	cases,	user	acceptance	testing,	
and	lessons	learnt	reviews.	The	total	gearing	of	investment	for	the	focal	firm	is	estimated	at	5:1.	
	
Thus,	 many	 positives.	 However,	 to	 put	 these	 into	 perspective	 it	 would	 be	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 the	
programme	 was	 of	 its	 time.	 Aoki	 and	 Lennerfors	 (2013)	 describe	 a	 period	 of	 cut-costing	 which	
preceded	the	 launch	of	the	programme.	Many	firms	then	swung	the	other	way.	My	research,	 for	
example,	 contributed	 to	 Rolls-Royce	 receiving	 the	 top	 award	 from	 the	 Chartered	 Institute	 of	
Procurement	and	Supply	(CIPS)	in	2019	for	their	submission	on	creating	collaborative	supply	chains	
(CIPS,	2019).	Nevertheless,	 looking	forward,	 it	 is	 fitting	to	reflect	upon	the	term	“value-driven”	 in	
Figure	1.4.	Firms	must	have	strong	relationships	but,	in	order	to	survive,	they	require	them	together	
with	strong	operational	performance.	Relatively	speaking	 from	a	business	perspective,	 the	SD/DT	
programme	has	undergone	a	long	gestation.	A	platform	has	now	been	established,	but	it	remains	
uncertain	exactly	how	business	value	will	continue	to	be	extracted	and	to	grow.	Important	questions	
remain,	for	example,	if/how	joint	investment	should	be	tackled	at	enterprise-level	and	firm-level.		
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5.3.3 Academic contribution 
The	academic	contributions	which	I	have	made	in	Chapter	5	can	be	summarised	as:	
	
a) Advanced	the	SD/DT	process	through	action	research	to	culminate	in	the	definition	of	nine	steps,	
twenty-eight	guidelines,	and	four	categories	of	special	intervention.	
	
b) Added	to	literature	on	work-based	research.	Section	7.3	discusses	this	further.	
	
c) Exposed	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	SD/DT	process	may	answer	my	research	question	(i.e.	how	
to	develop	suppliers	within	an	extended	enterprise	towards	a	digital	enterprise).	Chapter	6	moves	
onto	review	the	outcomes	for	the	cohort	of	24	suppliers.	
	
	
	
5.3.4 Items for discussion in Chapter 7 
Chapter	 7	 reviews	 the	 combined	 results	 from	 this	 and	 the	next	 chapter.	 The	discussion	 seeks	 to	
explore	common,	or	unifying,	themes	and	unresolved	significant	issues.	Hence,	this	section	points	
out	the	topics	which	are	carried	forward.		
	
Chapter	5	has	shown	the	digital	minimum	standards	to	emerge	as	the	instrument	for	sharing	best	
practice	within	this	specific	case	of	an	Extended	(Digital)	Enterprise.	The	emergence	of	best	practice	
sharing	is	in	accordance	with	Chandler	and	Hwang	(2015)	and	my	theoretical	framework	shown	in	
Figures	3.2	and	3.9.	Furthermore,	Figure	5.3	has	provided	some	indication	of	diffusion;	albeit,	still	
very	early	days.	Therefore,	Chapter	7	discusses	whether	potential	adopters	will	 continue	 to	have	
good	reason	to	perceive	the	digital	minimum	standards	positively.	Also,	it	discusses	the	next	phase	
in	their	deployment.	Should	the	standard	remain	unchanged	for	the	time-being	or	should	the	bar	
start	to	be	raised?	
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Chapter 6 
 
RESULTS (part 2 of 2) 
 
Outcomes from the SD/DT process 
for the cohort of 24 suppliers 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Chapters	 1	 and	 2	 set	 the	 scene	 and	 synthesised	 process-steps	 for	 organisational	 change	 from	
literature.	 Chapters	 3	 and	 4	 constructed	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 introduced	 my	 research	
methodology.	 Chapter	 5	 provided	 the	 first	 part	 of	 my	 empirical	 results	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	
comprehensive	description	of	the	SD/DT	process.	
	
Now,	chapter	6	provides	the	second	part	of	my	empirical	results	in	the	form	of	the	outcomes	from	
the	SD/DT	process	for	the	cohort	of	24	suppliers.	This	chapter	is	divided	into	three	sections	from	6.1	
to	6.3.	It	begins	by	comparing	and	triangulating	my	results.	This	identifies	two	groups	of	particular	
interest:	 6	 firms	who	have	unsuccessful	 outcomes	 to	date,	 and	3	 firms	where	my	 results	 do	not	
triangulate.		The	former	is	reviewed	in	section	6.1	and	the	latter	in	section	6.2.	Finally,	section	6.3	
summarises	and	draws	out	the	key	implications.	The	empirical	results	show	that	my	organisational	
change	process	answers	the	research	question.	It	has	a	high	success	rate	together	with	high	potential	
to	 be	 operationalised	 and	 embedded	 through	 the	 supplier	 scorecards.	 A	 bullet-point	 executive	
summary	is	given	overleaf	for	those	who	prefer	this	format. 	
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Section	6.1	 Triangulating	relative	absorptive	capacity	to	supplier	outcomes	at	Waypoint	A/B		
	
• 15	firms	have	successful	outcomes	at	Waypoint	A/B.	They	are	also	forecast	to	do	
so	 by	 their	 supplier	 scorecards	 and,	 therein,	 by	 my	 proxy	 for	 their	 relative	
absorptive	capacity.	Therefore,	in	their	case,	my	results	triangulate.	
	
• 3	 other	 firms	 (Foxtrot,	 Indigo,	 and	 Juliet)	 also	 have	 successful	 outcomes	 at	
Waypoint	 A/B.	 However,	 in	 their	 case,	 this	 is	 not	 forecast	 by	 their	 supplier	
scorecards.	Therefore,	their	results	do	not	triangulate.	These	firms	remain	on	the	
SD/DT	programme	and	they	are	reviewed	in	more	detail	in	section	6.2.	
	
• 6	 firms	 (Charlie,	 Oskar,	 Papa,	 Romeo,	 Tango,	 and	Whiskey)	 have	 unsuccessful	
outcomes	 at	 Waypoint	 A/B.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 is	 forecast	 by	 their	 supplier	
scorecards	 and,	 therein,	 by	 my	 proxy	 for	 their	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity.	
Therefore,	their	results	also	triangulate.	A	range	of	contextual	factors	contribute	
to	 their	unsuccessful	outcomes.	Each	has	 its	own	nuances.	But,	 the	overall	net	
effect	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 SD/DT	 programme	 has	 been	 captured	 consistently	
through	their	supplier	scorecards.	
	
Section	6.2	 Three	cases	where	my	results	do	not	triangulate	
	
• Foxtrot	are	characterised	as	a	taker	(i.e.	cautious	and	self-protective).	My	results	
for	them	may	not	have	triangulated,	because	of:	different	levels	of	granularity	in	
the	 assessments	 coupled	with	 the	 complex,	 dynamic,	 and	 subjective	 nature	 of	
buyer/supplier	relationships.			
	
• Indigo	are	characterised	as	a	giver	(i.e.	networker,	collaborator,	and	influencer).	
They	are	also	an	important	growth	supplier,	however,	with	this	comes	promises	
and	expectations.	My	results	for	them	may	not	have	triangulated,	because	of:	(a)	
an	impatience	for	results	in	their	supplier	scorecard	assessment,	versus	(b)	more	
allowance	for	the	voluntary	nature	of	the	SD/DT	programme	in	my	interviews.	
	
• Juliet	are	characterised	as	a	 laggard	 (i.e.	 late	adopter	and	suspicious	of	 change	
agents).	My	results	for	them	may	not	have	triangulated,	because	of:	(a)	staff	going	
through	 the	motions	and	blindly	 tracking	deliverables	 in	 the	 supplier	 scorecard	
assessment,	versus	(b)	deeper	probing	in	my	interviews	to	grasp	the	full	context.	
	
• Overall,	 in	 conclusion,	 we	 should	 not	 be	 surprised	 that	 my	 results	 did	 not	
triangulate	at	precise	spot-points	in	time	for	every	firm.	The	supplier	scorecards	
are	subject	to	measurement	bias.	This	is	discussed	further	in	chapter	7.	
	
Section	6.3	 Summary	of	key	implications	from	this	chapter		
	
• Provided	evidence	that	the	SD/DT	process	can	answer	the	research	question.	
	
• Supported	 the	 fusion	 of	 institutional	 and	 organisational	 learning	 theories	 with	
empirical	research.	
	
• Advanced	the	operationalisation	and	measurement	of	relative	absorptive	capacity	
using	a	novel	approach,	supplier	scorecards.		
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 135 - 
6.1 Triangulating absorptive capacity to outcomes at Waypoint A/B  
Appendix	A	shows	the	trend	in	supplier	scorecard	results,	over	nearly	four	years,	for	the	twenty-four	
suppliers	in	my	main	study	group.	This	data	is	used	as	a	proxy	to	measure	their	relative	absorptive	
capacity	 as	 explained	 in	 section	3.3.2.	Using	 Figure	3.6,	 the	 suppliers’	 2019Q4	 status	 is	 recorded	
together	with	a	supplementary	symbol	 if	 the	 following	apply:	“+”	 if	 the	 trend	 in	 their	 technology	
score	has	been	generally	increasing	since	the	supplier	joined	the	SD/DT	programme;	“–“	if	the	trend	
in	 their	 technology	 score	 has	 been	 generally	 reducing	 since	 the	 supplier	 joined	 the	 SD/DT	
programme;	and	“#”	if	they	have	no	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	in	2019Q4	and	therefore	their	
result	is	based	upon	historical	evidence	and/or	an	interview	with	their	buyer	at	Rolls-Royce.	
	
Figure	6.1	compares	the	relative	absorptive	capacity	at	2019Q4	(Appendix	A)	with	the	outcome	at	
Waypoint	A/B.	The	latter	is	assessed	using	success	criteria	which	is	mainly	qualitative	(Figure	4.7).	
	
	
Relative	absorptive	capacity	
points	incorrectly	to	the	
outcome	for	the	supplier	
Relative	absorptive	capacity	
points	correctly	to	the	
outcome	for	the	supplier	
Successful	outcome	
from	the	SD/DT	process	
	
(Waypoint	A/B	in	
accordance	with	
section	4.4.2)	
	
	
	
	
Unsuccessful	outcome	
from	the	SD/DT	process	
	
(Waypoint	A/B	in	
accordance	with	
section	4.4.2)	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure 6.1: Triangulating relative absorptive capacity to outcomes at Waypoint A/B  
	
	
My	analysis	will	primarily	focus	upon	two	groups	from	Figure	6.1.	Firstly,	the	group	of	six	suppliers	
(Charlie,	Oskar,	Papa,	Romeo,	Tango,	and	Whiskey)	who	were	judged	to	have	unsuccessful	outcomes	
from	the	SD/DT	process.	Secondly,	the	group	of	three	suppliers	(Foxtrot,	Indigo,	and	Juliet)	where	my	
results	have	not	triangulated.	These	suppliers	had	successful	outcomes,	but	contrary	to	what	was	
forecast	by	the	measurement	of	their	relative	absorptive	capacity	using	the	supplier	scorecards.	
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A	summary	of	the	results	and	contextual	factors	for	the	first	group	of	suppliers	is	provided	below	in	
Figure	 6.2.	 Individual	 uncollated	 results	 for	 each	 of	 the	 three	 suppliers	 in	 the	 second	 group	 (i.e.	
Foxtrot,	Indigo,	and	Juliet)	are	given	later	in	section	6.2.	
	
Supplier	
Name	
Reason	for	
unsuccessful	outcome	
(section	4.4.2)	
Contextual	factors	
	
(section	3.3)	
Current	
status	in	
the	SD/DT	
programme	
	
(March	2020)	
Waypoint	A	 Waypoint	B	
Relative	
absorptive	
capacity	
Others	which	
most	greatly	
contributed	to	
unsuccessful	
outcome	
Charlie	 Avoidance	
Their	buyer-side	interview	most	
greatly	contributed	to	their	
classification	of	having	had	an	
unsuccessful	outcome	to	date	
AC3	–	 Firm	Size	(Large)	 Step	8/9	
Oskar	 Manipulation	
Their	buyer-side	interview	most	
greatly	contributed	to	their	
classification	of	having	had	an	
unsuccessful	outcome	to	date	
AC2	–	
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Alignment	
(sub-optimal)	
+	
Power	Regime	
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cluster	group	instead	
AC4	 Firm	Location	(Asia)	 Step	7	
Romeo	
They	were	exited	from	the	SD/DT	programme	
at,	or	before,	Waypoint	A	
based	upon	their	buyer-side	interview	
AC4	#	
Strategic	
Alignment	
(sub-optimal)	
+	
Power	Regime	
(supplier	
dominance)	
Exited	
Tango	
They	were	exited	from	the	SD/DT	programme	
at,	or	before,	Waypoint	A	
based	upon	their	buyer-side	interview	
AC4	#	 Firm	Size	(Small)	 Exited	
Whiskey	
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Figure 6.2: Summary for suppliers with unsuccessful outcomes at Waypoint A/B 
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Figure 6.3: Contextual factors for the different groups of suppliers 
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Figures	6.3	and	6.4	provide	further	summaries	for	the	two	groups	of	suppliers	in	relation	to	the	rest	
of	the	cohort	on	the	SD/DT	programme.		
	
Waypoint	A	
(section	3.4)	
Waypoint	B	
(section	3.5)	
Current	status	in	the	SD/DT	
programme	(March	2020)	
Those	firms	
for	whom	my	
results	do	not	
triangulate	
Successful	
Outcome	
Unsuccessful	
Outcome	 Step	7	 Step	8/9	 Exited	
Acquiescence	 14	 0	 3	 11	 0	 1	
(Indigo)	
Compromise	 3	 0	 0	 3	 0	
2	
(Foxtrot)	
(Juliet)	
Avoidance	 1	 1	
(Charlie)	
0	 2	 0	 0	
Manipulation	 0	 1	
(Oskar)	
0	 1	 0	 0	
Defiance	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Those	firms	who	
have	not	passed	
through	Waypoint	A	
(as	of	March	2020)	
0	
4	
(unsuccessful	at,	or	
up	to,	Waypoint	A)	
2	
(Papa)	
(Whiskey)	
0	
2	
(Romeo)	
(Tango)	
0	
	
Figure 6.4: Distribution of results throughout the SD/DT programme 
	
The	remainder	of	this	section	reviews	and	analyses	the	results	for	the	group	of	six	suppliers	(Charlie,	
Oskar,	Papa,	Romeo,	Tango,	and	Whiskey)	who	were	judged	to	have	unsuccessful	outcomes	from	the	
SD/DT	process.	Section	6.2	then	moves	onto	consider	the	other	group	of	three	suppliers	(Foxtrot,	
Indigo,	and	Juliet)	for	whom	my	results	do	not	triangulate.	A	relatively	broad	and	high-level	approach	
is	taken	to	the	former	versus	a	more	detailed	approach	to	the	latter.	A	balance	is	required	between	
academic	rigour	and	commercial	sensitivity	which	I	am	able	to	achieve	by	reporting	this	way.	Even	if	
my	 thesis	word-count	had	allowed,	 I	 need	 to	 avoid	 getting	 into	 too	much	detail	 on	many	of	 the	
twenty-four	suppliers	because	it	is	through	the	detail	that	their	identity	emerges.	However,	each	has	
a	fascinating	story	to	tell.	I	have	been	very	privileged	to	study	them	all	and	to	be	able	to	extract	the	
illustrative	and	informative	examples	which	I	have.	
	
Starting	 first	 with	 Oskar.	 It	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 Figure	 6.1	 that	 they	 are	 an	 outlier.	 Their	 relative	
absorptive	 capacity	 at	 2019Q4	 had	 a	 generally	 satisfactory	 return	 from	 their	 supplier	 scorecard	
(technology)	i.e.	they	were	not	AC3	or	AC4	in	Figure	3.6.	They	fell	over	the	line	in	my	classification,	
because	of	a	sustained	negative	trend	which	had	reached	the	point	at	2019Q4	whereby	they	were	
very	close	to	AC4.	However,	as	they	were	a	marginal	case,	I	reviewed	the	triangulation	of	their	results	
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in	 Figure	 6.1	with	 their	 buyer	 from	 different	 perspectives.	 An	 upbeat	 view	 for	 triangulation	 (i.e.	
successful	outcome/AC2	or	unsuccessful	outcome/AC2–)	versus	a	downbeat	view	for	triangulation	
(i.e.	successful	outcome/	AC2–		or	unsuccessful	outcome/AC2).	The	position	shown	in	Figure	6.1	is	
that	which	was	agreed.	All	is	not	lost	with	them	and	they	remain	members	of	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	
Charlie	is	the	only	other	supplier	with	unsuccessful	outcomes	who	has	remained	a	member	of	the	
SD/DT	 programme	 and	 progressed	 through	 to	 step	 8/9.	 Similar	 to	 Oskar,	 they	 are	 reporting	
continued	business	value	from	membership	and	their	buyer	also	wishes	for	them	to	remain	in	the	
hope	that	more	is	yet	to	come.	There	is	some	reason	to	believe	that	this	could	occur.	In	addition	to	
Oskar	 and	 Charlie,	 there	 is	 a	 third	 supplier	 who	 had	 one	 of	 the	more	 confrontational	 response	
strategies	at	Waypoint	A	 (i.e.	avoidance),	but	 is	 shown	 in	Figure	6.4	as	having	been	successful	at	
Waypoint	B.	For	reference,	Victor	is	the	name	of	this	supplier	who	successfully	turned	it	around.	
	
Another	 two	of	 the	 suppliers	with	unsuccessful	outcomes,	Papa	and	Whiskey,	have	 instead	been	
moved	to	a	regional	cluster	group	(section	5.2.2).	This	was	in	response	to	issues	with	communication,	
ease	of	access,	and	digital	immaturity	relative	to	the	others	in	the	cohort.	As	such,	whilst	the	cluster	
is	bedding-in,	they	remain	at	step	7	of	the	SD/DT	programme.	By	contrast,	Romeo	and	Tango	have	
exited	the	programme	altogether.	In	addition	to	relative	absorptive	capacity,	Romeo	was	influenced	
by	strategic	alignment	(sub-optimal)	and	power	regime	(supplier	dominance)	which	effectively	drove	
the	dyadic	relationship	apart.	Tango	was	influenced	by	firm	size	(small)	which	eventually	led	to	a	re-
prioritisation	of	their	finite	resources.	
	
Thus,	a	range	of	contextual	factors	have	been	shown	to	contribute	to	the	unsuccessful	outcomes	of	
all	 six	 suppliers.	 Each	 has	 its	 own	 nuances.	 But,	 the	 overall	 net	 effect	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 SD/DT	
programme	has	been	captured	consistently	 through	 the	 supplier	 scorecards,	 and,	 therein,	by	my	
proxy	for	their	relative	absorptive	capacity.	
	
Finally,	it	is	appropriate	to	return	to	Figure	6.1	and	the	fact	that	there	are	no	improving	trends	(i.e.	
no	 supplementary	 “+”	 symbols).	 There	 are	 examples	 of	 performance	 levels	 being	 sustained	 (or	
reduced),	but	none	showing	significant	improvement.		Nevertheless,	the	word	collage	in	Figure	6.5	
provides	some	solace.	It	shows	an	illustrative	quote	for	half	of	the	words	selected	from	Figure	4.6	in	
response	 to	 the	 question	 “What	 is	 your	 firms	 purpose	 in	 being	 on	 the	 SD/DT	 programme?”.	
Furthermore,	quotes	for	the	remaining	nine	words	which	were	selected	are	provided	in	section	6.2.		
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Benchmarking	
“We’re	 benchmarking	 a	 little	 bit.	
Looking	at	what	others	are	doing	
and	where	we	stand	compared	to	
our,	well,	the	companies	we	work	
with	but	also	our	competitors.	Are	
we	developing	[the	best]	solutions	
right	now?	…	[otherwise]	we’re	all	
be	shaped	by	our	pre-knowledge.”	
	
	
	
	
	
Delta	
Discovering	
“If	 you	 go	 back	 to	 when	 things	
kicked-off,	 and	 where	 [company	
name]	was	at	that	time,	we	were	
discovering	 and	 understanding	
what	 it	 was	 Rolls-Royce	 was	
looking	to	do	…	and	of	course	from	
there	until	now	our	understanding	
has	evolved	…	and	this	led	to	some	
really	 structural	 changes	 [in	 our	
firm]	 with	 [employee	 name]	
charting	 our	 digital	 strategy	
moving	forward.”	
	
Bravo	
Explaining	
“People	 [others	 on	 the	 SD/DT	
programme]	 are	 full	 of	 serious	
information	 about	 a	 complete	
digital	 system	 …	 we	 are	 less	
mature,	but	from	now	we’re	fully	
engaged	 …	 we	 need	 to	 move	
quickly	 to	 catch	 up	…	 I	 report	 to	
my	 seniors,	 they	 support	me,	we	
want	 to	 work	 out	 overall	
framework,	 plan,	 and	 then	
promote	 step-by-step	 …	 in	 our	
company	 we	 are	 explaining	 and	
sharing	digital	experiences.”	
Uniform	
Translating	
“The	 problem	 that	 I	 see	 with	
[large	 OEM’s]	 is	 that	 a	 lot	 of	
translation	 needs	 to	 happen	 to	
break	their	big	corporate	schemes	
down	 to	 our	 little	 scale	…	 I	 think	
the	[SD/DT	programme]	has	done	
its	share	for	that.”	
	
	
	
	
	
X-Ray	
Complying	
“Here	I’m	a	little	bit	conflicted,	but	
I’d	probably	say	…	compliant.	As	a	
good	supplier,	needing	to	comply	
with	 where	 the	 customers	 are	
going.	Probably	more	compliance	
than	acquiescence	if	you	see	what	
I	 mean.	 Also,	 [from	 the	 row	 of	
related	words]	 aligning	 ourselves	
with	 the	 customers	 and	 where	
they’re	 going.	 Probably	 more	 so	
than	integrating	and	sponsoring.”	
	
Oskar		
Reciprocating	
“I	think	there’s	some	stuff	that	we	
are	already	doing,	without	getting	
into	levels	of	intellectual	property	
and	 all	 that,	 that	 would	 be	
straightforward	 for	 us	 to	 share.	
Good	practice	which	other	people	
could	 benefit	 from.	 And	 I	 think	
there’s	stuff	that	other	businesses	
probably	do	better	than	us	and	we	
can	get	some	benefit	from.	So	it	is	
about	 sharing.	 It	 can’t	 be	 just	
take,	take,	take.”	
Sierra	
Influencing	
“We	 are	 trying	 to	 influence	 and	
innovate	 with	 our	 software	
vendors	because	we	want	to	have	
more	 [digital]	 functionality	 …	
we’re	 learning	 about	 the	
functionality	 and	 we	 try	 to	
understand	the	philosophies	…	we	
try	 to	 develop	 our	 processes	 and	
the	 processes	 in	 the	 software	 as	
well	 …	 we	 try	 to	 influence	 and	
manipulate	the	future	or	the	next	
steps	 from	 these	 software	
vendors.”	
	
	
	
	
	
Echo	
Waiting	
“Initially	it	was	wait	and	see	what	
happens	 …	 we	 were	 not	
knowledgeable	 and	 we	 had	 not	
dealt	 a	 lot	 with	 digital	
transformation	 before.	 It	 was	
hard	for	us	to	transition	from	let’s	
wait	and	see	to	what	do	we	need	
to	 do	 next	 …	 there	 was	 a	
scepticism	 in	 [company	 name]	
simply	 because	 many	 people	
involved	 did	 not	 deal	 with	 the	
topic	 of	 digital	 transformation	
hands-on	 …	 we	 needed	 to	 get	
aligned	 internally.	 Here,	 the	
[SD/DT	 programme]	 was	 really	
very,	very	helpful.”	
	
	
Kilo	
Testing	
“I	read	it	[testing]	first	and	I	said,	
boy,	is	that	too	negative.	But	then	
I	 thought	 that	 there	 are	 certain	
things	…	that	are	clearly	not	being	
thought	 through	 from	 a	 supplier	
perspective	[example]	I	brought	it	
up	 afterwards	 with	 him	 and	 he	
said	 like	 yes,	 that’s	 a	 good	
thought,	 let	me	take	that	back	…	
It’s	like	saying,	wait	a	minute	now,	
you	guys	are	designing	this	world	
from	a	Rolls-Royce	perspective	but	
did	 you	 consider	 this,	 this,	 this?	
And	 that’s	 where	 I	 think	 is	 a	 big	
part	 of	 our	 role	 [in	 the	 SD/DT	
programme]	 is	to	say,	hey	wait	a	
minute,	did	anybody	consider	this	
before	you	make	this	decision?”	
Quebec	
	
Figure 6.5: What is your firms purpose in being on the SD/DT programme? 
(sample	of	responses	from	Waypoint	B)	
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6.2 Three cases where my results do not triangulate 
The	twenty	suppliers	who	progressed	to	Waypoint	B	had	three	word	choices	each	from	Figure	4.6.	
They	 selected	 eighteen	 different	words	 in	 total.	 The	 groupings	 are	 retained	 below	 in	 Figure	 6.6.	
Shown	explicitly	are	the	responses	from	the	three	suppliers	where	my	results	do	not	triangulate.		
	
 
 
Figure 6.6: What is your firms purpose in being on the SD/DT programme? 
(all	responses	from	Waypoint	B)	
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Starting	with	a	few	general	observations	about	Figure	6.6.	Firstly,	no	suppliers	selected	any	words	
originating	from	Figure	3.8	(i.e.	acquiescing,	avoiding,	compromising,	defying,	nor	manipulating).	The	
quote	from	Oskar	in	Figure	6.5,	for	example,	shows	their	deliberation	and	choice	of	“complying”	over	
“acquiescing”.	The	negative	connotation	of	the	words	in	Figure	3.8	was	identified	during	the	buyer-
side	 interviews	 and	 my	 response	 framework	 was	 redesigned	 accordingly	 for	 the	 supplier-side	
interviews	(section	4.4.1).	There	is	a	risk	that	I	may	have	overdone	it.	For	example,	Dayal	(2016),	who	
studies	the	syntax	and	semantics	of	questions,	points	to	this	problem;	albeit	 in	the	case	of	highly	
polar	questions	whereas	mine	are	more	graded	and	listed.		
	
However,	Robinson	and	Leonard	 (2019)	provide	an	alternative	view	which	 I	 consider	 to	be	a	 fair	
reflection	having	conducted	the	interviews.	They	argue	that	there	is	a	place	for	framing	questions	
such	as	mine	in	order	to	increase	the	likelihood	of	respondents	responding	on	sensitive	matters.	The	
quote	 from	Quebec	 in	 Figure	 6.5,	 for	 example,	 shows	 their	 deliberation	 and	 careful	 selection	 of	
“testing”.	Overall,	I	found	the	supplier	responses	to	be	very	rich	and	informative.	The	respondents	
openly	provided	a	detailed	explanation	of	their	firm’s	behaviour	(commercially	driven	or	otherwise)	
through	their	explanation	of	a	specific	word	selection	and	their	discussion	about	the	other	words	
which	they	had	included	or	rejected	alongside	it.		
	
Figure	6.6	shows	that	the	most	popular	groups	of	words	selected	from	Figure	4.6	are	the	new	ones	
which	did	not	originate	from	Figure	3.8	(i.e.	Group	D	which	contains	“learning”	and	Group	F	which	
contains	“sharing”).	These	point	to	aspects	of	my	theoretical	framework	in	section	3.5	and	support	
the	view	that	adoption	and	diffusion	is	taking	place.	Furthermore,	the	third	most	popular	group	of	
words	is	Group	A	which	is	the	one	which	contains	“acquiescing”	(Note:	although	nobody	selected	this	
word	from	the	group,	it	is	the	one	which	is	used	to	describe	the	desired	response	from	the	theoretical	
framework	in	section	3.4).	Also,	within	Group	A	lies	the	most	popular	singular	word	selected	by	the	
suppliers	which	was	“aligning”	(Note:	the	word	which	the	buyers	used	to	summarise	that	which	was	
of	most	importance	to	them	in	section	4.4.2).	Overall,	an	encouraging	set	of	results	from	Figure	6.6.	
	
Moving	 next	 to	 the	 three	 suppliers	 where	 my	 results	 did	 not	 triangulate.	 The	 complexity	 and	
confidentiality	of	the	subject,	and	the	nature	of	my	enquiry	and	research	positionality,	are	such	that	
I	cannot	be	absolutely	categorical	on	the	root	cause.	However,	I’ve	written	each	as	a	case	to	highlight	
important	aspects	of	consideration	in	the	maze	of	potential	contributory	factors.	 	
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6.2.1 The case of the taker (Foxtrot) 
Here,	 I	review	the	case	of	Foxtrot	 in	order	to	explore	aspects	which	are	special,	or	unique,	about	
them	which	may	have	 led	 to	a	 lack	of	 triangulation	 in	my	results.	Foxtrot	were	 judged	 to	have	a	
successful	 outcome	 at	Waypoint	 B,	 but	 their	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 at	 2019Q4	 of	 AC4	 (as	
measured	through	the	supplier	scorecards)	did	not	triangulate	with	this.	Appendix	A	shows	that	the	
relationship	 has	 struggled	 over	 many	 years.	 Furthermore,	 their	 organisational	 proximity	 is	 sub-
optimal	 and	 the	 power	 regime	 is	 supplier	 dominance	 throughout	 the	 research	 period.	 These	
contextual	 factors	suggest	a	higher	probability	 for	Foxtrot,	 than	many	others	 in	the	cohort,	 to	be	
unsuccessful	on	the	SD/DT	programme.	However,	they	were	not.	Why	might	this	be	the	case?	
	
An	important	aspect	of	consideration	which	may	have	contributed	to	the	lack	of	triangulation	is	that	
they	were	the	most	extreme	case	of	a	“taker”	from	the	cohort	of	twenty-four	suppliers	on	the	SD/DT	
programme.	 Grant	 (2013)	 includes	 in	 his	 attributes	 and	 characteristics	 of	 a	 taker	 that	 they	 are	
“cautious	and	self-protective”	whereas,	in	contrast,	a	giver	will	“contribute	without	keeping	score”.		
	
Figure	6.7	shows	quotes	from,	and	about,	Foxtrot	which	were	taken	on	three	occasions	during	the	
SD/DT	programme.	Firstly,	an	exercise	was	performed	on	the	role	of	all	attendees	as	change	agents	
at	one	of	the	workshops	held	shortly	before	their	Waypoint	A	buyer-side	interview.	Feedback	forms	
were	collected	and	extracts	from	Foxtrot’s	response	are	shown	in	Figure	6.7.	Also	included	are	the	
words	 selected,	 and	 quotations	 given,	 during	 their	 Waypoint	 A	 buyer-side	 interview	 and	 their	
Waypoint	B	supplier-side	interview.	A	high	level	of	frustration	is	clear	from	the	buyer-side	interview.	
There	 is	 reason	 to	 support	 their	view,	 that	Foxtrot	are	very	 inward-facing,	 from	both	 the	change	
agent	 form	and	the	supplier-side	 interview.	However,	evidence	can	also	be	seen	that	Foxtrot	are	
starting	to	embrace	the	digital	minimum	standards	and	show	signs	of	becoming	more	willing	to	share.	
	
This	demonstrates	the	complex,	dynamic,	and	subjective	nature	of	buyer/supplier	relationships.	The	
predominately	qualitative	success	criteria	for	Waypoint	A/B	(section	4.4.2)	is	more	tolerant	of	this	
than	 my	 attempt	 to	 operationalise	 and	 measure	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 quantitatively	 via	
supplier	scorecards.	I	should,	therefore,	not	be	surprised	that	some	cases	do	not	triangulate	perfectly	
at	a	specific	point	in	time.	At	one	stage,	Foxtrot’s	buyer	was	resigned	to	asking	them	to	leave	the	
SD/DT	programme.	However,	rather	than	doing	this	outright,	the	decision	was	taken	to	test	their	
commitment	and	resolve	through	the	Waypoint	B	supplier-side	interview.	This	turned	out	to	be	much	
more	positive	and	stronger	than	the	buyer	had	expected	and	so	they	have	remained.	
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Another	contributory	 factor	 to	 the	 lack	of	 triangulation	 in	my	 results	 for	Foxtrot	may	come	 from	
subtle	differences	in	the	management	of	expectations.	The	grounding	for	the	supplier	scorecards,	
from	which	my	measurement	of	relative	absorptive	capacity	is	taken,	is	in	product	technology	(i.e.	
where	 the	expectation	of	 the	buyer	 is	 that	 the	 supplier	will	make	 the	dominant	 contribution)	 as	
opposed	to	digital	technology	(i.e.	where	it	is	more	fluid	and	the	scope	extends	to	learning	together).		
	
Foxtrot	were	 criticised	 about	 their	 approach	 to	 product	 technology	 in	 their	 buyer-side	 interview	
when	it	was	said	that	“If	you	look	at	their	products	…	most	of	its	acquired.	Their	engineering	capability	
is	not	great	…	good	at	the	stuff	they	know,	but	not	if	asked	to	do	anything	different”.	This	mind-set	
and	 bias	may	 have	 remained	 unabated	when	 compiling	 the	 supplier	 scorecards.	 However,	more	
empathy	may	have	been	 introduced	when	conducting	my	 interviews.	Compared	 to	others	 in	 the	
cohort	of	twenty-four	suppliers	on	the	SD/DT	programme,	this	bias	may	have	been	more	pronounced	
for	Foxtrot	as	the	most	extreme	case	of	a	“taker”.	
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Foxtrot 
(Successful	outcome	at	Waypoint	B,	but	
relative	absorptive	capacity	of	AC4	in	2019Q4	does	not	triangulate	with	this)	
Prior	to	
Waypoint	A	
	
Change	agent	
feedback	form	
(supplier-side)	
What	are	your	key	takeaways?	
“change	management	with	Operations	is	a	key	success	factor	…	business	set-up	and	
governance	to	deploy	digital	solutions	into	[our	many	facilities].”	
	
What	help	do	you	need	as	your	firm’s	change	agent?		
“business	case	is	another	key	success	factor	and	challenging	to	track	…	further	
information	on	the	value	creation	for	[description	of	their	type	of	firm].”	
Waypoint	A	
	
Buyer-side	
interview	
Compromise	
	
“When	we	last	spoke	about	[firm	name]	…	we’d	started	to	talk	to	them	about	technology	
development	 ideas	 and	 then,	 all	 of	 a	 sudden,	 they	 re-organised	 their	 businesses.	 They	
completely	 took	 their	 eye	 off	 the	 ball.	 They	 focused	 on	 everything	 internally	 in	 the	
organisation.	The	customer	came	second	fiddle	and	everything	just	went	pear-shaped	…	
Digital,	 they	 say	 it’s	a	big	 thing,	but	 I	don’t	 think	 they’ll	 see	 it	as	a	big	 thing	with	 their	
customers.	I	think	they’ll	see	it	as	a	big	thing	with	their	facilities.”	
Waypoint	B	
	
Supplier-side	
interview	
Learning	
	
“This	 is	 an	 area	 where	 there	 are	 so	 many	 unanswered	 questions	 and,	 I	 mean,	 I	 keep	
discovering	at	all	 levels	 that	nobody	has	 the	magic	bullet	and	nobody	even	pretends	 to	
having	the	magic	bullet.”	
Internalising	
	
“I’m	happy	to	say	that	we	had	a	kick-off	call	around	the	digital	minimum	standards	formal	
assessment	earlier	this	week	with	all	the	people	who	were	identified	as	the	logical	owners	
for	 the	 individual	 chapters.	 They	 all	 very	 openly	 said,	 you	 know,	 ‘Absolutely,	 that’s	my	
territory.	I’ll	own	that.	I’m	taking	that	forward.’	…	I	think	we	moved	from	all	observing	and	
understanding,	which	 is	where	we	were	 very	much	 at	 the	 end	 of	 last	 year,	 to	 actually	
setting	ourselves	to	work	on	it.	The	difficulty,	of	course,	is	there’s	one	thing	having	clear	
owners	at	the	group	level	and	another	being	able	to	drive	that	change	to	the	operational	
businesses	 where	 it	 needs	 to	 eventually	 materialise.	 But	 at	 least	 we	 have	 the	 change	
agents,	I	think,	at	the	group	level.	Which	is	good.”	
Sharing		
	
“It	depends	on	where	you	sit	on	the	maturity	curve	because,	I	think,	we’re	…	learning	what	
the	right	way	of	deploying	some	of	this	capability	is.	So	we	feel	that	we’ve	got	nothing	to	
lose	from	sharing	and	collaborating	at	this	point.	I	think	if	we	were	much	more	mature	and	
we	felt	that	we	had	a	bit	of	an	advantage	because	we	were	that	mature,	then	it	might	be	
a	different	conversation.	But	we’re	not	there	yet	and	we’ve	probably	got	a	little	way	to	go	
before	we	consider	ourselves	for	that	level	of	maturity.”	
	
Figure 6.7: Quotes from, or about, Foxtrot at waypoints on the SD/DT programme  
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6.2.2 The case of the giver (Indigo) 
Next,	I	review	the	case	of	Indigo	in	order	to	explore	aspects	which	are	special,	or	unique,	about	them	
which	may	have	led	to	a	lack	of	triangulation	in	my	results.	Indigo	were	judged	to	have	a	successful	
outcome	 at	Waypoint	 B,	 but	 their	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 at	 2019Q4	 of	 AC3–	 (as	measured	
through	the	supplier	scorecards)	did	not	triangulate	with	this.	It	can	be	seen	from	Appendix	A	that	
their	operational	scorecard	has	been	up	and	down.	If	the	assessment	had	been	taken	at	2019Q3	or	
2019Q2	then	they	would	have	been	AC4,	like	Foxtrot.	This	would	have	pointed	even	more	strongly	
to	an	unsuccessful	outcome.	However,	they	are	a	different	case	to	Foxtrot	in	that	the	buyer/supplier	
relationship	is	on	a	much	stronger	footing.	They	are	classified	as	a	growth	supplier.	Lots	of	new	work	
is	being	placed	with	them	by	the	buyer;	however,	with	this	comes	promises	and	expectations.			
	
An	important	aspect	of	consideration	which	may	have	contributed	to	the	lack	of	triangulation	is	that	
Indigo	were	 the	most	extreme	case	of	a	 “giver”	 from	 the	cohort	of	 twenty-four	 suppliers	on	 the	
SD/DT	programme.	Grant	(2013)	includes	in	his	attributes	and	characteristics	of	a	giver	that	they	have	
“unique	approaches	to	interaction	in	four	key	domains:	networking,	collaborating,	evaluating,	and	
influencing”.	This	is	certainly	true	for	Indigo	in	terms	of	one	of	their	staff	members.	The	person	that	
they	 nominated	 to	 lead	 for	 them	 on	 the	 SD/DT	 programme	 had	 a	 wealth	 of	 these	 attributes.	
However,	during	busy	times,	his	firm	lacked	the	necessary	bandwidth	and	strength	in	depth.	
	
Figure	6.8	shows	quotes	from,	and	about,	Indigo	which	were	taken	on	three	occasions	during	the	
SD/DT	programme	in	a	similar	manner	to	those	shown	previously	for	Foxtrot.	A	very	different	tone	
is	apparent	between	Foxtrot	and	Indigo.	My	reason	for	characterising	one	as	the	taker	and	the	other	
as	the	giver	becomes	more	vivid.		Indigo’s	response	on	the	change	agent	form	was	typical	of	their	
representative.	Only	two	others	in	the	cohort	(15%	of	the	returns)	turned	the	question	around	to	
explicitly	state	what	they	themselves	were	going	to	contribute.		
	
However,	similar	to	Foxtrot,	a	potential	reason	why	my	results	did	not	triangulate	for	 Indigo	may	
come	down	to	measurement	bias	and	subtle	differences	in	the	management	of	expectations.	The	
specifics	for	Indigo	being	that	those	compiling	the	supplier	scorecards	were	growing	impatient	and	
seeking	tangible	quick	wins.	Their	expectations	were	linked	directly	to	the	award	of	new	business	
and	using	technology	swiftly	to	support	the	industrialisation	and	ramp-up.	But,	my	interviews	were	
less	confrontational	and	were	tempered	by	the	more	voluntary	nature	of	the	SD/DT	programme.		
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Indigo 
(Successful	outcome	at	Waypoint	B,	but	
relative	absorptive	capacity	of	AC3–	in	2019Q4	does	not	triangulate	with	this)	
Prior	to	
Waypoint	A	
	
Change	agent	
feedback	form	
(supplier-side)	
What	help	do	you	need	as	your	firm’s	change	agent?		
	
“Nothing	at	this	point.	
I	will	support	you	on	the	roll-out	of	the	new	[name	of	digital	tool].”	
Waypoint	A	
	
Buyer-side	
interview	
Acquiescence	
	
“[Firm	name]	are	going	through	a	large	company	change	at	the	moment	…	we	are	really	
keen	to	move	forward	and	do	the	[digital]	minimum	standards	…	although	we	did	an	early	
trial	…	we	want	to	see	it	moved	to	a	proper	roadmap	now	and	to	see	them	develop	their	
capabilities	…	my	only	worry	is	its	always	just	[employee	name]	…	he’s	the	senior	guy	…	but	
why	isn’t	he	delegating	more?”	
	
“I’m	getting	frustrated	with	[firm	name]	as	they	seem	to	talk	a	lot	about	future	capabilities	
but	are	not	acting	on	the	here	and	now	…	if	it’s	not	[employee	name]	there	is	no	backup	
for	their	work	on	the	digital	minimum	standards.”	
Waypoint	B	
	
Supplier-side	
interview	
Innovating		
	
“…	a	way	of	thinking	digitally	and	thinking	agile,	fast	change,	and	not	being	afraid	to	try	
something	…	and	fail	things	too.	We	wanted	to	do	the	[digital	tool],	it	didn’t	quite	do	what	
we	wanted	it	to	do.	It	was	too	big,	and	so	we	learned	what	not	to	do	which	was	equally	as	
important	…	we	gave	it	a	try	and	so	we	know	why	it’s	difficult.	So,	for	me,	that’s	value	in	
itself,	the	willingness	to	do	it.”	
Contributing		
	
“You	[Rolls-Royce]	became	an	oil	 tanker	…	you	can	actually	hop	 in	a	speed	boat	off	 the	
tanker,	go	out	and	explore	a	bit,	and	then	help	set	a	course	on	which	way	we	want	to	go	…	
so	I	think	that	for	me	to	be	part	of	that	and	to	be	able	to	help	contribute	and	shape	things	
such	as	[the	digital]	minimum	standards	[has	been	very	rewarding].”	
Developing	
	
“There	is	never	a	status	quo	balance	…	you	want	to	be	pushed,	you	want	to	be	challenged,	
you	want	to	be	taken	out	of	your	comfort	zone.”	
	
Figure 6.8: Quotes from, or about, Indigo at waypoints on the SD/DT programme 
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6.2.3 The case of the laggard (Juliet) 
Finally,	I	review	the	case	of	Juliet	in	order	to	explore	aspects	which	are	special,	or	unique,	about	them	
which	may	have	led	to	a	lack	of	triangulation	in	my	results.	Juliet	were	judged	to	have	a	successful	
outcome	 at	Waypoint	 B,	 but	 their	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 at	 2019Q4	 of	 AC3–	 (as	measured	
through	the	supplier	scorecards)	did	not	triangulate	with	this.	It	can	be	seen	from	Appendix	A	that	
timing	may	have	played	a	role	here,	because	they	are	a	far	more	marginal	case	than	Foxtrot	or	Indigo.	
They	were	AC1	for	the	vast	majority	of	their	time	on	the	SD/DT	programme	which,	had	it	continued,	
would	have	resulted	in	my	results	triangulating	for	them.	
	
This	again	raises	the	possibility	of	measurement	error,	bias,	or	phasing	 in	the	triangulation	of	my	
results.	Intriguingly,	concerns	about	the	supplier	scorecards	were	raised	by	Juliet	in	their	supplier-
side	interview.	They	were	the	only	firm	to	explicitly	do	so.	They	said:	“I	think	there’s	a	misalignment	
in	the	level	of	interaction	with	digitisation	on	both	sides	when	we	meet	to	discuss	the	scorecard	…	
[Rolls-Royce	 personnel]	 focus	 on	 the	 hard	 metrics,	 quality	 and	 delivery,	 and	 this	 dominates	 the	
discussion	…	[those	discussing	are]	nowhere	near	the	required	level	of	understanding	[about	digital]	
…	there’s	a	general	lag	in	terms	of	the	strategic	direction.”	
	
Buyer	staff	are	intended	to	play	a	role	in	pointing	their	suppliers	in	the	right	direction	and	drawing	in	
experts	and	support	if	required.	An	early	cry	for	help	can	be	detected	in	the	change	agent	response	
from	Juliet	 in	Figure	6.9.	This	may	be	where	unique	problems	have	arisen	with	them	which	could	
have	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 their	 results	 not	 triangulating.	 The	 organisational	 design	 on	 the	
buyer-side	is	very	different	for	Juliet	compared	to	most	others	in	the	cohort.	There	is	less	immediate	
and	direct	support	available	for	digital	manufacturing	to	either	the	supplier	or	to	the	buyer	staff	who	
work	with	them.	My	results	are	less	likely	to	triangulate	in	circumstances	where	one	input	is	derived	
from	staff	blindly	going	through	the	motions	of	tracking	deliverables	(i.e.	the	supplier	scorecards),	
and	the	other	probes	deeper	to	grasp	the	full	context	(i.e.	my	interviews).	
	
Figure	6.9	shows	quotes	 from,	and	about,	 Juliet	which	were	 taken	on	 three	occasions	during	 the	
SD/DT	 programme	 in	 a	 similar	manner	 to	 those	 shown	 previously	 for	 Foxtrot	 and	 Indigo.	When	
comparing	them,	it	is	possible	to	surmise	that	Juliet’s	issue	may	be	more	with	their	own	“absolute”	
level	of	absorptive	capacity	rather	than	that	associated	with	their	relationship	to	the	buyer	(i.e.	not	
their	“relative”	absorptive	capacity).	
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Finally,	another	consideration	which	may	have	contributed	to	the	lack	of	triangulation	is	that	Juliet	
were	the	most	extreme	case	of	a	“laggard”	from	the	cohort	of	twenty-four	suppliers	on	the	SD/DT	
programme.	Rogers	(2003)	places	laggards	as	the	last	to	adopt	an	innovation	and	highlights	that	they	
tend	to	be	more	suspicious	of	change	agents.	 In	terms	of	my	engagement	and	diffusion	model	 in	
Figure	5.2,	Juliet	sit	at	Level	2	whereas	Foxtrot	and	Indigo	are	at	Level	1.	In	this	respect,	Juliet	are	a	
laggard	compared	to	many	others	in	the	cohort.	Their	delay	(or	compromise)	in	adoption	may	also	
have	been	aided	by	the	power	regime	(i.e.	supplier	dominance);	but,	now	they	have	less	wriggle	room	
with	the	launch	of	the	digital	minimum	standards.	
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Juliet 
(Successful	outcome	at	Waypoint	B,	but	
relative	absorptive	capacity	of	AC3–	in	2019Q4	does	not	triangulate	with	this)	
Prior	to	
Waypoint	A	
	
Change	agent	
feedback	form	
(supplier-side)	
What	help	do	you	need	as	your	firm’s	change	agent?		
	
“make	it	a	focused	or	designated	role	at	my	firm”	
and	
“examples	and	role	models	from	other	firms	who	have	tackled	
all	levels	and	functions	across	multiple	facilities.”	
Waypoint	A	
	
Buyer-side	
interview	
Compromise	
	
“The	 structure	 of	 [firm	 name]	 is	 flat.	 They’re	 nowhere	 near	 the	 size	 of	 a	 corporate	
organisation	…	 don’t	 have	 an	 army	 of	 people	…	 now	 that	 they’ve	 got	 the	 right	 people	
engaged,	I	think	they’re	almost	acquiescence	…	their	issue	is	one	of	IT	capability	…	when	
we	did	the	draft	[digital]	minimum	standards	with	them	last	year	they	were	very	honest	
and	open	about	it,	a	bit	self-deprecating	in	a	way,	but	they	weren’t	scoring	very	highly	and	
they	recognised	that	…	[they]	are	a	very	technologically	driven	company	…	but	that’s	very	
much	on	their	product	development	and	technological	arm,	not	in	the	operational	plants	
…	I	think	we’ve	seen	a	bit	of	compromise.	Because,	again,	it’s	just	limited	points	of	contact	
and	bodies	and	they’ve	got	other	jobs	to	do.	It’s	sort	of	beg,	borrowing,	stealing	time	and	
availability	…	They	don’t	have	the	corporate	infrastructure	to	support	it.”	
	
“I	spent	quite	a	bit	of	time	recently	with	[firm	name]	….	and	their	new	general	manager	
[employee	name]	who	has	a	 [digital]	 background	but	 is	 currently	 struggling	with	 lower	
level	[operational]	issues	…	but	is	keen	to	be	looking	forward	as	well	…	they	don’t	seem	to	
have	a	corporate	strategy	on	how	to	move	forward	so	suspect	a	few	point	trials	might	start	
to	feed	the	desire.”	
Waypoint	B	
	
Supplier-side	
interview	
Aligning	
	
“Being	involved	has	enabled	me	certainly	to	have	dialogue	internally	in	the	company	about	
what	direction	we	should	go	in.	The	company	was	initially	kind	of	overwhelmed	with	the	
number	of	choices.”	
Customising	
	
“We’re	 still	 creating	our	digitisation	 framework.	We’re	 trying	 to	 customise	our	position	
where	possible	to	include	our	customers’	requirements	…	we	remain	quite	agile	and	steer	
digitisation	where	we	think	it	will	give	us	the	biggest	bang-for-the-buck	…	we	can’t	digitise	
everything	…	we	probably	need	to	bring	it	together	through	some	kind	of	plan	specifically	
on	digitisation	and	that	is	the	bit	I	would	suggest	is	probably	lacking	at	the	moment.”	
Understanding	
	
“I’m	not	sure	where	we	really	want	to	go.	I’m	not	sure	whether	we	know.	So,	I	sort	of	see	
us	really	as	just	understanding	what	other	people	are	doing,	which	drew	me	straight	into	
the	benchmarking	element.	And	then	really	from	there,	understanding	what	we’ve	got	and	
what	we	would	need	to	develop	…	we’re	still	looking	to	hire	a	digitisation	expert	or	a	lead	
…	our	intention	is	to	make	sure	as	we	do	develop	our	digitisation	plan	and	approach	that	
we’re	aligned	with	our	key	customers.”	
	
Figure 6.9: Quotes from, or about, Juliet at waypoints on the SD/DT programme   
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6.3 Summary of key implications from this chapter 
This	section	begins	by	comparing	my	results	with	the	research	from	others.	Then,	I	summarise	the	
business	 contribution.	 Finally,	 I	 summarise	 the	 academic	 contribution	 and	 identify	 items	 for	
discussion	in	chapter	7.	
	
6.3.1  Comparing my results with the research from others 
In	section	2.4.1,	I	explain	that	there	is	little	research	on	the	success	of	SD	programmes	for	purposes	
such	as	my	own.	Where	data	is	available,	it	suggests	that	digital	transformation	(or	equivalent)	is	the	
least	influenced.	Furthermore,	scholars	find	one	derivation	of	SD	to	be	unsuccessful	and	to	quickly	
stagnate	(CoI:	section	2.3.2).	Looking	more	broadly,	McKinsey	(2018)	speak	for	many	when	they	find	
repeatedly	through	annual	surveys	that	success	levels	of	no	more	than	30%	are	common	for	large	
scale	organisational	change.	Here,	they	define	success	as	one	that	improves	performance	and	also	
equips	the	firm	to	sustain	these	improvements	over	time.	
	
However,	I	am	wary	of	comparing	my	results	with	others	with	this	regard.	Mine	is	not	the	type	of	
empirical	research	which	seeks	to	generalise	or	draw	statistically	grounded	conclusions.	 Instead,	 I	
will	return	to	the	source	of	my	theoretical	framework	for	Waypoint	B	in	Figure	3.9.	The	framework	
shows	the	sharing	of	best	practice	which,	 in	my	case,	was	achieved	through	the	digital	minimum	
standards.	But,	also	in	their	article	on	the	fusion	between	institutional	and	organisational	learning	
theory,	Chandler	and	Hwang	(2015)	point	to	the	important	role	of	absorptive	capacity.	They	argue	
that	it	demonstrates	“an	ability	to	learn	and	provide	the	freedom	for	organisations	to	cast	a	wide	net	
in	the	search	for	new	ideas	because	they	are	better	placed	to	absorb	the	knowledge	and	transform	
(or	customise)	the	practice	on	arrival	…	In	fact,	those	firms	that	engage	in	the	maximum	amount	of	
learning	and	search	are	likely	to	find	more	unique	and	advantageous	innovations	to	adopt	the	further	
they	venture	from	their	local	environment	and	established	methods	of	operation”.	They	call	for	more	
empirical	 research	 which	 I	 have	 provided	 through	 my	 attempt	 to	 operationalise	 and	 measure	
absorptive	capacity.	I	will	discuss	measurement	bias	and	how	it	might	be	addressed	in	chapter	7.	
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6.3.2 Business contribution 
I	will	keep	this	brief	to	save	repetition	with	section	5.3.2.	That	which	is	better	placed	here,	however,	
is	the	contribution	which	my	research	has	made	to	the	supplier	scorecards	used	by	Rolls-Royce.	Again	
timing	helped.	They	were	due	an	overhaul	and	aspects	other	than	my	own	were	covered.	But,	pace	
and	depth	of	enquiry	can	be	very	different	between	business	and	academia.	I	will	touch	further	on	
this	in	section	7.3.	I	am	certain	that	the	update	of	the	supplier	scorecards	benefited	from	my	research	
and	they	have	embarked	upon	a	radically	different	path	than	would	otherwise	have	been	the	case.		
	
Finally,	 in	terms	of	the	business	contribution,	 I	shall	return	to	the	word	“aligning”.	My	buyer-side	
interviews	prioritised	it	as	the	outcome	which	they	wished	to	see	from	the	SD/DT	programme	and,	
therefore,	 it	 featured	highly	 in	 the	 success	 criteria	 (Figure	 4.7).	My	 supplier-side	 interviews	 then	
selected	it	as	the	most	popular	word	from	thirty-five	in	my	response	framework	(Figure	6.6).	This	
echoes	back	 to	 the	views	of	Krause	and	Handfield	 (1999)	who	remarked	about	SD	that	“the	 final	
objective	 is	to	achieve	a	globally	aligned	supplier	network”.	Yet,	 in	practice,	Krause	and	Handfield	
found	that	“even	the	most	advanced	organisations	interviewed	in	this	study	had	yet	to	achieve	this	
level	of	integration.”	My	research	suggests	that	Rolls-Royce	are	heading	in	the	right	direction.		
	
	
6.3.3 Academic contribution	and items for discussion in Chapter 7 
The	academic	contributions	which	I	have	made	in	chapter	6	can	be	summarised	as:	
	
a) Triangulated	evidence	to	show	that	the	SD/DT	process	can	answer	the	research	question	(i.e.	how	
to	develop	suppliers	within	an	extended	enterprise	towards	a	digital	enterprise)	for	“cases	within	
a	case”	(Gehman	et	al,	2018)	in	the	aerospace	sector.	The	empirical	results	have	shown	that	my	
organisational	 change	 process	 has	 a	 high	 success	 rate	 (18:24	 suppliers)	 together	 with	 high	
potential	(21:24	suppliers)	to	be	operationalised	and	embedded	through	the	supplier	scorecards.	
	
b) Supported	 the	 fusion	 of	 institutional	 and	 organisational	 learning	 theory	 through	 empirical	
research.		Developed	a	response	framework	with	a	rounded	dyad-level	perspective	(Figure	6.6).		
	
c) Advanced	the	operationalisation	and	measurement	of	relative	absorptive	capacity	using	a	novel	
approach,	supplier	scorecards.	Chapters	7	and	8	discuss	measurement	bias	and	further	work.	
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Chapter 7 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Exploring the implications of my results 
and how they were obtained 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Chapters	 1	 and	 2	 set	 the	 scene	 and	 synthesised	 process-steps	 for	 organisational	 change	 from	
literature.	 Chapters	 3	 and	 4	 constructed	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 introduced	 my	 research	
methodology.	 Chapters	 5	 and	 6	 provided	 the	 empirical	 results	which	 show	 that	my	 process	 can	
answer	 the	 research	 question.	 It	 has	 a	 high	 success	 rate	 together	 with	 high	 potential	 to	 be	
operationalised	and	embedded	through	the	supplier	scorecards.	
	
Now,	chapter	7	discusses	the	implications	of	my	results.	This	chapter	is	divided	into	three	sections	
from	7.1	to	7.3.	First,	 likely	sources	of	measurement	bias	 in	the	supplier	scorecards	are	reviewed	
together	 with	 their	 means	 of	 attenuation.	 Second,	 perceived	 attributes	 of	 the	 digital	 minimum	
standards	are	reviewed	and	their	continued	use.	Finally,	my	own	experience	of	work-based	research	
is	discussed.	A	bullet-point	executive	summary	is	given	overleaf	for	those	who	prefer	this	format.	
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Section	7.1:	 Discussion	about	three	sources	of	measurement	bias	
	
• Chapter	6	reveals	potential	 for	supplier	scorecards	to	be	used	to	operationalise	
and	measure	relative	absorptive	capacity;	however,	there	are	3	instances	which	
suggest	the	presence	of	measurement	bias.		
	
• Foxtrot’s	 supplier	 scorecard	 assessment	 may	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 common	
measure	bias.	
	
• Indigo’s	supplier	scorecard	assessment	may	have	been	subject	to	negativity	bias.	
	
• Juliet’s	supplier	scorecard	assessment	may	have	been	subject	to	ambiguity	bias.	
	
• Attenuating	these	sources	of	bias	could	be	pursued	by	training	and	systemising	
the	mundane	transactional	elements	of	the	assessment	process.	
	
Section	7.2:	 Discussion	about	the	digital	minimum	standards	
	
• There	is	reason	to	believe	that	the	digital	minimum	standards	will	continue	to	be	
perceived	positively.	This	conclusion	is	reached	by	assessing	them	against	the	5	
perceived	attributes	of	an	innovation	(Rogers,	2003).	
	
• Concerns	over	awareness	bias,	coupled	with	the	still	early	stage	of	adoption	and	
diffusion,	 result	 in	 the	digital	minimum	standards	 remaining	unchanged	 for	 the	
time-being.	For	2020,	the	focal	firm	focuses	instead	upon	training	and	embedding.	
	
Section	7.3:	 Discussion	about	work-based,	part-time,	research	conducted	by	a	mature	student	
	
• As	 a	 part-time	 student,	 I	 experienced	what	 some	 have	 reported	 as	 a	 sense	 of	
standing	between	two	very	different	worlds	(i.e.	industry	and	academia).	There	is	
a	 different	 pace	 and	 rhythm.	 I	 found	 the	 experience	 to	 be	 very	 enriching	 and	
positive	for	myself	personally	and	also	for	the	success	of	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	
• As	a	mature	student,	I	believed	that	I	had	already	honed	many	skills	after	nearly	
40	years	of	problem	solving	 in	 industry.	However,	 I	benefited	significantly	 from	
taking	time	to	read	more	deeply	around	a	subject,	to	fully	analysis	and	review	data,	
and	most	importantly	to	pause	to	reflect	in	a	more	structured	manner.	
	
• My	advice	for	those	who	follow	is	that	you	have	to	be	prepared	to	“make	the	road	
by	walking”	(Gorinski	and	Ferguson,	1997).	
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7.1 Discussion about three sources of measurement bias 
The	results	in	chapter	6	show	some	potential	for	supplier	scorecards	to	be	used	to	operationalise	and	
measure	relative	absorptive	capacity;	however,	there	are	also	instances	revealed	which	suggest	the	
presence	 of	measurement	 bias.	 The	 sources	 of	 bias	which	 scholars	 have	 previously	 identified	 in	
balanced	scorecards	include:	negativity	(e.g.	Kaplan	et	al,	2012),	ambiguity	(e.g.	Liedtka	et	al,	2008),	
and	common	measure	(e.g.	Lipe	and	Salterio,	2000):		
	
• Negativity	bias	refers	to	situations	where	there	are	equal	measures	of	good	and	bad	present,	but	
the	 psychological	 effects	 of	 the	 bad	 outweigh	 those	 of	 the	 good.	 There	 are	 indications	 that	
negativity	bias	may	be	present	in	the	supplier	scorecard	assessment	for	Indigo	(section	6.2.2).	
	
• Ambiguity	 bias	 occurs	with	 individuals	who	are	 intolerant	of	 ambiguity	 and	 they	discount,	 or	
ignore,	 such	 information	 regardless	 of	 its	 potential	 significance.	 There	 are	 indications	 that	
ambiguity	bias	may	be	present	in	the	supplier	scorecard	assessment	for	Juliet	(section	6.2.3).	
	
• Common	measure	bias	occurs	when	decision-makers	are	unwilling	to	 incorporate	 information	
which	is	less	familiar	to	them,	because	it	requires	greater	cognitive	effort	to	process.	This	may	
result	in	them	reacting	to	lagging	measures	(i.e.	those	for	which	they	are	familiar)	as	opposed	to	
working	pro-actively	through	the	leading	measures	(i.e.	those	for	which	they	are	less	familiar).	
There	 are	 indications	 that	 common	 measure	 bias	 may	 be	 present	 in	 the	 supplier	 scorecard	
assessment	for	Foxtrot	(section	6.2.1).	
	
Balanced	scorecard	assessment	is	recognised	as	a	highly	complex	task.	Hence,	the	topic	of	training	is	
often	raised	in	literature	as	a	primary	means	of	attenuating	bias	(e.g.	Dilla	and	Steinbart,	2005).	The	
training	and	awareness	APP	for	the	digital	minimum	standards	(Figure	5.4)	was	designed	with	the	
intention	of	it	being	intuitive	and	able	to	be	cascaded	to	others	through	a	train-the-trainer	approach	
(buyer-side	and	supplier-side).	Section	7.2	discusses	the	digital	minimum	standards	in	more	detail.	
	
Another	means	of	attenuating	bias	in	balanced	scorecard	assessment	is	effort-related	(e.g.	Libby	et	
al,	2004).	At	present,	the	process	being	followed	is	a	bit	of	a	chore	and	this	was	raised	with	me	on	a	
number	of	occasions.	There	are	plans	to	systemise	it	within	an	eProcurement	digital	tool,	called	DPEX,	
and	this	is	one	of	the	activities	being	pursued	in	2020	by	the	firms	on	the	SD/DT	programme.	
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7.2 Discussion about the digital minimum standards  
Section	5.3.4	introduces	two	items	for	discussion.	Firstly,	whether	potential	adopters	will	continue	
to	have	good	reason	to	perceive	the	digital	minimum	standards	positively.	Secondly,	whether	the	
standard	 should	be	 increased	or	 remain	unchanged	 for	 the	 time-being.	 Furthermore,	 section	7.1	
highlights	the	need	to	discuss	a	third,	and	interrelated	item,	that	of	training.	
	
Diffusion	of	innovation	(DOI)	theory	provides	a	means	by	which	the	first	item	can	be	explored.	In	DOI	
theory,	 Rogers	 (2003)	 lists	 the	 perceived	 attributes	 of	 an	 innovation	 as	 its:	 relative	 advantage,	
compatibility,	complexity,	trialability,	and	observability.	Therefore,	I	shall	review	each	of	these	in	turn	
for	the	digital	minimum	standards:	
	
a) Relative	advantage:	Rogers	defines	this	as	“the	degree	to	which	an	innovation	is	perceived	as	
being	better	than	the	idea	it	supersedes”.	The	quote	from	Delta	about	benchmarking	(Figure	6.5)	
captures	aspects	of	 this	 in	 that	 the	digital	minimum	standards	provide	 them	with	a	means	of	
benchmarking	which	had	not	previously	existed.	They	are	given	free-of-charge	to	all	suppliers	
and,	furthermore,	they	help	them	to	then	make	their	own	assessment	of	the	functionality	and	
economic	profitability	of	different	digital	technologies.	It	is	too	early	to	assess	the	impact	of	the	
digital	minimum	standards	upon	over-adoption	(i.e.	adoption	of	certain	digital	technologies	by	a	
firm	when	independent	experts	feel	they	are	needless	and	should	have	been	rejected).	However,	
there	is	some	evidence	that	discovering	and	prioritisation	is	important	to	the	adopters	(e.g.	Bravo	
in	Figure	6.5).	The	growing	mandate	to	adopt	from	the	focal	firm	is	clearly	prevalent,	although	
there	is	no	evidence	from	any	of	my	interviews	of	social	prestige	having	been	a	factor	in	adoption.	
	
b) Compatibility:	Rogers	defines	this	as	“the	degree	to	which	an	innovation	is	perceived	as	consistent	
with	 the	 existing	 values,	 past	 experiences,	 and	 needs	 of	 potential	 adopters”.	 The	 quote	 from	
Foxtrot	 about	 internalising	 (Figure	 6.7)	 captures	 aspects	 of	 this	 in	 that	 the	 digital	 minimum	
standards	provide	firms	with	an	implementation	framework.	They	were	co-created,	trialled,	and	
refined	with	the	suppliers	on	the	SD/DT	programme.	This	is	likely	to	have	contributed	significantly	
to	their	compatibility.	Nevertheless,	there	is	still	room	for	improvement.	The	quote	about	Indigo’s	
acquiescence	(Figure	6.8)	shows	that	full	support	and	engagement	was	not	always	possible	during	
their	 development.	 But,	 further	 updates	 and	 iterations	of	 the	digital	minimum	 standards	will	
occur	over	the	coming	years	as	part	of	an	ongoing	continuous	improvement	programme.	
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c) Complexity:	Rogers	defines	this	as	“the	degree	to	which	an	innovation	is	perceived	as	relatively	
difficult	 to	understand	and	to	use”.	The	quote	 from	Juliet	about	aligning	 (Figure	6.9)	captures	
aspects	of	 this	 in	 that	 the	digital	minimum	standards	are	used	as	one	of	 the	prime	means	of	
communication.	In	Figure	5.1,	guidelines	5.ii	and	7.ii	give	the	team	mantra	which	was	“working	
together	to	find	our	way	through	the	digital	fog”.	Of	critical	importance	here	is	that	the	digital	
minimum	standards	provide	a	common	vision	and	vocabulary	(guideline	8.i)	which	is	intended	to	
carry	through	all	of	the	organisations	at	firm-level,	dyad-level,	and	network-level.	
	
d) Trialability:	Rogers	defines	this	as	“the	degree	to	which	an	innovation	may	be	experimented	with	
on	 a	 limited	 basis”.	 The	 quotes	 from	 Indigo	 about	 innovating	 (Figure	 6.8)	 and	Quebec	 about	
testing	(Figure	6.5)	capture	many	aspects	of	this.	Also,	in	Figure	5.1,	guideline	7.i	refers	to	the	
concepts	of	sprinting	and	the	minimum	viable	product.	The	training	and	awareness	APP	for	the	
digital	minimum	standards	is	free	to	download	and	is	designed	to	be	easy	to	explore.	
	
e) Observability:	Rogers	defines	this	as	“the	degree	to	which	the	results	of	an	innovation	are	visible	
to	others”.	The	quotes	from	Uniform	about	explaining	(Figure	6.5)	capture	aspects	of	this	in	that	
the	digital	minimum	standards	are	used	as	one	of	the	prime	means	of	communication.	In	Figure	
5.1,	 guidelines	 9.i	 and	 9.ii	 refer	 to	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 digital	minimum	 standards	 into	 the	
overarching	 supplier	 performance	management	 process.	 At	workshop	 20,	 they	were	 used	 to	
showcase	best	practice	and	current	status	to	approximately	100	firms	from	across	the	Extended	
(Digital)	Enterprise.	
	
	
Thus,	there	 is	reason	to	believe	that	the	digital	minimum	standards	will	continue	to	be	perceived	
positively.	Firms	have	not	identified	any	conflict	with	the	requirements	or	activities	from	their	other	
customers.	Moreover,	 a	 few	of	 their	 other	 customers	 have	 recently	 enquired	 (tentatively)	 about	
working	closer	together	on	common	aspects	which	support	their	own	movement	towards	a	Digital	
Enterprise.	The	intent	being	to	benefit	industry	as	a	whole	rather	than	to	provide	any	specific	firm	
with	unique	competitive	advantage.	
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Moving	 next	 to	 the	 second	 item	 for	 discussion.	 Should	 the	 standard	 be	 increased	 or	 remain	
unchanged	for	the	time-being?	 I	 reviewed	this	 in	detail	with	my	steering	group	(section	4.2.1).	 In	
summary,	 the	 decision	 was	 made	 to:	 keep	 it	 unchanged	 for	 2020;	 use	 the	 firms	 on	 the	 SD/DT	
programme	to	investigate	potential	changes	during	2020	for	earliest	implementation	in	2021;	and	
focus	the	remaining	resources	in	2020	upon	upskilling	and	embedding.	
	
A	key	consideration	in	making	the	decision	summarised	above	was	to	respond	to	awareness	bias.	
This	is	another	source	of	bias	in	addition	to	the	three	already	discussed	in	section	7.1.	Awareness	bias	
has	been	found	in	environmental	health	research	when	more	illness	is	misreported	within	proximity	
to	 a	 known	 potential	 hazard	 (Moffatt	 et	 al,	 2000).	 Bias	 can	 arise	 from	 increasing	 knowledge,	
understanding,	 and	 awareness.	 A	 further	 permutation	which	 has	 been	 found	 in	 the	 gas	 process	
industry	is	described	by	Ellis	(2018)	as	the	“watermelon	effect”.	Here,	he	warns	that	bias	can	also	
arise	 from	a	 lack	of	awareness.	He	points	to	the	risk	arising	from	a	superficial	use	of	metrics	and	
dashboards.	 A	 green	 (positive)	 colour	 on	 the	 outside	 which	 is	 poorly	 founded;	 but,	 remains	
unchallenged,	because	it	is	not	highlighting	an	issue	of	concern	on	the	dashboard.	However,	it	masks	
a	red	(negative)	colour	on	the	inside.	This	is	the	true	position,	but	it	can	only	be	revealed	through	
deeper	enquiry	and/or	with	better	training.	
	
Members	of	my	steering	group	had	first-hand	experience	of	awareness	bias	and,	therefore,	argued	
not	to	raise	the	bar	at	present	on	the	digital	minimum	standard.	All	staff	are	yet	to	be	trained	and	
the	baseline	is	only	partially	established	and	embedded.	They	forecast	that	2020	may	see	a	decline	
in	 the	 results	as	awareness	 increases;	however,	 this	 is	 to	be	celebrated	 if	 it	 leads	 to	an	accurate	
reflection	of	reality	which	can	then	be	securely	built	upon.	One	person	reflected	that	awareness	bias	
is	a	long	term	phenomenon:	“The	more	aware	you	become,	the	harder	you	tend	to	mark	yourself.”	
	
This	takes	us	to	the	final	item	of	discussion	for	digital	minimum	standards	which	is	that	of	training.	A	
computer-based	APP	was	used	 for	 their	 launch	 (Figure	5.4);	however,	going	 forward,	more	video	
streaming	from	the	shop	floor	is	envisaged.	The	aim	is	to	stimulate	collective	learning	as	described	
in	section	2.3.1c	with	‘virtual’	communities	of	practice	and	‘chat	rooms’	with	subject	matter	experts.	
A	training	and	support	model	which	is	strongly	aligned	towards	the	principles	of	a	Digital	Enterprise	
(Figure	1.4).	This,	of	course,	is	reliant	upon	a	suitable	business	case.	Gaining	a	better	understanding	
of	the	whole	value	proposition	is	included	in	the	recommendations	for	further	work	in	chapter	8.	
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7.3 Discussion about work-based, part-time, research 
conducted by a mature student 
My	research	was	performed	internationally,	but	organised	and	led	from	the	UK.	I	began	the	research	
against	the	backdrop	of	the	Made	Smarter	Review	(UKG,	2017).	This	argued	that	UK	businesses	were	
facing	a	skills	shortage,	particularly	in	digital	engineering	capabilities,	and	were	being	hindered	by	a	
fragmented	skills	system	and	a	lack	of	systematic	engagement	between	industry	and	academia.	This	
built	upon	the	recommendations	of	the	Dowling	Review	(UKG,	2015)	which	recommended	increasing	
the	permeability	of	the	interface	between	industry	and	academia	in	order	to	promote	stronger	and	
more	effective,	trust-based,	relationships.		
	
Methodological	route	proving	is	listed	in	section	1.5	as	one	of	my	research	objectives	and	I	explain	
my	contribution	in	section	8.3.	According	to	Costley	et	al	(2010),	work-based	research	is	a	relatively	
new	field	of	study	which	 is	still	creating	and	understanding	methodologies.	Furthermore,	my	firm	
kindly	funded	me	to	perform	the	research	as	a	trial	for	part-time,	later	career,	mature	students.	In	
my	submission	for	funding	and	support,	I	argued	that	later	career	workers	are	just	as	motivated	to	
spend	time	and	effort	on	their	own	professional	development	as	younger	workers.	Their	interests	
and	 aspirations,	 rather	 than	 their	 age,	 are	 the	 key	 differentiator	 (Greller,	 2006).	 Also,	 firms	 and	
research	 bodies	 can	 benefit	 by	 drawing	 upon	 the	 talent,	 creativity,	 experience,	 and	 networks	
acquired	by	these	workers	from	their	preceding	industrial	careers.	
	
My	research	was	performed	as	a	part-time	PhD	as	opposed	to	an	EngD	programme.	The	latter	was	
launched	 in	 the	 UK	 in	 1992	 in	 response	 to	 criticism	 that	 the	 traditional	 PhD	 programme	 lacked	
industrial	 relevance	 (Parnaby,	 1990).	 I	 previously	 served	 as	 an	 EngD	 industrial	 supervisor	 and	 I	
subsequently	found	many	similarities	with	my	own	form	of	research.	Kitagawa	(2011)	describes	a	
sense	of	standing	between	two	very	different	worlds	(i.e.	industry	and	academia).	In	his	survey,	one	
EngD	student	commented	“Applying	academic	theory	in	a	business	setting	is	difficult.	You	have	to	
show	immediate	financial	return	or	the	company	is	not	interested.”	Another	added	“It	is	hard	to	keep	
the	academic	and	industrial	needs	balanced.	The	problem	keeps	changing	as	the	company	changes,	
so	it	cannot	readily	be	fully	expressed.”	My	own	experience,	however,	was	overwhelmingly	positive.	
There	certainly	is	a	different	pace	and	rhythm	derived	from	standing	between	the	two	very	different	
worlds.	But,	overall,	I	found	it	to	be	very	enriching	and	positive	for	myself	personally	and	also	for	the	
success	of	the	SD/DT	programme.	
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As	a	mature	student,	I	believed	that	I	had	already	honed	many	skills	after	nearly	40	years	of	problem	
solving	in	industry.	However,	I	benefited	significantly	from	taking	time	to	read	more	deeply	around	
a	 subject,	 to	 fully	 analysis	 and	 review	 data,	 and	most	 importantly	 to	 pause	 to	 reflect	 in	 a	more	
structured	manner.	Many	friends	and	colleagues	have	since	observed	that	my	enquiry	and	thought	
processes	are	now	very	different.	I	searched	for	a	quote	to	symbolise	how	I	have	changed	and	settled	
upon	the	following	from	Easton	(2000).	He	sets	the	benchmark	for	research	into	industrial	networks	
which	 I	 strived	 to	 live	 up	 to:	 “to	 be	 inquisitive,	 to	 look	 for	 the	 roots	 of	 things,	 to	 disentangle	
complexities	and	to	conceptualise	and	reconceptualise,	test	and	retest,	to	be	rigorous	and	creative	
and	above	all	to	seek	for	the	underlying	reality	through	the	thick	veil	which	hides	it.”	
	
But,	I	have	also	grown	to	better	appreciate	that	work-based	research	is	not	for	everyone.	You	must	
be	incredibly	well	organised	and	disciplined.	Bentley	(2012)	sets	a	sombre	tone	in	his	PhD	application	
handbook	by	stating	that	“Most	universities	prefer	not	to	take	on	too	many	part-time	PhD	students	
because	statistically,	the	success	rate	is	very	low.	With	reduced	access	to	the	university	facilities	and	
staff,	distractions	from	work,	and	so	many	years	in	which	to	lose	motivation	and	direction,	most	part-
time	students	give	up	and	never	achieve	their	PhDs.”	
	
Nevertheless,	despite	its	challenges,	my	own	experience	is	such	that	I	prefer	to	pass	on	the	advice	
from	Gorinski	and	Ferguson	(1997)	to	others	considering	this	path.	They	summed	up	action	research	
by	saying	that	you	have	to	be	prepared	to	“make	the	road	by	walking”.	
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Chapter 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Explaining my contribution and 
recommendations for further work 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Chapters	 1	 and	 2	 set	 the	 scene	 and	 synthesised	 process-steps	 for	 organisational	 change	 from	
literature.	 Chapters	 3	 and	 4	 constructed	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 introduced	 my	 research	
methodology.	 Chapters	 5	 and	 6	 provided	 the	 empirical	 results	 and	 showed	 that	my	 process	 can	
answer	the	research	question.	Chapter	7	discussed	the	implications.	
	
Now,	 chapter	 8	 concludes	 with	 an	 overall	 summary	 followed	 by	 a	 description	 of	 my	 research	
contribution	and	recommendations	for	further	work.	I	contribute	to	knowledge	through	my	process	
for	heterogeneous	organisational	change.	Also,	I	make	a	work-based	methodology	contribution. 	
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8.1 Concluding summary 
I	have	answered	 the	 research	question	by	demonstrating	 that	 the	SD/DT	process	can	be	used	 to	
develop	suppliers	within	an	Extended	Enterprise	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	These	heterogeneous	
interfirm	organisational	structures	are	complex.	There	are	aspects	of	wickedness	which	have	to	be	
tackled	through	the	process	of	organisational	change.	The	firms,	and	also	the	digital	technologies,	
are	at	various	states	of	readiness	for	deployment;	but,	change	is	often	needed	in	unison.	Bringing	
them	together	 to	 reach	a	 successful	enterprise-wide	solution	 is	 crucial,	 yet	 firms	may	not	always	
agree	on	even	the	most	basic	of	principles.	There	is	a	dichotomy.	The	ability	of	firms	to	choose	how	
they	respond	to	organisational	change	–	versus	–	the	need	for	sufficient	firms	to	respond	positively	
if	the	collective	vision	of	a	Digital	Enterprise	is	to	be	realised.	
	
The	SD/DT	process	did	not	pre-exist	and,	therefore,	I	created	an	initial	version	by	synthesising	and	
integrating	literature	from	multiple	domains	and	sources.	 I	then	iterated,	refined,	and	recorded	it	
through	a	series	of	action	research	cycles	which	coalesced	around	21	international	workshops	held	
over	a	3-year	period.	 I	ultimately	captured	and	documented	 the	SD/DT	process	using	9	steps,	28	
guidelines,	and	4	categories	of	special	intervention.	I	used	a	steering	group	and	expert	panel	to	guide	
my	research	and	validated	my	final	SD/DT	process	documentation	with	4	other	parties.	
	
I	studied	the	application	and	outcomes	of	the	SD/DT	process	upon	a	diverse	cohort	of	24	firms.	Their	
7	contextual	factors	spanned	those	revealed	by	literature	to	have	most	potential	significance,	such	
as:	their	relative	absorptive	capacity	and	the	link	between	hierarchy	and	causal	power.	I	developed	
a	 novel	 approach	 to	 measure	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 through	 the	 proxy	 of	 their	 supplier	
scorecards.	This	was	the	only	contextual	factor	to	change	over	the	3-year	period	of	my	research	and	
my	novel	approach	allowed	quantitative	data	to	be	gathered	independently.	
	
Using	 institutional	and	organisational	 learning	theory,	 I	set	2	waypoints	to	assess	progress	on	the	
journey	from	an	Extended	Enterprise	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise.	I	conducted	nearly	100	interviews,	
covering	both	sides	of	the	buyer/supplier	dyad,	and	developed	a	response	framework	to	explore	each	
firm’s	purpose	in	being	on	the	SD/DT	programme.	This	deepened	insights,	because	the	terminology	
otherwise	 used	 in	 theory	 held	 negative	 connotations	 in	 a	 business	 setting.	 I	 established	 success	
criteria,	which	were	ratified	by	my	steering	group,	and	used	them	to	assess	the	final	outcome	of	all	
24	firms	in	the	cohort.	My	own	assessment	was	counterchecked	and	agreed	by	another	person.		
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I	found	that	many	firms	had	a	successful	outcome	(18	out	of	24)	and,	therefore,	this	demonstrated	
that	the	SD/DT	process	can	be	used	to	answer	my	research	question.	Also,	in	most	cases	(21	out	of	
24),	 regardless	 of	whether	 the	 firm’s	 outcome	 is	 successful	 or	 not,	 the	 supplier	 scorecards	 and,	
therein,	the	proxy	for	their	relative	absorptive	capacity	predicted	a	consistent	result.	Each	firm	had	
its	own	nuances	and	I	revealed	how	a	web	of	contextual	factors	contributed	to	their	outcome.	But,	
in	most	cases,	the	overall	net	effect	as	it	relates	to	the	SD/DT	programme	was	captured	consistently	
through	their	supplier	scorecards.	
	
This	has	promising	implications	for	the	sustainment	of	the	journey	towards	a	Digital	Enterprise	and	
for	its	incorporation	into	routine	business.	There	are	3	key	parts	to	this	argument.	Firstly,	a	process	
has	been	created	which	has	been	shown	to	have	a	good	success	rate	across	a	diverse	mix	of	firms.	
Secondly,	the	aerospace	sector	which	I	am	researching	is	mature	and	stable.	Hence,	in	most	cases,	
only	1	contextual	factor	of	note	is	likely	to	be	able	to	be	changed	for	firms	in	an	Extended	Enterprise.	
This	is	their	relative	absorptive	capacity.	Thirdly,	a	proxy	for	measuring	this	through	their	supplier	
scorecards	has	been	shown	to	be	effective	in	the	majority	of	cases.	Supplier	scorecards	are	routinely	
used	across	industry	as	part	of	an	overarching	performance	and	relationship	management	process.	
	
Therefore,	I	investigated	the	reasons	why	the	supplier	scorecard	did	not	predict	in	accordance	with	
actual	outcomes	on	3	out	of	24	occasions.	I	refer	to	these	cases	as	those	where	my	results	do	not	
triangulate.	The	firms	in	question	are	Foxtrot,	Indigo,	and	Juliet.	I	characterise	them	as	taker,	giver,	
and	laggard	respectively	to	highlight	their	behavioural	differences.	I	reveal	evidence	which	points	to	
measurement	bias	in	each	of	their	supplier	scorecard	assessments.	I	trace	the	potential	sources	to	
common	cause,	negativity,	and	ambiguity	respectively.	Literature	shows	that	these	sources	of	bias	
may	be	attenuated	by	training	and	the	systemisation/removal	of	mundane	tasks.	Thus,	these	actions	
are	now	being	pursued	as	part	of	the	ongoing	programme	of	work	which	continues	after	my	research.	
	
Also,	during	my	research,	an	instrument	emerged	for	the	sharing	of	best	practice	which	proved	to	be	
pivotal	to	diffusion	and	organisational	adoption.	This	is	in	accordance	with	my	theoretical	framework	
which	 is	 based	 upon	 a	 recent	 fusion	 of	 institutional	 and	 organisational	 learning	 theory.	 The	
instrument	which	emerged	is	called	the	digital	minimum	standards.	There	is	already	some	indication	
of	 diffusion	with	 over	 200	 user	 requests	 to	 the	 training	APP	 after	 only	 7	months	 of	 full	 release;	
however,	it	is	still	very	early	days.		
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 164 - 
Using	diffusion	of	innovation	theory,	I	show	that	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	the	digital	minimum	
standards	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 perceived	 positively.	 Nevertheless,	 some	 broader	 concerns	 over	
awareness	bias	are	raised	by	the	focal	firm	and,	therefore,	their	focus	for	the	time-being	remains	
upon	 training	 and	 embedding	 the	 standard.	 They	 decide	 not	 to	 start	 to	 raise	 the	 requirements	
threshold	for	the	level	of	adoption	by	firms	within	the	Extended	Enterprise	until	at	least	2021.	There	
are	currently	10	 firms	who	report	 that	 they	have	achieved	the	standard,	and	39	 in	 total	who	are	
actively	adopting	them;	but,	not	all	self-assessments	have	yet	been	fully	validated	with	the	focal	firm.	
	
Overall,	my	research	has	had	a	positive	business	impact.	Research	ended	partway	through	the	final	
step	 of	 the	 SD/DT	 process.	 All	 that	 remains	 for	 completion	 is	 the	 longer-term	 embedding	 into	
executive	 systems	and	controls,	 such	as	 the	Quality	 System	at	 the	 focal	 firm.	When	my	 research	
ended,	 the	 project	 portfolio	 was	 healthy	 with	 a	 strong	 gearing	 of	 investment:	 6	 live	 projects,	 3	
completed	projects,	1	cancelled	project,	and	1	new	project	in	the	hopper	ready	to	be	launched.	In	
2019,	 supply	 chain	 readiness	 was	 achieved	 for	 digital	 product	 definition	 across	 Rolls-Royce’s	
aerospace	 product	 base	 and	 they	 won	 a	 top	 industry	 award	 for	 their	 submission	 on	 creating	
collaborative	supply	chains.	In	2020,	there	are	plans	to	launch	another	regional	cluster	group	and	a	
further	cohort	in	a	different	business	sector.	
	
Thus,	a	solid	platform	has	been	established.	However,	3-years	to	get	to	this	stage	is	a	long	gestation	
period	for	business	which	often	requires	quicker	financial	returns.	Furthermore,	it	remains	uncertain	
how	business	value	will	continue	to	be	extracted	and	to	grow.	This	is	an	intriguing	area	for	further	
research.	Organisations	such	as	the	World	Economic	Forum	have	published	estimates	of	significant	
financial	returns	for	Digital	Enterprises,	but	many	key	questions	remain	e.g.	if/how	joint	investment	
should	be	 tackled	at	enterprise-level	 and	 firm-level.	 This	and	other	 recommendations	 for	 further	
work	are	described	in	section	8.4.	
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8.2  Contribution to knowledge 
My	research	sits	within	the	domain	of	organisational	change.	The	supplier	development	for	digital	
transformation	(SD/DT)	process	which	I	have	created	is	original	and	innovative	(e.g.	Figure	2.2;	CAPS,	
2014;	Watts	&	Hahn,	1993).	Furthermore,	agnostic	of	the	topic	undergoing	change,	my	process	 is	
designed	to	tackle	the	impediments	to	organisational	learning	in	heterogeneous	supplier	networks	
which	arise	from	interfirm	competition	and	conflicts	of	 interest	(Lane,	2001).	Thus,	there	are	two	
counts	of	novelty	in	my	contribution	to	knowledge.	
	
The	content,	structure	and	sequencing	of	activities	in	my	process	are	new	and	important.	Previous	
research	was	inconsistent	with	different	steps	taken	in	different	sequences	(Figure	2.2).	I	show	that	
my	process	steps	and	guidelines	can	be	followed	in	practice	to	a	high	level	of	adherence	(Figure	5.6)	
and	that	they	deliver	valuable	results	(Figure	6.1).	Crucially,	my	contribution	builds	and	embeds	the	
process	of	organisational	change	into	routine	business.	This	was	lacking	in	previous	research	(section	
2.2.9),	 but	 is	 essential	 for	 the	 ongoing	 sustainment	 of	 major,	 long	 term,	 change	 programmes.	
Furthermore,	 my	 findings	 have	 extended	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 supplier	 development	
through	the	unique	use	of	 institutional	and	organisational	 learning	theories	for	a	diverse	range	of	
different	(contextual)	firms.	
	
My	process	is	underpinned	by	theory,	but	I	have	had	to	take	theoretical	concepts	and	operationalise	
them.	A	schematic	is	shown	in	Figure	8.1.	The	critical	aspects	which	I	have	woven	into	the	fabric	of	
my	process	are:	the	digital	minimum	standards	for	best-practice	sharing,	and	the	supplier	scorecards	
for	 governance	 via	 the	 proxy	 which	 they	 provide	 for	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity.	 Best-practice	
sharing	 was	 identified	 as	 being	 pivotal	 to	 diffusion	 and	 organisational	 adoption,	 but	 empirical	
evidence	was	lacking	(Chandler	and	Hwang,	2015).	Absorptive	capacity	has	long	been	identified	as	
important	to	interfirm	knowledge	transfer,	but	difficult	to	operationalise	and	measure	(Wijk	et	al,	
2011;	Roberts	et	al,	2012;	and	Lewandowska,	2015).	Also,	through	my	research,	I	have	identified	four	
prime	sources	of	measurement	bias	(i.e.	awareness,	negativity,	ambiguity,	and	common	measure).	I	
have	 explained	 how	 they	 can	 be	 attenuated	 within	 my	 process	 and	 revealed	 insights	 from	
operationalisation	to	feedback	and	inform	theory.		
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Figure 8.1: Schematic of my contribution to knowledge 
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There	 is	 potential	 to	 apply	my	 process	 elsewhere,	 but	 recipients	 should	 follow	 the	 principles	 of	
transferability	(Lincoln	and	Guba,	1985).	My	sending	context	includes:	the	environmental	setting	(i.e.	
aerospace	sector);	organisational	maturity	(i.e.	interfirm	experience	within	an	Extended	Enterprise);	
governance	 framework	 (i.e.	 pre-existing	balanced	 scorecards);	 and	 the	 technology	 era	 (i.e.	 up	 to	
2020).	A	representative	from	another	focal	firm	in	the	aerospace	sector	observed	workshop	13	(see	
Figure	4.3)	and	has	kindly	agreed	to	be	cited	in	my	thesis:	Colin	Scouller,	Digital	Technical	Lead,	Thales	
Land	and	Air	Systems.	His	feedback	on	my	process	was:	“I	think	it’s	really	good	and	it	can	be	scaled.	
You’re	not	going	to	get	much	of	a	bigger	scale	than	yourselves	[Rolls-Royce],	but	you	can	scale	down	
to	 the	 likes	 of	 ourselves	 [Thales].	 We	 would	 definitely	 be	 able	 to	 apply	 it.”	 Further	 research	 is	
recommended	in	section	8.4	to	explore	the	impact	upon	my	process	when	moving	even	further	away	
from	the	baseline	established	by	my	research.	
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8.3 Methodological contribution 
Section	8.2	describes	the	contribution	to	knowledge	which	I	have	made	against	most	of	my	objectives	
and	the	primary	research	aim	(section	1.5).	This	section	now	moves	onto	my	final	research	objective	
which	 is	 to	 also	 make	 a	 methodological	 contribution.	 I	 have	 developed	 a	 novel	 approach	 to	
conducting	work-based	research	(Costley	et	al,	2010).	Here,	the	dichotomy	which	I	have	successfully	
addressed	is	between:	(a)	gaining	sufficient	access	to	be	able	to	study	highly	commercially-sensitive	
phenomenon	over	a	long	period	of	time,	and	(b)	being	objective	and	not	introducing	researcher	bias.	
	
Whilst	completing	this	section,	I	made	enquiries	within	Rolls-Royce	in	order	to	establish	the	latest	
company	position	on	my	domain	of	research.	Third	parties	are	rarely	given	full	access.	Accordingly,	
they	 only	 foresaw	 circumstances	 where	 such	 research	 was	 performed	 by	 senior,	 and/or	 high	
potential,	employees.	Thus,	confirmation	that	the	dichotomy	continues.	Furthermore,	it	was	made	
clear	 to	 me	 that	 prerequisites	 would	 apply	 for	 any	 employee	 being	 paid	 their	 normal	 salary	 to	
perform	this	research.	In	most	cases,	the	methodology	would	be	expected	to	be	interventionist	and	
not	 observer.	 A	 research	 group	 could	 be	 assembled	 to	 bring	 together	 a	 range	 of	 skills	 and	
perspectives	 under	 the	 framework	 of	 a	 non-disclosure	 agreement.	 However,	 this	would	 become	
more	expensive	 and	would	 also	 introduce	 its	 own	 challenges	 such	 as	maintaining	 alignment	 and	
controlling	access.	
	
Having	identified	the	dichotomy	early	in	my	methodological	design,	I	thoroughly	explored	the	nature	
and	 implications	 of	 positionality.	 I	 found	 the	 continuum	 from	 Herr	 and	 Anderson	 (2015)	 to	 be	
particularly	helpful.	It	was	from	this	that	I	developed	my	own	concept	of	non-uniform	positionality.	
My	interactions	with	those	being	researched	needed	to	allow	for	the	important	differences	in	my	
insider/outsider	 paradigm.	 Within	 Rolls-Royce,	 for	 example,	 my	 position	 in	 global	 headquarters	
caused	me	 to	 be	 viewed	by	 those	 in	 the	 regional	 teams	 as	 an	 outsider.	 Beyond	Rolls-Royce,	my	
position	in	the	focal	firm	posed	other	risks	of	bias	which	I	also	had	to	mitigate.	I	took	to	keeping	track	
of	it	in	my	field	notes	and	journal.	Alongside	the	date	and	title	of	each	entry,	I	would	pause	to	describe	
my	 positionality	 ahead	 of	 any	 research	 interactions.	 This	 maintained	 my	 guard	 even	 when	
circumstances	appeared	entirely	innocuous.	Deeper	reflection	was	also	essential	which	I	achieved	
through	my	steering	group	and	expert	panel	(section	4.2).	Arranging	action	research	cycles	around	
workshops	was	invaluable.	It	gave	structure	and	purpose	to	our	discussions:	my	findings	and	personal	
reflection,	followed	by	independent	feedback	and	reflections,	then	key	actions	and	next	workshops.		
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Finally,	my	interview	response	framework	also	makes	a	methodological	contribution	by	virtue	of	how	
it	was	able	to	be	constructed	and	then	applied	seamlessly	as	a	result	of	my	rare	positionality.	The	
framework	is	repeated	below	for	ease	of	reference	as	Figure	8.2.		
	
	 What	is	your	firms	purpose	in	being	on	the	SD/DT	programme?	
Group	A	 Acquiescing	 Aligning	 Complying	 Integrating	 Sponsoring	
Group	B	 Avoiding	 Buffering	 Deferring	 Observing	 Waiting	
Group	C	 Balancing	 Compromising	 Customising	 Internalising	 Translating	
Group	D	 Benchmarking	 Developing	 Discovering	 Learning	 Understanding	
Group	E	 Challenging	 Defying	 Deviating	 Resisting	 Testing	
Group	F	 Contributing	 Explaining	 Sharing	 Reciprocating	 Teaching	
Group	G	 Controlling	 Influencing	 Innovating	 Manipulating	 Steering	
	
Figure 8.2: Response framework used for supplier-side interviews (Waypoint B) 
(repeat	of	Figure	4.6	for	ease	of	reference)	
	
My	interview	response	framework	is	a	further	example	of	how	I	operationalised	a	theoretical	concept	
in	order	to	apply	and	use	it	during	my	research.	I	found	during	my	buyer-side	interviews	that	the	5	
classic	words	from	institutional	theory	(Oliver,	1991),	which	are	highlighted	in	bold	in	Figure	8.2,	had	
negative	connotations	in	a	business	setting.	Therefore,	I	collected	other	words	which	the	buyers	used	
when	discussing	around	the	5	classic	words	and,	 for	 the	supplier-side	 interviews,	placed	them	all	
alongside	each	other	in	a	row	in	neutral	alphabetical	order	as	shown	in	Figure	8.2.	Also,	I	added	new	
rows	of	words	for	any	new	themes	which	were	raised	by	the	buyers	(i.e.	Groups	D	and	F).		
	
Using	the	response	framework	helped	to	facilitate	my	interviews	and	to	gather	rich	data	from	the	
suppliers.	This	is	illustrated,	for	example,	by	the	comments	from	Quebec	in	Figure	6.5	about	“testing”	
which	is	the	final	word	in	Group	E	in	Figure	8.2.	For	the	interviewee	to	first	broach,	and	then	expand,	
upon	a	potentially	sensitive	subject,	such	as	this,	may	have	otherwise	been	more	difficult/unlikely.	
	
In	 conclusion,	 work-based	 action	 research	 allowed	 me	 to	 study	 highly	 commercially-sensitive	
material	and	to	gain	deep	insights	into	organisational	change	over	an	extended	period	of	time.	As	an	
“insider”,	I	succeeded	in	addressing	the	risk	of	researcher	bias.	It	would	have	been	impossible	for	an	
“outsider”	to	have	conducted	the	research.	Different	approaches	and	perspectives	provide	us	with	a	
wealth	of	knowledge.	My	own	helps	to	complement	the	weave.		
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8.4 Recommendations for further work 
Three	directions	for	further	work	are	outlined	below	together	with	a	postscript	to	reflect	upon	the	
COVID-19	pandemic.	
	
a) Long-term	embedding	of	organisational	change:	Scholars	who	studied	the	move	from	traditional	
supply	chains	to	extended	enterprises	returned	to	review	progress	over	a	decade	later	(Davis	and	
Spekman,	2004;	Spekman	and	Davis,	2016).	Organisational	change,	of	the	magnitude	which	I	have	
described	in	Figure	1.4,	takes	considerable	time	to	settle	and	evolve.	Thus,	as	a	consequence	of	
my	research,	 I	recommend	a	long-term	longitudinal	study	into	the	move	to	Digital	Enterprises	
over	a	timeframe	of	at	least	double	my	own.	Consideration	should	be	given	to	the	research	being	
performed	by	an	early	career,	high	potential,	employee	to	resolve	the	dichotomy	described	in	
section	8.3.	This	would	provide	a	different,	but	complementary,	perspective	to	my	own.	During	
such	 a	 study,	 one	 would	 expect	 to	 see	 significant	 advances	 in	 the	 functionality	 and	
standardisation	of	digital	technology.	Also,	other	case	studies	could	be	gathered	to	research	the	
long-term	embedding	of	Digital	Enterprises	across	one,	or	more,	industrial	sectors.		
	
b) In-depth	evaluation	of	the	business	value	proposition:	During	my	research,	whilst	developing	a	
process	for	major	organisational	change,	it	became	clear	that	there	is	scope	for	further	research	
into	the	financing	and	extraction	of	value	from	heterogeneous	changes	of	this	complexity.	There	
is	a	cost/benefit	to	any	change.	My	research	revealed	signs	that	business	cases	are	sought	to	be	
constructed	and	explained	in	new	and	innovative	ways	for	Digital	Enterprises.	For	example,	one	
product-centric	(traditional)	firm	enquired	about	making	an	investment	in	return	for	access	to	
digital	data	over	the	product	lifecycle.	The	response,	from	both	sides,	indicated	research	gaps	in	
how	to	evaluate,	optimise,	risk	assess,	and	expand	to	compare	this	with	other	options.	Levels	of	
analysis	to	be	studied	include	firm,	dyad,	enterprise,	and	government.		
	
c) Transferability	 to	 different	 industrial	 sectors	 and/or	 types	 of	 organisational	 change:	 My	
organisational	change	process	has	been	shown	to	be	transferable	within	the	aerospace	sector	for	
the	purposes	of	digital	transformation	(section	8.2).	However,	it	may	become	more	stretched	and	
challenged	further	away	from	its	foundational	base.	Research	could,	therefore,	study	its	use	and	
application	in	different	industrial	sectors	(e.g.	construction,	retail,	etc.)	and/or	for	different	types	
of	organisational	change	(e.g.	servitisation,	sustainability,	etc.).		
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Postscript:	In	the	opening	address	at	workshop	21,	which	concluded	the	fieldwork	for	my	research,	
the	Chief	Executive	of	the	host	firm	requested	that	participants	did	not	shake-hands	in	response	to	
the	 emerging	 news	 about	 the	 COVID-19	 pandemic.	 We	 were	 a	 large	 and	 diverse	 international	
gathering	who	all	looked	at	him	with	concern	and	amazement.	In	the	weeks	that	followed	we	moved	
to	social	distancing	and	major	lockdown.	Many	lives	have	sadly	been	lost.	
	
My	 research	 is	about	major	organisational	 change,	however,	 it	was	performed	at	a	 time	without	
disruption	to	the	global	steady-state	as	has	been	caused	by	COVID-19.	Nevertheless,	what	is	the	role	
of	digital	technology	in	responding	to	the	crisis	and	does	this	make	the	move	to	a	Digital	Enterprise	
more,	or	less,	likely?	After	a	short	period	of	industrial	regrouping,	my	conjecture	is	that	the	pace	of	
adoption	will	increase.	Demand,	I	suggest,	will	grow	from	both	firms	and	their	employees.	
	
My	conjecture	that	employees	will	 increase	their	demand	for	digital	 technologies	stems	from	the	
step-change	which	has	been	enforced	 in	how	we	work.	 In	my	own	firm,	for	example,	the	remote	
working	services	are	now	much	simpler	and	more	efficient.	COVID-19	drove	a	concentration	of	effort	
and	purpose	to	get	long-standing	issues	resolved.	Employee	expectations	and	working	patterns	have	
now	been	changed.	In	my	opinion,	irreversibly.	Employees	will	not	wish	to	return	to	old	inefficient	
ways	of	working.	Also,	they	will	grasp	the	opportunity	to	rally	and	to	cross	the	digital	divide	which	
has	 previously	 slowed	 the	pace	of	 change	 in	 the	 aerospace	 sector.	My	 argument	 is	 not	 that	 the	
challenges	of	cyber-security	and	digital	non-interoperability	will	simply	go	away,	but	rather	that	the	
impetus	and	forces	to	fix	them	will	grow:	root	and	branch.	
	
My	conjecture	that	firms	will	increase	their	demand	for	digital	technologies	stems	from	their	basic	
quest	for	survival.	COVID-19	has	dramatically	impacted	business,	few	if	any	planned	for	anything	like	
it,	 therefore	 the	 crisis	 will	 drive	 change	 and	 be	 a	 catalyst	 for	 innovation.	 Deming	 (1982)	 offers	
parallels	from	far	more	gradual	and	orderly	times	when	he	describes	“an	awakening	to	the	crisis,	
followed	by	action”.	By	comparison,	the	forthcoming	period	of	change	is	likely	to	be	swift	and	chaotic;	
but,	 I	 look	here	towards	concepts	such	as	agility,	digital	sprints,	and	the	minimum	viable	product	
(Figure	5.1	guideline	7.i).	Furthermore,	organisational	structures	such	as	the	Digital	Enterprise	may	
provide	new	solutions	to	how	collective	groups	of	firms,	perhaps	facilitated	by	their	governments,	
respond	to	COVID-19	to	successfully	balance	both	cooperation	and	competition.	This	arrangement	is	
known	as	co-opetition	(Brandenburger	and	Nalebuff,	1996).	And	with	that,	speculating	about	future	
interfirm	alliances	and	rivalry	feels	like	a	fitting	point	to	end	my	thesis	on	organisational	change!		
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 172 - 
This	page	is	intentionally	blank 	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 173 - 
Bibliography 
 
  
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 174 - 
A&DPLMAG,	(2014).	Aerospace	and	Defence	PLM	Action	Group.	CIMdata,	Inc.	Available	on-line	and	
accessed	on	1st	May	2020:	https://www.cimdata.com/en/memberships/aerospace-defense-plm-action-group	
	
Acosta	P,	Acquier	A,	and	Delbard	O,	(2014).	“Just	do	it?	The	adoption	of	sustainable	supply	chain	
management	programs	from	a	supplier	perspective.”	Supply	Chain	Forum,	Vol.	15,	No.	1,	pp.	76-91.	
	
AESQ,	 (2015).	 Aerospace	 Engine	 Supplier	 Quality.	 Strategy	 Group,	 SAE	 Industry	 Technologies	
Consortia.	Available	on-line	and	accessed	on	1st	May	2020:	https://aesq.sae-itc.com	
	
Ahmed	M,	and	Hendry	L,	(2012).	“Supplier	development	literature	review	and	key	future	research	
areas.”	International	Journal	of	Engineering	and	Technology	Innovation,	Vol.	2,	No.	4,	pp.	293-303.	
	
Aitken	J	M,	(1998).	Supply	chain	integration	within	the	context	of	a	Supplier	Association:	Case	studies	
of	four	Supplier	Associations.	PhD	thesis,	Cranfield	University	School	of	Management.	
	
Alfalla-Luque	R,	Medina-Lopez	C,	and	Dey	P	K,	(2013).	“Supply	chain	 integration	framework	using	
literature	review.”	Production	Planning	and	Control,	Vol.	24,	No.	8–9,	pp.	800–817.		
	
Amin	 A,	 and	Thrift	N,	 (1994).	 “Living	 in	 the	 global.”	 In:	Amin	A	 and	Thrift	N	 (Eds).	Globalisation,	
institutions,	and	regional	development	in	Europe.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Anderssen	E	S,	and	Jessen	S	A,	(2003).	“Project	maturity	in	organisations.”	International	Journal	of	
Project	Management,	Vol.	21,	No.	6,	pp.	457-461.	
	
Andrews	D,	Nicoletti	G,	and	Timiliotis	C,	(2018).	Digital	technology	diffusion:	A	matter	of	capabilities,	
incentives	or	both?	OECD	Economics	Department	Working	Paper	No.	1476.	OECD	Publishing,	Paris.	
	
Aoki	K,	and	Lennerfors	T	T,	(2013).	“The	new,	improved	Keiretsu.”	Harvard	Business	Review,	Vol.	91,	
Iss.	9,	pp.	109-113.		
	
Argote	L,	(1999).	Organisational	learning:	Creating,	retaining,	and	transforming	knowledge.	Springer.	
	
Argyris	 C,	 and	 Schon	 D	 A,	 (1978).	 Organisational	 learning:	 A	 theory	 of	 action	 perspective.											
Addison-Wesley.	
	
Arroyo-Lopez	P,	Holmen	E,	and	Boer	L	de,	(2012).	“How	do	supplier	development	programs	affect	
suppliers?”	Business	Process	Management	Journal,	Vol.	18,	No.	4,	pp.	680-707.	
	
Arumugam	V	C,	Derakhshan	A,	and	Boon	O	H,	 (2011).	 “Implementation	of	 supplier	development	
activities	 in	manufacturing	 organization:	 A	 review	 of	 literature.”	 European	 Journal	 of	 Economics,	
Finance	and	Administrative	Sciences,	Vol.	16,	No.	43,	pp.35–43.	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 175 - 
Asheim	 B,	 (2000).	 “Industrial	 districts:	 The	 contributions	 of	 Marshall	 and	 beyond.”	 In:	 Clark	 G,	
Feldman	M	&	Gertlen	M	(Eds).	The	oxford	handbook	of	economic	geography.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
ATI,	(2017).	Insight	into	Digital	Transformation.	Aerospace	and	Technology	Institute.	Available	on-
line	and	accessed	on	1st	May	2020:	https://www.ati.org.uk/media/f41fb3nc/ati-insight-01-digital-transformation.pdf	
	
Attewell	 P,	 (1992).	 “Technology	 diffusion	 and	 organisational	 learning:	 The	 case	 of	 business	
computing.”	Organisation	Science,	Vol.	3,	No.	1,	pp.	1-19.	
	
Auguste	J,	(2013).	“Applying	Kotter’s	8-step	process	for	leading	change	to	the	Digital	Transformation	
of	an	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	group.”	Journal	of	Health	and	Medical	Informatics,	Vol.	4,	Iss.	3.	
	
Aune	T,	Holmen	E,	Pedersen	A-C,	(2013).	“Beyond	dyadic	supplier	development	efforts:	The	multiple	
roles	of	the	network	in	bringing	about	supplier	development.”	IMP	Journal,	Vol.	7,	Iss.	1,	pp.	91-105.	
	
Balland	P,	Boschma	R,	and	Frenken	K,	(2015).	“Proximity	and	innovation:	From	statics	to	dynamics.”	
Regional	Studies,	Vol.	49,	Iss.	6,	pp.	907–920.	
	
Baruch	 Y,	 and	 Holtom	 B	 C,	 (2008).	 “Survey	 response	 rate	 levels	 and	 trends	 in	 organisational	
research.”	Journal	of	Human	Relation,	Vol.	61,	No.	8,	pp.	1139-1160.	
	
Bartunek	 J	M,	 Crosta	 T	 E,	 Dame	R	 F,	 and	 LeLacheur	D	 F,	 (2000).	 “Managers	 and	 project	 leaders	
conducting	 their	 own	 action	 research	 interventions.”	 In:	 Golembiewski	 R	 T	 (Ed).	 Handbook	 of	
organisational	consultation.	2nd	Edition.	Marcel	Dekker	Inc.	
	
Baskerville	 R,	 and	Myers	M	D,	 (2004).	 “Action	 research	 in	 information	 systems.”	MIS	Quarterly,							
Vol.	28,	No.	3,	pp.	329-335.	
	
Baskerville	R,	and	Wood-Harper	T,	(1996).	“A	critical	perspective	on	action	research	as	a	method	for	
information	systems	research.”	Journal	of	Information	Technology,	Vol.	11,	pp.	235–246.	
	
Bateson	G,	(1972).	“The	logical	categories	of	learning	and	communication.”	In:	Bateson	G	(Ed).	Steps	
to	an	ecology	of	mind:	Collected	essays	in	anthropology,	psychiatry	and	epistemology.	Paladin.	
	
BCG,	 (2017).	 When	 lean	 meets	 Industry	 4.0:	 The	 next	 level	 of	 operational	 excellence.	 Boston	
Consulting	 Group.	 Available	 on-line	 and	 accessed	 on	 1st	 May	 2020:	 https://www.bcg.com/en-
gb/publications/2017/lean-meets-industry-4.0.aspx	
	
Beckhard	R,	(1997).	Agent	of	change:	My	life,	my	work.	Jossey-Bass.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 176 - 
Beckhard	 R,	 and	 Harris	 R	 T,	 (1987).	 Organisational	 transitions:	 Managing	 complex	 change.	 2nd	
Edition.	Addison-Wesley.	
	
Behrans	R	D,	(2008).	“Boeing	supplier	strategy	and	lean.”	Presented	at:	ISM	93rd	Annual	International	
Supply	Management	Conference.	May	2008,	St	Louis,	USA.	
	
Bentley	P	J,	(2012).	The	PhD	application	handbook.	Revised	edition.	Open	University	Press.	
	
Bessant	J,	(1988).	“Pushing	boxes	or	solving	problems:	Some	marketing	issues	in	the	diffusion	of	the	
CIM	innovation.”	Journal	of	Marketing	Management,	Vol.	3,	Iss.	3,	pp.	352-371.	
	
Bessant	J,	(2004).	“Supply	chain	learning.”	In:	New	S,	and	Westbroke	R	(Eds).	Understanding	supply	
chains.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Bessant	J,	Kaplinsky	R,	Ross	A,	Vaughan	R,	and	Lamming	R,	(1999).	Using	supply	chains	to	transfer	
learning	about	best	practice.	Final	report	to	the	UK	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry.	
	
Bhakoo	V,	 and	Choi	T,	 (2013).	 “The	 iron	 cage	exposed:	 Institutional	pressures	and	heterogeneity	
across	the	healthcare	supply	chain.”	Journal	of	Operations	Management,	Vol.	31,	Iss.	6,	pp.	432-449.	
	
Blaikie	N,	and	Priest	J,	(2017).	Social	research:	paradigms	in	action.	Polity	Press.	
	
Boardman	 J	 T,	 and	 Clegg	 B	 T,	 (2001).	 “Structured	 engagement	 in	 the	 extended	 enterprise.”	
International	Journal	of	Operations	and	Production	Management,	Vol.	21,	No.	5/6,	pp.	795–811.	
	
Bokinge	M,	and	Malmqvist	J,	(2012).	“PLM	implementation	guidelines	–	relevance	and	application	in	
practice.”	International	Journal	of	Product	Lifecycle	Management,	Vol.	6,	No.	1,	pp.	79-98.	
	
Bohorquez	Lopez	V	W,	(2018).	“Beyond	knowledge	integration	barriers	in	ERP	implementations:	An	
institutional	approach.”	Journal	of	Information	and	Organizational	Sciences,	Vol.	42,	pp.	159-178.		
	
Boyce	 G	 H,	 (2001).	 Co-operative	 structures	 in	 global	 business:	 Communicating,	 transferring	
knowledge	and	learning	across	the	corporate	frontier.	Routledge.	
	
Brandenburger	A	M,	and	Nalebuff	B	J,	(1996).	Co-opetition.	Doubleday,	New	York.	
	
Brettel	M,	Friederichsen	N,	Keller	M,	and	Rosenberg	M,	(2014).	“How	virtualization,	decentralization	
and	 network	 building	 change	 the	 manufacturing	 landscape:	 An	 Industry	 4.0	 perspective.”	
International	Journal	of	Information	and	Communication	Engineering,	Vol.	8,	No.	1,	pp.	37-44.	
	
BSI,	(2019).	Digital	readiness:	Adopting	digital	technologies	in	manufacturing.		British	Std.	PAS1040.	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 177 - 
Busse	 C,	 Kach	 A	 P,	 and	 Bode	 C,	 (2016).	 “Sustainability	 and	 the	 false	 sense	 of	 legitimacy:	 How	
institutional	distance	augments	risk.”	Journal	of	Business	Logistics,	Vol.	37,	Iss.	4,	pp.	312-328.	
	
Buyukozkan	 G,	 and	 Gocer	 F,	 (2018).	 “Digital	 supply	 chain:	 Literature	 review	 and	 a	 proposed	
framework	for	future	research.”	Computers	in	Industry,	Vol.	97,	pp.	157-177.	
	
Cagliano	R,	(2000).	“Integration	mechanisms	of	inter-company	processes.”	Presented	at:	1st	World	
Conference	of	Production	and	Operations	Management	Society	(POMS).	Sept	2000,	Seville,	Spain.	
	
Cagliano	R,	Caniato	F,	Corso	M,	and	Spina	G,	(2002).	“Collaborative	improvement	in	the	extended	
manufacturing	enterprise:	Some	empirical	evidence	and	a	preliminary	business	model.”	Presented	
at:	Annual	Conference	of	Production	and	Operations	Management	Society.	April	2002,	San	Francisco.	
	
Cagliano	R,	Caniato	F,	Corso	M,	and	Spina	G,	(2005).	“Collaborative	improvement	in	the	extended	
manufacturing	enterprise:	Lessons	from	an	action	research	process.”	Journal	of	Production	Planning	
and	Control,	Vol.	16,	No.4,	pp.	345-355.	
	
Camagni	 R,	 (1991).	 “Local	milieu,	 uncertainty	 and	 innovation	 networks:	 Towards	 a	 new	dynamic	
theory	of	economic	space.”	In:	Camagni	R	(Ed).	Innovation	networks:	Spatial	perspectives.	Belhaven.	
	
Camillus	J	C,	(2008).	“Strategy	as	a	wicked	problem.”	Harvard	Business	Review.	May	2008.	
	
CAPS,	 (2014).	 Strategic	 supplier	 development	 programs	 and	 activities.	 Centre	 for	 Advanced	
Purchasing	 Studies,	 Arizona	 State	 University.	 Available	 on-line	 and	 accessed	 on	 1st	 May	 2020:		
https://www.capsresearch.org/research/	
	
Chandler	 D,	 and	 Hwang	 H,	 (2015).	 “Learning	 from	 learning	 theory:	 A	 model	 of	 organizational	
adoption	 strategies	 at	 the	 micro-foundations	 of	 institutional	 theory.”	 Journal	 of	 Management,								
Vol.	41,	No.	5,	pp.	1446-1476.	
	
Child	J,	(2001).	“Learning	through	strategic	alliances.”	In:	Dierkes	M,	Antal	A,	Child	J,	and	Nonaka	I	
(Eds).	Handbook	of	organisational	learning	and	knowledge.	Oxford	University	Press.		
	
Chisholm	 R	 F,	 (1998).	 Developing	 network	 organisations:	 Learning	 from	 theory	 and	 practice.			
Addison-Wesley.	
	
Chisholm	R	F,	(2000).	“Using	large	system	designs	and	action	research	to	develop	inter-organisational	
networks.”	In:	Golembiewski	R	T	(Ed).	Handbook	of	organisational	consultation.	2nd	Edition.	Marcel	
Dekker	Inc.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 178 - 
Christensen	C	M,	Wang	D,	and	Bever	van	D,	(2013).	“Consulting	on	the	cusp	of	disruption.”	Harvard	
Business	Review,	October	2013.		
	
CIPS,	 (2019).	Excellence	 in	 procurement	 awards.	 Chartered	 Institute	 of	 Procurement	 and	 Supply.	
Available	on-line	and	accessed	on	1st	May	2020:	https://www.cipssmawards.com/2019-winners/	
	
Coghlan	D,	and	Brannick	T,	(2014).	Doing	action	research	in	your	own	organisation.	4th	Edition.	Sage.	
	
Coghlan	D,	and	Coughlan	P,	(2008).	“Action	learning	and	action	research	(ALAR):	A	methodological	
integration	in	inter-organisational	setting.”	Systemic	Practice	&	Action	Research,	Vol.	21,	pp.	97-104.	
	
Cohen	 W,	 and	 Levinthal	 D,	 (1990).	 “Absorptive	 capacity:	 A	 new	 perspective	 on	 learning	 and	
innovation.”	Administrative	Science	Quarterly,	Vol.	35,	Iss.	1,	pp.	128-152.	
	
Collis	D	 J,	 (1994).	 “How	valuable	are	organisational	 capabilities?”	Strategic	Management	 Journal,		
Vol.	15,	No.	8,	pp.	143-152.	
	
Cooper	 R	 B,	 and	 Zmud	 R	 W	 (1990).	 “Information	 technology	 implementation	 research:	 A	
technological	diffusion	approach.”	Management	Science,	Vol.	36,	pp.	123-139.	
	
Costley	C,	Elliott	G,	and	Gibbs	P,	(2010).	Doing	work	based	research.	Sage	Publishing.	
	
Coughlan	 P,	 and	Coghlan	D,	 (2002).	 “Action	 research	 for	 operations	management.”	 International	
Journal	of	Operations	and	Production	Management,	Vol.	22,	No.	2,	pp.	220-240.	
	
Coughlan	 P,	 and	Coghlan	D,	 (2016).	 “Action	 research.”	 In:	 Karlsson	C	 (Ed).	Research	methods	 for	
operations	management.	2nd	Edition.	Routledge.		
	
Cox	A,	(2014).	Sourcing	portfolio	analysis.	Earlsgate	Press.	
	
Cox	 A,	 Lonsdale	 C,	 Sanderson	 J,	 and	 Watson	 G,	 (2004).	 Business	 relationships	 for	 competitive	
advantage:	Managing	alignment	and	misalignment	in	buyer	and	supplier	transactions.	Palgrave.	
	
Cropper	 S,	 and	 Palmer	 I,	 (2008).	 “Change,	 dynamics,	 and	 temporality	 in	 inter-organisational	
relationships.”	In:	Cropper	S,	Ebers	M,	Huxham	C,	and	Smith	Ring	P	(Eds).	The	oxford	handbook	of	
inter-organisational	relationships.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Cross	R,	and	Israelit	S,	(2000).	Strategic	learning	in	a	knowledge	economy:	Individual,	collective,	and	
organisational	learning	process.	Butterworth-Heinemann.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 179 - 
Currie	W	I,	(2011).	“Institutional	theory	of	information	technology.”	In:	Gallier	R	D,	and	Currie	W	I	
(Eds).	 The	 oxford	 handbook	 of	 management	 information	 systems:	 Critical	 perspectives	 and	 new	
directions.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Dallasega	P,	Rauch	E,	and	Linder	C,	(2018).	“Industry	4.0	as	an	enabler	of	proximity	for	construction	
supply	chains:	A	systematic	literature	review.”	Computers	in	Industry,	Vol.	99,	pp.	205-225.	
	
Davis	 E	 W,	 and	 Spekman	 R	 E,	 (2004).	 The	 extended	 enterprise:	 Gaining	 competitive	 advantage	
through	collaborative	supply	chains.	Prentice	Hall.	
	
Dayal	V,	(2016).	Questions.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Deming	W	E,	(1986).	Out	of	the	crisis.	MIT	Press.	
	
Dilla	W	N,	and	Steinbart	P	J,	(2005).	“The	effects	of	alternative	supplementary	display	formats	on	
balanced	scorecard	judgments.”	Journal	of	Accounting	Information	Systems,	Vol.6,	No.3,	pp.159-176.	
	
DiMaggio	 P	 J,	 and	 Powell	W	W,	 (1983).	 “The	 iron	 cage	 revisited:	 Institutional	 isomorphism	 and	
collective	rationality	in	organisational	fields.”	American	Sociological	Review,	Vol.	48,	pp.	147-160.	
	
DoD,	(2018).	Digital	Engineering	Strategy.	US	Department	of	Defense.	Available	on-line	and	accessed	
on	1st	May	2020:	https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1567723/the-department-of-defense-announces-its-digital-engineering-strategy/	
	
Dong	 M	 C,	 Fang	 Y,	 and	 Straub	 D	 W,	 (2017).	 “The	 impact	 of	 institutional	 distance	 on	 the	 joint	
performance	of	collaborating	firms.”	Information	Systems	Research,	Vol.	28,	Iss.	2,	pp.	309-331.		
	
Dyer	J	H	(1996).	“How	Chrysler	created	an	American	Keiretsu.”	Harvard	Business	Review,	July-August.	
	
Dyer	J	H,	(2000).	Collaborative	advantage:	Winning	through	extended	enterprise	supplier	networks.	
Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Dyer	 J	H,	and	Nobeoka	K,	(2000).	“Creating	and	managing	a	high	performance	knowledge-sharing	
network:	The	Toyota	case.”	Strategic	Management	Journal,	Vol.	21,	pp.	345-367.	
	
Easterby-Smith	M,	Lyles	M	A,	and	Tsang	E	W	K,	 (2008).	“Inter-organisational	knowledge	transfer:	
Current	themes	and	future	prospects.”	Journal	of	Management	Studies,	Vol.	45,	No.	4,	pp.	677-690.	
	
Easton	G,	(2000).	“Case	research	as	a	method	for	industrial	networks.”	In	Ackroyd	and	Fleetwood	
(Eds).	Realist	perspectives	on	management	and	organisations.	Routledge.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 180 - 
Elder-Vass	 D,	 (2010).	 The	 causal	 power	 of	 social	 structures:	 Emergence,	 structure	 and	 agency.	
Cambridge	University	Press.	
	
Ellis	G,	(2018).	“The	watermelon	effect:	Does	a	green	dashboard	mean	a	healthy	facility?”	Presented	
at:	Gas	Processing	Association	(GPA)	Europe	35th	Annual	Conference.	May	2018,	Rome.	
	
Emmeche	 C,	 Køppe	 S,	 and	 Stjernfelt	 F,	 (2000).	 “Levels,	 emergence,	 and	3	 versions	 of	 downward	
causation.”	 In:	 Andersen,	 Emmeche,	 Finnermann,	 and	 Christiansen	 (Eds).	 Downward	 causation.		
Aarhus	University	Press.	
	
Estruch	 A,	 Vila	 C,	 Siller	H	 R,	 Romero	 F,	 and	Abellán	 J	 V,	 (2008).	 “Enabling	 innovative	 concurrent	
engineering	 and	 collaborative	 manufacturing	 in	 extended	 enterprises.”	 Presented	 at:	 IEEE	
International	Technology	Management	Conference	(ICE).	June	2008,	Lisbon,	Portugal.	
	
Ezell	S	J,	Atkinson	R	D,	Kim	I,	and	Cho	J,	(2018).	Manufacturing	digitisation:	Extent	of	adoption	and	
recommendations	 for	 increasing	 penetration	 in	 Korea	 and	 the	 US.	 Information	 Technology	 and	
Innovation	 Foundation.	 Available	 on-line	 and	 accessed	 on	 1st	 May	 2020:	 http://www2.itif.org/2018-
korean-manufacturing-digitalization.pdf	
	
Fisher	M	L,	(1997).	“What	is	the	right	supply	chain	for	your	product?”	Harvard	Business	Review.	
	
Foddy	W,	(1993).	Constructing	questions	for	interviews	and	questionnaires:	Theory	and	practice	in	
social	research.	Cambridge	University	Press.	
	
Frimanson	L,	and	Lind	J,	(2001).	“The	balanced	scorecard	and	learning	in	business	relationships.”	In:	
Hakansson	H,	and	Johanson	J	(Eds).	Business	network	learning.	Pergamon.	
	
Furusten	S,	(2013).	Institutional	theory	and	organisational	change.	Edgar	Elgar	Publishing.	
	
Gadde	L-E,	Håkansson	H,	and	Persson	G,	(2010).	Supply	network	strategies.	2nd	Edition.	Wiley.	
	
Gandhi	 R,	 Aggarwal	 S,	 and	 Sasindaran	 R,	 (2016).	 “Digital	 Green:	 Enabling	 a	 collective	 process	 of	
learning	in	rural	development.”	In:	Steiner	R,	and	Hanks	D	(Eds).	Harnessing	the	power	of	collective	
learning.	Routledge.	
	
Garavan	T	N,	and	Carbery	R,	(2012).	“Collective	Learning.”	In:	Seel	N	M	(Eds).	Encyclopaedia	of	the	
Sciences	of	Learning.	Springer.	
	
Gardes	 N,	 Dostaler	 I,	 Barredy	 C,	 and	 Gourmel-Rouger	 C,	 (2015).	 “Aerospace	 clusters	 and	
competitiveness	poles.”	Journal	of	Traffic	and	Transportation	Engineering,	Vol.	3,	pp.	52-62.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 181 - 
Gasson	S,	(2013).	“Framing	wicked	problems	in	enterprise-system	design	groups.”	In:	Langan-Fox	and	
Cooper	(Eds).	Boundary-spanning	in	organisations:	Network,	influence,	and	conflict.	Routledge.	
	
Gehman	J,	Glaser	V	L,	Eisenhardt	K	M,	Giois	D,	Langley	A,	and	Corley	K	G,	(2018).	“Finding	theory-
method	 fit:	 A	 comparison	 of	 three	 qualitative	 approaches	 to	 theory	 building.”	 Journal	 of	
Management	Inquiry,	Vol.	27,	No.	3,	pp.	284-300.	
	
Geroski	P	A,	(2000).	“Models	of	technology	diffusion.”	Research	Policy,	Vol.	29,	pp.	603-625.	
	
Giuliani	 E,	 (2010).	 “Clusters,	 networks	 and	 economic	 development:	 An	 evolutionary	 economics	
perspective.”	In:	Boschma	and	Martin	(Eds).	Handbook	of	evolutionary	economic	geography.	Elgar.	
	
Glock	C	H,	Grosse	E	H,	and	Ries	J	M,	(2017).	“Decision	support	models	for	supplier	development:	
Systematic	literature	review	and	research	agenda.”	International	Journal	of	Production	Economics,	
Vol.	194,	pp.	246-260.	
	
Goduscheit	R	C,	Bergenholtz	C,	Jorgensen	J	H,	and	Rasmussen	E	S,	(2008).	“Action	research	in	inter-
organisational	networks:	 Impartial	 studies	or	 the	Trojan	Horse?”	 Journal	of	Systemic	Practice	and	
Action	Research,	Vol.	21,	Iss.	4,	pp.	267-281.	
	
Gordon	S	R,	(2008).	Supplier	evaluation	and	performance	excellence.	J	Ross	Publishing.	
	
Gorinski	R,	and	Ferguson	P,	 (1997).	 “(Ex)changing	experiences	of	 insider	 research.”	Presented	at:	
New	Zealand	Association	for	Research	in	Education	(NZARE)	conference.	Dec	1997,	Auckland,	NZ.		
	
Grant	A,	(2013).	Give	and	take:	Why	helping	others	drives	our	success.	Weidenfeld	and	Nicolson.	
	
Greenwood	D,	and	Levin	M,	(2006).	Introduction	to	action	research:	Social	research	for	social	change.	
Sage	Publishing.	
	
Greller	M	M,	(2006).	"Hours	invested	in	professional	development	during	late	career	as	a	function	of	
career	motivation	and	satisfaction.”	Career	Development	International,	Vol.	11,	Iss.	6,	pp.	544-559.	
	
Guyon	I,	Amine	R,	Tamayo	S,	and	Fontane	F,	(2019).	“Analysis	of	the	opportunities	of	Industry	4.0	in	
the	 aeronautical	 sector.”	 Presented	 at:	 10th	 International	 Multi-Conference	 on	 Complexity,	
Informatics	and	Cybernetics	(IMCIC).	March	2019,	Orlando,	United	States.	
	
Hahn	C	K,	Watts	C	A,	and	Kim	K	Y,	(1990).	“The	supplier	development	program:	a	conceptual	model.”	
Journal	of	Purchasing	and	Materials	Management,	Vol.	26,	No.	2,	pp.	2–7.		
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 182 - 
Hailikari	T,	Nevgi	A,	and	Lindblom-Ylanne	S,	 (2007).	“Exploring	alternative	ways	of	assessing	prior	
knowledge,	 its	 components	 and	 their	 relation	 to	 student	 achievement.”	 Studies	 in	 Educational	
Evaluation,	Vol.	33,	pp.	320-337.	
	
Hakansson	H,	and	Johanson	J,	(2001).	Business	network	learning.	Pergamon.	
	
Handfield	R	B,	Krause	D	R,	Scannell	T	V,	and	Monczka	R	M,	 (2000).	“Avoid	the	pitfalls	 in	supplier	
development.”	Sloan	Management	Review,	Winter,	pp.	37-49.	
	
Hansen	T,	and	Mattes	J,	(2018).	“Proximity	and	power	in	collaborative	innovation	projects.”	Regional	
studies,	Vol.	52,	Iss.	1,	pp.	35-46.	
	
Harris	G	A,	(2018).	“Digitally	enabling	the	supply	chain.”	Presented	at:	9th	Model-Based	Enterprise	
Summit.	April	2018,	Gaithersburg,	Maryland,	USA.	
	
Harris	G	A,	 (2019).	 “Preliminary	 report	 from	MxD	project	17-01-01:	 Industry	 readiness	 for	digital	
manufacturing	may	not	be	as	we	thought.”	Presented	at:	10th	Model-Based	Enterprise	Summit.	April	
2019,	Gaithersburg,	Maryland,	USA.	
	
Harris	G	A,	Componation	P	J,	and	Farrington	P	A,	(2010).	“An	exploration	of	Fisher’s	framework	for	
the	 alignment	 of	 supply	 chain	 strategy	 with	 product	 characteristics.”	 Engineering	 Management	
Journal,	Vol.	22,	No.	4,	pp.	31–42.	
	
Hartley	J	L,	and	Jones	G	E,	(1997).	“Process	orientated	supplier	development:	Building	the	capability	
for	change.”	International	Journal	of	Purchasing	and	Materials	Management,	Summer,	pp.	24-29.	
	
Hartley	J	L,	and	Choi	T	Y,	(1996).	“Supplier	development:	Customers	as	a	catalyst	of	process	change.”	
Business	Horizons,	July-August,	pp.37-44.	
	
Haunschild	P	R,	Chandler	D,	(2008).	“Institutional-level	learning:	Learning	as	a	source	of	institutional	
change.”	 In:	 Greenwood	 R,	 Oliver	 C,	 Sahlin	 K,	 and	 Suddaby	 R	 (Eds).	 The	 Sage	 handbook	 of	
organizational	institutionalism.	Sage	Publishing.	
	
Helfat	C	E,	Finkelstein	S,	Mitchell	W,	Peteraf	M	A,	Singh	H,	Teece	D	J,	and	Winter	S	G,	(2007).	Dynamic	
capabilities:	Understanding	strategic	change	in	organisations.	Blackwell	Publishing.	
	
Henning	K,	(1998).	The	Digital	Enterprise.	Century	Business	Books.	
	
Herr	K,	and	Anderson	G	L,	(2015).	The	action	research	dissertation.	2nd	Edition.	Sage	Publishing.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 183 - 
Hess	T,	Matt	C,	Benlian	A,	and	Wiesbock	F,	(2016).	“Options	for	formulating	a	digital	transformation	
strategy.”	MIS	Quarterly	Executive,	Vol.	15,	No.	2,	pp.	123–139.	
	
Hines	P,	(1994).	Creating	world	class	suppliers.	Pitman	Publishing.	
	
Hines	P,	and	Rich	N,	(1998).	“Outsourcing	competitive	advantage:	the	use	of	supplier	associations.”	
International	Journal	of	Physical	Distribution	and	Logistics	Management,	Vol.	28,	No.	7,	pp.	524-546.	
	
Hinkin	T	R,	and	Schriesheim	C	A,	(1989).	“Development	and	application	of	new	scales	to	measure	the	
French	and	Raven	(1959)	bases	of	social	power.”	Journal	of	Applied	Psychology,	Vol.	74,	pp.	561-567.	
	
Hislop	 D,	 Bosua	 R,	 and	 Helms	 R,	 (2018).	 Knowledge	 management	 in	 organisation:	 A	 critical	
introduction.	4th	Edition.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Ho	D,	Kumar	A,	and	Shiwakoti	N,	(2019).	“Literature	review	of	supply	chain	collaboration	mechanisms	
and	their	impact	on	performance.”	Engineering	Management	Journal,	Vol.	31,	No.	1,	pp.	47-68.	
	
Ho,	M,	 Ghauri	 P	 N,	 and	 Larimo	 J	 A,	 (2017).	 “Institutional	 distance	 and	 knowledge	 acquisition	 in	
international	buyer-supplier	relationships.”	Asia	Pacific	Journal	of	Management,	Vol.35,	pp.	427-447.	
	
Hofstede	G,	Hofstede,	G	J,	and	Minkov	M,	(2010).	Cultures	and	organisations:	Software	of	the	mind,	
intercultural	cooperation	and	its	importance	for	survival.	3rd	Edition.	McGraw	Hill.	
	
Hovardas	T,	and	Korfiatis	K	J,	(2006).	“Word	associations	as	a	tool	for	assessing	conceptual	change	in	
science	education.”	Journal	of	Learning	and	Instruction,	Vol.	16,	pp.	416-432.	
	
ISO44001,	(2017).	Collaborative	business	relationship	management	systems	–	Requirements	and	
framework.	International	Standards	Organisation,	Geneva,	Switzerland.	
	
Jick	 T	 D,	 (1979).	 “Mixing	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 methods:	 Triangulation	 in	 action.”	
Administrative	Science	Quarterly,	Vol.	24,	pp.	602-611.	
	
Jong	G,	and	Nooteboom	B,	(2000).	The	causal	structure	of	long-term	supply	relationships.	Kluwer.	
	
Kaltoft	R,	Boer	H,	Caniato	F,	Gertsen	F,	Middel	R,	and	Nielsen	J	S,	(2007).	“Implementing	collaborative	
improvement:	Top-down,	bottom-up,	or	both?”	International	Journal	of	Technology	Management,	
Vol.	37,	Issue	3/4,	pp.	306-322.	
	
Kane	G	C,	Palmer	D,	Phillips	A	N,	Kiron	D,	and	Buckley	N,	(2015).	“Strategy,	not	technology,	drives	
digital	transformation”	Sloan	Management	Review,	Summer	Edition.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 184 - 
Kania	J,	and	Kramer	M	(2011).	“Collective	Impact.”	Stanford	Social	Innovation	Review,	Winter	Edition.	
	
Kania	J,	and	Kramer	M	(2013).	“Embracing	emergence:	How	collective	impact	addresses	complexity.”	
Stanford	Social	Innovation	Review,	10th	Anniversary	Edition.	
	
Kanter	 R	 R,	 (1999).	 “Managing	 the	 extended	 enterprise	 in	 a	 globally	 connected	 world.”	
Organisational	Dynamics,	Vol.	28,	Iss.	1,	pp.	7-23.	
	
Kaplan	R	S,	and	Norton	D	P,	(1996).	The	balanced	scorecard.	Harvard	Business	School	Press.	
	
Kaplan	R	S,	and	Norton	D	P,	(2006).	Alignment:	Using	the	balanced	scorecard	to	create	corporate	
synergies.	Harvard	Business	School	Press.	
	
Kaplan	S	E,	Petersen	M	J,	and	Samuels	 J	A,	 (2012).	“An	Examination	of	 the	effect	of	positive	and	
negative	performance	on	the	relative	weighting	of	strategically	and	non-strategically	linked	balanced	
scorecard	measures.”	Behavioural	Research	in	Accounting,	Vol.	24,	No.	2,	pp.	133-151.	
	
Kapoor	K,	Dwivedi	Y,	and	Williams	M,	(2014).	“Rogers'	innovation	adoption	attributes:	A	systematic	
review	&	synthesis	of	existing	research.”	Information	Systems	Management,	Vol.31,	No.1,	pp.74-91.	
	
Karlsson	C,	(2016).	Research	methods	for	operations	management.	2nd	Edition.	Routledge.	
	
Keeble	D,	(2000).	“Collective	learning	processes	in	European	high-technology	milieu.”	In:	Keeble	and	
Wilkinson	(Eds).	High-technology	clusters,	networking	and	collective	learning	in	Europe.	Ashgate.	
	
Kennedy	H,	Moss	G,	Birchall	C,	&	Moshonas	S	(2015).	“Balancing	the	potential	and	problems	of	digital	
methods	through	action	research.”	Information,	Communication	and	Society,	Vol.18(2),	pp.	172-186.	
	
Kemmis	S,	and	McTaggart	R,	(1988).	The	Action	Research	Planner.	Deakin	University.	
	
Kemmis	S,	and	McTaggart	R,	(2000).	“Participatory	action	research.”	In:	Denzin	N	K	and	Lincoln	Y	S	
(Eds).	Handbook	of	qualitative	research.	2nd	Edition.	Sage.	
	
Ketokivi	 M	 A,	 and	 Schroeder	 R	 G,	 (2004).	 “Strategic,	 structural	 contingency	 and	 institutional	
explanations	 in	 the	 adoption	 of	 innovative	 manufacturing	 practices.”	 Journal	 of	 Operations	
Management,	Vol.	22,	pp.	63-89.	
	
Kettinger	W	J,	Teng	J	T	C,	and	Guha	S,	(1997),	“Business	process	change:	A	study	of	methodologies,	
techniques,	and	tools.”	MIS	Quarterly,	Vol.	21,	No.	1,	pp.	55-80.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 185 - 
Kitagawa	F,	(2011).	"Industrial	Doctorates:	Employer	engagement	in	research	and	skills	formation.”	
ESRC	LLAKES	Centre	Research	Paper.	
	
Klotzer	C,	and	Pflaum	A,	(2017).	“Towards	the	development	of	a	maturity	model	for	digitalisation	
within	the	manufacturing	industry’s	supply	chain”	Presented	at:	50th	Hawaii	International	Conference	
on	System	Sciences	(HICSS	2017).	January	2017,	Hawaii,	USA.	
	
Knight	 L,	 (2002).	 “Network	 learning:	Exploring	 learning	by	 inter-organisational	networks.”	Human	
Relations,	Vol.	55,	No.	4,	pp.	427-454.	
	
Knight	 L,	 and	 Pye	 A,	 (2004).	 “Exploring	 the	 relationship	 between	 network	 change	 and	 network	
learning.”	Management	Learning,	Vol.	35,	No.	4,	pp.	473-490.	
	
Knoben	J,	and	Oerlemans	L	A,	(2006).	“Proximity	and	inter-organisational	collaboration:	A	literature	
review.”	International	Journal	of	Management	Reviews,	Vol.	8,	Iss.	2,	pp.	71-89.	
	
Kohnke	O,	(2017).	“It’s	not	just	about	technology:	The	people	side	of	digitisation.”	In:	Oswald	and	
Kleinemeier	(Eds).	Shaping	the	Digital	Enterprise.	Springer.	
	
Kostova	 T,	 (1999).	 “Transnational	 transfer	 of	 strategic	 organisational	 practices:	 A	 contextual	
perspective.”	The	Academy	of	Management	Review,	Vol.	24,	No.	2,	pp.	308-324.	
	
Kotter	 J	 P,	 (1995).	 “Leading	 change:	Why	 transformation	 efforts	 fail.”	Harvard	 Business	 Review,	
March/April	Edition,	pp.	59-67.	
	
Krause	D	R,	and	Handfield	R	B,	(1999).	Developing	a	world-class	supply	chain.	Centre	for	Advanced	
Purchasing	Studies.	
	
Krause	D	R,	Handfield	R	B,	and	Tyler	B	B,	(2007).	“The	relationships	between	supplier	development,	
commitment,	 social	 capital	 accumulation	 and	 performance	 improvement.”	 Journal	 of	 Operations	
Management,	Vol.	25,	No.	2,	pp.	528–545.	
	
Krueger	R	A,	and	Casey	M	A,	(2015).	Focus	Groups:	A	practical	guide	for	applied	research.	5th	Edition.	
Sage	Publications.	
	
Kvale	S,	(2006).	“Dominance	through	interview	and	dialogues.”	Qualitative	Enquiry,	Vol.	12,	No.	3,	
pp.	480-500.	
	
Laframboise	K,	and	Reyes	F,	(2007).	“The	digitisation	of	an	aerospace	supply	network.”	International	
Journal	of	Enterprise	Information	Systems,	Vol.	3,	Iss.	2,	pp.	68–89.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 186 - 
Lakemond	N,	Bengtsson	L,	Laursen	K,	and	Tell	F,		(2016).	“Match	and	manage:	The	use	of	knowledge	
matching	 and	 project	 management	 to	 integrate	 knowledge	 in	 collaborative	 inbound	 open	
innovation.”	Industrial	and	Corporate	Change,	Vol.	25,	Iss.	2,	pp.	333-352.	
	
Laming	R,	(1993).	Beyond	partnership:	Strategies	for	innovation	and	lean	supply.	Prentice	Hall.	
	
Lane	C,	(2001).	“Organisational	learning	in	supplier	networks.”	In:	Dierkes,	Antal,	Child,	and	Nonaka	
(Eds).	Handbook	of	organisational	learning	and	knowledge.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Lane	P	J,	and	Lubatkin	M,	(1998).	“Relative	absorptive	capacity	and	inter-organisational	 learning.”	
Strategic	Management	Journal,	Vol.	19,	pp.	461-477.	
	
Lane	 P	 J,	 Salk	 J	 E,	 and	 Lyles	 M	 A,	 (2001).	 “Absorptive	 capacity,	 learning,	 and	 performance	 in	
International	Joint	Ventures.”	Strategic	Management	Journal,	Vol.	22,	pp.	1139-1161.	
	
Lauer	T	W	(2000).	“Side	effects	of	mandatory	EDI	order	processing	in	the	automotive	supply	chain.”	
Business	Process	Management	Journal,	Vol.	6,	Iss.	5,	pp.	366–375.		
	
Laukkanen	S,	Sarpola	S,	and	Hallikainen	P,	(2007).	“Enterprise	size	matters:	objectives	and	constraints	
of	EPR	adoption.”	Journal	of	Enterprise	Information	Management,	Vol.	20,	Iss.	3,	pp.	319-334.	
	
Lawson	 B,	 Krause	 D,	 and	 Potter	 A,	 (2014).	 “Improving	 supplier	 new	 product	 development	
performance:	 The	 role	 of	 supplier	 development.”	 Journal	 of	 Product	 Innovation	 Management,									
Vol.	32,	Iss.	5,	pp.	777–792.	
	
Leenders	M	R,	(1966).	“Supplier	development.”	Journal	of	Purchasing,	Vol.	2	Iss.	4,	pp.	47–62.	
	
Lewandowska	M	S,	(2015).	“Capturing	absorptive	capacity:	Concepts,	determinants,	measurement	
modes	and	role	in	open	innovation.”	International	Journal	of	Management	and	Economics,	No.	45,	
pp.	32-56.	
	
Libby	T,	Salterio	S	E,	and	Webb	A,	 (2004).	“The	balanced	scorecard:	The	effects	of	assurance	and	
process	accountability	on	managerial	judgment.”	Accounting	Review,	Vol.	79,	No.	4,	pp.	1075-1094.		
	
Liedtka	S	L,	Church	B	K,	and	Ray	M	R,	(2008).	“Performance	variability,	ambiguity	intolerance,	and	
balanced	scorecard-based	performance	assessments.”	Behavioural	Research	in	Accounting,	Vol.	20,	
No.2,	pp.	73-88.	
	
Lichtenthaler	U,	and	Lichtenthaler	E,	 (2009).	 “A	capability-based	 framework	 for	open	 innovation:	
Complementing	absorptive	capacity.”	Journal	of	Management	Studies,	Vol.	46,	No.	8,	pp.	1315-1338.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 187 - 
Lincoln	Y,	and	Guba	E,	(1985).	Naturalistic	enquiry.	Sage.	
	
Lipe	M	G,	 and	Salterio	 S	E,	 (2000).	 “The	balanced	 scorecard:	 Judgmental	 effects	of	 common	and	
unique	performance	measures.”	The	Accounting	Review,	Vol.	75,	No.	3,	pp.	283-298.	
	
Liu	C,	(2009).	Multinationals,	globalisation	and	indigenous	firms	in	China.	Routledge.	
	
Loke	S-P,	Downe	A	G,	Sambasivan	M,	and	Khalid	K,	 (2012).	“A	structured	approach	to	 integrating	
Total	 Quality	Management	 and	 Knowledge	Management	 with	 supply	 chain	 learning.”	 Journal	 of	
Business	Economics	and	Management,	Vol.	13,	No.	4,	pp.	776-800.	
	
Lomas	P,	Woodward	C,	and	Parker	Z,	(1996).	“How	can	we	help	educational	managers	establish	and	
implement	 effective	 critical	 friendships?”	 In:	 Lomas	 P	 (Ed).	 Quality	 management	 in	 education:	
Sustaining	the	vision	through	action	research.	Routledge.	
	
Mabert	 V	A,	 Soni	A,	 and	Venkataramanan	M	A,	 (2003).	 “The	 impact	 of	 organisation	 size	 on	 ERP	
implementation	 in	 the	 US	manufacturing	 sector.”	 International	 Journal	 of	Management	 Science,	
Omega	Edition,	Vol.	31,	Iss.	3,	pp.	157–246.	
	
MacDuffie	J	P,	and	Helper	S,	(1997).	“Creating	lean	suppliers:	Diffusing	lean	production	throughout	
the	supply	chain.”	California	Management	Review,	Vol.	39,	Iss.	4,	pp.	118-134.	
	
Maestrini	 V,	 Luzzini	 D,	 Shani	 A	 B,	 and	 Canterino	 F,	 (2016).	 “The	 action	 research	 cycle	 reloaded:	
Conducting	action	research	across	buyer-supplier	relationships.”	Journal	of	Purchasing	and	Supply	
Management,	Vol.	22,	pp.	289-298.	
	
Mahdikhah	 S,	Messaadia	M,	 Baudry	D,	 Paquet	 T,	 Louis	 A,	Mazari	 B,	 Evans	 R,	 and	Gao	 J,	 (2014).	
“Towards	Supplier	Maturity	Evaluation	in	Terms	of	PLM	Collaboration.”	IFIP	Advances	in	Information	
and	Communication	Technology,	Vol.	438,	pp.	201-208.	
	
Malhotra	A,	Gosain	S,	and	El	Sawy	O	A,	(2005).	“Absorptive	capacity	configurations	in	supply	chains:	
Gearing	for	partner-enabled	market	knowledge	creation.”	MIS	Quarterly,	Vol.	29,	Iss.	1,	pp.	145-187.	
	
Malmberg	 A,	 and	Maskell	 P,	 (2010).	 “An	 evolutionary	 approach	 to	 localised	 learning	 and	 spatial	
clustering.”	In:	Boschma	and	Martin	(Eds).	Handbook	of	evolutionary	economic	geography.	Elgar.	
	
Matt	C,	Hess	T,	and	Benlian	A,	(2015).	“Digital	transformation	strategies.”	Business	and	Information	
Systems	Engineering,	Vol.	57,	Iss.	5,	pp.	339–343.	
	
McAdam	R,	Miller	K,	McMacken	N,	and	Davies	J,	(2010).	“Development	of	absorptive	capacity	based	
innovation	in	construction	SME.”	Journal	of	Entrepreneurship	&	Innovation,	Vol.11	No.3,	pp.	231-244.	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 188 - 
McBeth	C,	Tennant	C,	and	Neailey	K,	(2006).	“Developing	products	in	the	global	environment	using	
digital	technology.”	Presented	at:	IEEE	International	Technology	Management.	June,	Milan,	Italy.	
	
McKinsey,	(2018).	Unlocking	success	in	digital	transformations.	Available	on-line	and	accessed	on	1st	
May	2020:	https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/unlocking-success-in-digital-transformations	
	
McPherson	K,	Bronars	C,	Patten	C,	Decker	P,	Hughes	C,	Levine	J,	Vickers-Douglas	K,	Williams,	(2014).	
“Understanding	word	preference	for	description	of	exercise	interventions.”	Journal	of	Mental	Health	
and	Physical	Activity,	Vol.	7,	pp.	73-77.		
	
Meehan	J,	Touboulic	A,	and	Walker,	(2016).	“Time	to	get	real:	The	case	for	critical	action	research	in	
purchasing	&	supply	management.”	Journal	of	Purchasing	&	Supply	Management,	Vol.10	pp.255-257.	
	
Metzler	A,	Kunz	T,	and	Fuchs	M,	(2015).	“The	use	and	positioning	of	clarifications	in	web	surveys.”	
Journal	of	Psihologija,	Vol.	48,	No.	4,	pp.	379-408.	
	
Meyer	 J	W,	 and	Rowan	B,	 (1977).	 “Institutionalised	organisations:	 Formal	 structure	 as	myth	 and	
ceremony.”	American	Journal	of	Sociology,	Vol.	83,	pp.	340-363.	
	
Mignerat	M,	and	Rivard	S,	(2015).	“Positioning	the	institutional	perspective	in	Information	Systems	
research.”	 In:	 Willcocks,	 Sauer,	 and	 Lacity	 (Eds).	 Formulating	 research	 methods	 for	 information	
systems.	Vol.	2.	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
	
Mintzberg	H,	Ahlstrand	B,	and	Lampel	J,	(2009).	Strategy	safari.	2nd	Edition.	Prentice	Hall.	
	
Modi	S	B,	and	Mabert	V	A,	(2006).	“Supplier	development:	Improving	supplier	performance	through	
knowledge	transfer.”	Journal	of	Operations	Management,	Vol.	25,	No.	1,	pp.	42–64.	
	
Moffatt	S,	Mulloli	T	P,	Bhopal	R,	Foy	C,	and	Phillimore	P,	(2000).	“An	exploration	of	awareness	bias	
in	two	environmental	epidemiology	studies.”	Epidemiology,	Vol.	11,	No.2,	pp.	199-208.	
	
Momme	 J,	 and	 Hvolby	 H-H,	 (2002).	 “An	 outsourcing	 framework:	 Action	 research	 in	 the	 heavy	
industry	sector.”	European	Journal	of	Purchasing	and	Supply	Management,	Vol.	8,	pp.	185-196.	
	
Monczka	 R	 M,	 Handfield	 R	 B,	 Scannell	 T	 V,	 Ragatz	 G	 L,	 and	 Frayer	 D	 J,	 (2000).	 New	 product	
development:	Strategies	for	supplier	integration.	ASQ	Quality	Press.	
	
Morgan	 J	M,	 and	 Liker	 J	 K,	 (2006).	The	Toyota	Product	Development	 System:	 Integrating	people,	
process,	and	technology.	Productivity	Press,	New	York.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 189 - 
Morton	M	S	 S,	 (1991).	The	 corporation	of	 the	1990’s:	 Information	 technology	and	organisational	
transformation.	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Moultrie	 J,	 Clarkson	 P	 J,	 and	 Probert	D,	 (2007).	 “Development	 of	 a	 design	 audit	 tool	 for	 SMEs.”	
Journal	of	Production	Innovation	Management,	Vol.	24,	pp.	335-368.	
	
Mowery	D	C,	(1988).	International	collaborative	ventures	in	US	manufacturing.	Ballinger	Publishing.	
	
Murman	E,	Allen,	Bozdgan,	Cutcher-Gershenfeld,	McManus,	Nightingale,	Rebentisch,	Shields,	(2002).	
Lean	enterprise	value:	Insights	from	MIT’s	Lean	Aerospace	Initiative.	Palgrave.	
	
Nightingale	 D	 J,	 and	 Srinivasan	 J,	 (2011).	 Beyond	 the	 lean	 revolution:	 Achieving	 successful	 and	
sustainable	enterprise	transformation.	AMACOM	Publishing.	
	
NIST,	 (2016).	MBE	capability	 index	assessment	tool.	National	 Institute	of	Science	and	Technology.	
Available	on-line	and	accessed	on	1st	May	2020:	https://github.com/usnistgov/DT4SM/tree/master/MBE-Capabilities-Assessment	
	
Nooteboom	B,	(1999).	Inter-firm	alliances:	Analysis	and	design.	Routledge.	
	
Nooteboom	B,	(2006).	Learning	and	innovation	in	inter-organisational	relationships	and	networks.	
CentER	Discussion	Paper,	Vol.	2006-39,	Tilburg	University.	
	
Oliveira	T,	and	Martins	M	F,	(2011).	“Literature	review	of	information	technology	adoption	models	
at	firm	level.”	Journal	of	Information	Systems	Evaluation,	Vol.	14,	Iss.	1,	pp.	110-121.	
	
Oliver	 C,	 (1991).	 “Strategic	 responses	 to	 institutional	 processes.”	 The	 Academy	 of	Management	
Review,	Vol.	16,	No.	1,	pp.	145-179.	
	
Oman	S,	Leskovar	R,	Rosi	B,	and	Baggia	A,	(2017).	“Integration	of	MES	and	ERP	in	supply	chains:	Effect	
assessment	in	the	case	of	the	automotive	industry.”	Technical	Gazette,	Vol.	24,	No.	6,	pp.	1889–1896.	
	
Otto	A,	and	Obermaier	R,	(2009).	“How	can	supply	networks	increase	firm	value?	A	causal	framework	
to	structure	the	answer.”	Logistics	Research,	Vol.	1,	pp.	131-148.	
	
Oturakci	 M,	 and	 Yuregir	 O	 H,	 (2018).	 “New	 approach	 to	 Rogers’	 innovation	 characteristics	 and	
comparative	implementation	study.”	Journal	of	Engineering	&	Tech	Management,	Vol.47,	pp.53-67.	
	
Orlikowski	 W	 J,	 and	 Barley	 S	 R,	 (2001).	 “Technology	 and	 institutions:	 What	 can	 research	 on	
information	 technology	 and	 research	 on	 organisations	 learn	 from	 each	 other?”	MIS	 Quarterly,									
Vol.	25,	No.	2,	pp.	145-165.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 190 - 
Pallot	M,	Martinez-Carreras	M	A,	 and	 Prinz	W,	 (2010).	 “Collaborative	 distance:	 A	 framework	 for	
distance	factors	affecting	the	performance	of	distributed	collaboration.”	International	Journal	of	e-
Collaboration,	Vol.	6,	Iss.	2,	pp.	1-32.	
	
Parnaby	J,	(1990).	The	Engineering	Doctorate.	SERC	working	party	report	to	the	Engineering	Board	
of	the	UK	Science	and	Engineering	Research	Council.	
	
Pawar	K	S,	and	Driva	H,	 (2000).	"Electronic	trading	 in	the	supply	chain:	A	holistic	 implementation	
framework.”	Logistics	Information	Management,	Vol.	13,	Iss.	1,	pp.	21-32.	
	
Pishdad	A,	and	Haider	A,	(2013).	“ERP	institutionalisation:	Exploring	the	influential	factors.”	Journal	
of	Enterprise	Information	Management,	Vol.	26,	No.	6,	pp.	642-660.	
	
Pulkkinen	A	J,	Vainio	V,	Leino	S-P,	and	Anttila	J-P,	(2018).	“Modelling	of	digital	extended	enterprise.”	
Presented	at:	20th	International	Dependency	and	Structure	Modelling	Conference.	Oct,	Trieste,	Italy.	
	
Pulkkinen	 A	 J,	 Anttila	 J-P,	 and	 Leino	 S-P,	 (2019).	 “Assessing	 the	maturity	 and	 benefits	 of	 digital	
extended	 enterprise.”	 Presented	 at:	 29th	 International	 Conference	 on	 Flexible	 Automation	 and	
Intelligent	Manufacturing.	June,	Limerick,	Ireland.	
	
Qamar	A,	and	Hall	M,	 (2018).	“Can	 lean	and	agile	organisations	within	the	UK	automotive	supply	
chain	 be	 distinguished	 based	 upon	 contextual	 factors?”	 International	 Journal	 of	 Supply	 Chain	
Management,	Vol.	23,	Issue	3,	pp.	239-254.	
	
Quayle	M,	(2000).	“Supplier	development	for	UK	small	and	medium	sized	enterprises.”	Journal	of	
Applied	Management	Studies,	Vol.	9,	No.	1,	pp.	117–133.	
	
Reed	F	M,	and	Walsh	K,	(2002).	“Enhancing	technological	capability	through	supplier	development:	
Study	of	UK	aerospace	industry.”	IEEE	Transactions	on	Eng.	Management,	Vol.	49	No.	3,	pp.	231-242.	
	
Regional	 Studies	 (2015).	 “Special	 issue	 on	 proximity	 and	 innovation:	 Empirical	 issues.”	 Regional	
Studies,	Vol.	49,	Iss.	6.	
	
Rittel	H	W,	and	Webber	M	M,	(1973).	“Dilemmas	in	a	General	Theory	of	Planning.”	Policy	sciences,	
Vol.	4,	No.	2,	pp.	155-169.	
	
Roberts	N,	Galluch	P	S,	Dinger	M,	and	Grover	V,	(2012).	“Absorptive	capacity	and	information	systems	
research:	 Review,	 synthesis,	 and	 directions	 for	 future	 research.”	MIS	 Quarterly,	 Vol.	 36,	 No.	 2,	
pp.625-648.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 191 - 
Robey	D,	and	Boudreau	M-C,	(1999).	“Accounting	for	the	contradictory	organisational	consequences	
of	 information	 technology:	 Theoretical	 directions	 and	 methodological	 implications.”	 Information	
Systems	Research,	Vol.	10,	No.	2,	pp.	167-185.	
	
Robey	D,	 Ross	 J	W,	 and	 Boudreau	M-C,	 (2002).	 “Learning	 to	 implement	 enterprise	 systems:	 An	
exploratory	study	of	the	dialectics	of	change.”	Journal	of	Management	Information	Systems,	Vol.	19,	
No.	1,	pp.	17-46.	
	
Robinson	S	B,	and	Leonard	K	F,	(2019).	Designing	quality	survey	questions.	Sage	Publications.	
	
Robson	C,	and	McCartan	K,	(2016).	Real	world	research.	4th	Edition.	Wiley.	
	
Rodriguez-Pose	 A,	 (2013).	 “Do	 institutions	 matter	 for	 regional	 development?”	 Regional	 Studies,					
Vol.	47,	No.	7,	pp.	1034-1047.	
	
Rogers	E	M	(1995	first	edition;	2003	fifth	edition).	Diffusion	of	innovations.	Free	Press,	New	York.	
	
Rogers	K,	Purdy	L,	Safayeni	F,	and	Duimering	P	(2007).	“A	supplier	development	program:	Rational	
process	or	institutional	image	construction?”	Journal	of	Operations	Management,	Vol.25,	pp.556-72.	
	
Rolls-Royce,	(2017).	UltraFan®	engine.	Available	on-line	and	accesses	on	1st	May	2020:	
https://www.rolls-royce.com/products-and-services/civil-aerospace/future-products.aspx#section-overview	
	
	
Ronit	K,	(2018).	Global	business	associations.	Routledge.	
	
Saenz	M	J,	Revilla	E,	and	Knoppen	D,	(2014).	“Absorptive	capacity	 in	buyer-supplier	relationships:	
Empirical	evidence	of	mediating	role.”	Journal	of	Supply	Chain	Management,	Vol.50,	Iss.2,	pp.18-40.	
	
Sako	 M,	 (1993).	 “Kyoryokukai	 in	 the	 Japanese	 auto	 industry:	 Collective	 action	 for	 technology	
diffusion.”	IMVP	Research	Briefing,	June	1993,	Cape	Cod,	USA.	Subsequently	published	in	1996	in	the	
Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics,	Vol.	20,	pp.	651-671.	
	
Salimian	 H,	 Rashidirad	M,	 and	 Soltani	 E,	 (2017).	 “A	 contingency	 view	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 supplier	
development	on	design	and	conformance	quality	performance.”	Production	Planning	and	Control,	
Vol.	28,	No.	4,	pp.	310-320.	
	
SC21,	(2006).	Twenty	First	Century	Supply	Chains	Programme:	Implementation	guide.	Available	online	
and	accessed	on	1st	May	2020:	https://www.sc21.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2015/07/ADS-SC21-Implementation-Guide.pdf	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 192 - 
Schmitt	A,	and	Biesebroeck	van	J,	(2013).	“Proximity	strategies	in	outsourcing	relations:	The	role	of	
geographical,	 cultural	 and	 relational	 proximity	 in	 the	 European	 automotive	 industry.”	 Journal	 of	
International	Business	Studies,	Vol.	44,	pp.	475-503.	
	
Schumacher	A,	Erol	S,	and	Sihn	W,	(2016).	“A	maturity	model	for	assessing	Industry	4.0	readiness	and	
maturity	of	manufacturing	enterprises.”	Procedia	CIRP,	Vol.	52,	pp.	161–166.	
	
Scott	R	W,	(2014).	Institutions	and	organisations:	Ideas,	interests,	and	identifies.	4th	Edition.	Sage.	
	
SEDB,	 (2017).	 The	 Singapore	 Smart	 Industry	 Readiness	 Index.	 Singapore	 Economic	 Development	
Board,	 Available	 on-line	 and	 accessed	 on	 1st	 May	 2020:	 https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/news-and-
events/insights/manufacturing/singapore-smart-industry-readiness-Index.html	
	
Senge	P	M,	(1990	first	edition,	2006	second	edition).	The	fifth	discipline.	Random	House	Publishing.	
	
Senge	 P,	 Kleiner	 A,	 Roberts	 C,	 Ross	 R,	 Roth	 G,	 and	 Smith	 B,	 (1999).	 The	 dance	 of	 change:	 The	
challenges	of	sustaining	momentum	in	learning	organisations.	Nicholas	Brealey	Publishing.	
	
Sheridan	A	E,	and	Burnes	R,	(2018).	“F-35	program	history:	from	JAST	to	IOC.”	Presented	at:	AIAA	
Aviation	Forum;	Aviation	Technology,	Integration,	and	Operations	Conference.	June,	Atlanta,	USA.	
	
Sillanpää	 I,	 Shahzad	 K,	 and	 Sillanpää	 E,	 (2015).	 “Supplier	 development	 and	 buyer-supplier	
relationship	strategies.”	International	Journal	of	Procurement	Management,	Vol.8	No.2	pp.227-250.	
	
Simoes	A,	Simas	O,	Oliveira	L,	Dalmarco	G,	Rodrigues	J,	and	Barros	A,	(2019).	“Environmental	factors	
influencing	the	adoption	of	digitalisation	technologies	in	automotive	supply	chains.”	Presented	at:	
IEEE	international	conference	on	Engineering	Technology	and	Innovation.	June,	Valbonne,	France.	
	
Snider	B,	Silveira	G,	and	Balakrishnan	J,	(2009).	“ERP	implementation	at	SMEs:	Analysis	of	5	Canadian	
cases.”	International	Journal	of	Operations	and	Production	Management,	Vol.	29,	Iss.	1,	pp.	4-29.	
	
Spekman	R,	and	Davis	E	W,	(2016).	“The	extended	enterprise:	A	decade	later.”	International	Journal	
of	Physical	Distribution	and	Logistics	Management,	Vol.	46,	Iss.	1,	pp.	43–61.	
	
Su	Z,	Ahlstrom	D,	Li	J,	and	Cheng	D,	(2013).	“Knowledge	creation	capability,	absorptive	capacity,	and	
product	innovativeness.”	R&D	Management,	Vol.	43,	Iss.	5,	pp.	473-485.		
	
Sucky	 E,	 and	 Durst	 S	 M,	 (2013).	 “Supplier	 development:	 Current	 status	 of	 empirical	 research.”	
International	Journal	of	Procurement	Management,	Vol.	6,	No.	1,	pp.	92–127.	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 193 - 
Sweeney	E,	Evangelista	P,	and	Passaro	R,	(2005).	“Putting	supply	chain	learning	theory	into	practice:	
Lessons	from	an	Irish	case.”	Journal	of	Knowledge	and	Learning,	Vol.	1,	No.	4,	pp.	357-372.	
	
Symon	 G,	 and	 Clegg	 C	 W,	 (1991).	 “Technology-led	 change:	 A	 study	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	
CADCAM.”	Journal	of	Occupational	Psychology,	Vol.	64,	pp.	273-290.	
	
Tallman	S,	and	Phene	A,	(2007).	“Leveraging	knowledge	across	geographic	boundaries.”	Organisation	
Science,	Vol.	18,	No.	2,	pp.	252-260.	
	
Tayeb	 M,	 (2001).	 “Conducting	 research	 across	 cultures:	 Overcoming	 drawbacks	 and	 obstacles.”	
International	Journal	of	Cross	Cultural	Management,	Vol.	1,	No.	1,	pp.	91-108.	
	
Teo	H	H,	Wei	K	K,	and	Benbasat	I,	(2003).	“Predicting	intention	to	adopt	inter-organisational	linkages:	
An	institutional	perspective.”	MIS	Quarterly,	Vol.	27,	No.	1,	pp.	19-49.	
	
Thompson	 J	 D,	 (1967).	 Organisations	 in	 action:	 Social	 science	 bases	 of	 administrative	 theory.	
McGraw-	Hill	Transaction	Publishers.	
	
Thompson	P,	and	McHugh	D,	(2009).	Work	organisations:	A	critical	approach.	4th	Edition.	Palgrave.	
	
Tornatzky	L	G,	and	Fleischer	M,	(1990).	The	processes	of	technological	innovation.	Lexington	Books.	
	
Tourangeau	R,	Conrad	F	G,	Couper	M	P,	and	Ye	C,	(2014).	“The	effects	of	providing	examples	in	survey	
questions”	Public	Opinion	Quarterly,	Vol.	78,	Iss.	1,	pp.	100-125.	
	
Tranfield	 D,	 Denyer	 D,	 and	 Smarts	 P,	 (2003).	 “Towards	 a	methodology	 for	 developing	 evidence-
informed	management	knowledge	by	means	of	systematic	review.”	British	Academy	Management,	
Vol.	14,	pp.	207-222.		
	
Turkulainen	V,	Kauppi	K,	and	Nermes	E,	(2017).	“Institutional	explanations:	Missing	link	in	operations	
management?	Insights	on	supplier	integration.”	International	Journal	of	Operations	and	Production	
Management,	Vol.	37,	No.	8,	pp.	1117-1140.	
	
UKG,	 (2015).	 The	 Dowling	 review	 of	 business-university	 research	 collaborations.	 BIS/15/352,	
Department	 of	 Business,	 Innovation,	 and	 Skills.	 Available	 on-line	 and	 accessed	 on	 1st	May	 2020:		
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/business-university-research-collaborations-dowling-review-final-report	
	
UKG,	(2017).	Made	Smarter	Review.	Department	for	Business,	Energy	&	Industrial	Strategy.	Available	
on-line	and	accessed	on	1st	May	2020:	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/made-smarter-review	
	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 194 - 
Vera	D,	Crossan	M,	and	Apaydin	M,	 (2011).	“A	 framework	 for	 integrating	organisational	 learning,	
knowledge,	capabilities,	and	absorptive	capacity.”	In:	Easterby-Smith	and	Lyles	(Eds).	Handbook	of	
organisational	learning	and	knowledge	management.	2nd	Edition.	Wiley.	
	
Vincent	S,	and	Wapshott	R,	(2014).	“Critical	realism	and	the	organisational	case	study:	A	guide	to	
discovering	 institutional	 mechanisms.”	 In:	 Edwards,	 O’Mahoney,	 and	 Vincent	 (Eds).	 Studying	
organisations	using	critical	realism.	Oxford	University	Press.			
	
Volberda	H	W,	Foss	N	J,	and	Lyles	M	A,	(2010).	“Absorbing	the	concept	of	absorptive	capacity:	How	
to	realise	its	potential	in	the	organisation	field.”	Organisation	Science,	Vol.	21,	Iss.	4,	pp.	931-951.	
	
Waddock	S,	Meszoely	G	M,	Waddell	S,	and	Dentoni	D,	(2015).	“The	complexity	of	wicked	problems	
in	large	scale	change.”	Journal	of	Organizational	Change	Management,	Vol.	28,	Iss.	6,	pp.	993-1012.	
	
Wagner	S	M,	(2006).	“Supplier	development	practices:	An	exploratory	study.”	European	Journal	of	
Marketing,	Vol.	40,	pp.	554-571.	
	
Wang	 B,	 Kang	 Y,	 Childerhouse	 P,	 and	 Huo	 B,	 (2018).	 “Interpersonal	 and	 inter-organisational	
relationship	drivers	of	supply	chain	integration.”	Industrial	Management	and	Data	Systems,	Vol.	118,	
No.	6,	pp.	1170-1191.	
	
Waterson	P	E,	Pepper	K,	Clegg	C	W,	and	Fagan	C,	(2001).	“Organisational	obstacles	and	pitfalls	on	
the	 road	 to	 Product	Data	Management.”	 Presented	 at:	ASME	2001	Design	 Engineering	 Technical	
Conferences	and	Computers	&	Information	in	Engineering	Conferences.	September,	Pittsburgh,	USA.	
	
Watts	 C	 A,	 and	 Hahn	 C	 K,	 (1993).	 “Supplier	 development	 programs:	 An	 empirical	 analysis.”	
International	Journal	of	Purchasing	and	Materials	Management,	Vol.	29,	No.	2,	pp.	11–17.	
	
Weinstein	A,	 (2012).	Superior	customer	value:	Strategies	 for	winning	and	retaining	customers.	3rd	
Edition.	CRC	Press-Taylor	&	Francis	Group.	
	
Wenger	E,	McDermott	 R,	 and	 Snyder	W	M,	 (2002).	Cultivating	 communities	 of	 practice.	 Harvard	
Business	Review	Press.	
	
Wiengarten	 F,	 Humphreys	 P,	 and	 McKittrick	 A,	 (2013).	 “Investigating	 the	 impact	 of	 e-business	
applications	on	supply	chain	collaboration	in	the	German	automotive	industry.”	International	Journal	
of	Operations	and	Production	Management,	Vol.	33,	Iss.	1,	pp.	25-48.	
	
Wijk	R	van,	Bosch	F	van	den,	and	Volberda	H	W,	(2011).	“Absorptive	capacity:	Taking	stock	of	 its	
progress	and	prospects.”	 In:	Easterby-Smith	and	Lyles	(Eds).	Handbook	of	Organisational	Learning	
and	Knowledge	Management.	2nd	Edition.	Wiley.	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 195 - 
Winkelen	C	van,	and	McKenzie	J,	(2011).	Knowledge	works.	Wiley.	
	
Winter	S	G,	(2003).	“Understanding	dynamic	capabilities.”	Strategic	Management	Journal,	Vol.	24,	
No.	10,	pp.	991-995.	
	
World	 Economic	 Forum,	 (2016).	Digital	 Enterprise.	White	 paper	 on	 the	 digital	 transformation	 of	
industries.	 Available	 on-line	 and	 accessed	 on	 1st	 May	 2020:	 https://reports.weforum.org/digital-
transformation/digital-enterprise/	
	
World	 Economic	 Forum,	 (2017).	 Unlocking	 $100	 trillion	 for	 business	 and	 society	 from	 digital	
transformation.	Digital	Transformation	 Initiative.	Available	on-line	and	accessed	on	1st	May	2020:	
http://reports.weforum.org/digital-transformation/wp-content/blogs.dir/94/mp/files/pages/files/dti-executive-summary-20180510.pdf	
	
Wry	 T	 E	 (2009).	 “Does	business	 and	 society	 scholarship	matter	 to	 society?	Pursuing	 a	normative	
agenda	w/	critical	realism	&	institutional	theory.”	Journal	of	Business	Ethics,	Vol.89	No.2	pp.151-171.	
	
Yawar	 S	 A,	 and	 Kauppi	 K,	 (2018).	 “Understanding	 the	 adoption	 of	 socially	 responsible	 supplier	
development	practices	using	institutional	theory:	Dairy	supply	chains	in	India.”	Journal	of	Purchasing	
and	Supply	Management,	Vol.	24,	pp.	164-176.	
	
Zahra	 S	 A,	 and	 George	 G,	 (2002).	 “Absorptive	 capacity:	 A	 review,	 reconceptualization,	 and	
extension.”	Academy	of	Management	Review,	Vol.	27,	No.2,	pp.	185-203.	
	
Zahra	 S	A,	 Sapienza	H	 J,	 and	Davidsson	P,	 (2006).	 “Entrepreneurship	 and	dynamic	 capabilities:	A	
review,	model	and	research	agenda.”	Journal	of	Management	Studies,	Vol.	43,	No.	4,	pp.	917-955.	
	
Zuber-Skerritt	O,	and	Perry	C,	 (2002).	 “Action	 research	within	organisations	and	university	 thesis	
writing.”	The	Learning	Organisation,	Vol.	9,	No.	4,	pp.	171-179.	
	
Zukauskaite	 E,	 Trippl	 M,	 and	 Plechero	 M,	 (2017).	 “Institutional	 thickness	 revisited.”	 Economic	
Geography,	Vol.	93,	No.	4,	pp.	325-345.	
	
	 	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 196 - 
This	page	is	intentionally	blank	 	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 197 - 
Appendix A 
 
Profiles of the 24 suppliers 
in the main study group 
	 	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 198 - 
Introduction and overview of the contents of Appendix A 
To	protect	their	confidentiality,	the	twenty-four	suppliers	listed	in	Appendix	A	have	been	renamed	
using	the	phonetic	alphabet.	To	avoid	confusion,	the	term	Indigo	is	used	(instead	of	India)	and	two	
terms	(Mike	and	November)	are	omitted.	In	cirumstances	when	the	supplier	has	a	scorecard	with	
Rolls-Royce,	the	trend	in	their	results	over	nearly	four	years	(from	2016Q2	to	2019Q4)	is	shown	using	
Microsoft	EXCEL	software.	Plotted	darkest	are	the	results	for	the	supplier	and	lightest	are	the	average	
results	for	the	entire	population	of	suppliers	with	a	scorecard	at	that	particular	point	in	time.	The	
latter,	therefore,	includes	the	results	for	more	suppliers	than	just	the	twenty-four	in	my	main	study	
group.		
	
A	short	narrative	is	provided	on	each	supplier	to	explain	how	their	scorecard	is	used	to	assess	their	
relative	absorptive	capacity.	The	assessment	is	in	accordance	with	Figure	3.6.	It	uses	the	status	at	
2019Q4,	 and	 adds	 a	 supplementary	 symbol	 when	 the	 following	 apply:	 “+”	 if	 the	 trend	 in	 their	
technology	score	has	been	generally	increasing	since	the	supplier	joined	the	SD/DT	programme;	“–“	
if	the	trend	in	their	technology	score	has	been	generally	reducing	since	the	supplier	joined	the	SD/DT	
programme;	and	“#”	if	they	had	no	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	in	2019Q4	and	therefore	their	
result	was	based	upon	historical	evidence	and/or	an	interview	with	their	buyer	at	Rolls-Royce.	
	
Also,	 for	 those	with	a	supplier	scorecard	 (technology)	 in	2019Q4,	 then	a	statement	 is	 included	 in	
Appendix	A	in	support	of	the	outcome	which	was	measured	at	Waypoint	A/B.	As	shown	in	Figure	4.7,	
data	is	gathered	for	Questions	4	and	5	from	the	scorecard	(technology).	Question	4:	Were	the	digital	
minimum	 standards	 either	 achieved	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2019	 or	 a	 gap	 closure	 plan	 agreed	 for	 2020?	
Question	5:	Are	key	actions	relating	to	the	digital	minimum	standards	captured	in	the	Technology	
Engagement	Plan	in	2019Q4?	
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Alpha 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Alpha	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC2.	They	are	relatively	recent	
members	of	the	SD/DT	programme	and,	over	this	period,	it	is	too	early	to	say	whether	there	has	been	
any	significance	to	the	small	changes	in	their	technology	score.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Alpha	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	Although	
they	did	not	achieve	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019,	their	gap	closure	plan	for	2020	
is	reasonable.	In	addition,	the	actions	recorded	in	their	Technology	Engagement	Plan	(2019Q4)	are	
satisfactory.		
	 	
								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
Bravo 
The	 relative	absorptive	 capacity	of	Bravo	at	2019Q4	 is	 categorised	as	AC1.	Although	consistently	
performing	strongly,	their	technology	score	has	remained	flat	since	joining	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Bravo	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	One	of	their	
facilities	achieved	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019,	and	the	gap	closure	plan	for	the	
other	 for	 2020	 is	 reasonable.	 The	 actions	 in	 their	 Technology	 Engagement	 Plan	 (2019Q4)	 are	
satisfactory.		
	 	 	
							Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
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Charlie 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Charlie	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC3–.	They	are	a	long	term	
member	of	the	SD/DT	programme;	but,	have	a	downward	trend	in	their	technology	score.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Charlie	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	unsuccessful.	Their	
digital	minimum	standard	assessment	is	overdue	and	they	are	the	only	supplier	in	my	study	group	
(plus	the	whole	population	of	suppliers	with	a	technology	scorecard)	where	this	is	the	case.	However,	
on	a	more	positive	note,	the	actions	in	their	Technology	Engagement	Plan	(2019Q4)	are	satisfactory.		
		 	
								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
Delta 
The	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 of	Delta	 at	 2019Q4	 is	 categorised	 as	AC2.	 Although	 consistently	
performing	strongly,	their	technology	score	has	remained	flat	since	joining	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	
The	 outcome	 of	 the	 SD/DT	 process	 for	 Delta	 at	Waypoint	 A/B	 is	 judged	 to	 be	 successful.	 They	
achieved	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019.	Allowing	for	some	mitigation	because	
they	 achieved	 the	 digital	 minimum	 standard,	 the	 actions	 in	 their	 Technology	 Engagement	 Plan	
(2019Q4)	are	borderline	satisfactory.		
		 	
							Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
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Echo 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Echo	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC1.	They	are	a	special	case,	
because	they	are	a	new	supplier	to	Rolls-Royce	despite	being	highly	competent	and	well	established	
in	the	aerospace	sector	and	beyond.	They	do	not	yet	have	a	supplier	scorecard	(operational)	and	
have	only	recently	started	using	a	supplier	scorecard	(technology).	Therefore,	the	assessment	of	their	
absorptive	capacity	is	based	upon	this	together	with	an	interview	with	their	buyer	at	Rolls-Royce.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Echo	at	Waypoint	A/B	was	judged	to	be	successful.	They	did	
not	achieve	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019,	but	there	is	a	gap	closure	plan	for	2020	
(albeit	sparse).	
	
Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	
 
Foxtrot 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Foxtrot	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC4.	Their	technology	score	
has	remained	below	average	despite	them	being	long	term	members	of	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Foxtrot	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	Although	
they	did	not	achieve	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019,	their	gap	closure	plan	for	2020	
is	reasonable.	In	addition,	the	actions	in	their	Technology	Engagement	Plan	(2019Q4)	are	satisfactory.		
	 	
								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
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Golf 
The	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 of	 Golf	 at	 2019Q4	 is	 categorised	 as	AC1.	 Although	 consistently	
performing	strongly,	their	technology	score	has	remained	flat	since	joining	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Golf	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	They	did	not	
achieve	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019;	but	exceeded	most	aspects	and,	where	
not,	 have	a	 gap	 closure	plan	 for	2020	 (albeit	 sparse).	 In	 addition	 the	actions	 in	 their	 Technology	
Engagement	Plan	(2019Q4)	were	satisfactory.		
	 	 	
							 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational) 
 
Hotel 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Hotel	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC1.	They	are	a	special	case,	
because	 they	are	new	to	 the	SD/DT	programme	and	are	a	 large	 supplier	with	multiple	 sites.	The	
scorecard	results	given	below	are	a	collated	average	across	sites	which	masks	this.	Therefore,	the	
assessment	of	their	absorptive	capacity	is	based	upon	an	interview	with	their	buyer	at	Rolls-Royce.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Hotel	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	None	of	
their	sites	achieve	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019,	but	some	have	gap	closure	plans	
for	2020.	The	actions	across	all	sites	in	their	Technology	Engagement	Plans	(2019Q4)	are	satisfactory.		
	 	
							Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
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Indigo 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Indigo	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC3–.	They	are	a	long	term	
member	of	the	SD/DT	programme;	but,	have	a	downward	trend	in	their	technology	score.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Indigo	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	Although	
they	 did	 not	 achieve	 the	 digital	 minimum	 standard	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2019,	 their	 feedback	 on	 it’s	
applicability	to	their	circumstance	is	highly	constructive	and	they	include	elements	of	a	gap	closure	
plan	for	2020.	The	actions	in	their	Technology	Engagement	Plan	(2019Q4)	are	satisfactory.		
	 	
							 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
Juliet 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	 Juliet	at	2019Q4	 is	categorised	as	AC3–.	They	are	a	 long	term	
member	of	the	SD/DT	programme;	but,	have	a	downward	trend	in	their	technology	score.	
	
The	 outcome	 of	 the	 SD/DT	 process	 for	 Juliet	 at	Waypoint	 A/B	 is	 judged	 to	 be	 successful.	 They	
achieved	 many	 aspects	 of	 the	 digital	 minimum	 standard	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2019	 and	 also	 have	 a	
continuous	improvement	plan	for	2020.	The	actions	in	their	Technology	Engagement	Plan	(2019Q4)	
are	satisfactory.		
	 	
								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
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Kilo 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Kilo	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC1.	They	are	a	long	term	member	
of	the	SD/DT	programme.	Their	technology	score	dipped,	but	has	been	on	a	sustained	improvement	
trend	over	recent	quarters.	They	have	now	returned	to	a	similar	position	to	when	they	started	and	
therefore,	overall,	I	have	not	attributed	a	positive	or	negative	trend	to	their	absorptive	capacity.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Kilo	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	Although	they	
did	not	achieve	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019,	their	gap	closure	plan	for	2020	is	
reasonable.	The	actions	in	their	Technology	Engagement	Plan	(2019Q4)	are	satisfactory.		
	 	
							 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)																				Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
Lima 
The	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 of	 Lima	 at	 2019Q4	 is	 categorised	 as	AC1.	 They	 are	 a	 long	 term	
member	of	the	SD/DT	programme	and	their	technology	score	has	remained	flat	and	at	the	average.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Lima	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	They	have	
multiple	sites	with	multiple	scorecards;	therefore,	the	results	below	are	their	collated	average.	One	
of	their	facilities	achieved	the	digital	minimum	standard	by	the	end	of	2019	and	also	has	a	continuous	
improvement	plan	for	2020.	In	general,	the	actions	in	their	TEP’s	(2019Q4)	are	satisfactory.		
	 	
							Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
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Oskar 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Oskar	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC2–.	Although	their	technology	
score	remains	above	average	it	has	been	on	a	downward	trend,	despite	them	being	a	comparatively	
long	term	member	of	the	SD/DT	programme..	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Oskar	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	unsuccessful.	This	is	
driven	by	 the	other	aspects	of	 the	assessment	criteria	 (see	Figure	4.7).	Despite	not	achieving	the	
digital	minimum	standards	by	the	end	of	2019,	their	gap	closure	plan	and	TEP	actions	are	satisfactory.		
	 	
							 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
Papa 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Papa	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC4.	They	are	a	medium	term	
member	of	the	SD/DT	programme.	The	decision	is	taken	to	remove	their	supplier	scorecard	(tech)	
for	2020	and,	therefore,	AC	is	judged	to	be	unsatisfactory.	This	was	agreed	with	RR	buyer.	To	maintain	
goodwill,	their	closing	(2019Q4)	techn	score	was	more	generous	than	it	may	have	otherwise	been.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Papa	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	unsuccessful.	This	is	
driven	by	other	aspects	of	the	assessment	criteria	(see	Figure	4.7).	Despite	not	achieving	the	digital	
minimum	standards	by	the	end	of	2019,	their	gap	closure	plan	and	TEP	actions	are	satisfactory.	
	 	
								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
Paul Hacker, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, May 2020 - 206 - 
Quebec 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Quebec	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC1#.	Their	supplier	scorecard	
(technology)	 only	 ran	 up	 to	 the	 end	 of	 2018;	 however,	 they	 continued	 to	 demonstrate	 positive	
behaviours	which	their	buyer	in	Rolls-Royce	used	to	justify	a	satisfactory	level	of	absoptive	capacity.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Quebec	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	Since	they	
do	not	have	a	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	for	2019Q4,	there	is	no	data	from	it	to	support	this	
particular	aspect	in	the	assessment	of	their	outcome	from	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	 	
									Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	up	to	2019	 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
Romeo 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Romeo	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC4#.	Their	supplier	scorecard	
(technology)	only	ran	up	to	the	end	of	2018;	however,	around	this	time,	the	strategic	nature	of	the	
relationship	 deterioriated	 and	 working	 together	 on	 technology	 stopped.	 Therefore,	 the	 relative	
absoptive	capacity	has	been	assessed	at	being	unsatisfactory	since.		
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Romeo	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	unsuccessful.	Since	
they	do	not	have	a	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	for	2019Q4,	there	is	no	data	from	it	to	support	
this	particular	aspect	in	the	assessment	of	their	outcome	from	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	 	
								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	up	to	2019	 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
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Sierra 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Sierra	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC1#.	They	are	a	newly	formed	
multi-national	who	are	new	to	the	SD/DT	programme.	One	of	their	sites	had	a	supplier	scorecard	
(technology)	up	to	the	end	of	2018	as	shown	below.	For	2020,	it	is	planned	that	the	multi-national	
will	have	one;	therefore,	the	relative	absorptive	capacity	has	been	assessed	as	being	satisfactory.		
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Sierra	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	Since	they	
do	not	have	a	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	for	2019Q4,	there	is	no	data	from	it	to	support	this	
particular	aspect	in	the	assessment	of	their	outcome	from	the	SD/DT	programme.	 	
	 	
									Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	up	to	2019	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
Tango 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Tango	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC4#.	Their	supplier	scorecard	
(technology)	only	ran	up	to	the	end	of	2018.	However,	their	relative	absoptive	capacity	is	based	upon	
it	being	stopped	and	their	historical	performance.	This	was	agreed	with	their	buyer	in	Rolls-Royce.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Romeo	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	unsuccessful.	Since	
they	do	not	have	a	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	for	2019Q4,	there	is	no	data	from	it	to	support	
this	particular	aspect	in	the	assessment	of	their	outcome	from	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	 	
								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	up	to	2019	 								Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
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Uniform 
The	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 of	 Uniform	 at	 2019Q4	 is	 categorised	 as	 AC1#.	 Their	 supplier	
scorecard	(tech)	only	ran	up	to	the	end	of	2018;	however,	they	continued	to	demonstrate	positive	
behaviours	which	their	buyer	in	Rolls-Royce	used	to	justify	a	satisfactory	level	of	absoptive	capacity.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Uniform	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	 judged	to	be	successful.	Since	
they	do	not	have	a	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	for	2019Q4,	there	is	no	data	from	it	to	support	
this	particular	aspect	in	the	assessment	of	their	outcome	from	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	 	
									Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	up	to	2019	 							Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
Victor 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Victor	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC1#.	Their	supplier	scorecard	
(technology)	 only	 ran	 up	 to	 the	 end	 of	 2018;	 however,	 they	 continued	 to	 demonstrate	 positive	
behaviours	which	their	buyer	in	Rolls-Royce	used	to	justify	a	satisfactory	level	of	absoptive	capacity.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Victor	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	Since	they	
do	not	have	a	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	for	2019Q4,	there	is	no	data	from	it	to	support	this	
particular	aspect	in	the	assessment	of	their	outcome	from	the	SD/DT	programme.	
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Whiskey 
The	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 of	 Whiskey	 at	 2019Q4	 is	 categorised	 as	 AC3#.	 Their	 supplier	
scorecard	(tech)	only	ran	up	to	the	end	of	2018.	However,	their	relative	absoptive	capacity	is	based	
upon	it	being	stopped	and	their	historical	performance.	This	was	agreed	with	the	Rolls-Royce	buyer.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Whiskey	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	unsuccessful.	Since	
they	do	not	have	a	supplier	scorecard	(technology)	for	2019Q4,	there	is	no	data	from	it	to	support	
this	particular	aspect	in	the	assessment	of	their	outcome	from	the	SD/DT	programme.	
	 	
								Supplier	Scorecard	(Technology)	up	to	2019													Supplier	Scorecard	(Operational)	
 
X-ray 
The	 relative	 absorptive	 capacity	 of	 X-ray	 at	 2019Q4	 is	 categorised	 as	AC1#.	 They	 do	 not	 have	 a	
supplier	 scorecard	 (technology)	 nor	 (operational);	 therefore,	 an	 assessment	 of	 their	 absoptive	
capacity	was	made	in	conjunction	with	their	buyer	at	Rolls-Royce.	Also,	using	the	criteria	in	Figure	
4.7,	the	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	X-ray	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.		
	
Yankee 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Yankee	at	2019Q4	 is	categorised	as	AC1#.	They	do	not	have	a	
supplier	 scorecard	 (technology)	 nor	 (operational);	 therefore,	 an	 assessment	 of	 their	 absoptive	
capacity	was	made	in	conjunction	with	their	buyer	at	Rolls-Royce.	Also,	using	the	criteria	in	Figure	
4.7,	the	outcome	of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Yankee	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.		 	
	 	
Zulu 
The	relative	absorptive	capacity	of	Zulu	at	2019Q4	is	categorised	as	AC1#.	They	do	not	have	a	supplier	
scorecard	(technology)	nor	(operational);	therefore,	an	assessment	of	their	absoptive	capacity	was	
made	in	conjunction	with	their	buyer	at	Rolls-Royce.	Also,	using	the	criteria	in	Figure	4.7,	the	outcome	
of	the	SD/DT	process	for	Zulu	at	Waypoint	A/B	is	judged	to	be	successful.	
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